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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



S/S-4785

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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March 27, 1964

*Ret'd to me gfb with
Pink memo 3/31/64.
OTF*

MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: "Concord Squadron" Cruise in
Indian Ocean

1. On receipt of NSAM 289 a State/Defense message was sent to all posts in the area transmitting the tentative schedule: April 4 passage through Malacca Strait; April 14-17 Diego Suarez (Malagasy Republic); April 20-23 Mombasa; April 27-29 Aden; May 2-3 Gulf of Oman, (for an on-board weapons demonstration for the Shah; no port call).

2. Bearing in mind the delicate situation in Indonesia, all posts except London and Paris originally were instructed not to divulge any information prior to April 4, the date of the passage through the Malacca Strait. London and Paris were instructed to inform the British and French Governments immediately with a request for confidential treatment.

3. We also advised our posts that we wish to emphasize friendly interest and peaceful resolve rather than crisis anticipation.

4. As pointed out in the Secretary's memorandum to the President of March 15, our primary concern with negative reaction has centered on Indonesia. After full consultation with Ambassador Jones it has been decided that we should take advantage of his trip with Sukarno March 30-April 2 to inform Sukarno of the Concord Squadron cruise on a personal and confidential basis. Jones agreed that while giving

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 05-29

By us, NARA, Date 4-18-05

MAR 30 1964

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Sukarno advance notice might have its dangers, it would, in balance be the most prudent course because it would eliminate the possibility of the information coming to his attention through leakage; further, if the passage of the squadron through the Malacca Strait stirred Communist elements into action against American-owned estates on Sumatra, the Indonesian government would not be in any position to take precautionary measures if it did not have advance information. Authorization was given to Ambassador Jones to proceed as he recommended.

5. Ambassador Bell has requested reconsideration of the State/Defense position that port calls in Malaysia should be scheduled only if there are such calls in Indonesia. He would like to inform the Government of Malaysia prior to April 4 and recommends that a port call be scheduled. We have told Bell he may inform the Malaysians on April 3 and that we will consider visits to both countries in light of the Indonesian reaction to the passage through the Malacca Strait. The cruise is open-ended to permit such calls if the situation warrants.

6. Ambassador Battle in Canberra has requested permission to give the Australians information prior to April 4. We are giving him this in his discretion; he may also tell the Australians that we are seriously considering a port visit to Australia on a subsequent cruise. Ambassador Powell is being given similar authority on advance notification.

7. Embassy London reports the British reflect a cooperative attitude throughout. Embassy Paris reports the French will respect our request for confidential treatment. They are also to be advised by the Malagasy Republic in the framework of the France-Malagasy defense accords.

8. Embassy Tananarive requested authority to inform the government immediately of the impending

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visit in order to ensure time for adequate preparations. Since, in the Embassy's view, the government was likely to keep the matter confidential this permission was granted. A request by Embassy Nairobi to inform on a confidential basis senior British officers serving the Kenya government was granted and the Embassy given discretionary authority to inform the Kenya government March 31.

9. We have told our Embassies in Karachi and New Delhi that the Pakistan and Indian governments should be informed of our plans after April 4, but that we will make no requests for port calls. If either of these governments should then take the initiative in suggesting a port visit, this should be referred to Washington.

10. With respect to public affairs handling, we propose to give interim replies, if there should be any leaks or queries prior to April 4. After April 4 we hope that announcements regarding port calls will be made by host governments as desired and suitably replayed by us. We do not intend to take the initiative in making announcements unless strong pressures by the press should develop in Washington.

11. If an announcement has to be made it will be as routine and low key as possible, highlighting our friendly interest and peaceful resolve, without reference to our SEATO/CENTO defense commitments, but permitting our presence to speak for itself. The point is we do not want to involve non-aligned countries, where it is important that we visit now, in implication of indirect support of our treaty commitments.

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12. We have given Defense and the JCS an "all clear" signal today, March 27 which will enable them to authorize the fleet movement. It is expected that the squadron will sail from Subic Bay on March 31 to meet its schedule.

D/line (for)
Benjamin N. Read
Executive Secretary

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