

REPORT
of

The Select Committee on the Excision of the
Chagos Archipelago

I—Introduction

1. On 21st July 1982, the following motion standing in the name of the Honourable The Prime Minister was unanimously approved:—

“ This Assembly is of the opinion that, in accordance with Standing Order 96 of the Standing Orders and Rules of the Legislative Assembly, a Select Committee of the House consisting of not more than nine members to be nominated by Mr Speaker, be appointed to look into the circumstances which led to and followed the excision of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, from Mauritius in 1965 and the exact nature of the transactions that took place with documents in support and to report; the said Select Committee to have powers to send for persons, papers and records.” (1)
2. On 20th August 1982, Mr Speaker nominated the following Honourable Members to form part of the Select Committee (2):—

The Honourable Minister of Finance
The Honourable Minister of Commerce, Industry, Prices & Consumer Protection
The Honourable Minister of External Affairs, Tourism & Emigration
The Honourable Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Natural Resources
The Honourable Attorney-General and Minister for Women's Rights & Family Affairs
The Honourable Minister for Rodrigues & the Outer Islands
The Honourable A. Gayan
Dr the Honourable S. Peerthum
The Honourable Mrs F. Roussety

3. At its first meeting, the Select Committee unanimously elected the Honourable Jean-Claude de l'Estrac, then Minister of External Affairs, Tourism and Emigration, to the Chair.

4. The Committee met on 11 occasions and in the course of its proceedings heard witnesses whose names are listed in Appendix ‘A’ of this Report.

(1) Mauritius Legislative Assembly—Debates No. 8 of 21st July 1982—Col. 1026-1056.

(2) Mauritius Legislative Assembly— Debates No. 17 of 20th August 1982—Col. 2397—2398.

Mauritius Legislative Assembly
Mr. Carl Achille
R.M.O. 1983
June 1983



II — The Chagos Archipelago

5. The Chagos Archipelago — until 8th November 1965, a dependency of Mauritius — comprises the islands of Diego Garcia, Egnont or six Islands, Peros Banhos, Salomon Islands, Trois Frères, including Danger Island and Eagle Island. It lies some 1200 miles north-east of Mauritius and covers an area from 7°39' to 4°41' S and from 70°50' to 72°41' E. The largest island of the group is Diego Garcia which is about 11 square miles.

6. The early history of the archipelago is closely associated with that of the Seychelles which were both explored by the Portuguese as far back as the first half of the sixteenth century. Since then, both archipelagoes have known the fate common to the other islands of the region which changed hands, most particularly, according to the hazards of the long standing rivalry between the British and the French in the Indian Ocean. It is to be noted—as a premonition to the present status of Diego Garcia—that on 18th March 1786 an attempt was made from Bombay, by the East India Company to convert the island into a military base.(1) The venture proved unsuccessful. But when, during World War II, Diego Garcia happened to be a valuable ‘naval port of call’(2), the assessment proved to be a worthy one which dates back as far as 1769 when the French Naval Lieutenant La Fontaine made ‘a thorough survey of the bay, the first sign of French appreciation of the possible strategic value of that island.’(3)

Indeed, the strategical situation of the main island of the Chagos Archipelago—about 3,400 miles from the Cape of Good Hope, 2,600 miles from the North West Cape, Australia, 2,200 miles from Berbera, Somalia and 1,900 miles from Masirah Island, Oman (4)—was bound to make of Diego Garcia a point of capital importance in modern geo-politics. This position, in the nearest vicinity of the Maldives and of India, became more evident after World War II when England gradually withdrew from the region, in the wake of its new policy of granting political independence to its colonies.

7. Hence, the Chagos Archipelago was bound to play a pre-eminent role in what tended to constitute, through Britain’s withdrawal, ‘one of the largest and most complex power vacuums of the post-war periods.’(5) Later, the Gulf crisis was soon to make of the region a most strategic field of action for the powers which are bent upon controlling the energy routes to Europe and Asia.

(1) Auguste Toussaint — *L'Océan Indien aux XVIIIe siècle* — Flammarion, p. 65.

(2) Joël Larus — *Diego Garcia: Political clouds over a vital U.S. base*. Strategic Review, Winter 1982—United States Strategic Institute, p. 46.

(3) Robert Scott — *Limuria, The Lesser Dependencies of Mauritius* — Oxford University Press, p. 244.

(4) Robert Scott — Op. cit. p. 68.

(5) Joël Larus — Op. cit.

8. It might be useful to record here that it was not long after the British colonisation of Mauritius that the islands which constituted the dependencies thereof became an object of considerable interest to the new administering government. On 21st March, 1826, the House of Commons voted a resolution asking that an address be presented to His Majesty requesting that he ‘be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House a return of the number of all the islands, which come under the denomination of dependencies of Mauritius, showing their geographical position in reference to that island, the extent of their territory, and any census which may have been taken of their population together with their civil and military establishments and the description of naval force which may have been stationed there at any time since the conquest of the colony.’(1) Complying with the request, Sir Lowry Cole, the then Governor of Mauritius, submitted, on 19th September of the same year, to Lord Bathurst what one of his successors described as ‘the first catalogue of the dependencies of Mauritius ever to have been compiled’ and which even included two islands ‘which are now known to have existed only in the imagination of cartographers.’(2)

9. However, since the coming into force of the instructions contained in the Letters Patent of 31 August 1903 which made of the Seychelles a colony administratively independent from Mauritius, thought was constantly given by the British Government to the necessity of sharing between the two colonies the islands around. Such an exercise was concluded in 1921 and the Chagos Archipelago remained one of the lesser dependencies of Mauritius.

III — The British Indian Ocean Territory

10. The long association of the Chagos Archipelago with Mauritius came to an end on 8th November 1965 with the coming into force of the British Indian Ocean Territory Order (Appendix ‘B’). The new “colony” originally included not only the Chagos Archipelago, but the Farquhar Islands, the Aldabra Group and the islands of Desroches which formed part of the then British Colony of the Seychelles. Mention of these dependencies of the Seychelles is of strong political relevance. The two main political parties of the Seychelles which met the British Authorities during the first constitutional talks on the independence of that country (14—27 March 1975) made it a point to claim the islands back, but to no avail. However, as a result of the second talks with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and which culminated into the independence of the then colony (28th June 1976) the Farquhar Islands, the Aldabra Group and the islands of Desroches were finally returned to the Seychelles. Hence, with the coming into force on 28th June 1976, of the British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1976, the ‘territory’ now comprises only the Chagos Archipelago, one of the former lesser dependencies of Mauritius.

(1) Mauritius Archives—SA 9.

(2) Robert Scott op. cit. p. 3.

11. The excision from Mauritius of the Chagos Archipelago was effected in accordance with the provisions of the Colonial Boundaries Act, 1895, but in complete violation of Resolution 6 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples voted by the 948th General Meeting of the United Nations Organizations, on 14th December 1960 (Appendix 'C'). Later,
- the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2066 voted on 16th December 1965 (Appendix 'D'), in line with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Appendix 'C'); and
 - the Resolution on Diego Garcia voted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its 17th Ordinary Session in Sierra Leone from 1st to 4th July 1980. (Appendix 'E')
- will be flouted in the same manner.

12. It would be wrong, however, to pretend that the excision of the Chagos Archipelago was a unilateral exercise on the part of Great Britain. In a statement in the House of Commons, no less a person than the Prime Minister of Great Britain declared that "the Government of Mauritius have been kept fully informed of, and have raised no objection to, the proposed use of Diego Garcia as a naval communication facility". (1) Details of such connivance, together with the Select Committee's opinion on the legal and moral validity of the transaction are shown later in the report. (Para. 52). The Committee, however, hastens to record that the attitude of the political delegation which attended the Mauritius Constitutional Talks 1965 when the question was first mooted is in sharp contrast with the firm and patriotic stand of the Seychelles political leaders who succeeded during the Constitutional Talks which preceded the independence of the Seychelles to recover the territorial integrity of their country.

13. The first public announcement in regard to the excision was made in the House of Commons on 10th November 1965 by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Anthony Greenwood. (2). The news, embargoed for release in Mauritius at 20:00 hrs on that day, reproduced *in extenso* the Secretary of State's statement and contains the vague indication that the islands would be used for "defence facilities by the British and United States Governments." Mention is also made therein of the compensation to be paid to the company which exploited the plantations on the islands, the cost of "resettling elsewhere those inhabitants who can no longer remain there" and an additional grant of £3m. for development projects in Mauritius (Appendix 'F'). Later, the freeholds were acquired at agreed prices totalling £1,013,200.

(1) House of Commons debates—Vol. 811, Col. 138.
 (2) House of Commons debates—Vol. 720, Col. 1-2.

14. The decision of the British Government became immediately a matter of big concern to most of the countries of the world and particularly to those located in the Indian Ocean and which saw in the process the beginning of a long term militarization of the region, with inevitable risks of involvement in nuclear warfare.
15. On the excision issue, as early as 16th December 1965, the United Nations, as its 1398th Plenary Assembly voted a Resolution inviting, *inter alia*, "the administering power to take no action which would dismember the territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity." (Appendix D).

16. The Resolution did not, in the least, deter the British Government in its plans. On 30th December 1966, an Exchange of Notes was signed in London between the United Kingdom and the United States Governments on the Availability of certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defence Purposes (Common Paper No. 3231) and which confirmed the deal to use the islands in a joint military venture by the two countries. Indeed, the United States Government agreed at the very start "to contribute up to £ 5m towards the costs of setting up the British Indian Ocean Territory, by waiving to that extent research and development surcharges for the United Kingdom purchase of the Polaris missile system." (1) The islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory were made available for the defence purposes of both governments for an initial period of 50 years. (2)

17. The nature of these defence arrangements was first released to local public information in a press communiqué issued on 3rd December 1965 by the Government of Mauritius and which indicated "that at the time the matter was discussed with the Mauritius Government, the British and the American Governments were considering the establishment of a communications centre, supporting facilities and a naval refuelling depot" on the islands. (3) The disturbing element in the communiqué and which was for the first time brought to the public knowledge refers to prior consultation with the Government of Mauritius on the issue. This feature will be analysed later in the report. (Paras 39-44). In addition, it should be noted that the relatively more detailed press release of the Mauritius Government bears contrast with the euphemistic approach of the United Kingdom Government which persisted as late as 1970, on the eve of an upgrading of such facilities, to pretend that these innocently consisted of "a limited United States naval communications centre, partly operated by the United Kingdom and which wou'd provide communications support to United States and United Kingdom ships and aircraft in the Indian Ocean." (4)

(1) House of Commons debates—Vol. 899, Col. 271-272.

(2) House of Commons debates—Vol. 870, Col. 1274.

(3) Mauritius Legislative Assembly debates No. 27 of 14th December, 1965, Col. 1850-1851.

(4) House of Commons debates—Vol. 808, Col. 328.

These arrangements, within the terms of the 1966 Exchange of Notes, were approved, in principle, by the United Kingdom Government in 1968. A further Exchange of Notes was signed on 24th October, 1972, and the facility began operating in 1973 (1) when the United Kingdom Government agreed to "a limited expansion of the radio station" (2) in addition to the original defence facilities which were said then to "consist of a United States navy radio station, an 8,000 ft runway which is not capable of taking the larger transport and tanker aircraft fully laden; a natural anchorage restricted in draught and turning room; accommodation for some 450 personnel; and limited aircraft parking space and oil storage facilities." (2)

18. However, on 5th February, 1974, a statement made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Julian Amery, revealed that Her Majesty's Government had agreed in principle to a proposal of the United States Government made in January 1974 and in accordance with the 1966 Anglo-American Agreement (Command Paper No. 3221) to the expansion of the facilities at Diego Garcia and which would involve "improvements to the anchorage and to the airfield as well as to the shore facilities". The last part of the statement is however, indicative of military concern of a larger dimension: —

"Her Majesty's Government have long felt that it is desirable in the general Western interest to balance increased Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean area. Accordingly, they welcome the expansion of the United States facilities which will also be available for British use. Against this background, the United States and the British Governments have agreed to consult periodically on joint objectives, policies and activities in the area. As regards the use of the expanded facilities in normal circumstances, the United States and British representatives in Diego Garcia will inform each other of intended movements of ships and aircraft. In other circumstances the use of the facilities would be a matter for the joint decision of the two Governments." (3)

Later, on 20th March, 1974, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Miss Joan Lester, again stressed that one of the reasons for the United Kingdom's acceptance of the United States proposal was the fact that the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean had increased steadily in quantity and quality over the last five years and is larger than that of the Western countries. (4)

(1) House of Commons debates—Vol. 870; Col. 1274.

(2) House of Commons debates—Vol. 897; Col. 204.

(3) House of Commons debates—Vol. 868; Col. 276-277.

(4) House of Commons debates—Vol. 870; Col. 1275.

19. An assessment of the actual military arrangements on the islands is obviously difficult and whatever may be their size and nature is immaterial to this report. On two occasions at least,—11th March and 22nd July, 1975,—the then British Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Roy Mason, declared to the House of Commons that it was not the policy of the British Government "to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons in ships, aircraft or any particular location"—a statement pregnant with alarming military connotations.

Ten days after the announcement in regard to the constitution of the British Indian Ocean Territory, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Anthony Greenwood, declared to the House of Commons: "There is certainly no question of any derogation from Britain's sovereignty of these territories." (1) And, later, the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Hattersley, re-echoed: "The island of Diego Garcia is British Sovereign Territory." (2) At this stage, the Committee cannot dismiss the fact that such sovereignty was claimed in the teeth of strong opposition from the United Nations Organisation, the Organisation of African Unity and most of the independent States in the Indian Ocean, including India, whose Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, on 7th February, 1974, highlighted the danger that the militarization of the Chagos Archipelago constituted for the security of her country.

IV — The Mauritius Constitutional Conference, 1965

20. On 7th September, 1965, a Mauritius delegation comprising representatives of the Mauritius Labour Party, the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate, the Independent Forward Bloc, the Muslim Committee of Action and two independent Members of the Legislative Assembly (Appendix G) met at Lancaster House, under the chairmanship of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Anthony Greenwood, "to reach agreement on the ultimate status of Mauritius, the time of accession to it, whether accession should be preceded by consultation with the people and, if so, in what form." (3) The Conference met until 24th September, 1965.

21. The claim for independence was supported at the Conference by the Mauritius Labour Party, the Independent Forward Bloc and the Muslim Committee of Action, although this party had put up certain conditions in regard to the electoral system. The Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate advocated, as a substitute for independence, close constitutional associations with Great Britain and submitted that, in any event, the people of Mauritius should be allowed to express their preference in a free referendum.

(1) House of Commons debates Vol. 720, Col. 1309.

(2) House of Commons debates Vol. 872, Col. 327.

(3) Report of the Mauritius Constitutional Conference—September 1965—Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1965, p. 1.

22. In the final communiqué issued on 24th September 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies ruled out the proposal submitted by the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate for association with Great Britain on the ground that "given the known strength of the support for independence, it was clear that strong pressure for this would be bound to continue and that in such a state of association neither uncertainty nor the acute political controversy about ultimate status would be dispelled." The plea for a referendum which, in the Secretary of State's opinion would prolong "the current uncertainty and political controversy in a way which would harden and deepen communal divisions and rivalries" was also discarded. The United Kingdom's Government ultimate decision on the issue was "to fix a date and take necessary steps to declare Mauritius independent after a period of six months full internal self-government if a resolution asking for this was passed by a simple majority of the new Assembly." (1)

23. The final communiqué also referred to the following defence arrangements between the British and the Mauritius Governments:—

23. At this final Plenary meeting of the Conference the Secretary of State also indicated that the British Government had given careful consideration to the views expressed as to the desirability of a defence agreement being entered into between the British and Mauritius Governments covering not only defence against external threats but also assistance by the British Government in certain circumstances in the event of threats to the internal security of Mauritius. The Secretary of State announced that the British Government was willing in principle to negotiate with the Mauritius Government before independence the terms of a defence agreement which would be signed and come into effect immediately after independence. The British Government envisaged that such an agreement might provide that, in the event of an external threat to either country, the two governments would consult together to decide what action was necessary for mutual defence. There would also be joint consultation on any request from the Mauritius Government in the event of a threat to the internal security of Mauritius. Such an agreement would contain provisions under which on the one hand the British Government would undertake to assist in the provision of training for, and the secondment of trained personnel to, the Mauritius police and security forces; and on the other hand the Mauritius Government would agree to the continued enjoyment by Britain of existing rights and facilities in H.M.S. Mauritius and at Plaisance Airfield. (2)

That section of the communiqué which touches upon military arrangements makes no mention of any agreement in regard to the excision of any part of the Mauritian territory in the context of either mutual defence or what was ultimately termed "in the general western interest to balance increased Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean." (1)

However, in the light of evidence produced by representatives of the political parties which took part in the Mauritius Constitutional Conference 1965, and which is reviewed at paragraph 25 hereunder, the Committee is convinced, without any possible doubt, that, at a certain time while the Constitutional talks were on, the question was mooted. And, further, the Committee is satisfied that the genesis of the whole transaction is intimately connected with the constitutional issue then under consideration.

24. The Committee regrets that, apart from Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam who led the Mauritius Labour Party delegation, the leaders of the other participating political parties are no more. Nevertheless, the Committee has been fortunate enough to hear members from each of the parties present at Lancaster House, in September 1965.

25. Their reports to the Select Committee can be summarized as hereunder:

A *The Mauritius Labour Party*

The Mauritius Labour Party, led by the then Premier and Minister of Finance, Dr the Honourable Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, now Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, was, numerically speaking, the most important political party which attended the Constitutional Conference. Sir Seewoosagur was heard by the Select Committee on 6th December 1982. He declared that the eventual excision of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius never appeared on the agenda of the Constitutional talks nor was it ever brought for discussion in Mauritius prior to the Conference. It was only, while the talks were on, that he had two private meetings with the British Authorities; one, at 10, Downing Street where the British Government's decision to grant independence to Mauritius was communicated to him by the then Prime Minister, and the second, on 23rd September 1965, in one of the committee rooms of Lancaster House where he was, for the first time, informed by the Secretary of State, Mr Anthony Greenwood, of the United Kingdom's intention of detaching the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius.

(1) Report of the Mauritius Constitutional Conference—September 1965—Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1965, p. 4.
(2) Op. cit., p. 5.

(1) House of Commons debates Vol. 868, Col. 277.

Sir Seewoosagur declared that he accepted the excision, in principle, as (i) he felt he had no legal instrument to prohibit the United Kingdom Government from exercising the powers conferred upon it by the Colonial Boundaries Act 1895, which powers could not be resisted even by India when the partition of this country took place before its independence (ii) he could not then assess the strategic importance of the archipelago which consisted of islands very remote from Mauritius and virtually unknown to most Mauritians and (iii) it was concretely expressed to him that the islands would be used as a communications centre and not as a military base.

Sir Seewoosagur strongly emphasised that, at no time, during that meeting and during meetings he had subsequently with the Secretary of State — after the Constitutional talks — to discuss details of the excision, was he made aware that the United States of America were in the deal and that the islands would be required for a joint U.K./U.S.A. defence venture. So much so that the statement made in the Legislative Assembly, on 14th December 1965, by the then Acting Premier, Mr Guy Forget, (Appendix 'F') came as a surprise to him. He even declared to the Select Committee that the circumstances which led to the introduction in that statement of certain elements then unknown to him were still shrouded in 'mystery'. He did not deny, however, that while the Conference was on, a Mauritian delegation led by late Mr Guy Forget met the Minister in Charge of Economic Affairs in the American Embassy in London.

Sir Seewoosagur maintained that the choice he made between the independence of Mauritius and the excision of the archipelago was a most judicious one. He thought, however, that had all the political parties present at Lancaster House been united in the claim for independence, better conditions might have been obtained. But, the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (P.M.S.D.) walked out of the Conference, as soon as it became evident that independence could not be avoided.

Sir Seewoosagur recalled that at one of the meetings on the excision issue, with the Secretary of State, he stressed that the sovereignty of Mauritius over the islands should be maintained and all rights connected with fishing and mineral prospecting should be preserved. He also claimed the possibility for planes to use the strip on Diego Garcia for any emergency landing on their route to and from Mauritius. No records of these proceedings were communicated to him, but he had the impression

that, apart from the claim for sovereignty, all the other points were agreeable to the British Government including a proposal that, in the event of excision, the islands would be returned to Mauritius when not needed by the United Kingdom Government. He recognised, however, that apart from certain statements made by himself and members of his Government in international meetings, no official request had been made for the retrocession of the islands to Mauritius.

Touching upon the question of the displacement of the Ilois community, Sir Seewoosagur said that it was never raised with him at any time in London and whatever correspondence he exchanged later in Mauritius with the British High Commission on the subject, had to take into account the unexpected nature of the statement made in the House by late Mr Guy Forget. (Appendix 'F')

Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo confirmed that, at no time, was the question of the excision of the Chagos Archipelago brought on the table of the Mauritius Constitutional Conference of September 1965. He might have been informed of such proposals after the private meeting Sir Seewoosagur Rangoolam had with the Secretary of State, Mr Anthony Greenwood, on 23rd September, 1965. He did not object to the principle of the excision as he felt that, being given the defence agreement entered into with Great Britain (paragraph 23)—a decision which had the unanimous support of all political parties present at Lancaster House, most particularly in view of the social situation which had deteriorated in Mauritius—the United Kingdom Government should be given the means to honour such agreement. It was in this context that he viewed the excision of the islands which were to be used as a communications station.

Sir Veerasamy stated that, about one week after the Constitutional talks, Sir Seewoosagur Rangoolam and himself had discussions with officials of the Foreign Office on the excision issue, where both of them stressed that (i) when no longer needed, the islands should be returned to Mauritius (ii) all rights connected with fishing and mineral prospection would be maintained for Mauritius (iii) the possibility for planes to use the strip on Diego Garcia, in any emergency, on their route to and from Mauritius should be recognized and (iv) 'all the requirements for the installation of the station and for the food and everything would, as far as possible, be taken from Mauritius.' Unfortunately, no minutes of this meeting were circulated.

Sir Veerasamy supported Sir Seewoosagur's contention that nothing was heard in Mauritius about the excision until Mr Guy Forget made a statement in the Legislative Assembly on 14th December, 1965. He also maintained that the substance of this statement was absolutely alien to the nature of the talks he had, in company of Sir Seewoosagur, with the officials of the Foreign Office, in London.

Sir Harold Walter also stated that, at no time in Mauritius, prior to the Constitutional talks, was the question of the excision brought up for discussion. He happened to learn of this issue when he saw the definition of the State of Mauritius in a draft Constitution prepared for the country by the Colonial Office. He then questioned Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam on the matter and the latter revealed to him that he had to make some concessions on that score, as he felt that at one time during the Conference, the British Authorities tended to agree to the claim of the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (P.M.S.D.) for a referendum.

Sir Harold did not resist the stand taken by the Leader of the Mauritius Labour Party as he knew the amount of pressure that was made to bear on the United Kingdom Government against the grant of independence to Mauritius. Moreover, public opinion in the country was largely divided on the nature of constitutional progress to be achieved. Indeed, he had got Sir Seewoosagur's assurance that the abandonment of the Chagos Archipelago had been agreed on certain conditions, namely, that (i) fishing and mineral prospection rights would be preserved for Mauritius (ii) the islands would be returned when no more needed and (iii) Mauritians would be employed to work there. He further stressed that no Mauritian delegate present at Lancaster House had expressed any dissent on the principle of the excision.

Sir Harold declared having been made aware of the United States' interest in the archipelago "years after" the Constitutional Conference. Everything that could have been published on that issue before or immediately after the talks might have escaped his attention as he was mainly interested in the accession of Mauritius to national sovereignty.

Sir Harold stated that the question of the Ilois was raised in London and they were considered as Mauritians who had migrated to work on the islands. However, the amount of compensation to be paid by the United Kingdom was not discussed at his level and he came to know about it much later.

Sir Satcham Boolell informed the Committee that the question of the excision of the Chagos Archipelago was raised by the British Officials in private with Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, in London. He was not much concerned about it as he only had in mind the independence of Mauritius. He can vaguely recollect that the United Kingdom Government wanted Diego Garcia to be used as a signal station and that the whole archipelago would be returned to Mauritius when no more needed. He was further given to understand that all mineral resources around the islands would remain the property of the Government of Mauritius. At no time was he made aware of the United States involvement in the deal.

Sir Satcham further added that, in spite of the fact that he was then the Minister responsible for agriculture, he had no idea of any bid for the sale of Mauritian sugar on the American market as that transaction was in the hands of the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate.

Sir Satcham affirmed that he did not attend any meetings where the excision of the Chagos Archipelago was discussed and on this question he had put all his trust in the wisdom and experience of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam.

B. *The Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (P.M.S.D.)*

The first political commotion which took place in Mauritius, as a result of the excision of the Chagos Archipelago was the resignation, on 11th November, 1965, of the three P.M.S.D. Ministers (Messrs Koenig, Duval and Devienne) from the coalition Government. The next day, they convened a press conference in Port Louis and explained that the reason for their resignation was Government stand in regard to the excision of the Chagos Archipelago. The party's leader, Mr Koenig, stressed that the P.M.S.D. was not against the use of the archipelago for a joint United Kingdom/United States defence venture. But his party felt that Government should have retained the sovereignty of Mauritius over the islands and negotiated their occupation, on the best possible terms, direct with the occupying powers. The P.M.S.D. had in mind the possibility of securing a substantial sugar quota on the United States market and defining a policy of emigration to the United States for unemployed Mauritians.

This stand was supported by Sir Gaëtan Duval, Q.C., one of Mr Koenig's co-delegate, when he appeared before the Select Committee on 12th November, 1982. He underlined that a periodical review of such arrangements direct with the occupying powers would have been most beneficial to Mauritius. Sir Gaëtan further assured the Committee that the Council of Ministers was, from the very start, aware that the Chagos Archipelago would be used for defence purposes jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States. He indicated that this state of affairs is contained in official documents. The possibility of recruiting Mauritian workers for the construction of military installations at Diego Garcia and the purchase, as far as possible, of materials from Mauritius was even envisaged at that time.

Sir Gaëtan explained that, on 23rd September, 1965, while the Mauritius Constitutional Conference was discussing the proposition for a referendum put forward by his party, the chairman, Mr Anthony Greenwood, suspended the proceedings and invited the Mauritian delegates to meet him and offer their views on the future of the Chagos Archipelago. The P.M.S.D. refused to attend the meeting, feeling that such a question was outside the agenda of the Conference and that the party had no mandate to consider any possible excision of part of the Mauritian territory. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Sir Abdool Razack Mohamed and Mr Sookdeo Bissoondoyal, representing respectively the Mauritius Labour Party, the Muslim Committee of Action and the Independent Forward Bloc responded to the invitation but Sir Gaëtan was not in a position to say if the final decision was taken in their presence or as a result of private consultations between Mr Anthony Greenwood and Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. It was, revealed Sir Gaëtan, at the resumption of proceedings, after such a meeting extraneous to the Conference agenda, that the Secretary of State ruled out the suggestion for a referendum, leaving the clear impression that some sort of blackmailing had taken place.

Alluding to the question of the displaced Ilois, Sir Gaëtan argued that the excision having taken place in 1965, that is, three years before the independence of Mauritius, those persons cannot be considered as citizens of Mauritius but British nationals. He regretted that (i) the case of Mr Venecassen had been withdrawn from the British Law Courts, thus depriving the community at large from obtaining the verdict of the Court on this delicate issue and (ii) the attitude of the Mauritius Government, after independence, vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, might, in a large measure, have jeopardised the claim of Mauritius for recovering its sovereignty over the archipelago.

C *The Independent Forward Bloc (I.F.B.)*

Honourable Aneerood Jugnauth, Q.C., Prime Minister of Mauritius, who formed part of the Mauritius Delegation to the Constitutional talks 1965, under the banner of the I.F.B., was heard by the Selcet Committee. He stated that never, in the course of the talks, was the question of the excision of the Chagos Archipelago raised. Some time before the Conference ended, the Leader of the Mauritius Labour Party, Dr Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, came to the desk of the I.F.B. delegation and told the delegates that he had accepted a proposition from the United Kingdom to use Diego Garcia as a communications station. There was no indication that the islands would be used as a military base, nor was the question of an excision from the Mauritian territory mentioned. Mr Jugnauth said that, at the time, the I.F.B. "had not much to say about it", as the party thought that the installation of communications facilities on the islands was an innocuous venture.

Mr Jugnauth stressed that, at no time, did the Leader of the I.F.B. inform his co-delegates that he had taken part in any private talks on the issue with the British authorities, nor was the eventual excision of the islands ever discussed at party level. He added that the statement made by Mr Guy Forget in the Legislative Assembly on 14th December, 1965, (Appendix 'F') came as a surprise to him in the sense that it contained facts that were never brought to his knowledge or to that of his party before. He was not a minister when the excision was discussed in the then Council of Ministers and he was never informed subsequently of the decision then taken.

Mr Jugnauth recalled that the withdrawal of the P.M.S.D. from the Constitutional talks had nothing to do with the excision of the Chagos Archipelago which, he repeated, was never brought on the Conference agenda. The P.M.S.D. delegates left when they learnt of the United Kingdom's intention to grant independence to Mauritius.

The Committee wishes at this stage to reproduce a statement made in the Legislative Assembly, on 19th October, 1976 by late Mr. S. Bissoondoyal, then Leader of the I.F.B. on the excision of the archipelago and which supports substantially the evidence of Mr. Jugnauth: —

The London Conference in 1965 witnessed this question coming out whether Mauritius would agree to part with Diego Garcia. That was the question put to me as a Member of the Government, put to me in private. I had an answer for it and that question was also put to the Leader



of the Parti Mauricien. I am aware of the attitude of the Parti Mauricien at that time. Now let me make it clear to the House, the aftermath of all this matter was dealt with personally by the Prime Minister and no Government then existing. I was a Member of the Government, I knew what was taking place: (1)

D. Mr Maurice Paturau, D.F.C., C.B.E.—Independent Member

Mr Paturau appeared before the Select Committee on 13th December 1982. He formed part of the Mauritius delegation which attended the Constitutional talks of September 1965. He revealed that he participated in no less than two meetings with the British authorities on the question of the excision of the Chagos Archipelago, but all these meetings were extraneous to the open Constitutional Conference which was then in progress. It was in the course of the first of these meetings that Dr Ramgoolam himself and the other party leaders took cognizance of the amount of compensation proposed by the United Kingdom. When the possibility of securing a sugar quota on the American market was evoked by the Mauritian side, the British officials suggested that this question should be dealt with direct with the American Embassy in London. A meeting was accordingly arranged and Mr Guy Forget led the Mauritian delegation which comprised, *inter alia*, Messrs Abdool Razack Mohamed and Jules Koenig. The request of Mauritius was turned down by the American officials who stated that "as far as Chagos was concerned, they would not commit the American Senate or House of Representatives about anything like a sugar quota." They intimated that anything connected with the Chagos Archipelago issue was a matter for direct negotiation between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments, and not with Mauritius.

The second meeting took place after the P.M.S.D. had retired from the Conference and the Mauritius delegation was then represented by Dr Rangoolam, Messrs Abdool Razack Mohamed, Sookdeo Bissoondoyal and himself. A final compensation of £3m was then proposed by the United Kingdom Government. He expressed dissent as he thought the compensation inadequate, but the other delegates agreed.

Mr Paturau stressed that during all the negotiations that took place, he had in mind the lease of the Chagos Archipelago by Mauritius. An initial period of thirty years was even proposed during which term a sugar quota at more remunerative prices would be negotiated, coupled with the possibility of obtaining

rice and flour from America at subsidized rates. Such lease would have been, more or less, on the model of the North West Cape Agreement between Australia and the United States, signed in 1963. He did not agree that the idea of a communications station was devoid of any military connotation. The American sub-marines needed in fact a land base which would generate enough messages at low frequency, but of high power so that they could reach the sub-marine and give it the actual position it was in so that it could fire its missiles with as much precision.'

Referring to the attitude of the P.M.S.D. on the excision issue, Mr Paturau said that, at no time, either in London or in Mauritius, did that party express any opposition to the principle of the excision. The party was most concerned at Lancaster House with reservations in the electoral system and walked out of the Conference on that issue, whereas the resignation of the Ministers of that party from the then Council of Ministers was motivated by the inadequacy of the compensation offered by the United Kingdom Government. As regards the inhabitants of the islands, he explained that, to his mind, those who came from the Seychelles were considered as migrants, whereas the others were "established Mauritians" whose fate was never discussed at the meetings he attended.

V—The Lesser Dependencies in the Wake of a New Destiny

26. In November 1959, a Commission headed by Professor J. E. Meade was appointed to report to His Excellency the Governor of Mauritius, then Sir Colville Montgomery Devereil, K.C.M.G., C.V.O., on ways and means of improving the economic and social structure of Mauritius. Although the terms of reference of the Commission were wide enough, the Commissioners did not feel that a study of the economic potentialities of the dependencies of Mauritius, including Rodrigues, was justified. Indeed, the temptation of ignoring whatever contribution the lesser dependencies particularly, could make to the economy of Mauritius was so great that at paragraph 6:44 of their report, the Commissioners invited Government to reject an application for financial assistance made by the two private companies which were then engaged in copra production on the Chagos and Agalega islands. (1)

27. The outright ignorance of the lesser dependencies and of their possible contribution to the economy of Mauritius, by the Meade Commission, did not deter the private sector in its attempt to rehabilitate the islands by a more scientific approach to copra production. The sector felt that if the soap and oil industry were to be maintained in Mauritius, as a means of helping both to combat unemployment and to save foreign exchange,

(1) J. E. Meade & Others, *The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius*—Frank Cases & Co. Ltd. p. 138.

it was imperative that the raw materials produced on the islands should not be abandoned. Hence, in September/October 1961, an exploratory survey of the islands was undertaken by a team composed of Mr René Maingard de la Ville-es-Offrants, acting on behalf of Rogers & Co., Mr Paul Moulinié, an entrepreneur from the Seychelles and Dr Octave Wiehé.

28. Mr René Maingard de la Ville-es-Offrants, now Sir René Maingard de la Ville-es-Offrants, C.B.E., was heard by the Select Committee on 8th February 1983. He related to the Committee the attempts made by the private sector to rehabilitate copra production on the islands, with a view particularly to saving the soap and oil industry in Mauritius. These attempts may be summarized as follows. In August 1961, the two private companies which were operating on the islands offered to Rogers & Co. to buy 55% of their shares. Rogers & Co., before taking any decision on the offer, resolved to conduct a survey *in situ* of the islands and this exercise was undertaken by the team referred to at paragraph 27 above. After a full assessment of the economic situation of the operating companies and a thorough survey of the prospects of the industry, the party recommended that the islands be purchased by a private enterprise made up with the equal participation of Rogers & Co., the existing shareholders and Mr Paul Moulinié of the Seychelles. Mr Maingard de la Ville-es-Offrants tried to enlist, for the purpose, the financial support of the Government of Mauritius. Hence, through the agency of Dr Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, a meeting was arranged at Le Reduit between himself and the Governor of Mauritius (Sir Colville M. Deverell, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.), the Colonial Secretary (Mr Tom Vickers, C.M.G.), the Financial Secretary (Mr A. F. Bates, C.M.G.) and Mr A. L. Nairac, C.B.E., Q.C. who was then Minister of Industry, Commerce & External Communications.

The Governor then informed him that, taking into consideration the recommendations of the Meade Commission, the Colonial Office was opposed to any form of Government financial participation in the venture.

On 7th March 1962, the Colonial Steamships Co. Ltd. offered to put up a society, the Chagos Agalega Ltd., at par with Mr Paul Moulinié and shareholders from the Seychelles with a view to purchasing the islands. That company was registered in the Seychelles and the promoters suggested that the sovereignty of the islands should be transferred from Mauritius to the Seychelles. Although the then Governor of the Seychelles seemed agreeable to the project, the Colonial Office again stood in the way. Hence, the exploitation of the islands remained the sole concern of the Chagos Agalega Ltd., which had become the owners of the islands.

In 1964, Mr René Maingard de la Ville-es-Offrants had again the possibility of discussing, *inter alia*, the future of the islands with top British political personalities, such as Messrs Lennox-Boyd, Patrick Wall, Ian MacLeod and Sir Tufton Beamish. He got the firm impression out of the talks that the British Government had no intention of parting with the islands for which they had conceived projects of a nature other than industrial.

In April 1967, the assets of the Chagos Agalega Ltd. were compulsorily acquired by the United Kingdom Government and the administering company gave full powers to Mr Paul Moulinié to discuss the compensation issue and to take all measures connected with the displacement of the local population. Indeed, neither the Government of Mauritius nor any of the Mauritian shareholders took part in the negotiations. The amount paid by the United Kingdom Government was £660,000⁽¹⁾, but consideration of the company's assets brought the figure to Rs 7,500,000. The Chagos Agalega Ltd. was wound up on 19th December 1975 after the compulsory acquisition, on 1st October 1975, of Agalega by the Government of Mauritius. Its registration at the Registrar General's Office of the Seychelles was cancelled on 11th December 1980.

29. The Meade Commission was appointed 'to make recommendations concerning the action to be taken in order to render the country capable of maintaining and improving the standard of living of its people, having regard to current and foreseeable demographic trends' with particular reference to 'the economics of the staple agricultural industries of Mauritius'. In the chapter introductory to their report, the commissioners, however, explained that in their assessment they had chosen to ignore the dependencies of Mauritius, namely Rodrigues, the Chagos Archipelago, Agalega and St. Brandon. They did not even consider a visit to these dependencies necessary. The reason for this deliberate omission is thus outlined in chapter 1:2 of the report. 'Unfortunately, we had no opportunity of visiting the dependencies and have not therefore included them within the scope of our report. We do not think this greatly detracts from our report, however, since the dependencies amount for only 12% of the colony's area and 3% of its population, and play little or no part in the economic life of the island of Mauritius itself.' (1)

This statement might have proved surprising at the time it was published in as much as it looked contradictory to the terms of reference of the Commission which invited the Commissioners, *inter alia*, to look for a definition of 'the broad lines of development policy in the future.' It is indeed unbelievable that, in that particular context, the unquestionable potentialities of the dependencies, including Rodrigues, in the framing of a new social and economic structure for Mauritius could not have attracted the attention of the experts who formed part of the Meade Commission.

The Select Committee is thus tempted, at this stage, to share Sir Rene's feelings that the deliberate assignment of the dependencies of Mauritius to purposes in no way connected with the economic and social interests of Mauritius, formed part of a definite and long term strategy on the part of the United Kingdom Government.

(1) J. E. Meade and Others—op. cit.

PART II
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

VI — Preliminary Remark

30. At the very outset, the Committee wishes to report a most deplorable state of affairs. To an application for copies of correspondence exchanged between the Governor of Mauritius and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, pertaining to the years immediately preceding the independence of Mauritius, the Private Secretary and Comptroller, Le Reduit, replied that there were 'no record concerning the despatch of document from this office to other departments prior to 1970.' He further added: "I have also made searches in our Archives but have not been able to find any document where the information asked for could have been registered. I understand from Mr E. G. Goldsmith, former Private Secretary, that at the time of independence in 1968, a lot of documents were either destroyed or taken over by Mr Young, who was then Information Officer at the British High Commission."

The Committee deeply regrets that such valuable documents have not been allowed to form part of our archives. Their removal or destruction, in addition to being a national calamity, will be most harmful to the efforts of students in our local political history.

VII — The Anglo-American Survey

31. The first serious hint at the possibility of the United Kingdom Government using Mauritius and its dependencies, most particularly Diego Garcia, as a unit for its defence strategy in the Indian Ocean, came from Mr David Windsor, of the United Kingdom Institute of Strategic Studies, in the course of an interview given on the B.B.C. in the programme 'London Calling Mauritius', on 21st February, 1964. (1) This opinion was subsequently carried by the written press overseas which made no mystery of the United Kingdom's choice of 'keeping Aden at all costs, enlarging Britain's fleet of aircraft carriers, or finding some territory in the Indian Ocean, if there is one, with natural facilities and a small, politically isolated population.' (2)

32. However, no allusion to any consultation between the United Kingdom Government and the local authorities was reported until the 31st July, 1964, when a local daily reproduced the following information from its London correspondent:

"Il y a eu à Maurice, une importante réunion du Cabinet des Ministres, présidée par Sir John Rennie, probablement le 13 ou le 14 juillet. Au cours de cette réunion, Sir John a tenu les ministres présents au courant d'un communiqué dans lequel le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Colonies, M. Sandys, révèle l'intention de Londres de faire de Maurice, des Seychelles et d'Agalega une importante base navale militaire." (3)

33. The meeting of the Council of Ministers referred to in the press excerpt quoted at paragraph 32 above took place on the 14th July 1964. The Minutes of that meeting indicate that the then Governor of Mauritius, Sir John Shaw Rennie, K.C.M.G., O.B.E., made a statement on certain developments in the field of defence. The Select Committee regrets that the Governor's pronouncement cannot be reproduced as it, undoubtedly, forms part of the records which have either been destroyed or removed to the British High Commission as mentioned in paragraph 30 of this report. However, this situation does not deter the Select Committee in its opinion that Sir John's statement was of a nature which cannot but render absolutely misleading both to the House and to the nation, the interjection made in the Legislative Assembly, on 10th November, 1964, by Honourable Saticam Bootell to the effect that the Government of Mauritius was not aware of any military project conceived by the United Kingdom Government for either Mauritius or any of its dependencies. (1) Indeed, in reply to a parliamentary question in the House of Commons on 5th April 1965, Mrs Irene White, then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, revealed that consultation prior to the survey had in fact taken place both at the level of the Premier and of the Council of Ministers. She stated: "The Premier of Mauritius was consulted in July last about the joint survey of possible sites for certain limited facilities that was then about to begin. In November the Council of Ministers, who had been kept informed, were told that the results of the survey were still being examined and that the Premier would be consulted again before any announcement was made in London or in Washington." (2) However, the Select Committee will establish hereunder (para. 34) that not only the Council of Ministers but the whole Legislative Assembly sitting in 1964 were informed, in unequivocal terms, of the British-American technical survey of the islands. The information was even released to the press on 14th December, 1964.

34. On 10th November, 1964, in the Legislative Assembly, at adjournment time, Honourable B. Ramiallah intervened lengthily on certain speculation to the effect that a joint Anglo-American survey was in progress in Diego Garcia and requested a full and prompt explanation from Government (Appendix 'H'). The reply came on 14th December, 1964, in the form of a letter from the then Chief Secretary, Mr Tom Vickers, C.M.G., addressed to Honourable Ramiallah, copied to all Members of the Legislative Assembly and released to the press. (Appendix 'I'). Confirmation is contained therein of (i) the presence of a joint British-American survey team on certain islands, including the Chagos Archipelago, Agalega, but not including Mauritius' and (ii) prior notification of this exercise having been given to the Council of Ministers. Such notification was no doubt contained in Sir John Rennie's statement to the Council of Ministers on 14th July, 1964, (paragraph 33) and

(1) Mauritius Legislative Assembly Debates No. 23 of 10th November 64 Col. 1574.
(2) House of Commons Debates—Vol. 710, Col. 26.

(1) Advance—22nd February 1964.
(2) The Economist—4th July 1964
(3) Le Mauricien—31st July 1964.

brings to naught all future submissions to the effect that any United Kingdom's project for the islands was first communicated to both the Premier and his Ministers *en marge* of the Constitutional talks of September 1965 and that the United States participation therein was unheard of prior to that conference.

35. The news of the Anglo-American survey of the islands met with protests from nearly all quarters of the Mauritian press which urged the then Government to combat the project. The danger of thus pushing the Indian Ocean into the zone of nuclear warfare was vehemently denounced in the Upper House of Parliament, India, on 18th November 1965, by the then Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Sardar Swaran Singh, and a no less energetic condemnation of the project was echoed in Sri Lanka by the then Prime Minister, Mrs Bandaranaike. And, at this stage, the Select Committee wishes to underline that, in the face of the complete indifference of the then Government, even a group of Mauritians living in the United Kingdom took the initiative of publishing in the British press their strong opposition to the Anglo-American venture. (1) Unfortunately, none of these outbursts of indignation succeeded in provoking from the then Premier of Mauritius and his Ministers a single note of protest.

36. On 15th June 1965, nearly on the eve of the Constitutional talks, Dr J. M. Curé, pressed Government to say whether the United States of America had any military interests in our dependencies. He urged Government to convey to the British Authorities 'the inadvisability of entering into any agreement with the United States of America before a change in our Constitution as envisaged by the London Conference of September next' and to ascertain, in the first instance 'the presence of oil fields in our dependencies before alienating them'. (Appendix J) The reply again came from Mr Tom Vickers who referred the Legislative Assembly to the reply he made on 14th December 1964 to Honourable Ramllah. (Appendix I) Hence, when the parliamentary vacations came on 29th June, 1965, the Ministers who formed part of the Mauritius delegation to the Constitutional talks of September of that year, prepared their trip to Lancaster House in a spirit which, as far as the lesser dependencies were concerned, bordered, in the Select Committee's opinion, on outright collusion. Indeed, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam when he deponed before the Select Committee on 6th December, 1982, made no bones of submitting that his main concern at Lancaster House was the independence of Mauritius and that he was prepared to achieve that aim at any costs. He stated: 'A request was made to me. I had to see which was better—to cede out a portion of our territory of which very few people knew, and independence. I thought that independence was much more primordial and more important than the excision of the island which is very far from here, and which we had never visited, which we could never visit.' He added: "If I had to choose between independence and the ceding of Diego Garcia, I would have done again the same thing.'

(1) Le Mauricien—29th September, 1964.

VIII — Outside the Conference Table, 1965

37. The Select Committee accepts the unanimous statements made by the participants at the Constitutional Conference of September 1965, and who deponed before the Select Committee (paragraph 25), to the effect that at no time was the question of the excision of any part of the Mauritian territory brought for discussion at the open Conference. Such decision of the United Kingdom Government was privately communicated to the then Premier, Dr the Honourable Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. But the Select Committee is not prepared to put on the sole shoulders of the latter the blame for acceding unreservedly to the United Kingdom's request. Evidence is not lacking to show that, indeed, the Premier shared with, at least, the leaders of the political parties present at Lancaster House, and with some independent participants, including Mr Paturau, D.F.C., the United Kingdom's offer of excision of the islands and the interests of the United States of America in the deal. So much so that, at one time during the Conference, a Mauritian delegation comprising MM Guy Forget (Labour), Jules Koenig (PMSD), Abdool Razack Mohamed (CAM) and Maurice Paturau (Independent) met the Minister in charge of Economic Affairs in the American Embassy in London in an attempt to secure, against the proposal for excision, a remunerative market in America for Mauritian sugar. The only surviving member of that particular delegation, Mr Maurice Paturau, D.F.C., informed the Select Committee that the American authorities turned down the proposition and stressed that all matters incidental to the Chagos Archipelago issue were meant for discussion between the United States and the United Kingdom and not with Mauritius.

38. The most decisive event in the history of the excision of the Chagos Archipelago occurred on Thursday, 23rd September, 1965, on the eve of the closing session of the Constitutional talks. On that day, discussions were officially held between a group of United Kingdom officials, headed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Anthony Greenwood, and a number of Mauritian Ministers. Evidence produced before the Select Committee shows, without any possible doubt, that the following Ministers took part in the proceedings: The Premier (Dr Seewoosagur Ramgoolam), the Minister of Social Security (Mr Abdool Razack Mohamed), the Minister of Industry, Commerce and External Communications (Mr Maurice Paturau, D.F.C.), the Minister of Local Government (Mr Sookdeo Bissoondoyal). As regards Mr Koenig, the minutes do not refer to his presence (Appendix K). The Chief Secretary's memorandum (Appendix M) mentions his attendance at certain discussions, without specifically referring to the meeting held on 23rd September 1965. Sir Gaëtan Duval categorically affirmed that Mr Koenig did not attend that meeting and Mr Paturau stated that he had no recollection of Mr Koenig being present. Record of the proceedings (Appendix K) indicates (i) the eight conditions on which Dr the Honourable Seewoosagur Ramgoolam undertook to obtain the approval of the local Council of Ministers and (ii) the acceptance thereof, in principle, by MM Mohamed (CAM) and Bissoondoyal (IFB). As regards the other participant, Mr Paturau, he had expressed dissent about the amount (£ 3m) of final compensation offered, which he considered to be totally inadequate. (Paragraph 25).

IX—Before the Council of Ministers

39. The relevant parts of the minutes of the meeting held on 23rd September, 1965 (Appendix 'K') were transmitted to the Governor of Mauritius under cover of Colonial Office Despatch No. 423 dated 6th October 1965. (Appendix 'L'). The Select Committee notes that this document does not give any definite character to the proposals which Dr the Honourable S. Ramgoolam had undertaken to carry to the approval of his colleagues in the Council of Ministers. Hence, (i) defence and internal security would have to be negotiated, after independence (ii) projects to which the £3 m compensation would be devoted would be the subject of further discussions (iii) the British Government would use their good offices, without any firm guarantee of success, with the United States Government to secure concessions over sugar imports, supply of wheat and other commodities, to use labour and materials from Mauritius for construction works on the islands and (iv) to ensure that navigational and meteorological facilities, fishing rights and the possibility of using the air strip for emergency landing and refuelling of civil planes be made available to Mauritius. As regards the two other crucial points, namely, the return to Mauritius of the islands when no more needed and the exclusive right of Mauritius to 'the benefit of any mineral and oil discovered in or near the Chagos Archipelago', the United Kingdom Government simply took note, whilst stressing that the archipelago would remain under British Sovereignty.

40. The arrangements regarding defence and internal security appear, in more details, in the final communiqué issued at the end of the Conference, (para. 23) Hence, in the Memorandum (Appendix 'M') prepared by the Chief Secretary, Mr Tom Vickers, C.M.G., for the Council of Ministers and embodying the United Kingdom's reservations on the proposals agreed to in principle by the Premier, Mr Mohamed and Mr Bissandooyal (Appendix 'K'), a significant change had occurred. Point (i) relating to the defence agreement had been replaced by the following: (i) the Chagos Archipelago would be detached from Mauritius and placed under British Sovereignty by Order in Council. And the last paragraph of the Memorandum invited the Government of Mauritius to give confirmation of his willingness 'to agree that the British Government should now take the necessary legal steps to detach the Chagos Archipelago'. The Select Committee notes with concern that this unexpected proposition which had supposedly emerged from the discussions held on 23rd September 1965, but which is not contained in the original record of proceedings (Appendix 'K') did not strike the attention of any Mauritian Minister as being new and unwarranted.

41. The Council of Ministers met on 5th November 1965 and the names of the Ministers present are listed in Appendix 'N' of this Report. Telegram 247 from Mauritius to the Secretary of State (Appendix 'O') translates the views of the Council of Ministers on the Chief Secretary's memorandum (Appendix 'M') and reports the dissent of the P.M.S.D. Ministers, in relation to the inadequacy of the compensation offered. No dissentient voice was

recorded on the principle of (i) the detachment of the archipelago and (ii) the establishment of "defence facilities" thereon (Appendices 'P' & 'Q'). On the 11th November 1965, the P.M.S.D. Ministers resigned from the Coalition Government and in a press conference held the next day, they re-affirmed that their objection was not based on the principle of putting the islands at the disposal of the joint U.K./U.S. venture, but merely on the conditions under which such facilities have been granted, in complete indifference of the social and economic needs of Mauritius.

42. The United Kingdom's views on the last hour reservations of the Council of Ministers in regard to the excision came by way of telegram 313 dated 19th November 1965 (Appendix 'R'). It reasserts the hypothetical character of all future negotiations with the United States about sugar imports. The conditions under which the islands would be returned to Mauritius and prospections for oil and minerals permitted, are worth quoting:

3. As regards point (vii) the assurance can be given provided it is made clear that a decision about the need to retain the islands must rest entirely with the United Kingdom Government and that it would not (repeat not) be open to the Government of Mauritius to raise the matter, or press for the return of the islands on its own initiative.

4. As stated in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 298 there is no intention of permitting prospecting for minerals and oils. The question of any benefits arising therefrom should not therefore arise unless and until the islands were no longer required for defence purposes and were returned to Mauritius.

43. The latest development as regards the eventual return of the islands to Mauritius when no more required is contained in a reply made by the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons, on 11th July, 1980, and which is reproduced hereunder:—

I had a useful exchange of views on 7 July with the Prime Minister of Mauritius on political, economic and cultural matters. Diego Garcia was one of the subjects discussed. When the Mauritius Council of Ministers agreed in 1965 to the detachment of the Chagos Islands to form part of British Indian Ocean Territory, it was announced that these would be available for the construction of defence facilities and that, in the event of the islands no longer being required for defence purposes, they should revert to Mauritius. This remains the policy of Her Majesty's Government. (1)

As regards the plea for employing Mauritian labour on construction works on the islands, the Select Committee is reproducing at Appendix 'S' of this report, an eloquent and self-explanatory exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister of Mauritius and the British High Commissioner, as late as February/March 1971.

(1) House of Commons debates—Vol. 988, Col. 314.

44. The agreement of the Council of Ministers for the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius having been obtained at the sitting of 5th November, 1965, the Governor of Mauritius, Sir John Shaw Rennie, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., addressed a confidential letter to Ministers on 10th November, 1965, conveying the substance of the public announcement to that effect that was to be made in the House of Commons later on the same day. Sir John's letter together with the text of a communique to be released immediately afterwards are herewith reproduced as annexures T and U respectively.

X—The Public Announcement

45. Before entering into the last stage of description of the circumstances which led to the excision of the Chagos Archipelago, the Select Committee wishes to summarize hereunder the sequence of events leading thereto and underline at the same time the responsibilities of the then Premier, Dr the Honourable Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and its Council of Ministers therein:—

- (i) In August 1964, an anglo-american survey of the islands takes place. On the 14th July preceding, the whole Council of Ministers is so informed by the then Governor of Mauritius, Sir John Shaw Rennie, K.C.M.G., C.B.E. (Para. 33)
- (ii) In September 1965, the Mauritius Constitutional Conference is held in Lancaster House, London. *En marge* of these talks, the Premier is apprised in private of the joint UK/US project of using the islands for "defence" purposes. This information is conveyed by him to his fellow delegates and a delegation comprising the Deputy Leader of the Mauritius Labour Party, the Leader of the P.M.S.D., the Leader of the CAM and an Independent Member meets the Minister in Charge of Economic Affairs in the American Embassy, London, in an attempt to negotiate, in return for the use of the Chagos Archipelago, certain facilities from the United States of America. (Para. 37)
- (iii) On 23rd September 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Anthony Greenwood, meets the Premier and certain Ministers of the Coalition Government. The discussions include the eventual detachment of the Chagos Archipelago. (Para. 38).
- (iv) On 5th November 1965, the Council of Ministers is invited to give *inter-alia*, its agreement to the detachment. The agreement is given, in principle. (Para. 41).
- (v) On 8th November, 1965, the British Indian Ocean Territory Order is issued. (Para. 10).
- (vi) On 10th November, 1965, the Governor of Mauritius, Sir John Shaw Rennie, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., addresses a confidential letter to Ministers informing them of the United Kingdom's Government final decision on the issue and attaching the text of a press release in that connection. (Para. 44).

The above catalogue of events is most important for the comprehension of the most undignified attitude of certain Labour Ministers of the last Government who depcnd before the Select Committee. (Para. 25).

46. Evidence shows that Dr the Honourable Seewoosagur Ramgoolam came back from the London Constitutional Conference on 11 October 1965 and left again for the United Kingdom on 29 November 1965, for medical treatment. He returned on 3 January 1966.

47. As already indicated by Sir John Shaw Rennie, K.C.M.G., C.B.E. (para. 44), the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Anthony Greenwood, made on 10th November, 1965, an announcement in the House of Commons regarding 'new arrangements for the administration of certain islands in the Indian Ocean.' The text of that communication was released in Mauritius by the Chief Secretary's Office on the same day. (Appendix 'U')

48. On 14th December 1965, a parliamentary question was put to the Premier and Minister of Finance requesting a comprehensive statement on the question of the sale or hire of the island of Diego Garcia to either the United Kingdom Government or the United States of America or to both jointly' and certain other related matters. (Appendix F.) Honorable Guy Forget, on behalf of the Premier and Minister of Finance, replied to the question and reproduced *verbatim* the reply made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the House of Commons, on 10th November, 1965 (Appendix U).

49. On 6th December 1982, when Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam appeared before the Select Committee, he declared, to the Committee's astonishment and dismay, that the statement made in the Legislative Assembly, on 14th December 1965, by Mr Guy Forget, came as a surprise to him. 'Something was done mysteriously', he added. Indeed, he further stated: 'When I came back from the Conference to Mauritius, I was faced with the statement made to a question put in Parliament, by the late Mr Forget, which I said, as I still maintain, is a mystery to me.' And Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam went further as to declare that as late as 1972, when, as Prime Minister, he accepted on behalf of the Mauritius Government the receipt of a sum of £ 650,000 from the United Kingdom Government 'in full and final discharge of your Government's undertaking, given in 1965, to meet the cost of resettlement of persons displaced from the Chagos Archipelago since 8th November 1965, including those at present still in the archipelago' (Appendix W). he was still unwillingly bound by Mr Forget's statement.

When asked by the Select Committee to comment on Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam's observations that, "Mr Forget's statement came as a complete surprise to him and that there is a mystery surrounding Mr Forget's statement on the 14th December," Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo replied:—"If he had said that, then his recollection is as good as mine." Sir Veerasamy, who was then Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs, did not remember having seen the text of the communiqué (Appendix 'T') which the Governor of Mauritius addressed to Members of the Council of Ministers on 10th November 1965.

That element of surprise in the face of Honourable Forget's statement was also shared by Sir Harold Walter.

XI. The Displaced Ilois

50. On 3rd October 1980, the Public Accounts Committee, a Sessional Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly produced a detailed report on the "financial and other aspects of the 'sale' of Chagos Islands and the resettlement of the Displaced Ilois." The report is reproduced at Appendix 'Z'.

The Committee wishes to underline a new disturbing element in the question of the resettlement of the displaced population of the excised islands. Deponing before the Select Committee on 6th December 1982, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam stated that the resettlement issue was "taken up here in Mauritius" after the Constitutional Conference of September 1965. He stated that the issue was so extraneous to the proceedings at Lancaster House that, when he wrote to the British High Commissioner, on 4th September 1972, acknowledging receipt of a sum of £ 650,000 from the British Government "in full and final discharge" of the United Kingdom's undertaking given in 1965 "to meet the cost of resettlement of persons displaced from the Chagos Archipelago since 8th November 1965, including those at present still in the archipelago" (Appendix 'W'), he was simply acting in the "context" of the unexpected reply made by Mr Forget in the Legislative Assembly on 14th December 1965 (Appendix 'F').

In the light of documentary evidence produced, the Committee cannot but reject Sir Seewoosagur's submission. Item (iii) of the Record of Meeting held at Lancaster House, on 23rd September 1965, (Appendix 'K') indicates that the question was raised with him on that occasion. And Colonial Office Despatch No. 423 of 6th October 1965 (Appendix 'L') reports that he agreed that the document under reference was an accurate report of the proceedings.

On 4th November 1965, a Memorandum by the Chief Secretary (Appendix 'M') conveying the points agreed upon at the meeting of 23rd September 1965, was circulated to the then Council of Ministers and item (iii) thereof again alluded to the resettlement question.

Hence, as far back as September 1965, documents relating to such a delicate issue were in Government files and the Committee, whilst deplored Sir Seewoosagur's inaccurate statement before the Select Committee, strongly condemns the then Government for its indifference towards the displaced Ilois. Although the amount of compensation had been paid into the public treasury as far back as 1972, it was not until January 1977, after Mr Prosser's visit to Mauritius as a result of strong public agitation that, as a measure preliminary to some sort of rehabilitation, a survey of the persons involved was conducted.

XII. The Latest Developments

51. The Committee feels much comfort in the Resolution contained in the Political Declaration voted at the Non-Aligned Movement's New Delhi Summit Meeting, 1983, about Diego Garcia. (Appendix 'X'). It fully concurs with the views expressed to the effect that "the establishment and strengthening of the military base at Diego Garcia has endangered the sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development of Mauritius and other states". It sincerely hopes that this new Resolution, added to those already adopted by international organisations, such as the United Nations General Assembly (Appendix 'D') and the Organisation of African Unity (Appendix 'E') will contribute to the return to Mauritius of that part of its territory.

XIII. Conclusions

52. Five main themes emerge from the Committee's proceedings and they are set out hereunder as a concluding chapter to this report.

A. The political climate prior to the Constitutional Conference, 1965

All the political parties which appeared before the Committee,—with the exception of the P.M.S.D. whose stand will be commented upon in the subsequent sub-paragraph—were unanimous in their submission (para. 25) that the question of the excision of the islands or their use for defence purposes did not occupy public opinion prior to the Constitutional Conference of September 1965. So much so that none of them did think it appropriate to make their stand known before leaving for the Constitutional talks. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam alleged that the position of the U.K. Government was first communicated to him in private talks while the Conference was in progress. Honourable Aneerood Jugnauth, Q.C., then a member of the I.F.B. delegation, stated to the Committee that before the different delegations to the 1965 Constitutional Conference parted, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam had come to the desk where the I.F.B. delegation was and had informed them that he had had private talks with the British Government and had agreed, on behalf of the Government of Mauritius, to a request for communications facilities to be installed at Diego Garcia. He added:—"When he told us that, we took note and we had not much to say about it."

Evidence produced before the Committee does not support the claim that the question of the excision of the islands or their use for defence purposes did not occupy public opinion prior to the Constitutional Conference. Amongst others, the more

salient features indicative of the U.K. Government's definite plans for the militarization of the islands with United States involvement and their possible excision therefrom are listed chronologically hereunder:—

1. On 21st February 1964, Mr David Windsor, of the United Kingdom Institute of Strategic Studies, in a broadcast styled "London Calling Mauritius" hinted, in most unequivocal terms, at the U.K.'s decision of using Mauritius and its dependencies as a unit for its defence strategy in the Indian Ocean (para. 31). Report of this broadcast was lengthily reproduced in the local press. (Appendix 'A 1').
2. On 4th July 1964, the *Economist*, reviewing the U.K.'s military strategy as a result of the political uncertainties in Aden, called for a "military effort" for the setting up of a new Indian Ocean base and stressed that "this way of thinking points unerringly to some kind of Anglo-American exercise." Again, this article was taken up in the local press. (Appendix 'A 2').
3. On 22nd July 1964, the Australian paper "Daily News" revealed that talks had been initiated between Washington and Whitehall for a joint military venture in the Indian Ocean and pointed Mauritius as a logical base for such operation both for reasons of strategy and political stability. This excerpt was also published in the local press. (Appendix 'A 3').
4. On 30th August 1964, Reuter confirmed that "high level discussions" were in progress for providing new American bases "on British islands in the Indian Ocean" and reported that a technical survey had already been effected. (Appendix 'A 4').
5. On 31st August 1964, the "Daily Telegraph" directly alluded to the possibility of using Diego Garcia as a Polaris communications centre. (Appendix 'A 5').
6. On 5th September 1964, the *Economist* carried a more direct allusion to the "present Anglo-American search for a communications centre (and may be something more) in the Seychelles or one of the Mauritius dependencies." (Appendix 'A 6').
7. On 23rd September 1964, a group of Mauritian nationals residing in London lodged in the British press a strong protest against the possible installation of "military bases on Mauritian territory and on other islands in the Indian Ocean." This denunciation was reproduced in the local press. (Appendix 'A 7').

8. On 10th November 1964, Honourable B. Ramallah intervened rather lengthily on the question (Appendix 'H') in the Legislative Assembly. His intervention succeeded in obtaining from Government side two contradictory statements. On the same day, Honourable Satcam Boolell, then Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, interjected that Government was not aware of the project. This assertion will be contradicted on 14th December 1964 when the Chief Secretary will confess that indeed "a joint British-American technical survey of certain islands, including the Chagos Archipelago and Agalega but not including Mauritius" had been in progress and that the Council of Ministers—of which Honourable Boolell was a member—had been duly informed. (Appendix 'I'). Such information was, indeed, communicated to the Council of Ministers by the then Governor-General on 14th July 1964. (Para. 33).
9. On 16th January 1965, the *Economist*, in an article headed "Strategies West and East" confirmed that a joint Anglo-American survey of the islands had been effected and, for the first time, hinted at the necessity of excising the Aldabra Group from the Seychelles and Diego Garcia from Mauritius, by an Order-in-Council. (Appendix 'A 8').
10. On 5th April 1965, Reuter made mention of a statement in the House of Commons by Mrs Irene White, then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, who indicated that consultations about the joint Anglo-American survey of the islands had taken place with the Mauritian authorities, at two levels: namely, with Dr. the Honourable Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, in July 1964 and with the Council of Ministers in November of the same year. (Appendix 'A 9').
11. On 9th May, 1965, the Washington Post revealed that, as a result of the technical survey, Diego Garcia stood first on the priority list drawn by the American and British authorities as a recommended location for a joint Anglo-American military facility in the Indian Ocean and referred to the necessity of entrusting the administration of the island to London. The paper revealed that the United States had requested that the "entire archipelago be acquired" and that such exercise should be completed before the forthcoming Constitutional Conference. This

illuminating article even hinted at the U.S. idea "wherever possible, to buy out indigenous inhabitants of the islands selected for military use and move them elsewhere." (Appendix 'A 10').

12. On 3rd June 1965, news broke out in the local press that the Anglo-American military base would, in fact, be installed on the dependencies of Mauritius and of the Seychelles and that a sum of Rs 135 m had been voted for the acquisition of the islands and the displacement of their inhabitants. (Appendix 'A 11').
13. On 15th June 1965, Dr. M. Curé, by way of a parliamentary question, urged Government to "express to the British Government the inadvisability of entering into any agreement with the United States of America" for the eventual acquisition of the Dependencies of Mauritius, before the forthcoming Constitutional Conference. The Chief Secretary replied that he had nothing to add to the information communicated by him to Mr Ramlallah on 14th December 1964. (Appendix 'T')
14. On 19th June 1965, the local press carried information to the effect that the joint U.K./U.S. military project in the Indian Ocean was on the agenda of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which was then in session and requested the prompt intervention of the Premier of Mauritius and of the Government. The appeal fell on deaf ears. (Appendix 'A 12').
15. On 27th July 1965, the local press again reported that the Government of Mauritius had been put in presence of the whole scheme, including the excision of the islands and that the Premier had offered, as a counter-proposal, the lease thereof. (Appendix 'A 13').

This long—but not complete—catalogue of events translates, in the Committee's opinion, the psychosis prevalent in the public mind, both in Mauritius and overseas, on the issue, prior to the Constitutional Conference of September 1965. It is a matter of regret therefore, that none of the political parties which, at that time, formed part of the Coalition Government, did think it fit to allay the fears of the population. Hence, the Select Committee strongly condemns the passive attitude of the political class represented in the then all-party Government and which formed part of the Mauritian delegation which attended the Constitutional Conference of September 1965. Their silence, in the light of such repeated warnings from responsible sectors of public opinion, bordered, in the Committee's judgment, on connivence.

Even more strongly, the Select Committee condemns the attitude of the then Ministers who, as will be commented upon at sub-paragraph (C), gave their agreement to the excision of the Chagos Archipelago and to its use for U.K./U.S. defence interests.

B. *The attitude of the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (P.M.S.D.)*

The position of the P.M.S.D. on the excision of the Chagos Archipelago was made known to the Select Committee by Sir Gaëtan Duval when he deposed on 12th November 1982. He claimed that the P.M.S.D. had not been against the use of the archipelago for a joint U.K./U.S. venture, but had been dissatisfied with the conditions attached to the deal. The sovereignty of Mauritius ought to have been preserved and negotiations for terms most beneficial to the social and economic betterment of the Mauritian population, subsequently conducted with any nation interested in the use of the islands. Sir Gaëtan explained that the then Leader of the P.M.S.D. even refused to attend the meeting held on 23rd September 1965, as a proof that the party was adamant on the excision issue. Referring to the reasons for the resignation of P.M.S.D. Ministers from Government, Sir Gaëtan had this to say:

"Je dois vous dire qu'à ce moment là nous démissionnons non pas parce que nous étions contre l'idée de la construction d'une base américaine, mais parce que nous étions contre l'idée de la cession d'une partie du territoire mauricien". He will later state: "Nous étions d'accord sur le principe de la base anglo-américaine à Diego Garcia mais nous refusions la cession."

The Select Committee regrets not being able to accept Sir Gaëtan's submission. On no less than three occasions, documentary evidence will establish without the least possible doubt that the P.M.S.D. was indeed agreeable, in principle, to the excision of the Chagos Archipelago but objected to the terms thereof. These occasions are listed hereunder:—

- (i) the Minutes of the Council of Ministers indicate that on 5th November 1965, the Council was called upon to give "their agreement that the British Government should take necessary legal steps to detach the Chagos Archipelago." On that day, the P.M.S.D. Ministers intimated that "while they were agreeable to detachment of the Chagos Archipelago they must reconsider their position as Members of the Government in the light of the Council's decision because they considered the amount of compensation inadequate". (Appendix 'P'). These Minutes were approved without any amendment to that effect, on 12th November 1965, (Appendix 'Q') in the absence of the P.M.S.D. Ministers who had resigned the day before.

(ii) Public confirmation of the Minutes of the Council of Ministers held on 5th November 1965 (Appendix 'P') was however given at a press conference held by the leaders of that party on 12th November 1965 to explain their resignation as Ministers. The following excerpts from press reports are worth quoting: —

Je tiens à déclarer de la façon la plus formelle que le P.M.S.D. n'est pas contre le principe de céder les Chagos ou que cet archipel devienne un centre de communications pour faciliter la défense de l'Occident. Le P.M.S.D. en approuve le principe: il est en désaccord sur les termes et les conditions de cette cession. (Mr Koenig) (1) Nous ne sommes pas contre l'excision des îles pour les besoins militaires de l'Ouest. (Mr Koenig) (2)

(iii) On 14th December 1965, Mr Duval, by way of a parliamentary question invited Government to give an opportunity to the Legislative Assembly "to discuss the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and its inclusion in the British Indian Ocean Territory, specially in view of the stand taken by India and other Afro-Asian countries". Mr Forget, on behalf of the Premier and Minister of Finance, rightly referred Mr Duval to the press conference of the P.M.S.D. held on 12th November 1965 where no disagreement against the excision was expressed by the party. The supplementary question put by Mr. Duval re-affirmed that the P.M.S.D. was concerned by the conditions of the excision and not by the excision itself. (Appendix 'Y').

Hence, the plea of the P.M.S.D.'s opposition to the excision of the islands does not hold water.

C. *The existence of documents*

Both Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo, when they deposed before the Select Committee (para. 25A) stated that at no time were they put in presence of any document relating to the excision of the islands. They argued that there never existed any agreement thereon nor any minutes of proceedings of possible discussions on the issue. This statement was made not only to the Committee but was very often repeated in the Legislative Assembly, in the past, in reply to interventions from all sides of the House.

The Select Committee is in a position to reject these statements. In spite of Sir Seewoosagur's declaration to the effect that no Minutes whatsoever had been produced to him, the Select Committee has been able to obtain at least two documents from files kept at the Prime Minister's Office and which indicate the contrary. They are listed hereunder:—

- (i) The record of the meeting held at Lancaster House and which outlines the points agreed upon between the Secretary of State for the Colonies on one side and on the other Dr the Honourable Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the Honourable Abdool Razack Mohamed and the Honourable Soodeo Bissoondoyal. The document is reproduced at Appendix 'K' of this report.
- (ii) Colonial Office despatch No. 423, dated 6th October, 1965, which confirms that the contents of the record mentioned above had already been agreed in London with Dr the Honourable Seewoosagur Ramgoolam "and by him with Mr Mohamed, as being an accurate record of what was decided". (Appendix 'L').
- (iii) Furthermore, on 5th November 1965, the Council of Ministers, including Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo, gave their agreement to the effect that, "the British Government should take the necessary legal steps to detach the Chagos Archipelago." (Appendix 'P').

In these circumstances, the Select Committee cannot but record its indignation at the attitude of these Senior Ministers of the then Government who, before the Committee, in the Legislative Assembly, and in public pronouncements, denied the existence of any documents relating to the detachment of the islands. In the same breath, the Select Committee wishes to denounce the then Council of Ministers which did not hesitate to agree to the detachment of the islands.

D. *The United States Involvement and Defence Considerations*

The Select Committee again rejects the submission made by the then Leaders of the Mauritius Labour Party and the Independent Forward Bloc to the effect that, from information made available to them, in 1965, the islands would be used as a communications centre only with no United States involvement.

The United States interest in the deal was evident ever since 1964 when the technical survey of the islands was being carried out. The evidence is contained in the then Chief Secretary's reply to Mr Ramallah, (Appendix 'I'). Again, at the Constitutional

(1) Le Mauricien—13th November 1965
 (2) L'Express—13th November 1965

Conference of September 1965, the United States involvement was such that a delegation headed by the Deputy Leader of the Mauritian Labour Party visited the Minister in Charge of Economic Affairs at the American Embassy, in London, in an attempt to secure, for Mauritius, some benefits in return for the excision. (Para. 37). And later, the record of the meeting held at Lancaster House on 23rd September 1965, will, in no uncertain terms, at items (iv) (v) and (vi) bear testimony of the U.S. presence in the deal. (Appendix 'K').

In addition, all documents exchanged between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Mauritius Government preceding and following the them Council of Ministers' agreement to the excision (Appendices 'L', 'M', 'O', 'R') bear reference to a joint U.K./U.S. venture. Some of the letters, including the memorandum submitted to the Council of Ministers by the Chief Secretary on 4th November 1965 (Appendix 'M') were even boldly headed "U.K./U.S. Defence Interests".

Here again, the Select Committee cannot but strongly denounce such deliberate misleading of public opinion on the matter.

E. The Blackmail Element

Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam's statement before the Select Committee is highly indicative of the atmosphere which prevailed during the private talks he had, at Lancaster House, with the British authorities. He averred that he was put before the choice of either retaining the archipelago or obtaining independence for his country, but refused to describe the deal as a blackmail. Sir Gaëtan Duval argued that the choice was between the excision and a referendum on independence. This contradiction is substantially immaterial to the Committee. What is of deeper concern to the Select Committee is the indisputable fact that a choice was offered through Sir Seewoosagur to the majority of delegates supporting independence and which attitude cannot fall outside the most elementary definition of blackmailing. Sir Harold Walter, deponing before the Select Committee on 11th January 1983, will even go to the length of stating that the position was such that, had Diego Garcia which "was, certainly, an important tooth in the whole cogwheel leading to independence" not been ceded, the grant of national sovereignty to Mauritius "would have taken more years probably".


The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples voted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14th December 1960 (Appendix 'C') clearly sets out at para. 5 that the transfer of power to peoples living in "Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories or all other Territories" should be effected "without any conditions and reservations". In addition , at para. 6, it expressly lays down that, "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

Hence, notwithstanding the blackmail element which strongly puts in question the legal validity of the excision, the Select Committee strongly denounces the flouting by the United Kingdom Government, on these counts, of the Charter of the United Nations.

1st June 1983.

JEAN-CLAUDE DE L'ESTRAC

Chairman



APPENDIX A**List of Persons who Deponed Before the Select Committee and Date of Hearing**

1. Sir Charles Gaëtan Duval, Q.C.—Leader of the Opposition—12th November 1982.
2. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, G.C.M.G.—6th December 1982.
3. Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo, Kt.—13th December 1982.
4. Mr Maurice Patura, D.F.C., C.B.E.—13th December 1982.
5. Sir Harold Walter, Kt.—11th January 1983.
6. Sir Satcam Boolell, Kt.—11th January 1983.
7. The Hon. Aneerood Jugnauth, Q.C.—Prime Minister of Mauritius—1st February 1983.
8. Sir René Maingard de la Ville-es-Offrancs, C.B.E.—8th February 1983.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS*1965 No. 1920***Overseas Territories****The British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965****Made** 8th November 1965**At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 8th day of November 1965****Present****The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council**

Her Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in that behalf by the Colonial Boundaries Act 1895, or otherwise in Her Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows :—

1. This Order may be cited as the British Indian Ocean Territory Order Citation. 1965.

2. (1) In this Order—
“the Territory” means the British Indian Ocean Territory;

“the Chagos Archipelago” means the islands mentioned in schedule 2 to this Order;

“the Aldabra Group” means the islands as specified in the First Schedule to the Seychelles Letters Patent 1948 and mentioned in schedule 3 to this Order.

(2) The Interpretation Act 1889 shall apply, with the necessary modifications, for the purpose of interpreting this Order and otherwise in relation thereto as it applies for the purpose of interpreting and otherwise in relation to Acts of Parliament of the United Kingdom.

3. As from the date of this Order—

(a) the Chagos Archipelago, being islands which immediately before the date of this Order were included in the Dependencies of a separate colony, Mauritius, and

(b) the Farquhar Islands, the Aldabra Group and the Island of Desroches, being islands which immediately before the date of this Order were part of the Colony of Seychelles, shall together form a separate colony which shall be known as the British Indian Ocean Territory.

4. There shall be a Commissioner for the Territory who shall be appointed by Her Majesty by Commission under Her Majesty's Sign Manual and of Commission and shall hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure.

APPENDIX B**STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS***1965 No. 1920***Overseas Territories****The British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965****Made** 8th November 1965**At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 8th day of November 1965****Present****The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council**

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4. There shall be a Commissioner for the Territory who shall be appointed by Her Majesty by Commission under Her Majesty's Sign Manual and of Commission and shall hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure.

APPENDIX B—continued

Powers and
duties of
Commissioner.

5. The Commissioner shall have such powers and duties as are conferred or imposed upon him by or under this Order or any other law and such other functions as Her Majesty may from time to time be pleased to give to him, and subject to the provisions of this Order and any other law by which any such powers or duties are conferred or imposed, shall do and execute all things that belong to his office according to such instructions, if any, as Her Majesty may from time to time see fit to give him.

Oaths to be taken by Commissioner.

6. A person appointed to hold the office of Commissioner shall, before entering upon the duties of that office, take and subscribe the oath of allegiance and the oath for the due execution of his office in the forms set out in Schedule 1 to this Order.

Discharge of Commissioner's functions during vacancy, etc. 7. (1) Whenever the office of Commissioner is vacant or the Commissioner is absent from the Territory or is from any other cause prevented from or incapable of discharging the functions of his office, those functions shall be performed by such persons as Her Majesty may designate by instructions given under Her Sign Manual and Signet or through a Secretary of State.

(2) Before any person enters upon the performance of the functions of the office of Commissioner under this section, he shall take and subscribe the oaths directed by section 6 of this Order to be taken by a person appointed to hold the office of Commissioner.

(3) For the purposes of this section—

(a) the Commissioner shall not be regarded as absent from the Territory, or as prevented from, or incapable of, discharging the functions of his office, by reason only that he is in the Colony of Seychelles or is in passage between that Colony and the Territory or between one part of the Territory and another; and

(b) the Commissioner shall not be regarded as absent from the Territory, or as prevented from, or incapable of, discharging the functions of his office at any time when an officer is discharging those functions under section 8 of this Order.

Discharge of Commissioner's functions by deputy. 8. (1) The Commissioner may, by instrument under the Official Stamp of the Territory, authorize a fit and proper person to discharge for and on behalf of the Commissioner on such occasions and subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be specified in that Instrument such of the functions of the office of Commissioner as may be specified in that Instrument.

APPENDIX B—continued

(2) The powers and authority of the Commissioner shall not be affected by any authority given to such person under this section otherwise than as Her Majesty may at any time think proper to direct, and such person shall conform to and observe such instructions relating to the discharge by him of any of the functions of the office of Commissioner as the Commissioner may from time to time address to him.

(3) Any authority given under this section may at any time be varied or revoked by Her Majesty by instructions given through a Secretary of State or by the Commissioner by Instruments under the Official Stamp of the Territory.

9. There shall be an Official Stamp for the Territory which the Commissioner shall keep and use for stamping all such documents as may be required to be stamped therewith.

10. The Commissioner, in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty, Constitution may constitute such offices for the Territory, as may lawfully be constituted by Her Majesty and, subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force in the Territory and to such instructions as may from time to time be given to him by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State, the Commissioner may likewise—

(a) make appointments, to be held during Her Majesty's pleasure, to any office so constituted; and
(b) dismiss any person so appointed or take such other disciplinary action in relation to him as the Commissioner may think fit.

11. (1) The Commissioner may make laws for the peace, order and Power to good government of the Territory, and such laws shall be published in such manner as the Commissioner may direct.

(2) Any laws made by the Commissioner may be disallowed by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State.

(3) Whenever any law has been disallowed by Her Majesty, the Commissioner shall cause notice of such disallowance to be published in such manner as he may direct.

(4) Every law disallowed shall cease to have effect as soon as notice of disallowance is published as aforesaid, and thereupon any enactment amended or repealed by, or in pursuance of, the law disallowed shall have effect as if the law had not been made.

(5) Subject as aforesaid, the provisions of subsection (2) of section 38 of the Interpretation Act 1899 shall apply to such disallowance as they apply to the repeal of an enactment by an Act of Parliament.

APPENDIX B—continued

Commissioner—¹² His Commissioner may, in Her Majesty's name and on Her Majesty's behalf—

- (a) grant to any person concerned in or convicted of any offence against the laws of the Territory a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions; or
- (b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of any sentence imposed on that person for any such offence; or
- (c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed by any such sentence; or
- (d) remit the whole or any part of any such sentence or of any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to Her Majesty on account of any offence.

Concurrent appointments.

13. Whenever the substantive holder of any office constituted by or under this Order is on leave of absence pending relinquishment of his office—
- (a) another person may be appointed substantively to that office;
 - (b) that person shall, for the purpose of any functions attaching to that office, be deemed to be the sole holder of that office.

Disposal of land.

14. Subject to any law for the time being in force in the Territory and to any Instructions from time to time given to the Commissioner by Her Majesty under Her Sign Manual and Signet or through a Secretary of State, the Commissioner, in Her Majesty's name and on Her Majesty's behalf, may make and execute grants and dispositions of any lands or other immovable property within the Territory that may be lawfully granted or disposed of by Her Majesty.

Existing laws.

15. (1) Except to the extent that they may be repealed, amended or modified by laws made under section 11 of this Order or by other lawful authority, the enactments and rules of law that are in force immediately before the date of this Order in any of the islands comprised in the Territory shall, on and after that date, continue in force therein but shall be applied with such adaptations, modifications and exceptions as are necessary to bring them into conformity with the provisions of this Order.
- (2) In this section „enactments” includes any instruments having the force of law.

Exercise of jurisdiction by courts.

16. (1) The Commissioner, with the concurrence of the Governor of any other colony, may, by a law made under section 11 of this Order, confer jurisdiction in respect of the Territory upon any court established for that other colony.
- (2) Any such court as is referred to in subsection (1) of this section and any court established for the Territory by a law made under section 11 of this Order may, in accordance with any directions issued from time to time by the Commissioner, sit in the Territory or elsewhere for the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction in respect of the Territory.

APPENDIX B—continued

17. (1) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Order but subject judicial proceedings.

- (a) any proceedings that, immediately before the date of this Order, have been commenced in any court having jurisdiction in any of the islands comprised in the Territory may be continued and determined before that court in accordance with the law that was applicable thereto before that date;
- (b) where, under the law in force in any such island immediately before the date of this Order, an appeal would lie from any judgment of a court having jurisdiction in that island, whether given before that date or given on or after that date in pursuance of paragraph (a) of this subsection, such an appeal shall continue to lie and may be commenced and determined in accordance with the law that was applicable thereto before that date;
- (c) any judgment of a court having jurisdiction in any such island given, but not satisfied or enforced, before the date of this Order, and any judgment of a court given in any such proceedings as are referred to in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this subsection, may be enforced on and after the date of this Order in accordance with the law in force immediately before that date.

- (2) In this section “judgment” includes decree, order, conviction, sentence and decision.

18. (1) The Seychelles Letters Patent 1948 as amended by the Seychelles Amendment Letters Patent 1955 are amended as follows:—
- (a) the words “and the Farquhar Islands” are omitted from Patent 1948 and the definition of “the Colony” in Article 1(1);
 - (b) in the first schedule the word “Desroches” and the words (Continued) “Aldabra Group consisting of”, including the words Order 1964, specifying the islands comprised in that Group, are omitted.
- (2) Section 90(1) of the Constitution set out in schedule 2 to the Mauritus (Constitution) Order 1964 is amended by the insertion of the following definition immediately before the definition of “the Gazette”:—
- “ Dependencies ” means the islands of Rodrigues and Agalega, and the St. Brandon Group of islands often called Cargados Carajos; ;

- (3) Section 2(1) of the Seychelles (Legislative Council) Order in Council 1960 as amended by the Seychelles (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order in Council 1963 is further amended by the deletion from the definition of “the Colony” of the words “as defined in the Seychelles Letters Patent 1948” .

APPENDIX B—continued

19. There is reserved to Her Majesty full power to make laws from time to time for the peace, order and good government of the British Indian Ocean Territory (including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, laws amending or revoking this Order).

(*sd*) W. G. AGNEW

SCHEDULE I
Section 6
OATH (OR AFFIRMATION) OF ALLEGIANCE

I,.....do swear (or do solemnly affirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Her Heirs and Successors, according to law. So help me God.

OATH (OR AFFIRMATION) FOR THE DUE EXECUTION OF THE OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER

I,.....do swear (or do solemnly affirm) that I will well and truly serve Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Her Heirs and Successors, in the office of Commissioner of the British Indian Ocean Territory.

SCHEDULE 2
Section 2(1)

Salomon Islands
Trois Frères, including Danger Island and Eagle Island

SCHEDULE 3

Cocanut Island
Euphrat's and other small Islets.

Diego Garcia
Egmont or Six Islands
Péros Banhos

3.—(1) These Instructions “the Commissioner” means the Commissioner for the British Indian Ocean Territory and includes the person who, under and to the extent of any authority in that behalf, is for the time being performing the functions of his office.

(2) The Interpretation Act 1889 shall apply, with the necessary adaptations, for the purpose of interpreting these Instructions and otherwise in relation thereto as it applies for the purpose of interpreting, and in relation to, Acts of Parliament of the United Kingdom.

Note: The British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965 was amended, as follows, by the British Indian Ocean Territory (Amendment) Order 1968:—
(a) In the definition of “the Aldabra Group” in section 2(1) the words „as specified in the First Schedule to the Seychelles Letters Patent 1948 and „were omitted;
(b) in schedule 2 for the words—
“Trois Frères, including Danger Island and Eagle Island.” there were substituted the words—
“Three Brothers Islands
Nelson or Legour Island
Eagle Islands
Danger Islands.”; and
(c) in schedule 3 the words “Polymnie Island” were inserted immediately after the words
“Cocanut Island”.

4. In the enacting of laws the Commissioner shall observe, so far as is Rules for the practicable, the following rules:—
(1) All laws shall be styled Ordinances and the words of enactment shall be “Enacted by the Commissioner for the British Indian Ocean Territory”.

APPENDIX B—continued**OVERSEAS TERRITORIES****The British Indian Ocean Territory Royal Instructions 1965**

Dated 8th November 1965

Elizabeth R.

Instructions to Our Commissioner for the British Indian Ocean Territory or other Officer for the time being performing the functions of his office.
We do hereby direct and enjoin and declare Our will and pleasure as follows:—

1. (1) These Instructions may be cited as the British Indian Ocean Citation, commencement and revocation.

(2) These Instructions shall come into operation on the same day as the British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965 and thereupon the Instructions issued to Our Governor and Commander-in-Chief for Mauritius and dated the 26th February 1964, and the Instructions issued to Our Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Seychelles and dated the 11th March 1948, and the Additional Instructions issued to the said Governor and Commander-in-Chief and dated the 2nd May 1960 and the 29th July 1963, shall, without prejudice to anything lawfully done thereunder, and in so far as they are, respectively, applicable to the islands comprised in the British Indian Ocean Territory as defined in the British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965, cease to have effect in respect of those islands.

2.—(1) In these Instructions “the Commissioner” means the Commissioner for the British Indian Ocean Territory and includes the person who, under and to the extent of any authority in that behalf, is for the time being performing the functions of his office.

(2) The Interpretation Act 1889 shall apply, with the necessary adaptations, for the purpose of interpreting these Instructions and otherwise in relation thereto as it applies for the purpose of interpreting, and in relation to, Acts of Parliament of the United Kingdom.

3.—(1) These Instructions, so far as they are applicable to any Instructions functions of the office of Commissioner to be performed by such person to be observed as is mentioned in paragraph (1) of the preceding clause, shall be deemed to be addressed to, and shall be observed by, such person.

(2) Such person may, if he thinks fit, apply to Us through a Secretary of State for instructions in any matter; but he shall forthwith transmit to the Commissioner a copy of every despatch or other communication addressed to Us.

APPENDIX B—continued

- (2) Matters having no proper relation to each other shall not be provided for by the same Ordinance; no Ordinance shall contain anything foreign to what the title of the Ordinance imports; and no provision having indefinite duration shall be included in any Ordinance expressed to have limited duration.
- (3) All Ordinances shall be distinguished by titles, and shall be divided into successive sections consecutively numbered, and to every section there shall be annexed in the margin a short indication of its contents.

(4) All Ordinances shall be numbered consecutively in a separate series for each year commencing in each year with the number one, and the position of each Ordinance in the series shall be determined with reference to the day on which the Commissioner enacted it.

Certain Ordinances not to be enacted instructions through a Secretary of State, enact any Ordinance within any of the following classes, unless such Ordinance contains a clause suspending the operation thereof until the signification of Our pleasure thereon, that is to say—

- (1) any Ordinance for the divorce of married persons;
- (2) any Ordinance whereby any grant of land or money, or other donation or gratuity may be made to himself;
- (3) any Ordinance affecting the currency of the British Indian Ocean Territory or relating to the issue of bank notes;
- (4) any Ordinance imposing differential duties;
- (5) any Ordinance the provisions of which shall appear to him to be inconsistent with obligations imposed upon Us by Treaty;
- (6) any Ordinance affecting the discipline or control of Our Forces by land, sea or air;
- (7) any Ordinance of an extraordinary nature and importance whereby Our prerogative, or the rights or property of Our subjects not residing in the British Indian Ocean Territory, or the trade, transport or communications of any part of Our dominions or any territory under Our protection or any territory in which We may for the time being have jurisdiction may be prejudiced;
- (8) any Ordinance whereby persons of any community or religion may be subjected or made liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not also made liable, or become entitled to any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions;

APPENDIX B—continued

- (9) any Ordinance containing provisions which have been disallowed by Us;

Provided that the Commissioner may, without such instructions as aforesaid and although the Ordinance contains no such clause as aforesaid, enact any such Ordinance (except an Ordinance the provisions of which appear to him to be inconsistent with obligations imposed upon Us by Treaty) if he shall have satisfied himself that an urgent necessity exists requiring that the Ordinance be brought into immediate operation; but in any such case he shall forthwith transmit a copy of the Ordinance to Us together with his reasons for so enacting the same.

6. When any Ordinance has been enacted, the Commissioner shall Ordinances at the earliest convenient opportunity transmit to Us, through a Secretary to be sent of State, for the signification of Our pleasure, a transcript in duplicate of Secretary of the Ordinance duly authenticated under the Official Stamp of the British Indian Ocean Territory and by his own signature, together with an explanation of the reasons and occasion for the enactment of the Ordinance.
7. As soon as practicable after the commencement of each year, the Ordinances Commissioner shall cause a complete collection to be published, for general information, of all Ordinances enacted for the British Indian yearly. Ocean Territory during the preceding year.
8. Every appointment by the Commissioner of any person to any Appointments office of employment shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be expressed to be during pleasure only.
9. (1) Before disposing of any lands to Us belonging in the British Disposition Indian Ocean Territory the Commissioner shall cause such reservations lands, to be made therefrom as he may think necessary for any public purpose.
- (2) The Commissioner shall not, directly or indirectly, purchase for himself any land or building in the British Indian Ocean Territory to Us belonging without Our special permission given through a Secretary of State.
10. Whenever any offender has been condemned by the sentence of Power of any court having jurisdiction in the matter to suffer death for any offence committed in the British Indian Ocean Territory, the Commissioner shall call for a written report of the case from the judge who tried it, and for such other information derived from the record of the case or elsewhere as he may require, and may call upon the judge to attend upon him and to produce his notes; and if he pardons or respite the offender, he shall as soon as is practicable, transmit to Us through a Secretary of State a report upon the case, giving the reason for his decision.

Given at Our Court at St. James's this eighth day of November 1965
in the fourteenth year of Our Reign.



APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C—continued

Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly peaceful trends towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence,

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence,

Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace,

Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories,

Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations,

Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic cooperation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law,

Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,

Declaration on the granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;

And to this end Declares:

1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all states, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

14th December 1960.

948th plenary meeting

APPENDIX D

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2066

QUESTION OF MAURITIUS

The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Mauritius and other islands composing the Territory of Mauritius,

Having examined the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Mauritius,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Regretting that the administering Power has not fully implemented Resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to that Territory,

Noting with deep concern that any step taken by the administering Power to detach certain islands from the Territory of Mauritius for the purpose of establishing a military base would be in contravention of the Declaration, and in particular of paragraph 6 thereof;

1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Mauritius and endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee contained therein;

2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory of Mauritius to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV);

3. Invites the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take effective measures with a view to the immediate and full implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV);

4. Invites the administering Power to take no action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity;

5. Further invites the administering Power to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Requests the Special Committee to keep the question of the Territory of Mauritius under review and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

1398th plenary meeting, 16 December 1965

APPENDIX E

AHG/Res. 99(XVII)

RESOLUTION ON THE DIEGO GARCIA

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting at its 17th Ordinary Session in Freetown, Sierra Leone from 1 to 4 July, 1980.

Pursuant to article 1, para. 2, of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which stipulates 'The Organization shall include the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa',

Considering that one of the fundamental principles of the Organization is the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state;

Aware of the fact that Diego Garcia has always been an integral part of Mauritius, a Member State of the Organization of African Unity,

Recognizing that Diego Garcia was not ceded to Britain for military purposes,

Realising that the militarization of Diego Garcia is a threat to Africa and to the Indian Ocean as a zone of Peace,

Demanding that Diego Garcia be unconditionally returned to Mauritius and that its peaceful character be maintained.

APPENDIX F

DIEGO GARCIA — SALE OR HIRE — (No A/33) — Mr J.R. Rey (Moka)

asked the Premier and Minister of Finance whether he will make a statement on the question of the sale or hire of the Island of Diego Garcia to either the United Kingdom Government or to the Government of the United States of America or both jointly and state what is the price offered by the would-be purchasers and what is the minimum price insisted upon by the Government of Mauritius?

Mr. Forget on behalf of the Premier and Minister of Finance:—

I would refer the Honourable Member to the following communique issued from the Chief Secretary's Office on 10th November on the subject of the Chagos Archipelago, a copy of which is being circulated. In discussions of this kind which affect British arrangements for the defence of the region in which Mauritius is situated, there could, in the Government's view, be no question of insisting on a minimum amount of compensation. The question of the sale or hire of the Chagos Archipelago has not arisen as they were detached from Mauritius by Order in Council under powers possessed by the British Government.

(Communiqué)

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 2000 HOURS LOCAL TIME
WEDNESDAY 10th NOVEMBER

Defence facilities in the Indian Ocean

In reply to a Parliamentary Question the Secretary of State made the following statement in the House of Commons on Wednesday November 10th:—

"With the agreement of the Governments of Mauritius and the Seychelles new arrangements for the administration of certain islands were introduced by an Order in Council made on the 8th November. The islands are the Chagos Archipelago, some 1,200 miles north east of Mauritius, and Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches in the western Indian Ocean. Their population are approximately 1,000, 100, 172 and 112 respectively. The Chagos Archipelago was formerly administered by the Government of Mauritius and the other three islands by that of the Seychelles. The islands will be called the British Indian Ocean Territory and will be administered by a Commissioner. It is intended that the islands will be available for the construction of defence facilities by the British and U.S. Governments, but no firm plans have yet been made by either Government. Compensation will be paid as appropriate."

The cost of compensating the Company which exploits the plantations and the cost of resettling elsewhere those inhabitants who can no longer remain there will be the responsibility of the British Government. In addition, the British Government has undertaken in recognition of the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, to provide additional grants amounting to £3m. for expenditure on development projects in Mauritius to be agreed between the British and the Mauritius Governments. These grants will be over and above the allocation earmarked for Mauritius in the next period of C.D. & W. assistance.

The population of the Chagos Archipelago consists, apart from civil servants and estate managers, of a labour force, together with their dependants, which is drawn from Mauritius and Seychelles and employed on the copra plantations. The total number of Mauritians in the Chagos Archipelago is 638, of whom 176 are adult men, employed on the plantations.

APPENDIX G

MAURITIUS CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE — 1965

Mauritius Delegation

The Mauritius Labour Party Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam
Hon. G. Forget	Hon. G. Forget
Hon. V. Ringadoo	Hon. V. Ringadoo
Hon. S. Boolell	Hon. S. Boolell
Hon. H. Walter	Hon. H. Walter
Hon. R. Jomadar	Hon. R. Jomadar
Hon. R. Jaypal	Hon. R. Jaypal
Dr the Hon. L. R. Chaperon	Dr the Hon. L. R. Chaperon
Hon. V. Govinden, M.B.E.	Hon. V. Govinden, M.B.E.
Hon. H. Rammarnain	Hon. H. Rammarnain
Hon. R. Modun	Hon. R. Modun
Hon. S. Veerasamy	Hon. S. Veerasamy
Dr the Hon. J. M. Curé	Dr the Hon. J. M. Curé
The Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate Hon. J. Koenig, Q.C.
"	Hon. L. R. Devienne
	Hon. C. G. Duval
	Hon. J. C. M. Lésage
	Hon. H. Rossen Khan
The Independent Forward Bloc Hon. S. Bissoonroyal
	Hon. A. W. Foondun
	Hon. D. Basant Rai
	Hon. A. Jugnauth
	Hon. S. Bappoo
The Muslim Committee of Action Hon. A. R. Mohamed
	Hon. A. H. Osman
	Hon. H. R. Abdool
Independent Members Hon. J. M. Patura, D.F.C.
	Hon. J. Ah-Chuen

APPENDIX H

Extract from Debates No. 23 of 10th November, 1964 — Adjournment

Mr. B. Ramlallah (Poudre d'Or) — Anglo-American Military Base

Sir, as we have been speaking of America and Americans, there is a very pertinent question which is in the air about the projected base in Mauritius or at Diego. I think if the Government is able to do so, if it is not going to reveal a secret, the sooner it makes a declaration about that projected base the better it will be. Even the British Press is writing about it. There is much wild talk going around it in Mauritius. In India, Pakistan, everywhere people are talking about it, and we do not know what is the foundation of the talk. I understand even Mrs Bandaranaike has said in a press interview that she is opposed to the base in this part of the world.

Anyway I think the sooner something is said about it, the better it will be for the Government because people think that Government is in a way connected with it. Probably £ 125m or £ 115m . . .

Mr. Bootell: The Government is not aware of it.

Mr Ramlallah: The Minister has come to my rescue. If this Government is not aware of it, I hope the Premier will stand up and say that we have not been consulted, that something is being done behind our back. There is something in the air there is no doubt about it.

Prospection is going on; we know that a lot of experts have come to Mauritius and surprisingly enough the Government has not been made aware. It is time the Government makes a declaration and says bluntly to the Imperial Government, "We have heard of that. You should tell us what is in store." We have heard something very painful — that America wants to have the base at Diego, which was supposed to be our colonial territory and which would then be cut off from us. They want to do it in order not to give us the £ 125m or whatever it is. That is something which makes us think seriously and I hope Government will give it all the seriousness which it deserves.

APPENDIX I

14th December, 1964

No. 19085

On the adjournment of the Legislative Assembly on 10th November, you referred to speculation about defence installations.

The position is that a joint British-American technical survey of certain islands, including the Chagos Archipelago and Agalega but not including Mauritius, has been in progress. The results of the survey are still being examined and no decisions have been taken either by the British or by the American Government as to their respective requirements. The Council of Ministers was notified of the survey in advance and will be consulted about further steps in due course.

I am circulating a copy of this letter to other members of the Assembly and releasing it to the Press in the usual way.

TOM VICKERS
Chief Secretary

The Hon. B. Ramlallah, M.L.A.
c/o Mauritius Times
Port Louis.

APPENDIX J

Extract from Debates No. 15 of 15th June, 1965


Acquisition of Dependencies of Mauritius by the U.S.A.

(No. A/30) Dr J. M. Curé (Nominated Member) asked the Chief Secretary whether the Government has been approached for the acquisition of our dependencies or part thereof by the United States of America for military purposes. If so, will he make a statement thereon and state whether the Government will

(a) express to the British Government the inadvisability of entering into an agreement with the United States of America before a change in our Constitution as envisaged by the London Conference of September next; and

(b) ascertain the presence of oilfields in our dependencies before alienating them?

Mr Vickers: I have nothing to add to the information I conveyed to Hon. Members of the Legislative Assembly by the circulation of the copy of the letter which I addressed to the Hon. Member for Poudre d'Or on the 14th December, 1964, after he had raised the matter on the adjournment of the Legislative Assembly on the 10th November, 1964.



Extract from Record of Meeting held in Lancaster House on Thursday, 23 September, 1965, between the Colonial Secretary (Mr Greenwood) and Mauritian Ministers

Paragraphs 22 and 23

22. Summing up the discussion, the Secretary of State asked whether he could inform his colleagues that Dr Ramgoolam, Mr Bissoondoyal and Mr Mohamed were prepared to agree to the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago on the understanding that he would recommend to his colleagues the following :—

- i. negotiations for a defence agreement between Britain and Mauritius;
- ii. in the event of independence an understanding between the two governments that they would consult together in the event of a difficult internal security situation arising in Mauritius;
- iii. compensation totalling up to £ 3m, should be paid to the Mauritius Government over and above direct compensation to landowners and the cost of resettling others affected in the Chagos Islands;
- iv. the British Government would use their good offices with the United States Government in support of Mauritius' request for concessions over sugar imports and the supply of wheat and other commodities;
- v. that the British Government would do their best to persuade the American Government to use labour and materials from Mauritius for construction work in the islands;
- vi. the British Government would use their good offices with the U.S. Government to ensure that the following facilities in the Chagos Archipelago would remain available to the Mauritius Government as far as practicable:
 - a. Navigational and Meteorological facilities;
 - b. Fishing Rights;
 - c. Use of Air Strip for emergency landing and for refuelling civil planes without disembarkation of passengers;
- vii. that if the need for the facilities on the islands disappeared the islands should be returned to Mauritius;
- viii. that the benefit of any minerals or oil discovered in or near the Chagos Archipelago should revert to the Mauritius Government.

23. Sir S. Ramgoolam said that this was acceptable to him and Messrs Bissoondoyal and Mohamed in principle but he expressed the wish to discuss it with his other ministerial colleagues.

APPENDIX K

APPENDIX L

Colonial Office Despatch to Governor of Mauritius No. 423 dated 6 October, 1965

C M (65) 183

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the discussions which I held in London recently with a group of Mauritius Ministers led by the Premier on the subject of U.K./U.S. Defence Facilities in the Indian Ocean. I enclose a copy of the record prepared here of the final meeting on this matter with Mauritius Ministers. This record has already been agreed in London with Sir S. Rangoolam, and by him with Mr Mohamed, as being an accurate record of what was decided.

2. I should be grateful for your early confirmation that the Mauritius Government is willing to agree that Britain should now take the necessary legal steps to detach the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius on the conditions enumerated in (i)-(viii) in paragraph 22 of the enclosed record.

3. Points (i) and (ii) of paragraph 22 will be taken into account in the preparation of a first draft of the Defence Agreement which is to be negotiated between the British and Mauritius Governments before Independence. The preparation of this draft will now be put in hand.

4. As regards point (iii), I am arranging for separate consultations to take place with the Mauritius Government with a view to working out agreed projects to which the £3 million compensation will be devoted. Your Ministers will recall that the possibility of land settlement schemes was touched on in our discussions.

5. As regards points (iv), (v) and (vi) the British Government will make appropriate representations to the American Government as soon as possible. You will be kept fully informed of the progress of these representations.

6. The Chagos Archipelago will remain under British sovereignty, and Her Majesty's Government have taken careful note of points (vii) and (viii).

I have the honour to be,
etc.

APPENDIX M

COPY No. 19

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

UK/U.S Defence Interests in the Indian Ocean

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY

As Council is aware, the establishment of a communications centre and supporting defence facilities on Diego Garcia by the U.S. Government for joint UK/U.S. use was further discussed in London in September by the Secretary of State for the Colonies with the Premier, the Minister of Social Security, the Minister of Industry, the Minister of Local Government and the Attorney-General. The Secretary of State explained that a lease would not be practicable from the point of view of the British and the American Governments. The Ministers were also informed of the difficulties in the way of obtaining a *quid pro quo* in the form of trading concessions, such as a bigger allocation of sugar in the American market, and on this point they had an interview with the Minister in charge of Economic Affairs in the American Embassy in London.

2. The proposals that eventually emerged from these discussions are as follows :—

- (i) the Chagos Archipelago should be detached from Mauritius and placed under British sovereignty by Order in Council;
- (ii) in the event of independence a defence agreement should be negotiated between Britain and Mauritius and there should be an understanding between the two Governments that they would consult together in the event of a difficult internal security situation arising in Mauritius;
- (iii) the compensation totalling up to £3 million should be paid to the Mauritius Government to be devoted to agreed development projects over and above direct compensation to land owners and the cost of resettlement of others affected in the Chagos Archipelago;
- (iv) the British Government would also use their good offices with the U.S. Government in support of the request of Mauritius for concessions over sugar imports and the supply of wheat and other commodities;
- (v) the British Government would do their best to persuade the U.S. Government to use labour and materials from Mauritius for construction work in the Chagos Archipelago;
- (vi) the British Government would use their good offices with the U.S. Government to ensure that the following facilities in the Chagos Archipelago would remain available to the Mauritius Government as far as practicable;
 - (a) navigational and meteorological facilities;
 - (b) fishing rights;
 - (c) use of air strip for emergency landing and for refuelling civil planes without disembarkation of passengers;

APPENDIX M—*continued*

(vii) if the need for the facilities in the Chagos Archipelago disappeared, sovereignty would be returned to Mauritius;

(viii) the benefit of any minerals or oil discovered on or near the Chagos Archipelago would revert to the Mauritius Government.

3. The Secretary of State has said that as regards point (iii) he is arranging for consultations to take place with the Mauritius Government with a view to working out the agreed projects to which the £3 m. compensation will be devoted (Ministers present at the discussions in London will recall that the possibility of land settlement schemes was raised). As regards points (iv), (v) and (vi) the British Government will make appropriate representations to the U.S. Government and will keep the Mauritius Government fully informed of progress in the matter. The Chagos Archipelago will remain under British sovereignty and the British Government have taken careful notes of points (vii) and (viii).

4. The Secretary of State has now asked for early confirmation that the Mauritius Government is willing to agree that the British Government should now take the necessary legal steps to detach the Chagos Archipelago on the conditions enumerated in paragraph 2 above.

T. D. VICKERS

APPENDIX N

Copy No. 23

Council of Ministers

Minutes of Proceedings of the 45th Meeting held on Friday the 5th November 1965.
PRESENT: His Excellency the Governor (Sir John Rennie, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.)

The Premier and Minister of Finance (Dr. the Honourable Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Kt.)

The Chief Secretary (The Honourable T.D. Vickers, C.M.G.)

The Minister of Works and Internal Communications (The Honourable J.G. Forget)

The Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs (The Honourable V. Ringadoo)

The Minister of Social Security (The Honourable A. R. Mohamed)
 The Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources (The Honourable S. Boolell)

The Minister of Health (The Honourable H. E. Walter)

The Minister of Information, Posts & Telegraphs & Telecommunications (The Honourable A. H. M. Osman)

The Minister of Industry, Commerce & External Communications
 (The Honourable J. M. Paturau, D.F.C.)

The Minister of Local Government & Co-operative Development
 (The Honourable S. Bissoondoyal)

The Attorney-General (The Honourable J. Koenig, Q.C.)

The Minister of Labour (The Honourable R. Jomadar)
 The Minister of State (Development) in the Ministry of Finance
 (The Honourable L. R. Devienne)

The Minister of Housing, Lands and Town & Country Planning
 (The Honourable C. G. Duval)

The Minister of State (Budget) in the Ministry of Finance (The Honourable K. Tirvengadum)

APPENDIX O

TELEGRAM No. 247 FROM MAURITIUS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES SENT 5th NOVEMBER 1965

Your Secret Despatch No. 423 of 6th October.

United Kingdom/U.S. Defence Interests.

Council of Ministers today confirmed agreement to the detachment of Chagos Archipelago on conditions enumerated, on the understanding that (1) statement in paragraph 6 of your despatch "H.M.G. have taken careful note of points (vii) and (viii)" means H.M.G. have in fact agreed to them.

- (2) As regards (vii) undertaking to Legislative Assembly excludes
 - (a) sale or transfer by H.M.G. to third party or
 - (b) any payment or financial obligation by Mauritius as condition of return.

(3) In (viii) "on or near" means within areas within which Mauritius would be able to derive benefit but for change of sovereignty. I should be grateful if you would confirm this understanding is agreed.

2. PMSD Ministers dissented and (are now) considering their position in the government. They understand that no disclosure of the matter may be made at this stage and they also understand that if they feel obliged to withdraw from the Government they must let me have (resignations) in writing and consult with me about timing of the publication (which they accepted should not be before Friday 12th November).

³. (Within this) Ministers said they were not opposed in principle to the establishment of facilities and detachment of Chagos but considered compensation inadequate, especially the absence of additional (sugar) quota and negotiations should have been pursued and pressed more strongly. They were also dissatisfied with mere assurances about (v) and (vi). They also raised the points (1), (2) and (3) in paragraph 1 above.

APPENDIX P

Extract from Minutes of Proceedings of the Meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 5th November 1965
No. 553 Council considered the Governor's Memorandum CM (65)
183 on UK/US Defence Interests in the Indian Ocean.*

Council decided that the Secretary of State should be informed of their agreement that the British Government should take the necessary legal steps to detach the Chagos Archipelago on the conditions enumerated on the understanding that the British Government has agreed to points (vii) and (viii) that as regards point (vii) there would be no question of sale or transfer to a third party nor of any payment or financial obligation on the part of Mauritius as a condition of return and that "on or near" in point (viii) meant within the area within which Mauritius would be able to derive benefit but for the change of sovereignty.

The Attorney General, the Minister of State (Development) and the Minister of Housing said that, while they were agreeable to detachment of the Chagos Archipelago, they must reconsider their position as members of the Government in the light of the Council's decision because they considered the amount of compensation inadequate, in particular the absence of any additional sugar quota, and the assurance given by the Secretary of State in regard to points (v) and (vii) unsatisfactory.

*reproduced as Appendix 'M'.

APPENDIX Q

Extract from Minutes of Proceedings of the Meeting of the
Council of Ministers held on 12th November 1965

C. M. (65) 46

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Minutes of Proceedings of the 46th Meeting held on Friday the 12th November 1965

PRESENT: His Excellency the Governor (Sir John Rennie, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.)

COPY No. 23

The Premier and Minister of Finance

(Dr the Honourable Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Kt.)

The Chief Secretary (The Honourable T. D. Vickers, C.M.G.)

The Minister of Works and Internal Communications

(The Honourable J. G. Forget)

The Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs

(The Honourable V. Ringadoo)

The Minister of Social Security (The Honourable A.R. Mohamed)

The Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources

(The Honourable S. Booell)

The Minister of Health (The Honourable H. E. Walter)

The Minister of Information, Posts & Telegraphs & Telecommunications

(The Honourable A. H. M. Osman)

The Minister of Industry, Commerce & External Communications

(The Honourable J. M. Patura, D.F.C.)

The Minister of Local Government & Co-operative Development

(The Honourable S. Bissoondoyal)

The Minister of Labour (The Honourable R. Jomadar)

The Minister of State (Budget) in the Ministry of Finance

(The Honourable K. Tirvengadam)

Council met at 10.20 a.m.

The Governor announced that the previous afternoon he had received from the Honourable J. Koenig, M.L.A., the Honourable L.R. Devienne, M.L.A., and the Honourable C.G. Duval, M.L.A., their letters of resignations as appointed members of the Council of Ministers. These resignations took immediate effect, i.e. from Thursday the 11th November 1965.

Confirmation of Minutes

The Minutes of the 45th Meeting held on Friday the 5th November 1965 were corrected and confirmed.



APPENDIX R

TELEGRAM NO. 313 TO MAURITIUS FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES SENT 19TH NOVEMBER 1965

C. M. (65) 46

Your telegram No. 254.

U.K./U.S. defence interests.

There is no objection to Ministers referring to points contained in paragraph 22 of enclosure to Secret despatch No. 423 of 6th October so long as qualifications contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the despatch are borne in mind.

2. It may well be some time before we can give final answers regarding points (iv), (v) and (vi) of paragraph 22 and as you know we cannot be at all hopeful for concessions oversugar imports and it would therefore seem unwise for anything to be said locally which would raise expectations on this point.

3. As regards point (vii) the assurance can be given provided it is made clear that a decision about the need to retain the islands must rest entirely with the United Kingdom Government and that it would not (repeat not) be open to the Government of Mauritius to raise the matter, or press for the return of the islands on its own initiative.

4. As stated in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 298 there is no intention of permitting prospecting for minerals and oils. The question of any benefits arising therefrom should not therefore arise unless and until the islands were no longer required for defence purposes and were returned to Mauritius.

(Passed to Ministry of Defence for transmission to Mauritius).

APPENDIX S

No' 1138

18th February 1971

In connection with the proposed construction of an austere naval communications facility on Diego Garcia under the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States of America, I should be grateful if consideration could be given to the possibilities of employing Mauritian labour.

As you know, Mauritius is faced with a severe unemployment problem, and the Mauritius Government is exploring all the possibilities of relieving the situation. Favourable consideration of request made will undoubtedly help the Mauritius Government while, at the same time providing the British and the U.S. Governments with readily available labour.

S. RAMGOOLAM
Prime Minister

His Excellency Mr P. Carter
British High Commissioner,
Port Louis.

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
Chaussee, Port Louis, Mauritius
32/J
22 March 1971

Dr the Hon. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam Kt, M.L.A.
Government House
Port Louis.

Dear Prime Minister,

1. You will remember that in my letter of 18 February replying to yours of the said date, I said that I would consult my Government regarding your enquiry about the possibility of employing Mauritian labour on Diego Garcia.

2. I have now heard from my Government. They have asked me to say that they are, of course, well aware of the undertaking that they gave on this subject to the Mauritius Government in 1965, namely that they would do their best to persuade the American Government to use labour from Mauritius for works of construction on the Islands. They are also well aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (7)(a) of the Anglo-American exchange of notes of 1966 (Cmnd 3231) on the British Indian Ocean Territory. Indeed, Her Majesty's Government did tackle United States Government and urged this proposition on them. However, Her Majesty's Government have now heard from the United States Government that it will not be possible for them to employ any Mauritians on the Diego Garcia facility.

3. I understand that the United States Ambassador in Mauritius is informing your Government of this decision.

Kindest regards,
Yours very sincerely,
PETER A. CARTER

APPENDIX T

67

GOVERNMENT HOUSE MAURITIUS

10th November, 1965

My Dear Minister,

In the light of the decision by the Council of Ministers last Friday and a similar decision by the Government of the Seychelles an Order in Council has been made to introduce new arrangements for the administration of the Chagos Archipelago, Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches as a new territory to be called the British Indian Ocean Territory. The Secretary of State will be making a statement in Parliament in reply to a Parliamentary Question later today and I intend to issue thereafter the enclosed statement.

The Secretary of State has confirmed that the Chagos Archipelago will remain under British sovereignty but is nevertheless giving further consideration to the points raised in the Council of Ministers on Friday and the U.S. Government has been warned that certain points will be raised with them.

Yours sincerely,
J. S. RENNIE

Note :-The text of the question and reply is reproduced at Appendix 'V'

APPENDIX U

Embargoed for release until 2000 hours local time Wednesday, 10th November

Defence facilities in the Indian Ocean

In reply to a Parliamentary Question the Secretary of State made the following statement in the House of Commons on Wednesday November 10th :—

"With the agreement of the Governments of Mauritius and the Seychelles new arrangements for the administration of certain islands were introduced by an Order in Council made on the 8th November. The islands are the Chagos Archipelago, some 1,200 miles north-east of Mauritius, and Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches in the Western Indian Ocean. Their populations are approximately 1,000, 100, 172 and 112 respectively. The Chagos Archipelago was formerly administered by the Government of Mauritius and the other three islands by that of the Seychelles. The islands will be called the British Indian Ocean Territory and will be administered by a Commissioner. It is intended that the islands will be available for the construction of defence facilities by the British and U.S. Governments, but no firm plans have yet been made by either Government. Compensation will be paid as appropriate.

The cost of compensating the Company which exploits the plantations and the cost of resettling elsewhere those inhabitants who can no longer remain there will be the responsibility of the British Government. In addition, the British Government has undertaken in recognition of the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, to provide additional grants amounting to £3 m. for expenditure on development projects in Mauritius to be agreed between the British and the Mauritius Governments. These grants will be over and above the allocation earmarked for Mauritius in the next period of C.D. & W. assistance.

The population of the Chagos Archipelago consists, apart from civil servants and estate managers, of a labour force, together with their dependants, which is drawn from Mauritius and Seychelles and employed on the copra plantations. The total number of Mauritians in the Chagos Archipelago is 638, of whom 176 are adult men employed on the plantations.

Chief Secretary's Office
Port Louis
10th November, 1965

APPENDIX V

WRITTEN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS


Wednesday, 10th November, 1965

MAURITIUS AND SEYCHELLES

Defence Facilities

Mr James Johnson asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what further approaches have been made to the Mauritius and Seychelles Governments about the use of islands in the Indian Ocean for British and American defence facilities.

Mr Greenwood: With the agreement of the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles new arrangements for the administration of certain islands in the Indian Ocean were introduced by an Order in Council made on 8th November. The islands are the Chagos Archipelago some 1,200 miles north-east of Mauritius, and Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches in the Western Indian Ocean. Their populations are approximately 1,000, 100, 172 and 112 respectively. The Chagos Archipelago was formerly administered by the Government of Mauritius and the other three islands by that of Seychelles. The islands will be called the British Indian Ocean Territory and will be administered by a Commissioner. It is intended that the islands will be available for the construction of defence facilities by the British and United States Governments, but no firm plans have yet been made by either Government. Appropriate compensation will be paid.



APPENDIX W

British High Commission
Chaussée, Port Louis, Mauritius
26th June 1972

32/1
Dr the Rt Hon. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam Kt, M.L.A.
Government House,
Port Louis.

My dear Prime Minister,

I refer to the meeting in London on 23 February, 1972, between yourself, Sir Harold Walter and Lord Lothian, and to your meeting with Baroness Tweedsmuir on 23 June, 1972, at which the Mauritius Government scheme for the resettlement of the persons displaced from the Chagos Archipelago was discussed.

2. The scheme has been fully appraised in London and I have been authorised to inform you that the British Government are prepared to pay £ 650,000 (the cost of the scheme) to the Mauritius Government provided that the Mauritius Government accept such payment in full and final discharge of my Government's undertaking, given at Lancaster House, London, on 23 September, 1965, to meet the cost of resettlement of persons displaced from the Chagos Archipelago since 8 November, 1965, including those at present still in the Chagos Archipelago.

3. Accordingly, I should be most grateful if you would confirm that you are willing to accept the payment of £ 650,000 in full and final discharge of my Government's undertaking, and to agree that the British Government may state this in public, should the need arise.

4. When replying, perhaps you would indicate the date and manner in which the Mauritius Government wish payment to be made.

Yours very sincerely,
R. D. GIDDENS

4th September 1972

With reference to the communication No. 32/1 dated the 26th June, 1972, by the then Acting High Commissioner, I confirm that the Mauritius Government accepts payment of £ 650,000 from the Government of the United Kingdom (being the cost of the scheme for the resettlement of persons displaced from the Chagos Archipelago) in full and final discharge of your Government's undertaking, given in 1965, to meet the cost of resettlement of persons displaced from the Chagos Archipelago since 8 November, 1965, including those at present still in the Archipelago. Of course, this does not in any way affect the verbal agreement giving this country all sovereign rights relating to minerals, fishing, prospecting and other arrangements.

In regard to the date and manner of the payment to be made I presume it will be in British pounds sterling made to the Government of Mauritius at the earliest date convenient to your Government.

The Government of Mauritius has no objection to the Government of United Kingdom making a public statement to this effect, should the need arise.

With my warmest regards,
S. RAMGOOLAM
Prime Minister

APPENDIX X

Extract from the Political Declaration of Non-Aligned Movement's New Delhi Summit Meeting 1983

IX-MAURITIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO,
INCLUDING DIEGO GARCIA

81. The Heads of State or Government expressed, in particular, their full support for Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, which was detached from the territory of Mauritius by the former colonial power in 1965 in contravention of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 1514(XV) and 2066(XX). The establishment and strengthening of the military base at Diego Garcia has endangered the sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development of Mauritius and other States. They called for the early return of Diego Garcia to Mauritius.

APPENDIX Y

Debates No. 27 of 14th December 1965

Chagos Archipelago — Detachment from Mauritius

(B/245) Mr C. G. Duval (Curepipe) asked the Premier and Minister of Finance whether he will give an opportunity to the House to discuss the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, and its inclusion in the British Indian Ocean Territory, especially in view of the stand taken by India and other Afro-Asian countries.

Mr Forget on behalf of the Premier and Minister of Finance :—

No, Sir, since I understand from the public statement made by the Leader of the Opposition on November 12th that there is no disagreement between the Opposition and the Government on the principle of the detachment and use for defence facilities of the Chagos Archipelago.

Mr Duval: Sir, in view of the reply of the hon. Minister replacing the Premier, and in view of the fact that there have been contradictory statements made by members of the Government at different moments about the conditions attached to the excision of the base, will the Minister say whether, at least, the correspondence exchanged between Her Majesty's Government and this Government will be released to the public?

Mr Speaker : This does not arise from the question.

APPENDIX Z

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE
FOR THE 1980 SESSION

**Financial and other aspects of the "Sale" of Chagos Islands and the
Re-settlement of the displaced Ilois**

Introduction

Your Committee investigated into the Revenue received by Government in 1975 for the "SALE" of the Chagos Archipelago and in 1972, for the re-settlement of the displaced Ilois and also into all the disbursements effected in relation to this matter. In the course of our inquiry we came across some disturbing facts which we have felt should be brought to notice.

£ 3 m cash compensation from U.K. in 1965

Your Committee was informed that financial compensation for the "SALE" of Diego Garcia was effected in two stages. The sum of £ 3 m was paid by the British Government in financial year 1965/66 and was credited to Capital Revenue, item L IV/4 — "Sale of Chagos Islands", as per the Accountant General's Financial Report for the financial year 1965/66. This item did not appear in the Estimates of 1965/66. Your Committee enquired whether the word "sale" had caused any problem at the time but was unfortunately unable to obtain any information on this matter. It has also not been possible to get any information on the basis on which the sum of £ 3 m was arrived at in the discussions with the British Government in 1965.

In an answer to a Parliamentary Question (PQ B/754 of 1979) the Prime Minister informed the House that the compensation of £ 3 m was meant for the implementation of development projects in Mauritius. The money was therefore credited to Capital Revenue and was not earmarked for any specific project.

Your Committee was also not able to ascertain whether any cash compensation was effected to the company exploiting the copra plantations in the Chagos at the time. We learned from the representative of the Prime Minister's Office that it was a Seychellois Company, namely Mouliné & Co.

£ 650,000 from U.K. in 1972 for Resettlement Scheme

The second payment of £ 650,000 by the British Government was effected on 28th October, 1972 and credited to Capital Revenue, item L 1/8 — "Financial Assistance for Resettlement Scheme" in the Financial Report of 1972/73. This item had not appeared in the Estimates for the year 1972/73. This figure was arrived at after discussions had taken place between the British and Mauritian Governments, on a special scheme "devised to build housing estates and establish pig-rearing co-operatives on land to be provided by the Government of Mauritius", (Forward to the Prosser Report submitted to Government in 1976) for the resettlement of persons displaced from Diego Garcia, Land at Roche Bois and at Pointe aux Sables was duly acquired for this purpose.

APPENDIX Z—continued

No details on how and when this initial scheme was worked out, were provided to your Committee.

In the Foreword to the Prosser Report the Prime Minister's Office states the following:

" Not long after, it became clear that the displaced persons concerned were not happy with the proposed scheme. An official survey confirmed that the majority was in favour of the simple expedient of sharing the financial assistance received from Britain among the workers, irrespective of their need for proper housing and for a planned means of future livelihood " .

Your Committee has not obtained any information on the survey mentioned above although there was an official request for the details of how and when the displaced persons showed dissatisfaction with that initial scheme.

The Prosser Report

For 5 years after funds had been made available by the U.K. Government for the resettlement of the displaced Ilois, the Government of Mauritius was unable to arrive at a satisfactory decision on the manner in which the funds should be utilised. In 1976, the Prime Minister discussed the problems affecting the displaced Ilois with the British Government and it was decided that Mr A.R.G. Prosser, C.M.G., M.B.E., Adviser on Social Development in the Ministry of Overseas Development, would visit Mauritius in order to advise on an appropriate solution to the problem.

The major recommendations made by Mr Prosser were the following:

- (a) The immediate setting up of a Resettlement Committee with a first-class administrative officer attached to it on a full time basis. The Government did implement this recommendation. Its composition was in fact reinforced by the inclusion of the Secretary to the Cabinet as its Chairman. It was unfortunate however, that the Committee was not provided with an administrative officer on a full time basis. The Principal Assistant Secretary of the Ministry for Rodrigues was assigned this duty on a part time basis. Your Committee appreciates the fact that his normal duties as P.A.S. in his own Ministry must not have left him much time to deal with the Ilois problem.
- (b) Another important recommendation was an occupational training scheme for the unemployed. Mr Prosser even made the interesting suggestion that functional training could be combined with the building of houses necessary for the Resettlement Scheme. This scheme will be described later. Mr. Prosser recommended that the sum of Rs 750,000 should be set aside for this purpose, immediately. It is very unfortunate that Government never considered this interesting recommendation.
- (c) Welfare services. Mr. Prosser suggested that the Resettlement Committee should allocate Rs 60,000.— to the Social Welfare Commissioner so that the present Social Worker could be funded for a period of 3 years. We were informed that a primary school teacher was seconded for duty to the Social Welfare Division to work with the Ilois on a full time basis. But we obtained no information on the length of time for which she was thus employed.

APPENDIX Z—continued

- (d) The housing scheme proposed by Mr Prosser was in fact the most important recommendation in his report. As Mr Prosser rightly pointed out " the most intractable problem for the Ilois, has been housing ". (Prosser Report — para. 4). He worked out that after deducting the sum of Rs 750,000 for training purposes and Rs 60,000 for the service of the Social Worker, the sum of Rs 18,500 would be available for each individual household of the 426 families. He suggested a scheme whereby each household in need of a house could be provided with a 15,000 rupee house which would be of " sound construction but.....slightly outside the high quality of building regulations which govern housing in Mauritius ". (Prosser Report, para. 22) the remaining Rs 3,500 would be distributed to each household for basic furnishing purposes. In the Foreword to the Prosser Report, the Prime Minister's Office did not accept this recommendation to provide the Ilois with sub-standard houses. The Government went very far, by undertaking to allocate the necessary additional funds in order that the houses constructed for the Ilois are not below standards acceptable in the country. In a general way, the Government felt that the Prosser recommendations as amended were in the long term interest of the Ilois community.

Your Committee was informed by representatives of the Prime Minister's Office that Mr Prosser's recommendations for a housing scheme had been rejected by the representatives of the Ilois on the Resettlement Committee and that the latter had opted for cash compensation.

However, your Committee was seriously concerned by some of the facts that came to light in the survey carried out in January 1977 in specific relation to the housing issue. It is true that representatives of the Ilois did formally request that the money available be distributed in cash to the Ilois, at a meeting of the Resettlement Committee held on 4th December 1976. However, the survey carried out in January 1977 revealed that of the 557 families who had registered, 341 had opted for a house and 213 for cash compensation. 3 had not expressed any option. Of the 38 families in Agalega, 6 had opted for a house in Mauritius and 32 for cash payment with the possibility of continued employment there. It should also be well noted that representatives of the Ilois did enquire, at a meeting of the Committee held on 19th February 1977, whether there was any possibility of satisfying both options. According to the minutes of proceedings of that meeting, the Resettlement Committee felt that this proposal would not be feasible. However, the Chairman added that the views of the Committee would be submitted to the Government and a decision would be taken at a later stage. In spite of the fact that a majority of households, over 50% opted for housing, one year later, in December 1977, Government decided to effect cash compensation to all Ilois, irrespective of their date of arrival.

Your Committee wanted to know in very concrete terms, the way in which the proposal for a housing scheme was presented to the Ilois. We wanted to know whether Government had worked out in detail the type of houses to be built, the length of time it would take to construct them etc., and whether such information had been made available to the representatives of the Ilois. Your Committee was unfortunately, not provided with this information.

APPENDIX Z—continued

What your Committee found even more surprising was the fact that after it had been discovered in January 1977 that a majority had opted for housing and that the representatives of the Ilois had in February 1977, requested that both options, namely housing and cash compensation, be considered, the Prime Minister, in December 1977, stated the following in a reply to a Parliamentary Question (B/746 of 1977):

“The Government has finally given up hope to convince the families from Diego Garcia that it is in their best interests to have houses built for them rather than to have a cash compensation only. So steps are being taken to share the grant as well as the interest accrued thereon to the families”.

Surveys of the Ilois

It has not been easy to establish the exact number of persons that were transferred from the Chagos Archipelago. In reply to a Parliamentary Question in the House of Commons in November 1965, in relation to defence facilities in the Indian Ocean, the Secretary of State referring to the Chagos Archipelago and Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches islands said the following:

“Their population are approximately 1000, 100, 172 and 112 respectively”.

(See Annex I)

On 14 December 1965, in the Legislative Council, Mr Forget, on behalf of the Premier and Minister of Finance informed the House that:

“The total number of Mauritians in the Chagos Archipelago is 638, of whom 176 are adult men, employed on the plantations”. (See Annex I).

In Mauritius, two main surveys were carried out to establish the total number of Ilois families. The first survey was carried out by the Public Assistance Officers who collected relevant information from the displaced Ilois everytime a group landed in Mauritius. The survey revealed that 426 families had been transferred from the Chagos since 1965. This figure of 426 families was considered to be the correct one by Mr Prosser.

In 1976, when the possibility of the distribution of cash compensation to all Ilois, irrespective of their date of arrival, came up, the Resettlement Committee, set up in 1976, upon a recommendation made by Mr Prosser, decided that a registration of all Ilois settled in Mauritius should be carried out. This second major survey was carried out, in January 1977, by the Public Assistance Division of the Ministry of Social Security under the aegis of the Resettlement Committee. In this case, press and radio/Tv communiques were issued asking all displaced persons to register themselves. The figure arrived at in this second survey was 557 families.

Of these 557 families—

- 378 persons were under 5 years of age
- 543 persons were between 5-12 years of age
- 334 persons were between 12-18 years of age
- 1068 were adults
- 102 were above 60 years of age.

Over 150 persons had arrived before 1965. (See Annexures II & III)

The survey also indicated that there were 38 Ilois families in Agalega.

APPENDIX Z—continued

Although the Ilois were provided with facilities for their registration, a number of persons were left out for various reasons. The representatives of the Prime Minister's Office informed your Committee that there have been a certain number of complaints from those who claim not to have received any compensation; the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office has even received letters from some Ilois in Rodrigues, Australia and South Africa. It should be noted that there was, in fact, no facilities provided for registration of the Ilois in Rodrigues, Agalega and St. Brandon, when the 1977 survey was carried out.

Government has now decided to proceed with a new survey of all those who had failed to register in 1977. Your Committee recommends that this facility should be extended to those Ilois residing in the Seychelles as well.

The Ilois in Agalega

Your Committee was informed that in the Resettlement Committee, a suggestion was made to the effect that a possibility existed for the families in Agalega to be given shares in the Agalega Corporation to the value of their allocation instead of being paid in cash. Your Committee was not provided with any information on the manner in which cash compensation was actually effected in Agalega.

Cash compensation

When Government finally decided to go ahead with cash compensation, payment was effected in March 1978 on the basis of the survey carried out in January 1977. The following payments were then made:

	Rs	Total
351 children under 5	...	1,000
459 children between 5 and 11	...	1,200
474 children between 11 and 18	...	1,500
1081 adults	...	7,590
109 old age pensioners (additional)	...	250
71 females with children (additional)	...	250
TOTAL	...	9,862,590
Amount available (including interest)	...	11,167,604
Amount paid	...	9,862,580
BALANCE	...	1,305,014

APPENDIX Z—*continued*

Disbursements as from 1972

Various disbursements were effected as from 1972 when funds were made available by the British Government. The total amount disbursed from 1972 to 1977 was Rs 155,773.33 (Annex IV). Apart from the cash compensation of Rs 9,858,827 effected in 1977/78, there was a further disbursement of Rs 18,605 in 1978/79. Your Committee has, however, not been able to obtain any details on the nature of all the disbursements effected, apart from the cash compensation of Rs 9,858,827 effected in 1978. It should also be noted that interest was, of course, not credited on the disbursements. Interest on the account was paid at 6% per annum between 28th October 1972 and 31st December 1977 although the Bank Rate had risen to 7% from March 1977 to January 1978, and to 9% from January 1978 to October 1979 and has been 10½% since then.

Your Committee fails to understand why interest was not credited to the Fund after December 1977. If accounts had been properly kept, a higher sum would have accumulated in the form of interest.

Further financial assistance from U.K. Government

At a meeting of the Resettlement Committee held on 19th February 1977, a representative of the Ilois wanted to know whether there was any possibility of obtaining further assistance from the British Government. The Committee according to the Minutes of Proceeding of that Meeting "agreed that there was little, if any, likelihood of such assistance forthcoming".

However, representatives of the Prime Minister's Office informed your Committee that it had always been the wish of the Mauritian Government that such further assistance should be provided by the U.K. Government. Your Committee has however, not been informed whether such request has been made formally and officially by the Government since March 1978.

In a reply to a Parliamentary Question in June 1980, (B/766 of 1980) the Prime Minister informed the House that:

"Regarding the additional compensation to be paid to the Ilois, the British Government has already offered a supplementary amount of £ 1.25 million for their resettlement but is unable to pursue the matter because of a court action in the United Kingdom. The matter being *sub-judice*, we have to wait for the outcome."

Your Committee is aware of the fact that the Prime Minister is referring to the court action entered by certain members of the Ilois community presenting legal claims to the U.K. Government. They are being represented by Mr. B. Sheridan who during his visit in Mauritius in November 1979 tried to make the Ilois sign a document (a deed of acceptance and power of attorney) the terms and conditions of which are reproduced in Annexure V.

In reply to a Parliamentary Question in November 1979 (P.Q. B/1033 of 1979) the Prime Minister informed the House that Government had spent Rs 2,015 on Mr Sheridan during his visit in Mauritius. This would imply that he was in Mauritius in an official capacity, to a certain extent.

APPENDIX Z—*continued*

General Comments

1. Your Committee feels that this whole problem of displaced persons which arose since 1965 did not receive the serious attention it deserved on the part of government until 1976 when Mr Prosser visited Mauritius. The first serious survey to establish the exact number of persons involved was carried out as late as in January 1977.

2. The compensation of £ 650,000 was linked to a specific scheme when it was made available in 1972. The money was distributed 5 years later when conditions of life had become very difficult due to rapid inflation during that corresponding period. Mr Prosser himself made a very pertinent remark in that respect in specific relation to the housing scheme:

"Unfortunately, from the time of the signing of the agreement between the Mauritius Government and the British Government the cost of housing in Mauritius has risen approximately 500%." (Prosser Report. Para 19)

Mr Prosser made that remark in 1976 and the money was distributed in March 1978. Throughout his Report, Mr Prosser placed emphasis on the necessity to find an urgent solution to the problem, because of the terrible conditions in which he found the Ilois when he visited Mauritius. In para 24 of the Report he says:

"The fact is that the Ilois are living in deplorable conditions which could be immediately alleviated if action is taken on the lines I have suggested".

Cash compensation was effected almost two years after Mr Prosser had written his Report.

4. Your Committee feels that it is very unfortunate that Government promised that additional funds would be made available in the Resettlement Scheme being proposed by Mr Prosser but no such additional financial assistance has been forthcoming.

5. There is a serious lack of information on the nature of disbursements that were effected since the grant became available in 1972. The Ilois do not seem to be at all aware of the details of these disbursements.

Your Committee was also not at all satisfied with the approximate way in which interest on the account was worked out. In our opinion total interest accrued on the account, should have been much higher.

6. The survey carried out in January 1977 was not comprehensive enough. A number of Ilois were left out for some reason or another.

7. Your Committee feels that the Ilois were not presented with a housing scheme worked out in concrete terms nor were the advantages of such a scheme over straight cash payment sufficiently stressed. It is normal that for persons, who have been living in deplorable conditions for such a long time cash compensation represented immediate relief. But as it was rightly pointed out by the Prime Minister's Office in the Foreword to the Prosser Report, the recommendations in the Report, especially the housing scheme would have been, "in the long term interest of the people concerned".

8. Finally, Your Committee is concerned that it has not been confirmed whether Government has so far made any formal and official request for further financial assistance despite the fact that the majority of the Ilois are still living in deplorable conditions.

3rd October, 1980.

V. NABABSING,
Chairwoman.

ANNEX I

EXTRACT FROM DEBATES NO. 27 OF 14 DECEMBER 1965

DIEGO GARCIA — SALE OR HIRE (No. A/33) Mr J. R. Rey (Moka) asked the Premier and Minister of Finance whether he will make a statement on the question of the sale or hire of the Island of *Diego Garcia* to either the United Kingdom Government or to the Government of the United States of America or to both jointly and state what is the price offered by the would-be purchasers and what is the minimum price insisted upon by the Government of Mauritius?

Mr Forget on behalf of the Premier and Minister of Finance :—

I would refer the Honourable Member to the following communiqué issued from the Chief Secretary's Office on 10th November on the subject of the Chagos Archipelago, a copy of which is being circulated. In discussions of this kind which affect British arrangements for the defence of the region in which Mauritius is situated, there could, in the Government's view, be no question of insisting on a minimum amount of compensation. The question of the sale or hire of the Chagos Archipelago has not arisen as they were detached from Mauritius by Order in Council under powers possessed by the British Government.

(COMMUNIQUE)

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 2000 HOURS LOCAL TIME
WEDNESDAY 10TH NOVEMBER

Defence facilities in the Indian Ocean

In reply to a Parliamentary Question the Secretary of State made the following statement in the House of Commons on Wednesday November 10th:

"With the agreement of the Governments of Mauritius and the Seychelles new arrangements for the administration of certain islands were introduced by an Order in Council made on the 8th November. The islands are the Chagos Archipelago, some 1,200 miles northeast of Mauritius, and Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches in the Western Indian Ocean. Their population are approximately 1,000, 100, 172 and 112 respectively. The Chagos Archipelago was formerly administered by the Government of Mauritius and the other three islands by that of the Seychelles. The islands will be called the British Indian Ocean Territory and will be administered by a Commissioner. It is intended that the islands will be available for the construction of defence facilities by the British and U.S. Governments, but no firm plans have yet been made by either Government. Compensation will be paid as appropriate."

The cost of compensating the Company which exploits the plantations and the cost of resettling elsewhere those inhabitants who can no longer remain there will be the responsibility of the British Government. In addition, the British Government has undertaken in recognition of the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, to provide additional grants amounting to £ 3 m. for expenditure on development projects in Mauritius to be agreed between the British and the Mauritius Governments. These grants will be over and above the allocation earmarked for Mauritius in the next period of C. D. and W. assistance.

The population of the Chagos Archipelago consists, apart from civil servants and estate managers, of a labour force, together with their dependents, which is drawn from Mauritius and Seychelles and employed on the copra plantations. The total number of Mauritians in the Chagos Archipelago is 638, of whom 176 are adult men employed on the plantations.

ANNEX II

SURVEY OF ILLOIS

Year of Arrival

	<i>Locality</i>	No. of families	30's	40's	50's	60's	70's	70's Unknown
1. Baie du Tombeau	...	5	—	—	4	1	—	—
2. Bois Marchand	...	2	—	—	—	2	—	—
3. Beau Bassin	...	9	—	4	3	1	1	—
4. Cassis	...	24	—	1	17	61	14	1
5. Cité La Cure	...	22	—	1	3	7	10	1
6. Docker's Flat	...	40	—	—	—	6	11	23
7. Grand River North West	...	5	—	—	—	2	3	—
8. Le Hochet	...	5	—	—	—	—	4	1
9. Les Salines	...	51	—	1	6	35	8	1
10. Pointe aux Sables	...	31	—	2	11	14	1	3
11. Pailles	...	16	—	2	—	10	4	—
12. Port Louis	...	4	—	—	—	2	2	2
13. Petite Rivière	...	26	—	—	9	12	3	2
14. Roche Bois	...	225	3	7	28	139	35	13
15. Ste. Croix	...	10	—	—	2	7	1	—
16. Other areas	...	12	—	1	—	10	1	—
TOTAL	...	557	3	19	91	319	104	21

ANNEX III

SURVEY OF ILOIS

Population according to Age-Group

Locality	No. of families	Under 5	5-12	12-18	Adults	Over 60
1. Baie du Tombeau	...	5	3	3	7	—
2. Bois Marchand	...	2	—	1	—	5
3. Beau Bassin	...	9	3	6	15	22
4. Cassis	...	94	67	82	49	181
5. Cité La Cure	...	22	24	27	14	64
6. Docker's Flat	...	40	31	48	30	107
7. Grand River North West	...	5	1	2	5	10
8. Le Hochet	...	5	1	6	8	10
9. Les Salines	...	51	43	44	19	94
10. Pointe aux Sables	...	31	24	38	22	72
11. Pailles	...	16	14	8	8	22
12. Port Louis	...	4	3	8	1	8
13. Petite Rivière	...	26	14	22	28	55
14. Roche Bois	...	225	130	210	117	370
15. Ste. Croix	...	10	11	16	6	13
16. Other Areas	...	12	9	18	9	28
TOTAL	...	557	378	543	334	1068

Amount received on 28.10.72

Disbursed in 1972-73

Balance on 30.6.73

Disbursed in 1973-74

Balance on 30.6.74

Disbursed in 1974-75

Balance on 30.6.75

Disbursed in 1975-76

Balance on 30.6.76

Disbursed in 1976-77

Balance on 30.6.77

Disbursed July 77 to December 77

Balance on 31.12.77

Interest at 6% per annum

28.10.72 to 30.6.73 (246 days) — 246 × 6 × Rs 8,666,583

1.7.73 to 30. 6.74= 6 × Rs 8,554,181

365 100

1.7.74 to 30. 6.75= 6 × Rs 8,539,006

100

1.7.75 to 30. 6.76= do " × Rs 8,514,903

100

1.7.77 to 31.12.77= 184 × 6 × Rs 8,510,893

365 100

TOTAL ...

2,656,711

11,167,504

Amount received

Interest to 31.12.77

8,510,893 (after disbursement)

2,656,711

11,167,504

ANNEX IV

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ANNEX V

1 DEED OF ACCEPTANCE AND POWER OF ATTORNEY

This is the Deed of me (1).....and the adult members of my family who have hereunto subscribed their names and seals.

I am an Ilois who left that part of British Indian Ocean Territory known as (2).....in the ship (3).....on the.....day of.....19.....

.....never to return. My family who came with me then are (4).....and the following children:—

Adult children's names

Addresses

Dates of Birth

Infant children's names

Addresses

Dates of Birth

ANNEX V—continued

1. We appoint Bernard Sheridan of 14 Red Lion Square, London WC 1 as our Attorney in accordance with S. 10 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 and in particular we authorize him to receive the £ 1,250,000 on behalf on the Ilois in such instalments and amounts and subject to such conditions as he in his absolute discretion and without need to make further reference to us, may agree with the United Kingdom Government.

2. We appoint him as our solicitor to act on our behalf in relation to all matters connected with the payment of the £ 1,250,000 and 1, (5).....authorize him to act on behalf of my infant children named above as their next friend.

3. We accept the money already paid to the Mauritian Government and the money to be paid to Mr Sheridan as aforesaid in such instalments as he shall agree in full and final settlement and discharge of all our claims however arising upon the United Kingdom Government (both upon the Crown in right of the United Kingdom and the Crown in right of British Indian Ocean Territory) and upon its servants, agents and contractors in respect of the events, their incidents, circumstances and consequences and we further abandon all our claims and rights (if any) of whatsoever nature to British Indian Ocean Territory.

4. We understand accept and agree that by entering into this Deed we shall not be able to sue the United Kingdom Government in respect of the events, their incidents, circumstances and consequences and hereby covenant not to do so.

5. We agree that all questions concerning the validity and construction of this Deed and any disputes arising upon it shall be governed by English law and justifiable only in English Courts.

We know that the United Kingdom Government has already paid the Mauritian Government £650,000 for the resettlement of the Ilois people who came to Mauritius following the setting up of British Indian Ocean Territory and has offered to make available a further £ 1,250,000 for the purpose provided it is accepted by the Ilois in full and final settlement of all claims whatsoever upon the United Kingdom Government by the Ilois arising out of the following events:—the creation of British Indian Ocean Territory, the closing of the plantations there, the departure or removal of those living or working there, the termination of their contracts, their transfer to and resettlement in Mauritius and their prohibition from ever returning to the Islands comprising British Indian Ocean Territory (the events) and of all such claims arising out of any incidents or circumstances occurring in the course of the events or out of the consequences of the events, whether past, present or to come (" their incidents circumstances and consequences ").

So that this money may be paid to help the Ilois.

-
- (1) Insert name and address of head of family
 - (2) Insert name of Island
 - (3) Insert name of ship and date of leaving BIOT
 - (4) Insert name and address of wife
 - (5) Insert name of head of family

(APPENDIX 'A 1')

L'île Maurice base de la Réserve Stratégique Britannique

Au cours d'une interview qui a été diffusée, hier soir, dans le programme "London Calling Mauritius", M. David Windsor, de l'Institut des Etudes Stratégiques de Grande Bretagne a parlé de la possibilité pour Maurice de servir de base à une brigade de la Réserve Stratégique du Royaume-Uni.

Les récents troubles en Est-Afrique, au Bornéo, à Aden ont mis en relief l'impérieuse nécessité pour le Gouvernement britannique d'avoir des troupes disponibles dans un rayon qui ne soit pas trop éloigné des foyers de troubles afin qu'elles puissent se porter le plus rapidement possible au secours des Gouvernements de ces territoires si ces derniers font appel à leur aide.

Il est difficile pour ces troupes de se rendre avec la rapidité voulue de la Grande Bretagne au Bornéo, par exemple. Si des bases peuvent être créées dans des régions assez rapprochées des centres possibles de troubles, la situation serait grandement améliorée.

Maurice est bien placé dans ce sens, située comme elle l'est, à un angle d'un triangle, dont les deux autres angles sont Aden et Singapour. Une brigade de la Réserve Stratégique, stationnée à Maurice, pourrait se rendre rapidement dans un pays membre de la Fédération de Grande Malaisie, à Aden ou dans les territoires est-africains. De plus, notre dépendance, Diego Garcia, possède un port naturel immense qui pourrait abriter des unités de la Marine Royale.

M. Windsor a dit que les autorités britanniques étudient attentivement cette possibilité. Le stationnement d'une brigade de la Réserve Stratégique à Maurice, de même que l'utilisation de la rade de Diego Garcia comme base pour la marine britannique, donnerait de l'emploi à un grand nombre de Mauriciens et aiderait à résoudre, du moins en partie, notre problème de chômage.

(APPENDIX 'A 2')

The Economist—July 4, 1964

"So the search has properly been on for a well-situated, sparsely populated, politically unexplosive haven in the Indian Ocean. Eyes, logarithms and compasses have been turned to Mauritius and to the Seychelles; the pointers suggest that there is a good deal to be said for one of the island dependencies of Mauritius, one at least of which does have a natural harbour and was used during the second world war. Mauritius is politically calm: its party leaders have agreed to form an all-party government and to discuss internal self-government some time after October, 1965.

But even under these moderately propitious stars, is it up to Britain alone once again to set about the job of looking for a reasonably secure base east of Suez? There has been endless argument about what an Indian Ocean base is for: a stepping stone to south-east Asia; a mounting post for peace-keeping operations like the useful east African ones in January; a guard against Arab take-over bids like the Iraq-Kuwait incident in 1961; a warning eye on British oil interests. The point is not so much which of these functions survive scrutiny—the first and second look the sounder ones—but that Sir Alec Douglas Home, Mr Wilson and Mr McNamara all agree that collectively they justify a military effort.

(APPENDIX 'A 3')

L'île Maurice et la nécessité d'une base dans l'Océan Indien

Les alliés occidentaux sont à la recherche d'une base, d'un marchepied entre l'Europe et l'Australie et l'Extrême Orient.

Cette nécessité a donné lieu à un marchandage dans les coulisses entre Washington et Whitehall au sujet de l'établissement d'une base importante, sur une île de l'Océan Indien.

Le choix semble devoir se porter sur l'île Maurice, située à 500 milles à l'est de Madagascar.

Une des propositions britanniques serait à l'effet que les USA aident à établir une base importante dans l'Océan Indien dont le double but de servir de poste de relais aux Britanniques et de ravitailler une flotte américaine de porte-avions.

Les Américains, de leur côté, ont laissé entendre qu'un engagement américain dans l'Océan Indien pourrait être conditionnel à l'appui que la Grande Bretagne donnerait au plan américain pour une force nucléaire mixte au service de Nato.

L'île Maurice, ou l'une de ses dépendances est le choix le plus plausible — non seulement pour des raisons logiques et stratégiques: ce pays jouit d'une certaine stabilité politique. Il a une population de 550 000, faite en grande partie d'Indiens introduits par les Français et les Anglais, et qui a atteint un stade d'harmonie politique et multiraciale tel que l'indépendance pourrait lui être accordée demain n'étant le manque de devises étrangères et un lourd problème de chômage. En fait, c'est exactement le genre de pays qui bénéficierait de l'argent et de l'emploi additionnels qu'une base militaire importante y déverserait.

(APPENDIX 'A 4')

London. (00.55) August 30. New American bases being sought on British islands in the Indian Ocean were "purely and simply to provide radio-communication link," official sources said here tonight.

"But," the sources added, "they could, of course, be extremely useful as forward staging points for troops."

High-level discussions are now taking place between the United States and British Governments to consider the usefulness of various islands which might be used. A British survey ship is in the Indian Ocean and experts are studying the possibilities.

The sources said they were looking for a small island on which to set up a small American relay station. This would provide better communications between United States forces in the.....

"If we find one big enough and if we could lay down a runway without spending millions on it, we could have a first-class base for troops," an authoritative source said.

(APPENDIX 'A 5')

London (08.33) Aug. 31 The Daily Telegraph stated here today that co-operation between Britain and America over the use of remote but, by modern requirements, strategically based islands as defence posts of various kinds, was long overdue.

This Conservative daily said it would be 'short-sighted' to limit the co-operation to the Mauritius dependency of Diego Garcia—"the use of which by the American Navy as a Polaris communications centre is under discussion between the two countries."

The Telegraph continued: "There are several reasons why America now needs these posts in parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean, where at present she has none.

"Her Polaris fleet is expanding fast. She wants to be better equipped for getting forces and military aid very quickly to possible trouble spots.

"One contingency might be a renewed Chinese attack on India. Others might arise from increasing Russian and Chinese activities in Africa.

"Britain has the islands strewn about. America has the forces and the money. Britain is over extended and cannot take full responsibility for new commitments just because the only possible bases happen to be British islands. The case for co-operation in some form is overwhelming."

The Telegraph stated that no doubt a howl of indignation against "Anglo-American imperialism" would arise from the Communist countries at "any such precautionary measures."

It added: "This will be joined by most of the Afro-Asian countries, although perhaps with less conviction by those who are aware of Communist activities and their own need for disinterested help in a crisis.

"In fact the islands in question are inhospitable, with populations of a couple of hundred people, who would certainly welcome and benefit from an American presence."

(APPENDIX 'A 6')

The Economist

A Vacuum to fill

The east African operations of last January, which saved the governments of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda from their mutinying armies, were models of what can be done. It does not take much imagination to think of three or four places in this rickety reach of the globe where the same call for help may be heard again. This may give offence, but is it not possible in Ceylon, or Persia, or somewhere in the Persian Gulf, or somewhere on the east coast of Africa again?

This is presumably the thought that lies behind the present Anglo-American search for a communications centre (and maybe something more) in the Seychelles or one of the Mauritius dependencies. The difficulty lies in winning Afro-Asian acceptance of the British share in this operation.

The Indian Ocean is the only large part of the world where the United States does not already bear the main burden of looking after western interests. It cannot be expected to bear the whole extra weight of trying to preserve stability between Nairobi and Singapore too; and British knowledge of the area, and the present deployment of British forces, make it common sense for Britain to help out. But Britain's surviving colonial entanglements—particularly the Aden entanglements in the north-west—still cause suspicion. This is why it is essential to explain as clearly as possible the distinction between the colonial period, which is now very near its inevitable end, and the vastly changed conditions of the post-colonial period.



(APPENDIX 'A 7')

Des Mauriciens à Londres protestent

There are persistent reports in the London press that joint consultations are at present being held between the British and American Governments for the setting up of certain bases in the Indian Ocean. Allegedly the Government of Mauritius is being consulted on the question. We are being told that these bases will be used for a communications system, but the implication is so serious that Mrs Bandaranaike of Ceylon has felt it necessary to issue a statement expressing concern about the matter and the Indian Government has deftly proposed a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean.

I feel sure that the Governments of India and Ceylon would not have been unduly worried if the discussions were merely for the installation of innocuous communication centres. I draw the conclusion, and voice the apprehension of hundreds of Mauritians in London, that the Anglo-American discussions are a conspiracy to find surreptitious ways for inaugurating a cluster of military bases on our soil and on other islands in the Indian Ocean with all the cold war concomitants that these entail.

The danger inherent in the presence of military bases in any part of the world cannot be ignored and there are too many glaring examples for us to be apathetic to the situation. The attitude of our leaders has not yet been made public but I have a strong suspicion that somehow the British Government will attempt to link this question of bases with the granting of Independence.

Let us make it clear to our elected representatives that we are not going to allow Mauritius to become a pawn on the Chessboard of the Big Powers. The presence of military bases on our soil will endanger our national security, for in the event of any war there is not one single military installation that will be immune from retaliatory measures. If it is true, as has been openly suggested in the London press, that in reality these bases will be used mainly for operations in Malaysia and South East Asia, then we shall find ourselves involved in an unholy alliance which tends to exacerbate an already tense situation fraught with unprecedented danger.

There will undoubtedly be sophisticated arguments in favour of allowing these bases to operate, on the grounds that they would bring employment and foreign capital to help us out of our present economic plight. These arguments would banish morality from the field of politics and must be rejected as despicable pragmatic logic in the most repulsive form of Machiavellism.

We are not prepared to pawn our lives for the benefit of a few crumbs of bread.

APPENDIX 'A 7"—continued

If our leaders consider that the affairs of our country can only be administered by leasing our land for doubtful military enterprises then they ought to say so to the people and in no uncertain terms. I trust our people will not be easily duped.

We do not wish to become a partner in the gigantic conflict between East and West. What we require from all the nations of the world is to be allowed to pursue our destiny in peace and friendship. Our internal problems are exacting enough and we will have to pool all the energy we can muster to bring about their solution.

I call upon all responsible citizens and particularly the intellectuals, writers, journalists and artists who have a special responsibility, being the guiding light of our nation, to do everything in their power to awaken and arouse the national consciousness to this dangerous threat.

Tell our political leaders that if it is their intention to mortgage our national security for questionable economic advantages, then we shall not rest at all until the danger is removed.

Le Mauricien — 29th September 1964.

(APPENDIX 'A 8')

The Economist—January 16, 1965
Strategies West and East

Here the Indian Ocean has been a relative gap, and it happens that Britain still possesses in it and in the south Atlantic various islands which might be made into useful staging posts. A joint Anglo-American survey has been made of a possible chain of such posts on Ascension Island, Aldabra or another island in the Seychelles, Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, and an island in the Cocos group, the administration of which was prudently transferred some years ago from Singapore to Australia. This scheme would give British and American forces convenient access to Singapore and Australia, either by way of Aden or across, or round, southern Africa, by a route relatively immune to political hazards. There are, however, one or two possible political hazards to be surmounted first. The islands are insignificant bits of sand or coral and barely inhabited; still Aldabra is administered from the Seychelles and Diego Garcia from Mauritius, and each would need to be detached by, presumably, an Order in Council and administered from London, to make the investment of putting runways and other installations on them seem a reasonable bet.

(APPENDIX 'A 9')

London. 23.55 April 5. (1965) The Government was asked in the House of Commons today what approaches had been made to the Government of MAURITIUS regarding certain facilities for an Anglo-United States base in the Indian Ocean.

Mrs Eirene White, Colonial Under-Secretary, replied that the Premier of MAURITIUS (Dr S. Ramgoolam) was consulted in July last about the joint survey of possible sites for certain limited facilities that was then about to begin.

She added: "In November, the Council of Ministers, who had been kept informed, were told that the results of the survey were still being examined and that the Premier would be consulted again before an announcement was made in London or in Washington."

MAURITIUS, an island in the Indian Ocean, was ceded to Britain by France in 1814.

(APPENDIX 'A' 10')**THE WASHINGTON POST****Sunday, May 9, 1965****ENGLAND, U.S. PLAN BASES IN INDIAN OCEAN****by Robert Eastabrook****Washington Post Foreign Service**

London, May 8. Plans for developing a series of joint Anglo-American military facilities on largely uninhabited islands in the Indian Ocean have received preliminary approval by Britain's Labor Government.

The initial outlay for acquiring necessary real estate in remote island dependencies of the British Colonies of Mauritius and the Seychelles has been estimated at \$28 million.

This would include the cost of buying out and moving the few indigenous inhabitants.

Discussions have been under way for a year about a chain of communications and staging sites, relatively invulnerable to anticolonial agitation, to assist peacekeeping operations in South and Southeast Asia as well as Africa if necessary.

In January the United States relayed a list of six to eight recommended locations based upon a survey made by an American team aboard a British ship last summer.

Navy Seeks Site

First on the priority list is Diego Garcia, a Mauritius dependency in the Chagos Archipelago 1000 miles southwest of Ceylon. Funds are already assured for a Navy communications relay station on Diego Garcia. The American request, however, is that the entire Chagos Archipelago be acquired.

Before plans can be carried further, Britain must approach local authorities in Mauritius and the Seychelles in order to transfer administrative responsibility to London for the Chagos and other faraway dependencies.

Some urgency attaches to this step because constitutional talks looking to possible early independence for Mauritius are scheduled for this fall, and it will be necessary to complete the transfer beforehand.

APPENDIX 'A' 10'—continued

Any fears that the British Labour Government might not be enthusiastic about the Indian Ocean scheme have been delayed by the enthusiasm with which new ministers have taken up the idea. It dovetails with the "East of Suez" defence concept of Prime Minister Wilson.

Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, Defence Secretary Denis Healey and Navy Minister Christopher Mayhew are particularly impressed with the possibilities. The government is under heavy pressure, however, to economise on military expenditures.

No precise arrangement has been made for sharing the initial cost, but Britain reportedly expects the United States to bear the larger portion. How much Britain can devote to development of the actual military facilities will be determined in part by a broad defence review now under way.

Inadequate Water

Such development may be relatively expensive in some instances because some of the islands lack adequate water or are surrounded by coral. But whatever the eventual American share, many diplomats as well as military men consider the cost well warranted because the opportunity to obtain such secure sites may never recur.

In addition to the Chagos Archipelago, other sites under consideration include the Aldabra islands, a dependency of the Seychelles 300 miles northwest of Madagascar, where Britain wants an air field; the Farquhar Islands, also a Seychelles dependency 150 miles north-east of Madagascar; the Agalega Islands, a Mauritius dependency 500 miles north-east of Madagascar, and the Australian-owned Cocos Islands 500 miles south of Sumatra.

American officials emphasize that the Indian ocean facilities would be primarily logistical and would not be intended as full-scale bases with garrisons. They could nevertheless be used for servicing or staging conventional air, sea and ground forces.

In response to a recent question in Parliament, Wilson denied that any submarine basis are contemplated in the area. Even though the Indian Ocean facilities would not be large, however, their presence would be potential reassurance to governments that might be intimidated by Chinese nuclear weapons.

APPENDIX 'A 10'—*continued*

Although no one likes to talk about abandonment of the big British base at Aden, some planners are thinking about an alternative. The official position is that the question of the future of the Aden base will be negotiated when the Federation of South Arabia becomes independent in 1968.

Present thinking is that either Britain or the United States would assume individual responsibility for the operation of each particular site, but that all such facilities would be available for use by both countries.

No Formal Request

No formal request for transfer of the dependencies has yet been made to the governments of Mauritius or the Seychelles, although officials were advised of the military survey.

Similarly the Australian government has not yet been approached for facilities in the Cocos Islands, but no difficulty is anticipated in view of the extensive Australian cooperation with Britain and the United States.

In the case of Mauritius the situation becomes delicate because of internal political disagreement over whether the 720 square mile territory with a population of 700,000 should opt for full independence or some lesser status in the Commonwealth.

Transfer of the dependencies could become a bone of contention, although some Mauritians believe that the military facilities would benefit the area.

Actually the far-removed dependencies are attached to Mauritius only for convenience of administration. The total population of all such lesser dependencies is under 2000.

With the Seychelles there is less of a problem because the 45,000 people are not so far advanced towards independence. This colony (where Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus spent a period in exile during the mid-1950s) lacks air connections.

Officials here suggest that agreement to build an airport as an aid to communications and tourism might ease the transfer of the dependencies.

APPENDIX 'A 10'—*continued*

The idea of American planners has been wherever possible to buy out indigenous inhabitants of the islands selected for military use and move them elsewhere. British or American nationals would then be brought in to staff the facilities.

In the case of Diego Garcia it would be necessary to purchase one foreign-owned coconut plantation. Transfer of the 664 residents of the Cocos Islands is not contemplated, however. Cocos already has a civil airport that is a stop on the route between South Africa and Australia.

Perhaps because of cost, British authorities have regarded the transfer of population as less important. Although they acknowledge that military facilities on the Indian Ocean islands might stimulate new "colonialism" propaganda charges, they believe that it probably would be possible to operate them with the local production remaining.

(APPENDIX 'A 11')

APPENDIX 'A 1'—continued

Les U.S.A. proposent Rs 135 m pour militariser les dépendances de Maurice et des Seychelles

.....
 Les Etats Unis sont fin prêts pour l'installation de bases militaires dans les dépendances de l'Ile Maurice et les Seychelles. Des fonds ont déjà été votés pour une station de relais télégraphiques destinée à la marine. La station seraient située à Diego Garcia. Des experts sont arrivés à une estimation précise: Rs 135 millions, pour le coût initial de l'acquisition des terres nécessaires et le déplacement (avec dédommagement) des habitants de ces terres. Ils sont au nombre de 2000.

Toutefois, les Etats Unis ne peuvent aller de l'avant. Il faut d'abord obtenir des gouvernements mauricien et seychellois le transfert du contrôle administratif des territoires convoités au gouvernement de Londres. Dans les milieux américains on pousse à la roue pour que le transfert ait lieu avant la conférence constitutionnelle de septembre prochain.

Londres d'accord

Le gouvernement travailliste britannique a donné son accord préliminaire au projet de création d'une chaîne d'installations militaires anglo-américaines dans des îles de l'océan Indien. C'est Robert H. Estabrook du Washington Post Foreign Service qui l'a affirmé récemment.

Il déclare par ailleurs que le nouveau gouvernement a accepté cette idée avec enthousiasme et que Michael Stewart (Affaires Etrangères), Denis Healey (Défense) et Christopher Mayhew (Marine) ont été impressionnés par les perspectives du plan. Il précise que le gouvernement britannique, sous la pression de difficultés économiques, voudrait économiser sur le budget militaire et s'attend à ce que les U.S.A. financent en grande partie le projet.

Un chapelet de stations

1. La première priorité militaire est Diego Garcia, dépendance mauricienne de l'archipel des Chagos à 1,000 milles au sud-ouest de Ceylan. Mais les conseillers U.S. voudraient que l'archipel entier soit acquis. Les autres possibilités sont: 2. les îles Aldabra, dépendances des Seychelles, à 300 milles au nord-ouest de Madagascar, où la Grande Bretagne voudrait créer un aérodrome. 3. les îles Farquhar, dépendances des Seychelles, à 150 milles au nord-est de Madagascar, 4. les îles Agaléga (Maurice) à 500 milles au nord-est de Madagascar et 5. les îles Cocos, possession australienne à 500 milles au sud de Sumatra.

La menace chinoise

Robert Eastabrook rapporte que les bases ne seraient pas dotées de garnisons mais serviraient au transit et au déploiement des forces de l'air, de mer et de terre. Même des installations de deuxième ordre seraient une garantie tangible de protection pour les pays qui pourraient être intimidés par la force nucléaire chinoise.

Aden abandonné en 1968

Personne ne parle ouvertement de l'abandon de la grosse base britannique à Aden mais certains conseillers en stratégie pensent à une alternative. Ce n'est qu'en 1968, lorsque la fédération de l'Arabie du Sud deviendra indépendante, que l'Angleterre négociera l'avenir de la base d'Aden.


La tactique américaine

A en juger par ce que rapporte ce correspondant américain, la tactique américaine consiste à minimiser la nature des liens entre Maurice et ses dépendances. Ainsi, il est allégué que ces îles dépeuplées ne représentent rien. Les U.S.A. ont évidemment intérêt à sous-estimer la valeur de nos dépendances.

La procédure préconisée par les "cerveaux" américains est d'acheter les droits des habitants d'îles choisies pour leur valeur militaire et les transférer ailleurs pour faire du repeuplement anglo-saxon.

Une base en deux temps

Par ailleurs, de source britannique, on croit savoir que M. Robert McNamara, Secrétaire d'Etat américain à la défense, est tombé d'accord pour commencer la construction des installations à Diego. Celle-ci, d'abord une station de communications américaine, pourrait devenir éventuellement une base d'arrière-garde anglo-américaine, si la base d'Aden est perdue.



(APPENDIX 'A 12')

Un gros morceau à la conférence du Commonwealth: le dilemme des bases.
Wilson décidera-t-il sans Ramgoolam?

La question de l'installation de bases dans l'Océan Indien (à Diego Garcia notamment) sera soulevée à la conférence des Premiers ministres du Commonwealth qui se réunit actuellement.

L'installation d'une base militaire dans une de nos dépendances touche de près notre pays. Or, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Premier, n'assiste pas à la conférence des Premiers ministres du Commonwealth. L'île Maurice, colonie, n'a pas été invitée par le gouvernement britannique.

Toutefois, nous pensons que Sir Seewoosagur ou un délégué averti de notre gouvernement comme M. Maurice Paturau devrait, pour une fois, être à Londres afin de pouvoir discuter à l'échelon individuel de cette importante question avec les représentants des gouvernements du Commonwealth qui participent à la conférence.

Notre correspondant particulier à Londres rapporte dans une dépêche en date du 17 juin, date de l'ouverture de la conférence des Premiers Ministres du Commonwealth:

"La Grande Bretagne discutera avec ses partenaires du Commonwealth de la possibilité de l'installation de bases militaires dans les îles de l'Océan Indien".

Il poursuit et dit que la presse britannique de dimanche dernier a fait mention de consultations que M. Harold Wilson, Premier Ministre britannique, a eues ce jour-là avec ses *senior ministers* à Chequers, pour préparer la voie.
"For straight talking later this week to Prime Ministers Conference on Britain defence dilemma".

La Grande Bretagne demandera à l'Australie et à la Nouvelle-Zélande de l'aider dans sa tâche de défendre le monde libre. Ces deux pays ont intérêt à la défense de l'Extrême Orient et de l'Asie en raison de la menace nucléaire chinoise.

Les points suivants seront soulevés avec les membres qui participeront à la conférence du Commonwealth et qui ont été mis en avant par M. Denis Healey, ministre de la Défense de Grande Bretagne.

(1) La défense du Sud Est asiatique et de l'Inde peut être assurée par une force mobile dépendant d'avions de transport ou par une chaîne de bases militaires dans l'Océan Indien. Les bases sont-elles moins chères et meilleures?

APPENDIX 'A 12'—continued

(ii) Un avion de transport coûte £ 60 millions et un investissement de £ 25 millions est nécessaire tous les 5 ans, pour lui permettre d'être opérationnel.

(iii) Pour les bases militaires dans les îles, les avions F 111 seraient choisis.

(iv) Le nombre de soldats nécessaires pour maintenir une base.

Notre correspondant particulier précise qu'une des inquiétudes exprimées par la presse britannique est la suivante:

"Can Island bases in Indian Ocean cover the oil rich Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf and enable Britain to close the costly and politically difficult base at Aden?"

Il faut toutefois préciser ici que la question militaire sera traitée "as aside line issue" avec les ministres du Commonwealth.

Le progrès des territoires britanniques vers l'indépendance et leur admission dans le Commonwealth est un des sujets qui sera discuté au cours de la 14e réunion des chefs de gouvernements du Commonwealth, qui a commencé à Londres avant-hier (jeudi 17 juin 1965).

Cette question ainsi que certaines autres sont inscrites sur l'agenda. Elles furent toutes acceptées par les représentants des 21 pays membres, après qu'ils aient été reçus par le Premier ministre britannique, M. Harold Wilson.

Les autres sujets à l'ordre du jour consistent en une revue de la situation politique et économique dans le monde et la création du secrétariat du Commonwealth. La question de l'immigration sera aussi soulevée.

(APPENDIX 'A 13'—continued)

BASE BRITANNIQUE DANS L'ARCHIPEL DES CHAGOS

/ La Grande Bretagne veut retrancher les Chagos
de l'administration de Maurice

Opposition de Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam qui propose une location**La défense à l'Est d'Aden**

Pour ceux qui ont suivi de près l'évolution de la situation politique et militaire en Arabie du Sud, la déclaration faite à Londres par le Secrétaire d'Etat aux colonies, M. Anthony Greenwood, annonçant que l'Arabie du Sud doit être indépendante avant la fin de 1966, n'a pas été une surprise.

La presse britannique avait fait état de l'évolution de cette situation. Un journal britannique, l'ECONOMIST, avait même conclu que, pour pouvoir contenir la Chine en profondeur à l'Est d'Aden, la métropole pourrait être amenée à porter son choix sur "une île de l'Océan Indien".

Nous sommes en mesure d'annoncer, aujourd'hui, que ce projet britannique a pris corps.

Le gouvernement de Maurice a été mis en présence, tout récemment, d'une proposition formelle de Londres à ce sujet.

Cette proposition est la suivante:

La métropole offre de faire acquisition de l'Archipel des Chagos pour y établir des bases aériennes. Nos dépendances deviendraient ainsi une zone d'atterrissement.

Une condition importante est attachée à cette proposition: l'île Maurice accepterait que l'Archipel des Chagos soit retranché de sa dépendance.

Londres a offert de déplacer à ses frais les habitants de ces îles—trois cents ou quatre cents familles—pour les replacer, en les dédommagerait, à Agaléga.

Le gouvernement britannique n'a encore présenté aucun prix ferme de dédommagement au gouvernement mauricien. On en ignore le montant exact.

APPENDIX 'A 13'—continued**Ramgoolam: pas de retranchement**

A ces propositions, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam a objecté que l'archipel des Chagos soit retranché de la dépendance de Maurice. Le Premier, leader du Parti Travailiste, veut plutôt d'un bail, condition qui, à ses yeux, viendrait grossir les revenus de Maurice.

A cette objection de Sir Seewoosagur, Londres opposerait, croyons-nous savoir, une objection de taille pleine d'enseignement: non retranché de la dépendance de Maurice, l'archipel des Chagos, devenu base aérienne britannique, continuerait à déprendre des aléas d'un gouvernement mauricien.

La métropole pourrait donc être bientôt placée devant une alternative fort embarrassante pour elle: (a) ou bien imposer sa décision en la déguisant, comme il convient en pareille circonstance, d'une procédure *ad hoc*; (b) ou bien céder à l'objection de Sir Seewoosagur et reviser toute la question.

Sir Seewoosagur se trouve, de ce fait, dans une situation clé. Il est peu probable qu'il puisse abandonner ainsi des dépendances mauriciennes et ses objections, il faut l'en féliciter, sont, cette fois, celles d'un esprit avisé dont la circonspection est pleine de sagesse. Aucun Mauricien ne pourra lui donner tort en la conjoncture.

Le Mauricien—27 July 1965.

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