

S. Asia
Louis J. Smith
WDC: USG Rmngt Off (1726)

portrayed by the Foreign Secretary. Even if the risks were appreciable, the dangers of hopeless inaction seemed greater.

9. I noted that traditionally "the war is on" the more violent forms of propaganda by tacit agreement between Pakistan and India during the course of a Kashmir settlement effort. The worst invective and diatribe are "out" for the duration of the negotiation and this in itself is a considerable, albeit temporary gain, at least in a negative sense.

10. I further urged that even if the mediator's efforts should unhappily prove to be stillborn, his recommendations would be almost bound to have some nourishment in them for the Pakistan point of view, and Pakistan would not lose by keeping unsullied its record of cooperation and compliance with all responsible international moves looking to a Kashmir solution.

11. As to the Foreign Secretary's argument that every abortive effort on Kashmir resulted in a serious political setback in Pakistan, I noted that Foreign Minister Bhutto himself had just set forth in a speech before the National Assembly that there were modest but important gains for Pakistan growing out of the ill-fated six rounds of ministerial level meetings on Kashmir from December to May. The Foreign Secretary had no effective rejoinder to this and he smilingly said the Foreign Minister had to make this speech for internal political purposes, pretending there were gains in order to protect himself from opposition attacks.

12. I told the Foreign Secretary that the attitude of India on Kashmir and on Pak relations in general remained one of various factors we were taking into account in determining the nature and pace of our defense assistance program. It was a complicated equation and of course our evaluation of the Chinese Communist threat had to be the largest single factor. But Indian policy toward Pakistan was not outside our area of consideration. The Foreign Secretary said he knew this factor had not been entirely ignored but his govt was eager to see it given much greater weight and to be told more about it. He conceded we could not disregard the dimensions or the imminence of the Chinese Communist military threat on India's northern borders.

13. The Foreign Secretary ended by saying that his govt had made an earnest search for some additional initiative which would assist us in our search for a useful approach to the Kashmir problem. The GOP did not want to add to US burdens. Accordingly the GOP was now suggesting that the US might wish to consider the possibility of informally dispatching an acceptable prospective mediator for preliminary and exploratory personal conversations in Rawalpindi and Delhi as to the outlook for a successful mediation effort. The nature of the visit would not be divulged. The visitor would be as close to incognito as possible claiming merely a tourist status if questioned. The Foreign Secretary granted my point that this status would be exceptionally difficult to maintain, since the individual would be an outstanding personage. Foreign Secretary said that if the designee made a finding that the prospects

for mediation were favorable, "we could proceed from there." I said that I would prefer not to express any reaction to this final thought, since it would need to be studied. Foreign Secretary said President Ayub had again mentioned ex-President Eisenhower as representing the type of individual of world stature that he had in mind.

14. Foreign Secretary said he would give British Acting High Commissioner Hunt the same aide-mémoire he had given me, with the deletion of numbered paragraph seven regarding the stature of the mediator, which did not directly concern the UK.

15. I told the Foreign Secretary I felt that the dialogue on the aide-mémoire, which we had already usefully begun, would need to be continued. I hoped it could be carried considerably further before Under Secretary Ball's arrival.

16. Analysis and comments follow in separate telegram tomorrow.²

McConaughy

² In telegram 429 from Karachi, August 24, McConaughy concluded that the Pakistani reply to the Kashmir mediation proposal was disappointing but not tantamount to a rejection of mediation. His assessment was that Pakistan had apparently decided to bring the Kashmir mediation proposal to a head at the time of Ball's visit, placing pressure on the United States and India to produce meaningful progress toward a Kashmir settlement. (*Ibid.*)

324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 23, 1963, 8:16 p.m.

1272. Ref: Deptel 274 to New Delhi,¹ 198 to Karachi, 42 to Colombo.

1. Reftel on need for communications station in Indian Ocean area being repeated to you.

2. Despite technical desirability of surveying alternative sites, present political-military relations with India, Pakistan, Ceylon rule out

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 21 US. Secret. Drafted in G/PM by Lord; cleared with BNA, RPM, FE, SOA, UNP, NR, OC, AFI, and within G/PM by Colonel Robinson; and approved by G/PM Director of Operations Howard Meyers. Repeated to New Delhi, Karachi, and Colombo.

¹ Telegram 274 to New Delhi, August 1, informed the Embassy that the Secretary of Defense had approved a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the establishment of a communications station in the Indian Ocean area. The Department of State's preliminary assessment, based on political considerations, was that Diego Garcia was the most suitable location for such a station. (*Ibid.*)

approaches to those countries at this time. This leaves only Diego Garcia for consideration.

3. As you know (ref Dept. A-82, July 30),² British have responded affirmatively to our proposal for exploratory talks concerning Indian Ocean defense matters; and Diego Garcia is major link in JCS concept of possible US-UK small island base complex. (DOD is now preparing draft, for State clearance and transmittal, of preliminary paper that British have requested before talks begin in London.)

4. We had planned to include this specific communications station requirement in these forthcoming Indian Ocean discussions with British. However, given the political and economic factors that the British wish discussed from the outset, it will probably be some time before way is cleared for substantive discussions and subsequent survey visits to the area.

Meanwhile DOD has reiterated its urgent requirement to survey at least one possible communications site. (The proposed station, while primarily for military purposes, would enhance entire U.S. communications capabilities in Indian Ocean area.)

5. DOD has therefore requested we seek permission from UK for visit of site survey team to Diego Garcia at earliest opportunity. DOD and State have considered possible tactical drawbacks of approaching British on one element in Indian Ocean base concept while we are preparing to discuss with them in near future the over-all area. We nevertheless conclude that urgency of this communications requirement justifies such an approach at this time. (FYI, and for your approach to the British if you consider it useful: DOD has necessary funds in hand to move ahead immediately on construction of communications station.)

6. Survey party would consist of about nine members, including three military (civilian dress) and a State or Embassy representative if desirable. Team would need approximately 12 days and would bring transmitter-receivers, recording and metering devices, generators, cameras, camping equipment. Survey would of course be carried out without UK commitment on future acceptance of station, and if results of survey favorable, establishment of station could become part of forthcoming broader discussions in London.

7. Accordingly, unless you see serious objections, request you approach the British soonest for their approval of the survey team visit as herein outlined.³

Ball

² Airgram A-82 transmitted to London a copy of the British note of July 29. (*Ibid.*, DEF 15 UK-US) The July 29 note is printed as Document 312.

³ The Embassy in London reported on September 5 that the Colonial Office was reluctant to concur in the request for approval of a U.S. survey team to visit Diego Garcia until the Governors of Mauritius and Seychelles had been consulted. (Telegram 1087 from London; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 UK-US)

325. Letter From Prime Minister Nehru to President Kennedy

New Delhi, August 27, 1963.

[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 4/1/63-8/31/63. No classification marking. This letter has not been declassified by the Indian Government. In his biography of Nehru, Gopal summarized the letter, which dealt with the Kashmir dispute, as follows: "If Britain and the United States could persuade Pakistan to adopt at least a neutral, if not a pro-Indian attitude in the conflict between India and China, then mediation could be considered." (Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol. 3, p. 261)]

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

Washington, August 28, 12:43 p.m.

349. Karachi's 429 to Dept.¹ info New Delhi 163, London 122; New Delhi's 773 to Dept.² info Karachi 332, London 289. As we view Kashmir mediation problem on basis your thorough explorations, we seem to have reached impasse on both sides. Neither one has rejected mediation out of hand but each has imposed conditions which make early initiation of mediation impossible. Furthermore both sides seem to have rejected in advance various possible compromise plans for settlement. Nehru seems to have eliminated all but readjustment of cease-fire line. Pak insistence on self-determination "inherent in UNCIP resolutions" limits possibilities for compromise.

Under these circumstances we believe we should restate the basis on which we have intervened in Kashmir dispute, indicate that positions

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider on August 26; cleared by Cameron, Grant, and with BNA; and approved by Ball. Also sent to New Delhi and repeated to London.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 323.

² In telegram 773 from New Delhi, August 23, Bowles reported that he had met with Foreign Secretary Desai on August 21 to discuss the mediation proposal. In the course of the conversation, Bowles stressed the points he had made in his discussion of the proposal with Nehru on August 16. Bowles described Desai's reaction as more moderate than in previous conversations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK)