

AIRGRAM

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DEF 15 IND-45
XR DEF 145

A-2170

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DEF 1 IND
AIR PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

COPY NO

DEF 4 4K-45

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA for POLAD,
CINCLANT for POLAD, CINCPAC for POLAD

COPY NO.

SERIES B

DATE: March 3, 1964

FROM : AmEmbassy, LONDON

SUBJECT: Indian Ocean Island Facilities

REF : Embtel 4187

LIMDIS.

The referenced telegram has sketched the general nature of the discussions on this subject which took place in London 25-27 February 1964. The purpose of this airgram is to transmit for the record the pertinent documents, and to convey something of the general atmosphere of these discussions.

Attached for these purposes, therefore, are: a copy of the agreed statement of the results of the discussion, together with a list of participants and a joint analysis of the political effect of an increased U. S. defense presence in the Indian Ocean and the nature of the diplomatic presentations to be made as a consequence (Enclosure No. 1); a summary presentation of a British military appreciation of the potential for strategic development purposes of the Indian Ocean islands (Enclosure No. 2); and a summary of essential data on these islands (Enclosure No. 3).

Enclosures att-4P

1. Agreed statement with attachments
2. Summary presentation
3. Summary of essential data

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NLJ/RAC 00-336

By us, NARA, Date 12-6-04

FORM
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G/PM-Heyers/flj,kf&lbs

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DOD/ISA - R. Bronez (in draft)

POL/F - R. A. Ericson

February 28, 1964

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From AmEmbassy, London

The general atmosphere in these discussions was cordial. The Foreign Office, Ministry of Defense and Service representatives clearly wished to move the conversations along to points of mutual agreement and to act in cooperation so far as strategic development of the islands was concerned. The Colonial Office representatives, while friendly, were unwilling to commit their Ministry to action without the usual reservations about consulting local authorities and the need to make haste slowly. The Commonwealth Relations Office representative could not convey information on Africa largely due to the need to await the results of his Minister's pending visit to East Africa and his consequential decisions. Despite these qualifications, it is clear that HMG is truly pleased at this U. S. initiative in this area, wants to cooperate as far as it can, and wishes to be consulted closely on future developments. This last point should be emphasized. The British regard our presence as supplementary to theirs; not as a substitution.

Of particular items of interest, the following are worth noting:

The British strategic concepts concerning use of the islands are essentially similar to those of the U. S. They see development of particular islands as insurance against loss or limitation of existing base or staging facilities. They envisage developing the western island area (particularly Aldabra) to avoid, if required, overflying black Commonwealth Africa on the way to the Far East and as means of enhancing police operations in East Africa and the Middle East. They see the middle island area development as helpful to their uncertain position in the Maldives. They do not envisage withdrawal from their bases on the littoral, but wish to provide for contingencies of this nature and for a secondary line of support behind the on-shore base complex.

In practical terms, the UK might be willing to play a major role in constructing facilities in Aldabra, while their immediate interests in Diego Garcia seem limited to use of supplementary U. S. facilities (e.g. an airstrip) if necessary, and to putting in an oil storage depot and possibly a small communications facility on land not needed by the U. S.

3.3 (b) (6)

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

George S. Newman
George S. Newman

Counselor for

Politico-Military Affairs

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Enclosure No. 1
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U.S. Defence Interests in the Indian Ocean
MEMORANDUM of U.K./U.S. London Discussions

February 1964

Official discussions between representatives of the U.K. and U.S. Governments took place in London from February 25-27, 1964. On the U.K. side, the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence and Service Departments took part. On the U.S. side, the Departments of State and of Defense and the military commands concerned were represented. A list of both delegations is at Annex A. The following is agreed between the two sides as recording the results of the discussions and recommendations to their respective governmental authorities for future action.

Background

2. The U.S. Government is considering a greater defense presence in the Indian Ocean area to complement (but not in any way to replace) the existing British effort in this area. U.S. participation is likely to mean over a period of time:-

- (a) Periodic visits by a U.S. task force into the Indian ocean area.
- (b) The installation of military communications and technical facilities on islands under British sovereignty. ②
- (c) The development of austere base facilities to support U.S. forces which may be deployed in the area. ③

H.M.G. in the U.K. have welcomed this American initiative and agree that their joint basic objectives in the Indian Ocean area are first to deter Communist encroachment on countries bordering the Indian Ocean and second to have the capacity to deal firmly and rapidly with local disturbances in the area.

3. It was accepted by both delegations that the U.S. interest in developing a greater defense presence and support facilities in the area was conceived as a complement to the existing U.K. strategic posture, and would provide a valuable joint insurance in case of any loss or limitation of use of existing facilities.

Political reactions by countries on the periphery and presentation by both Governments to third countries of the American initiative.

4. The two delegations agreed on a joint assessment (at Annex B) of the probable reactions of countries on the periphery to the American initiative and on the line which should be followed by both Governments in presenting this, as the need arises, to third countries.

5. As regards periodic visits of the task force, the U.S. delegation agreed to keep H.M.G. informed of U.S. general intentions and, in particular, to give as much notice as possible of requests to visit any U.K. bases.

U.S. Interest in technical and support facilities.

6. The U.S. delegation (affirmed their positive interest in the development of a

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communications facility, subject to joint survey, in Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, which is now under the administration of Mauritius. They also expressed interest in the development of austere support facilities in Diego Garcia, and in a lower order of priorities possibly in Aldabra, the remainder of the Seychelles area, and the Cocos/Keeling Islands (under Australian administration). Such facilities might include in the long-term:-

- (a) Stockpile area for substantial portion of an Army division plus other pre-stockage facilities.
- (b) Air base capable of supporting cargo, troop carrier, and tanker aircraft. Facilities to support antisubmarine patrol operations and air logistic operations. Parking area for two to four squadrons of aircraft.
- (c) Naval anchorage and base area to support a carrier task force, amphibious, and support ships.
- (d) Communications station.
- (e) Amphibious staging area.
- (f) Space tracking and communications facilities.
- (g) Fuel and ammunition storage.
- (h) Secondary support anchorages and logistic air strips.

The U.K. delegation reserved their position about the dimensions of any space tracking facilities which the U.S. might possibly propose to establish on Diego Garcia.

The U.S. delegation recognized that topography might preclude the location of facilities for the above objectives in one single island and, since the entry of their forces into the area in individual instances might be from either East or West, according to circumstances, envisaged the development of some support facilities at both extremes of the Indian Ocean, with, ideally, a principal base area in the center. The U.S. delegation emphasized that they wished to avoid the political problems arising from the development of military facilities in populated areas and to have assured security of tenure for at least 25 years.

Diego Garcia

7.

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3.3 (b)(6)

8.

9. When it is agreed that a survey can take place, this should be a joint project, under U.K. auspices, with the U.S. contingent of minimum size necessary. The U.K. would provide one of H.M. ships for the purpose.

Aldabra

10. The U.S. delegation expressed a possible interest in the eventual development of an air staging post in the Western Indian Ocean. Aldabra seemed a likely possible site for this. The U.K. delegation said there might well be a future U.K. requirement of a similar nature in this area and made available to the U.S. side a survey for a possible airfield, which had already been completed of Aldabra. Consideration of such a facility was agreed by both delegations to be a matter for further reference to governmental authorities.

Cocos/Keeling Islands

11. The U.S. delegation explained that they had already been advised informally by Australian authorities of interest in U.S. use of facilities to be developed in the Cocos/Keeling islands. It was agreed by both delegations that since the U.K. also shared a positive interest in facilities there, further approaches to the Australians might best be undertaken in concert by the U.K./U.S. At the same time a general explanation would be given to the Australians of the discussions held between the U.K. and the U.S. It was agreed that the U.K. and U.S. Governments would keep in close touch on this matter.

Summary of agreed recommendations

12. The U.K. delegation agreed to recommend to the U.K. governmental authorities that they should:-

(a) Consider favourably the possibility of the development by the U.S. of such facilities on U.K. island possessions as they may require, on the following general principles:-

(i)

(ii) U.S. Government should be responsible for all construction and maintenance costs.

(iii) U.S. Government would share these facilities, during development and subsequently, with the U.K.

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- (iv) The two governments would consult as necessary about the establishment of any possible U.K. military facilities that might be required.

(b)

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- (c) As soon as politically practicable, facilitate a joint survey of Diego Garcia and any other islands under British sovereignty in the Indian Ocean area that the U.S. may require.

13. The U.S. delegation agreed:-

- (a) To recommend to the U.S. Governmental Authorities acceptance of the proposals set out in paragraph 12 above.
- (b) To consider further the location of a site for an air staging post in the Western Indian Ocean.
- (c) To consider further whether jointly to approach the Australian Government regarding possible use of facilities in the Cocos/Keeling Islands.
- (d) To communicate further with the U.K. regarding all the above.

London
27th February, 1964.

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ANNEX A

U.S. Delegation

Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen

Mr. Frank Sloan

Rear Admiral J.W. Leverton, Jr.

Mr. Howard Meyers

Mr. George Newman

Mr. Ray Bronez

Captain Walter Stencil

Mr. R.A. Ericson, Jr.

Colonel George Hannah

Captain Charles Tucker

U.K. Delegation

Mr. E.H. Peck

Mr. J.P. Waterfield

Rear Admiral P.J. Hill-Norton

Captain J.C.Y. Roxburgh, R.N.

Commander G.R.M. de la Pasture, R.N.

Lieutenant-Colonel A.H. Thrift

Lieutenant-Colonel V.H. Martin

Mr. M. Holton

Mr. F.H. Mawer

Mr. R.F. Havell

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Politico - Military Affairs

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs

Deputy Chief of Staff, CINCLANT

Department of State

American Embassy

Department of Defense

Joint Staff

American Embassy

U.S. Air Force Staff

London Staff, CINCSTRIKE

Assistant Under-Secretary, Foreign Office

Foreign Office

Assistant Chief of Naval Staff

Deputy Director of Plans (Navy)

Defence Planning Staff

Defence Planning Staff

Defence Signal Staff

D.S.11, Ministry of Defence

M II, Admiralty

Head of S 6, Air Ministry

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ANNEX A (cont'd.)

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Group Captain J.H.L. Blount

Major-General G.R. Price

Mr. J.D. Higham

Honble, A.P. Cumming-Bruce

Mr. R. Terrell

Deputy Director Air Plans 2, Air Ministry

Commonwealth Relations Office

Colonial Office

Colonial Office

Colonial Office

Note:- Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, State Department, and Mr. R.S. Crawford, Assistant Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, also attended for part of the talks.

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ANNEX B

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The Political Effect of increased American defence participation in the Indian Ocean on the countries of the periphery and the political presentation to be made by the U.K. and U.S. Authorities

Introduction

"Increased American participation is likely to mean:-

- (a) Periodic visits into the area of an American carrier force (say once every six months). This force is likely to sail from the Pacific through the Singapore or Malacca Straits, and to visit Diego Suarez, Aden and the Gulf of Oman (and probably Mombasa) on the initial visit and possibly Karachi and an Indian port, Malaysia and Indonesia. Subsequent visits will depend on circumstances.
- (b) The installation of a few communications and other technical facilities on British possessions (e.g. most probably in the Chagos Archipelago).
- (c) The possible development of an "austere base" - i.e. airstrip, anchorage, oil depot, on one or more islands under U.K. control.

2. Paragraph (a) above is more likely to attract publicity than (b) or (c). Our line, agreed with the Americans, might be "this is not provocative; this is an area where the British have always provided the major Western presence; now here is a sign of Western solidarity, and of an increasingly solid Western military guarantee behind the various Western treaty commitments (CENTO, SEATO etc.)."

COUNTRY BY COUNTRY ASSESSMENT OF REACTIONS TO INCREASED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.K./U.S. ACTION IN EACH CASE

The following assessment and recommendations for action have been agreed by the U.K. and U.S. delegations during their talks in London from February 25 to 27, 1964

IRAN

<u>Reaction</u>	Would welcome Naval task force deployment; no problems with technical facilities; would welcome austere base. Grateful for support and for presence in Indian Ocean.
<u>Action by U.S./U.K.</u>	Make the most of the "support for CENTO and for Iran" theme.

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ANNEX B (cont'd.)

IRAQ

Reaction

Reaction largely dependent on volume of communist - neutralist propaganda, and on state of Arab-U.S. relations. Mildly suspicious but not deeply interested.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Diplomatic explanation of any major visits to the Gulf by U.S. representative in Baghdad portray increased U.S. presence as not directed against any state, available for help in natural disasters, potential support for countries menaced by CHICOM expansionist efforts.

U.A.R.

Reaction

As for Iraq, but quick to seize on any tactlessness in presentation for anti-West propaganda.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

As for Iraq.

SUDAN

Reaction

Not interested.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

If Sudanese inquire, use line recommended for Iraq.

ETHIOPIA

Reaction

Interested, probably welcoming attitude.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Careful presentation through U.S./U.K. diplomatic channels. Line similar to that for Iraq, adding that presence will make for greater stability in the area.

PERSIAN GULF GENERAL

Reaction

Take note that U.S. appear to be backing up British policies - grateful for this.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.K. primary responsibility.

KUWAIT

Reaction

As for Persian Gulf.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. will explain locally before task force enters area. U.K. will support as necessary.

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SAUDI ARABIA

Reaction

While public attitude would be constricted by pan-Arab and pan-African feeling, would welcome task force. Have no problems with technical facilities and generally would be pleased with increased U.S. presence.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. should explain with attention directed to increased ability to contribute to stability of area.

SOMALI REPUBLIC

Reaction

Government position opposed; possible that pro-Western element may be encouraged.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. should do their best with diplomatic presentation along lines for Iraq, but without reference to CHICOM threat.

EAST AFRICA
(Kenya, Uganda,
Tanganyika)

Reaction

Perhaps less influenced than formerly by pan-African line, which is likely to allege that cold war is being brought into Indian Ocean. But with tactful presentation, with particular note of friendly intentions, might welcome privately increased presence, and would probably welcome benefits of occasional visits. Probably apprehensions that increased U.S. presence might adversely affect their desires for neutralist position.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Great care with presentation and timing of any visits. U.S. must make approaches but U.K. would welcome prior consultation over method and timing.

ZANZIBAR

Reaction

Likely to be distinctly adverse and would not welcome naval visits.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

As above, but more difficult to prevent loud protests.

MADAGASCAR

Reaction

Has requested task force visit. Likely to welcome

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ANNEX B (cont'd.)

Action by
U.S./U.K.

SOUTH AFRICA

Reaction

Action by
U.S./U.K.

future visits and increased U.S. military presence.
U.S. to confirm when task force schedule clear.

Welcome.

None at present. (U.S. not presently considering sending this task force to South Africa.)

South-East Asia

BURMA

Reaction

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Publicly highly suspicious; danger of protests if not carefully handled. Private satisfaction that Western strength increased in area vis-a-vis Chinese.

Careful presentation, stressing non-aggressive intention.

MALAYSIA

Reaction

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Pleased, provided the carrier force does not visit Indonesia, but might reluctantly accept such a visit anyhow, dependent on the circumstances at the time. No problems with technical facilities; would welcome increased U.S. presence as backing up U.K.

U.S. responsibility to clear visits with Malaysians; dependent on task force schedule and influenced by reactions of India, Pakistan, Indonesia. U.S. will keep U.K. informed on political and military levels.

INDONESIA

Reaction

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Probably reluctant to have task force visit Indonesia. Particularly suspicious if carrier force visits Malaysia. Opposed to any increased U.S. military presence in "Indonesian Ocean".

U.S. responsibility.

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ANNEX B (cont'd.)

THAILAND

Reaction

Welcome support for SEATO.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Plug this for all that it is worth.

INDIA

Reaction

Any increase in U.S. military presence likely to provide adverse press and Governmental reaction. Intensity of this reaction will be conditioned by internal domestic factors - non-alignment needs, and whether CHICOMS threatening. In last event Indians could almost welcome presence. No great problems with technical facilities.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Careful presentation before taking any action. U.S. responsibility to obtain clearance for visits.

PAKISTAN

Reaction

Indifferent to technical facilities; probably would accept task force visits, although not happy about it. Would accept increased U.S. presence but public attitude would be dependent on state of Indo-Pakistan, CHICOM and U.S.-U.K./Pakistan relations and on Afro-Asian reactions.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. responsibility. Careful presentation of political and further military benefits of task force and increased U.S. presence, particularly to Ayub. U.K. would welcome being kept closely informed and would support if necessary.

CHINA

Reaction

Strongly hostile obviously; possibilities for anti-American exploitation dependent on reactions of other countries.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

No initiative by either U.K. or U.S.

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CEYLON

Reaction

Except for communication facility, Government and public reactions hostile. Will be strongly opposed to any increased U.S. military presence. No visits by task force expected to be allowed (particularly due to Ceylon's denial of visits of "ships with nuclear weapons or equipment for nuclear warfare").

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. responsibility. U.K. would welcome being kept informed.

Conclusion

Although increased American participation will be welcome to several countries in the area, it will provoke suspicion and criticism in several others whose hostility will be exploited by the Chinese Communists. The critics are likely to be more vocal than the supporters of this development. Every effort should be made to reduce this reaction to the minimum by careful advance explanations to the countries in the area.

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SUMMARY OF ISLANDS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Island	Political Affiliation	Population	Area (sq.m.)
<u>Agalega</u>	Mauritius	225	
North			5
South			5
<u>Aldabra Group</u>	Seychelles		
Aldabra		100	6.4
Assumption		31	.6
<u>Amirante Islands</u>	Seychelles		
African Islets			
Alphonse	N11		?
D'Arros	93		.7
Desroches	105		.75
Eagle	112		1.9
Marie Louise	N11		
Poivre	16		.2
St. Joseph	78		1.5
	N11		?
<u>Astove</u>	Seychelles	50	1.9
<u>Chagos Archipelago</u>	Mauritius		
Danger			
Diego Garcia	N11		?
Eagle	200		11
Egmont	N11		?
Nelsons	N11		?
Perhos Banhos	N11		?
(32 islands)	342		5
Salamon (11 islands)			
Three Brothers	205		3.5
	N11		?
<u>Christras Island</u>	Australia	2000	
<u>Cocos/Keeling Islands</u>	Australia	650	
<u>Coetivy</u>	Seychelles	210	2.5
<u>Cosmoledo Group</u>	Seychelles		
Goelette			
Mensai	N11		
Polyte	N11		
South	N11		
	N11		

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Cosmoledo Group (cont'd)

West North
Wizard

N11
N11

Farquhar Group

Seychelles

Cerf
Farquhar
Golette
Providence
St. Pierre
Trois Iles

N11
172
N11
70
45
N11
2.4
.6
.6

Kuria Muria Islands

Aden

Total 28

Gharzant
Hallaniya
Hasikiya
Qibiya
Suda

N11
55
N11
N11
N11

Maldives (200 Islands) Independent

90,000

Total 100

Addu Atoll (including Gan)

8000

Masirah

Oman

2000

Mauritius

British Colony

681,619

720

Rodriguez

Mauritius

18,335

40

St. Brandon

Mauritius

90

.5

Otherwise known as Cargados
Carajos

Seychelles

British Colony

Bird
Denis
Frigate
La Digne
Mahé
North
Platte
Praslin
Recife
Silhouette
St. Anne

49
67
94
1,842
33,478
53
21
3,836
4
780
N11
.25
.5
.9
4
56
.8
.2
15
.08
8
?

Socotra

Aden

12,000

1400

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SOCOTRA

1. Position. Latitude 12° 0'N Longitude 53° 0'E
2. Political Status. Sultanate of Socotra, with nominal suzerainty of the Arab mainland region of Mahra. Has been under British protection since 1886 and is subject to an advisory treaty concluded in 1954.
3. Population and General Features. 12,000 (estimate, 1952). About 70 miles by 20 miles. It rises from sandy coastal plains to limestone plateaux with an average height of 1,000 feet and a nucleus of granite peaks rising about 4,000 feet.
4. Climate. Torrid. North east monsoon November to March, south west monsoon June to August.
5. Communications. Nil.
6. Water. Generally available north central and north eastern areas. Abundant supplies from November to March during NE monsoon. Water at the airfield at Ras Karma for the war time garrison of between 500-700 was obtained from two wells nearby.
7. Port Facilities. No ports. Some landing places on north and south sides of the island, and several anchorages. Jetty near airfield in disrepair.
8. Airfield Facilities.
 - (a) An airfield, sited about 7 nm west of Hadibo, was a World War II RAF Wellington station, but was abandoned in 1947 and no maintenance has been carried out since. No facilities are available and although still suitable for occasional use by piston engined aircraft of the Beverley category, it would be necessary to construct a new runway and to provide support facilities for operational use.
 - (b) Runway details
 - (i) NNE/SSW 9000 x 600 ft. (but only 4000 x 300 ft. usable).
 - (ii) ENE/WSW 6000 x 600 ft. (but only 4600 x 300 ft. usable).
 - (iii) WNW/ESE 3000 x 300 ft. (unusable).

All runways are of graded and compacted sandy earth with stone debris, sparsely grassed and littered with loose stones. Encroaching wadis and lack of maintenance since 1947 have considerably reduced the usable lengths of the runways and because of the quantity of loose stones they are unsuitable for light aircraft or aircraft with single wheel undercarriages. Aircraft with multi-wheeled undercarriages (e.g. Beverley) can use the NNE/SSW and ENE/WSW runways but damage from loose stones is possible.

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(c) Capability of Extension. We have no information on the development capability of this airfield and to give a reliable assessment of this a detailed study would be necessary. However, from a quick appraisal it appears that surrounding hills (east through south to south-west) in approaches would probably limit any appreciable extension of the NNE/SSW and WNW/ESE runways, but the ENE/WSW runway seems to be comparatively clear of obstructions and it is possible that a runway in excess of 9,000 ft. could be provided on this or on a slightly different alignment. However, since the ground to the south west is crossed by shallow wadis a ground survey would be necessary to determine its suitability for runway construction.

9. Electricity supplies. Nil.
10. POL Storage. Nil

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KURIA MURIA ISLANDS

1. Position. Latitude 17°30' North. Longitude 55°52' East.
2. Political Status. The Kuria Muria islands are technically part of Aden Colony but are administered by the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.
3. Population and General Features. Only the largest island of the group, Hallaniya, is inhabited. The population is transient and rarely exceeds 70. The five islands extend about 45 miles from west to east, and lie some 25 miles south of the mainland. The islands are mostly formed of granite with rocky peaks.
4. Climate. The climate is very hot and dry. Strong winds occur during the south-west monsoon. Rainfall is about 2-8 inches per annum.
5. Communications. None.
6. Water. Water is found on only two of the islands. On Hallaniya water is plentiful for the requirements of the present population but is brackish. There is some water on Suda Island.
7. Port Facilities. Some shelter can be found from the south-west on the north side of Hallaniya but there are no natural harbours.
8. Airfield Facilities. None.
9. Other Facilities. None.

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MASIRAH

1. Position. Latitude 20° 20'N Longitude 58° 40' E.
 2. Political Status. Part of the Sultanate of Oman.
 3. Population and General Features. 2,000 (estimated). 40 miles by 8 miles. Barren, rolling hills, highest point 750 ft. in the north.
 4. Climate. Hot and dry for most of the year. Strong south west winds prevail June to October. North-east winds prevail November to March.
 5. Communications. RAF radio.
 6. Water. Scarce natural sources. Limited supplies by distillation.
 7. Port Facilities. One small jetty near airfield at northern tip of island, where stores can be landed from vessels at anchor $\frac{1}{2}$ mile off-shore. Otherwise only beach landings. A new deep water terminal for unloading up to 2.330M gallons aviation fuel has been provided beside the jetty on the north-west tip of the island. Jetty and beach landings are impossible during the monsoon period from May to September.
 8. Airfield Facilities. Under development as a staging post and operating point. Main runway NNW/SSE 7,500 x 150 ft asphalt, designed to a LCN of 40, but because of high weight-bearing capacity of the sub-soil the actual LCN is likely to be about 60; capable of extension to over 12,000 ft. Subsidiary runway ENE/WSW 5,650 x 100 ft. sand and gravel, LCN 50; capable of extension to at least 8,000 ft.
 9. Electricity Supplies. }
 10. POL Storage. }
- } RAF as above

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SEYCHELLES GROUP

1. Position. Ninety or so islands lying between Latitude 4° and 10° South, and Longitude 46° and 57° East.
2. Political Status. British Colony.
3. Population and General Features. Total population of the colony in 1960 was 41,500 of which 33,500 live on Mahé. They derive largely from the original French colonists and their slaves, and from Chinese and Indian immigrants. The principal islands of the group including Mahé, Praslin, La Digne, and Silhouette are granitic, mountainous, or hilly, and some are fringed by reefs. The other islands are flat and of coral formation.
4. Climate. The climate is warm, humid, and monsoonal. The islands are under the influence of the SE monsoon from May to October, and of the NW monsoon from December to March, with intervening periods of variable winds.
5. Communications. See Mahé, otherwise nil.
6. Water. Supplies are generally adequate throughout the year but are often polluted, and sources of water should be treated.
7. Port Facilities. Only developed in Mahé. See Mahé and Aldabra.
8. Airfield Facilities. There are no airfields in the archipelago.
9. Electricity Supplies. See Mahé, otherwise nil.
10. POL Storage. See Mahé, otherwise nil.

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MAHE

1. Position. Latitude 40° 40' South, Longitude 55° 28' East.
2. Political Status. British Colony.
3. Population and General Features. Population of Mahe in 1960 was 33,500. Mahe 17 miles by 4 miles, is the largest of a group of 90 islands and reefs. It has little level ground and consists of rugged, partly palm covered terrain with heavily weathered granites rising to form main peaks of 3,000 ft.
4. Climate. Warm, humid. Monsoonal winds south easterly May to October, west north westerly winds December to March. Weather fair during south east monsoon; overcast, squally and rainy during north west monsoon.
5. Communications. There is a Cable and Wireless station.
6. Water. Generally adequate.
7. Port Facilities. Extensive anchorage in 7-13 fathoms. One small pier - depth at head 12 ft where frigates can berth stern to. A few local cargo craft. Monthly steamer service from East Africa and Bombay.
8. Airfield Facilities. None existing though the lagoon was used by flying boats during the war. Air Ministry in conjunction with the Colonial Office have recently completed a survey and a possible site has been discovered for a 10,000 ft. runway.
9. Electricity. Available.
10. POL Storage. Bulk storage for 608 tons.

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ALDABRA

1. Position. Latitude 9° 25'South Longitude 46° 22'East.
2. Political Status. British Colony - dependency of the Seychelles.
3. Population and General Features. Population about 100. Four flat coral islands, total area about 6½sq. miles, forming an atoll. Scrub vegetation.
4. Climate. Warm, humid. Monsoonal south easterly winds from May to October and west north west winds from December to March.
5. Communications. Nil.
6. Water. Brackish water from shallow pools and well. Limited fresh water in South Island (the main island) only.
7. Port Facilities. None developed. There are anchorages outside the lagoon and a channel about 8-9 fathoms deep into the lagoon for 1 3/4 miles. Remainder of lagoon is shallow and full of coral heads. To seaward shore is steep to and impracticable for landing stores. Inside the lagoon it is impossible to approach the shore at all except in very shallow draft craft. Large scale landing of stores would require construction of a deep water harbour or at least a harbour to take lighters.
8. Airfield Facilities. None existing. Sufficient flat land exists for constructing an airfield but all facilities would need to be provided labour would have to be brought from Mahé.
9. Electricity Supplies. Nil.
10. POL Storage. Nil.

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MAURITIUS

1. Position. Latitude 20° 18'South Longitude 57° 35'East.
2. Political Status. British Colony with Dependencies.
3. Population and General Features. 681,619 (1962). Area 720 sq. miles. Northern part is fairly flat, rising gradually to a central plateau. Elsewhere coastal plain is narrow. Bordering the central plateau are 3 mountain ranges and other isolated hills and peaks. Extensive sugar cane. Mountains and isolated hill areas are forested.
4. Climate. Tropical maritime. Prevailing south east trade winds; cyclones, especially December to April.
5. Communications
 - (a) RN Wireless Station.
 - (b) Cable. World wide via Seychelles, Rodriguez and Durban.
 - (c) Radio. To Dar-es-Salaam.
6. Water. Generally adequate.
7. Port Facilities. Port Louis. One alongside berth for a vessel up to 600 ft. and 30 ft. draught. Several mooring buoys. Shore cranes available, max. lift 20 tons. Wartime fuelling berth (by flexible pipeline) existed at Grand Port in south east of island.
8. Airfield Facilities. Airfield at Plaisance 20° 26'South 57° 41'East, elevation 180 ft., runway 6640 ft., concrete on rock. Estimated LCN 50. Has been used by Britannias at 164,000 lb AUW. Diversion airfield available at Reunion Island (French) 127 nm distant.
9. Electricity Supplies. Available.
10. POL Storage. Available at Port Louis from commercial sources. 3 depots total capacity 43,000 tons.

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AGALEGA

1. Position. Latitude 10° 33'South. Longitude 56° 45'East.
2. Political Status. Dependency of Mauritius.
3. Population and General Features. The population is about 225. Agalega consists of two main islands about 12 miles long, joined by a ridge of drying sand about one mile long. Both islands are thickly covered with coconut trees.
4. Climate. Mean daily maximum temperature varies from 87°F in March to 81°F in August. Winds are predominantly between east and south east, 5 to 10 knots. Cloud cover will exceed 6/8 on about 12 days a month throughout the year.
5. Communications. None
6. Port Facilities. Anchorage is obtainable in depths of 17 to 20 fathoms in Little Mapeu Bay on the western side of South Island.

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RODRIGUEZ

1. Position. Latitude 19° 42' South, Longitude 63° 27' East.
2. Political Status. Dependency of Mauritius.
3. Population and General Features. The population numbers about 18,300 people. The island is of volcanic foundation composed principally of basalt with a little upraised coral at each end. It is hilly throughout with but little level land.
4. Climate. Mean daily maximum temperature varies between 87°F in January and 78°F in July. The prevailing wind is between east and south east, 5 to 7 knots. Mean cloud cover throughout the year is between 4/8 and 5/8.
5. Port Facilities. There is an excellent anchorage for vessels of deep draught in Mathwin Bay. Access is through two channels having least depths of seven and four fathoms respectively.
6. Communications. Rodriguez is connected with the general telegraph system.
7. Water. Water is scarce in the dry season, from November to December, as many of the streams are dry.

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CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO

1. Position. Latitude 5°20' South. Longitude between 71° and 72° East.
2. Political Status. Dependency of Mauritius.
3. Population and General Features. The archipelago consists of 14 major groups of islands and coral reefs of which the largest are Diego Garcia, Peros Banhos and the Salamon Group. The total population of the archipelago was 742 in 1962. Peros Banhos and the Salamon Islands are habitable atolls consisting of low coral islands, mostly covered with coconut palms, surrounding central lagoons.
4. Climate. It is warm and humid and rainfall is heavy. Prevailing winds are south east from June to September and north west from December to April.
5. Communications. Nil.
6. Water. Very small quantities of brackish water from wells.
7. Port Facilities.
 - (a) Salamon Islands. There is deep water in the lagoon which is some three miles long and three miles across, but there are numerous coral rocks and therefore anchorage facilities are limited.
 - (b) Peros Banhos. Anchorage can be obtained in the lagoon which is some 10 by 13 miles in extent; however, it is not very sheltered and there are also numerous shoals, rocks and coral reefs.

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DIEGO GARCIA

1. Position. Latitude 7° 20' South. Longitude 72°25' East.
2. Political Status. Dependency of Mauritius.
3. Population and General Features. The population (Census 1962) is about 200. It consists of a narrow strip of land 3 1/2 miles long, varying from 1 1/4 miles to 40 yards in width and aggregating 11 square miles. It encloses a lagoon 13 miles long and 6-8 miles wide. Practically the whole island is under cultivation with coconut plantations.
4. Climate. The climate is warm and humid and rainfall is heavy. Prevailing winds are south east from June to September and north west from December to April.
5. Communications. Nil.
6. Water. Very restricted supplies of brackish water from wells.
7. Port Facilities. The lagoon has three entrance channels of which the main one has a least depth of 31 feet. It provides an extensive area of good anchorage in depths of from 8 to 16 fathoms in reasonable holding ground sheltered from the prevailing winds.
8. Flying Boat Alighting Area. A flying boat alighting area exists, but this has not been used since 1950, and possesses no facilities.

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MALDIVES

1. Position. Between Latitude 8°North and 1°South Longitude 73°East.
 2. Political Status. The Maldives are an independent protected state under the British Government which is responsible for external affairs.
 3. Population and General Features. The population numbers about 90,000. Male, the only town, has a population of 12,000. The islands form an archipelago stretching some 500 miles from north to south. The total land area is little more than 100 square miles. The archipelago consists of 19 atolls each of which consists of a ring of coral reefs and islands encircling a lagoon dotted with small islets. Some 200 of the islands are inhabited, their average size being just over half a square mile and none is larger than four square miles.
 4. Climate. The climate is very warm and humid. The greater part of the Maldives are under the influence of the SW monsoon from June to August and the NE monsoon from November to March.
 5. Communications. There are no telecommunications other than the RAF facilities at Gan.
 6. Water. Water is available on many of the islands at a maximum depth of 10 feet.
 7. Port Facilities. Fourteen of the atolls afford good anchorage, otherwise there are no port facilities of any kind except at Gan.
 8. Airfield Facilities. See Gan.
 9. POL Storage. See Gan.
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GAN

1. Position. Latitude 00° 42' South, Longitude 73° 09' East.
2. Political Status. Part of a Sultanate under British protection.
3. Population and General Features. No indigenous population. Is one of a group of atolls, 2,800 yards by 1,200 yards. Well wooded.
4. Climate. Very warm and humid. Less marked monsoonal than in N. Maldives. Heavy rainfall - 150 inches a year. Hurricanes rare.
5. Communications. RAF.
6. Water. Adequate but brackish.
7. Port Facilities. Extensive sheltered anchorage for large vessels in lagoon. One jetty with depth of 12 ft. at head. Tankers anchor off Jetty and secure their sterns to mooring buoys close to the seaward edge of the reef. Fuel is pumped ashore by pipeline.
8. Airfield Facilities. Gan Island airfield elevation 7 ft. Runway 8,700 ft. concrete, LCN 60. Not extendable.
9. Electricity Supplies. Available.
10. POL Storage. Full RAF servicing facilities available.

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COCOS ISLANDS

1. Position. Latitude 12° 00'South, Longitude 96° 50'East.
2. Political Status. Australian Dependency.
3. Population and General Features. 650 (1959). About 27 small coral islands varying between 50 yards and 5 miles in length, up to 700 yards wide with little variation in elevation.
4. Climate. Tropical. SE trades prevail. Rough weather in first quarter of the year - seldom typhoons.
5. Communications. Cable and wireless station with HF WT, teleprinter line to Perth.
6. Water. Limited wells, with occasional shortages.
7. Port Facilities. West Island. There is anchorage within the lagoon for medium draught ships, but there are no port facilities within the group.
8. Airfield Facilities. West Island 12° 11'S, 96° 50'E. Elevation 10 ft. runway 8000 ft. primed coral, 75,000 lb SIWL, extensible by 2000 ft. by using present overrun strips. Further extension would involve filling the lagoon. Capable of accepting Britannias at 185,000 lb and probably VC 10sup 300,000 lb AWW. Hydrant refuelling.
9. Electricity Supplies. Available, locally generated.
10. POL Storage. Minimum stocks of 84,000 gals. of AVTUR with storage for 310,000 gals. AVGAS is also available. Replenishment is by sea tanker at intervals calculated to prevent stocks falling below the minimum. If replenishment out of schedule is required sufficient time should be allowed for the charter, filling and voyage time of the tanker.
11. Accommodation. 80 beds for transients, can be increased to 130.

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CHRISTMAS ISLAND

1. Position. Latitude 6° 45'N. Longitude 105° 13'E.
2. Political Status. Australian Dependency.
3. Population and General Features. In 1955 the total population was about 2000 of which 1000 are employees of the Phosphate Company. The island is of limestone formation, densely wooded and rising from the sea to a central plateau in successive terraces and cliffs. The coast is composed of perpendicular and almost continuous cliffs, from 20 to 80 feet high, interspersed with rough beaches where the cliffs have crumbled away.
4. Climate. Temperature varies between 88°F in January and 73°F in August. The prevailing wind is between east and south east, 5 to 10 knots. Mean cloud cover is 4/8.
5. Communications. There is a radio station in the settlement at Flying Fish Cove.
6. Water. Water from springs is laid on to the pier but owing to local requirements can only be supplied in small quantities.
7. Port Facilities. There is a pier in Flying Fish Cove; a vessel cannot actually berth alongside but has to lie at moorings a few feet off. Owing to exposed conditions the cove is an uncomfortable place to lie in and is often untenable.
8. Airfield Facilities. Nil.
9. POL Storage. Nil.

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