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deployment, local factors affecting the precise timing of visits, activities to be scheduled during port calls, and publicity and press play, will be requested. The present message is designed to provide you with background information concerning the over-all concepts and policy considerations relating to the establishment of an American military presence in the Indian Ocean area.

Having in mind the entire panorama of countries from Iran and the East Coast of Africa to Indonesia and the spectrum of contingencies that confront us, or may in the future confront us, we are in this area, Exam of the opinion that a decided innex increase in our military presence is desirable as a politically versatile and visible means to help deter potential aggressors, reassure our allies, and stabilize the situation among our friends. We consider a naval presence on as nearly a permanent basis as possible to be the means best suited for forestalling some of the troubles now foreseeable and preventing others from rising to the surface.

By providing us with a wide-ranging presence, an Indian Ocean Task Force, built around an attack carrier with a nuclear and conventional capability, would have both immediate and

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lorg range advantages for our national security policy. It would give additional credence to our intent to support friendly nations in the Middle East and South Asia and would therefore have a beneficial effect on our security arrangements in the area, both from the viewpoint of the external as well as the internal threat. More specifically, reduced reaction time enabling us, possibly ina a matter of hours, to support friendly forces fighting invasion, would greatly enhance the KKH credibility of our assurances to Iran, Pakistan and ka India. Moreover, to the extent that the force might fill specific security requirements it x and enable us better " to forestall increased demands for MAP aid on the part of some of our Allies. Further important considerations are that the MAKAMANAN established presence of a task force would increase the number of options available to us in times of crisis; that we would be less vulnerable to political blackmail or demands for our withdrawal such as might occur on land if our presence were no longer desired; and that we would also have much greater freedom to reduce our commitment if this should become desirable.

The deployment of the Carrier Force should not affect other military activities in the area, including the deployment of Composite Air Strike Forces (CASF) if deemed desirable.

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As a first step, NHMEN State and Defense are formulating plans for the intermittent deployment of a carrier force for a period of about two months out of HMEN every six, possibly to begin late this year or early in 1964. The problems involved in deployment for a majority of the time are being examined concurrently with a view toward later implementation. In order to avoid premature speculation that could dissipate the effectiveness of an initial announcement from Washington and distort the impact we are trying to HMENEUM achieve, this subject should not be discussed with host governments until we come closer to the implementation phase.

FOR LONDON: Request your views as to what the reaction of the British Government is likely to be. In view of special British interests in the area, we would certainly want to discuss this matter with them before any announcement regarding establishment of an Indian Ocean Task Force is made. We should have an opportunity to develop ourXFXH purpose to the British and to make it quite clear that our objective is to increase Western military presence, which they would presumably welcome, rather than to supplant in any way M British influence or provide the British with an opportunity to reduce some of their commitments in the area.

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The IOTF, the question of Indian Ocean bases and specifically of a communications station at Diego Garcia currently under discussion, and the reorganization of our Middle East Command structure involving the disestablishment of CINCNELM in fact developed independently. For purposes of proceeding with IOTF, we believe it would be desirable for the time being to keep IOTF and other Indian Ocean questions procedurally separate although ultimately of course they are all related.

FOR MOSCOW AND HONG KONG: Would appreciate your assess-

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