

UK Defense Review
January 27, 1966

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UKR/G-3
January 21, 1966

Secretary's Talking Points

1. GENERAL APPROACH

a. We appreciate the opportunity to have a discussion in depth.

b. You know our Vietnam burden; we will continue to carry our obligations there. Your political support has been invaluable; we need your continuing support.

c. At the same time, we are aware of the pressures you face in supporting your extensive commitments. We agree with you that other nations should properly contribute much more to the overall costs of maintaining peace and security worldwide.

d. We recognize that you wish to establish expenditure ceilings in planning your future overseas posture. Our view is that major overseas retrenchments now or in the early future could be seriously damaging to both your interests and ours in the absence of some major change in the international environment. In particular you must realize it would be most difficult for us to agree to any significant reduction of your efforts in the Far East area under current conditions.

e. We do believe we can usefully discuss a range of problems affecting our mutual interests, commitments and overseas military capabilities over the next several years.

f. It is in this context that we would like to examine your views and assumptions deriving from your Defense Review.

2. INVITE UK PRESENTATION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-268

By wp, NARA, Date 4-5-94

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(NOTE: FOLLOWING MATERIAL SUMMARIZES PROPOSED US RESPONSE TO EXPECTED UK PRESENTATION)

3. UK FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE

a. We continue to regard the maintenance of major forces in Western Europe as essential to the security of the Free World and to the survival of NATO. We are pleased that you are not proposing reductions there.

b. We would be sympathetic to the notion that you treat your forces in Western Germany as more readily available for use in contingencies elsewhere, subject to appropriate advance consultation.

c. We would also be prepared to try to assist you in obtaining a better FRG offset arrangement.

4. OUR VIEWS ON MEDITERRANEAN AREA

a. As regards Malta, our primary concern is that such adjustments as you may need to make be carried out in a manner that will contribute most to local stability and avoid possible economic reorientation of the Maltese Government toward the bloc.

b. We recognize the value of your forces on Malta for potential use in the Middle East, but accept your gradually phasing them down provided alternative arrangements are made for the Libya commitment.

c. Regarding Cyprus, we welcome your retention of the CENTO commitment and your constructive motivation in planning to turn over one of your base areas as a contribution to the ultimate settlement of the Cyprus issue. We reluctantly accept your phasing down your forces and military supplies on Cyprus, again provided alternative arrangements can be made for the Libya commitment.

d. On Libya, we strongly urge that as a minimum you maintain your treaty commitment, your arrangements for

protection of the King, a significant military presence in Cyrenaica, and the capability to bring in additional forces from the outside. We would be prepared to discuss with you possibilities for our cooperation in this respect, conceivably including airlift assistance for your forces and materiel if that should be required.

5. ADEN AND PERSIAN GULF

a. We regret the necessity for it, but we understand and accept your decision regarding withdrawal from Aden within the next two or three years.

b. We welcome your intent to build up your forces in the Persian Gulf area, in order to maintain a significant peace-keeping capability in the region. We agree with your assessment that your role in this area is important also in assuring Iran.

6. INDIAN OCEAN-EAST AFRICA

a. We strongly support the continuing operation of the Royal Navy and Air Force in the Indian Ocean and development of some Indian Ocean Island facilities as elements in maintaining an adequate peace-keeping capability in the East African and Arabian Sea-Persian Gulf areas.

b. We consider it essential that you keep in being quick-reaction forces for use throughout the area, including sufficient facilities for support of potential international peace-keeping forces.

c. We are willing to examine with you the future utility of Indian Ocean Island facilities as an element in maintaining a longer range peace-keeping capability.

d. Although we have no immediate construction plans, we would welcome any indications of your intention to establish such facilities as a fuel depot in Diego Garcia and an air staging base on Aldabra, with priority to the latter.

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e. With regard to the latter, we would be prepared to contribute to construction costs of an RAF station involving joint usage rights previously discussed between us.

7. SOUTHERN AFRICA

a. We understand your wish to reduce your commitments in this area.

b. We would urge, however, that you consider stretching out the timetable for your disengagement and that you maintain some residual commitment and military presence to assist in providing security after the High Commission Territories become independent.

8. WESTERN HEMISPHERE

a. We welcome your decision to keep troops in British Guiana until October 31, 1966.

b. We urge you maintain continuing contact with Guiana on security problems after your troops are withdrawn.

9. MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE-BORNEO-HONG KONG

a. We appreciate your undertaking to maintain essentially your current force levels in the Singapore-Malaysia area under present conditions in the Far East.

b. We understand and accept your decision to make some cut in the garrison in Hong Kong.

c. We regard your presence in Singapore as of great importance for many years to come, and consider it highly desirable that you retain your position there as long as possible.

d. We do recognize the problem you face in the long run cost of maintaining your presence in this general area, and will be prepared to undertake detailed discussions with you on this and related problems (see next item).

10. PROPOSED FOUR-POWER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

a. We are interested in hearing your detailed thoughts on the subject of possible four-power security arrangements in the Far East-Indian Ocean area.

b. We recognize the necessity of considering what alternative arrangements, including facilities, we should look to in the event that you should be compelled to leave Singapore at some future time.

c. Without prejudice to examining such specific proposals as you may have in mind, we consider that there would be some disadvantages in going to highly formalized international arrangements; we suggest that we might explore carefully a variety of less formal arrangements for cooperation in politico-military planning, military contingency planning, cooperative logistic arrangements and joint use of facilities.

d. We are particularly concerned that there should be no public disclosure now of any agreement to planning for the Southeast Asia area that could either (1) foreshadow early retrenchments of your forces there or (2) raise problems that would be associated with a four-power "White Man's Club" in the area.

e. Subject to the above, we will be prepared to participate with you in further talks, including four-power conversations, for a detailed, intensive examination of this problem.

11. DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER ALLIES

We might discuss what steps if any you propose to take, or we might take jointly, in discussing this general range of problems with our NATO allies, and in due course with other allies in the Far East and possibly the Near East-South Asia region.

12. UK WHITE PAPER - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

a. We understand you may wish to incorporate in your

White Paper a substantial indication of the results of your very intensive Defense Review.

b. We urge that you stress as far as you can the positive aspects of your resultant defense posture: your decision to leave your forces in NATO at current strengths, your undertakings to maintain your current force levels in the Far East in light of the continuing threat in the area, and your determination to continue to carry out your responsibilities for peace-keeping in the Africa-Near East-Indian Ocean areas.

c. We believe it could be seriously detrimental to your interests as well as ours if public disclosures should provide a basis for speculation that you are planning to leave Singapore, for example. We also consider it advisable to avoid, at least for the present, any indication that there has been agreement to new arrangements among the four white nations involving the Far East-Indian Ocean area.

13. FOLLOW-UP ARRANGEMENTS

a. Points that would seem to require some detailed follow-up talks include:

- (1) Coordination of our planning for intervention in Libya.
- (2) (Possibly) Your future arrangements in Southern Africa.
- (3) The future utilization of the Indian Ocean islands.
- (4) The four-power security arrangements for the Far East-Indian Ocean area.

b. We would welcome your suggestions as to specific arrangements (such as joint study groups) for following up on any or all of these topics.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
G/PM - Col. Lindjord	G/PM - Mr. Kitchen
	EUR - Mr. Leddy
S/S-S:LSEagleburger:room 7239, ext. 7552	