

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BERN 647

DEPT PASS NSC FOR CDR SICK

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, OX
SUBJ: US-USSR INDIAN OCEAN ARMS CONTROL TALKS: PLEANARY
SESSION OF FEB 7

SUMMARY: IN FIRST PLENARY OF FOURTH ROUND, US
TABLED REVISED DRAFT TEXT; MOST OF SESSION WAS
DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF IT. MENDELEVICH IN OPENING
STATEMENT STRESSED FOUR "SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS" THAT ANY
AGREEMENT MUST HAVE: PROHIBITION OF STRATEGIC FORCES,
NO EXCEEDING OF CURRENT LEVELS, NO BASE EXPANSION, AND A
CLEAR STATEMENT OF FINAL OBJECTIVES OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE
ALSO RAISED ALLIED AND ADJACENT AREAS ISSUES. THERE
WERE NO MAJOR CHANGES IN SOVIET POSITION. END SUMMARY.

1. DISCUSSION OF SOVIET'S FOUR POINTS:

MENDELEVICH BEGAN HIS REMARKS BY INSISTING THAT
FINAL AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FOUR "SPECIFIC REQUIRE-
MENTS" WHICH MUST BE "CLEAR, COMPREHENSIVE AND UNAMBIGUOUS:"

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-- A PROVISION THAT DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC FORCES OF
BOTH SIDES IN INDIAN OCEAN WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED AND THAT
THIS WOULD INCLUDE STRATEGIC LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT AND SSBNS;

-- A FREEZE ON FORCES OF BOTH SIDES AT PRESENT
LEVEL, MEANING AVERAGE LEVEL OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS AND NOT

A SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR A SPECIFIC DATE;

-- AGREEMENT MUST "DECIDE" QUESTION OF MILITARY BASES INCLUDING FREEZE ON NEW BASES AND ON "EXTENSION" OF EXISTING BASES;

-- AGREEMENT MUST SHOW THE "UNITY OF TWO STAGES OF STABILIZATION AND REDUCTIONS AND STATE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE "PROCESS" IN WHICH TWO SIDES ARE ENGAGED.

2. IN MAKING THESE FOUR POINTS MENDELEVICH STATED HE WAS SPEAKING NOT ONLY OF REQUIREMENTS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION DEMANDED BE IN AGREEMENT, BUT WHICH "OTHER STATES", LITTORAL STATES, WISHED TO SEE IN AGREEMENT. HE KNEW DESIRES OF LITTORAL STATES BECAUSE OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "HONEST" AND NOT DESIGNED TO "PROVOKE" THEM AGAINST US. HE SAID HE TOLD LITTORAL STATES THAT "STEP-BY-STEP" APPROACH WAS US PREFERENCE, NOT SOVIET, AND ALTHOUGH THIS APPROACH DID NOT PRODUCE AN "ENTHUSIASM" AMONG LITTORALS (AS HE TOLD US IN WASH IN SEPT), IT NONE- THELESS DID MEET WITH THEIR "ACCEPTANCE" PROVIDED IT CONTAINED THE FOUR "REQUIREMENTS" HE LISTED.

3. MENDELEVICH THEN TURNED TO THE "ALLIED FACTOR" AND QUESTION OF ADJACENT AREAS WHICH HE SAID HE DID NOT INCLUDE AMONG FIRST FOUR FACTORS BECAUSE THESE LATTER TWO ARE NOT SOVIET SECRET

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PROBLEMS BUT US, AND WHILE THEY WERE "REQUIRED" ELEMENTS IN AN AGREEMENT THEY WERE NOT REQUIREMENTS "OF A SPECIFIC NATURE".

4. ON QUESTION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENT, MENDELEVICH AGREED IN "IN PRINCIPLE" IF IT PROVIDED A "CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS" SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF STIPULATING CURRENT LEVELS OF FORCES.

5. AMB WARNKE REPLIED TO MENDELEVICH'S FOUR POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

- REGARDING PRESENCE OF STRATEGIC FORCES, IT IS SUFFICIENT THAT AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL CHANGE CHARACTER OR QUANTITY OF FORCES DEPLOYED IN IO. ADDITIONALLY, IT IS EVIDENT FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID IN TALKS THAT WE REMAIN IN DISAGREEMENT ON DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES STRATEGIC FORCES.

- QUESTION OF AGREEMENT ON WHAT CONSTITUTES "PRESENT LEVEL" IS INDEED ONE WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED.

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- US POSITION IS THAT STATED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 3.
THERE IS NO NEED TO INTERFERE WITH MODEST PROGRAM
WHICH IS IN PROGRESS IN DIEGO GARCIA IN ORDER TO COME TO
AGREEMENT ON STABILIZATION.

- THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT ON NEED FOR "UNITY" BETWEEN
STABILIZATION AND REDUCTION STAGES; IT IS SIMPLY QUESTION
OF HOW THAT UNITY IS TO BE EXPRESSED. US BELIEVES
IT IS BEST EXPRESSED AS WE HAVE DONE IN ARTICLE VII.
THE "ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE" OF PROCESS IS NOT CLEAR ENOUGH AT
THIS POINT TO STATE IT AND IN ANY CASE IT WOULD NOT FACILITATE
REDUCTIONS IN ANY PRACTICAL WAY. AT MOST WE MIGHT COME UP WITH
SOME PIOUS HOPE WHICH MIGHT PLEASE SOME LITTORALS, BUT UPSET
OTHERS.

6. AMBASSADOR WARNKE BRIEFLY RESPONDED TO MENDELEVICH'S COMMENTS
ON LITTORAL STATE CONSULTATIONS BY NOTING THAT WE TOO HAD
CONSULTED AND THAT WE FOUND WIDE SUPPORT FOR THE STAGED
APPROACH AS A FIRST STEP, AND A CERTAIN CONCERN THAN THERE
MAY BE A TEMPTATION TO USE THE TIME DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF
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THIS STABILIZATION FOR A BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN THE IO AREA. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ALTHOUGH WE MUST BE COGNIZANT OF THE OPINIONS OF THE LITTORAL STATES, WE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT PRIMARILY OF OUR OWN INTERESTS IN THESE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

7. MENDELEVICH LATER REBUTTED WARNE, SAYING IT WAS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO REACH UNDERSTANDING ON FOUR POINTS AND HE WANTED TO RETURN TO THEM. ON THE STRATEGIC QUESTION, WHILE IT WAS CORRECT TO STATE STABILIZATION IN TERMS OF PRESENT LEVELS, THERE AS NO REASON NOT RPT NOT TO SAY WHETHER IT INCLUDES OR EXDLUES STRATEGIC FORCES. THE SOVIET DRAFT DOES NOTIMPLY THE PRESENCE OF ANY, BUT SAYS "DO NOT AND SHALL NOT," AND SPECIFIES SUBMARINES AND AIR AND THE APPROPRIATE FACILITIES FOR THEM. IT SEEMED TO SOVIETS THAT THE TWO SIDES SUBSTANTIALLY NARROWED DIFFERENCES ON THIS IN LAST ROUND. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD REPORTED SO BACK IN MOSCOW, SAYING THAT SOME UNCERTAINTIES REMAINED. THIS IS ONE OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES IN OUR TALKS. HE ASKED FOR A RESTRICTED SESSION ON THIS MATTER THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

8. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLISTS OF MENDELEVICH'S COMMENTS, AND WARNKE'S REPLIES, ON THE US REVISED DRAFT. MENDELEVICH SAID THE WORDS "MUTUAL RESTRAINT" WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE IN THE TITLE. DID IT MEAN NOT STEPPING UP THE ARMS RACE, OR STOPPING IT? THE WORDS WERE VAGUE AND INADEQUATE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT INDICATE ANY SENSE OF PROCESS OR OBJECTIVE. PERHAPS WORDS SUCH AS "PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE," WHICH APPEARED IN TEXT OF THE US DRAFT, COULD BE USED.

9. ARTICLE I: MENDELEVICH SAID THAT PARA 1 DESCRIBED AIMS AND NOT ACTIONS AND SHOULD PERHAPS BE IN THE PREAMBLE. WARNKE SAID THE LANGUAGE WAS NOT SPECIFIC BUT DID EXPRESS THE DESIRE TO TAKE ACTION. ON PARA 2, MENDELEVICH
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SAID THAT SUBDIVIDING COMBATANTS AND AUXILLIARIES WAS AN OLD SOVIET IDEA THAT HAD BEEN DROPPED. IF A DIVISION WERE NEEDED, IT SHOULD BE BETWEEN SHIPS WITH PERMANENT OR STATIONARY ARMAMENT (WARSHIPS) AND THOSE WITHOUT (AUXILLIARIES). THE LATTER SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED. WARNKE DISAGREED AND REPLIED THAT THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE EXPERTS GROUP. ON PARA 3, MEMDELEVICH SAID THE US DRAFT WAS STILL UNCLEAR AND HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW FACILITIES WERE TO BE LIMITED AND STILL ALLOWED TO EXPAND. THIS WAS A SERIOUS PROBLEM AND HE DID NOT SEE HOW THE SOVIET SIDE COULD ACCOMMODATE IT. IN ONE LITTORAL COUNTRY HE HAD RECENTLY VISITED (INDIA IMPLIED) HE HAD BEEN ASKED WHAT THE TALKS WOULD ACHIEVE IF DIEGO GARCIA WERE COMPLETED. REFERRING TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE PARA, HE SAID THAT IT INTRODUCED THE NEW NOTION OF THE USE OF FACILITIES BY

LITTORAL STATES; THIS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH REDUCTIONS.
WARNKE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO LACK OF CLARITY,
RATHER THERE WERE DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH, AND THIS
SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE EXPERTS GROUP.

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9. ARTICLE II: MENDELEVICH SAID THE US SUGGESTED THAT
TRANSPORT PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT BE EXCLUDED
FROM RESTRICTIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD STUDIED THIS
QUESTION AND REMAINED UNCLEAR ABOUT IT. IF WE AGREE NOT
TO DEPLOY LAND- AND SEA-BASED STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT, AND
NOT LIMIT TRANSPORT, PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT,
THEN TO WHAT AIRCRAFT DO PRESENT LEVELS REFER? WHAT IS
LIMITED? TRANSPORT WERE NOT THE SAME AS PATROL AND RECON-
NAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. THE LATTER MAY BE NUCLEAR-ARMED.
WARNKE REPLIED THAT THERE WERE INDEED AIRCRAFT WHICH WERE
NEITHER CATEGORY. ON EXCLUDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
SPACE-TRACKING STATIONS, MENDELEVICH SAID THERE WERE NO
DISAGREEMENTS OF SUBSTANCE.

11. ARTICLE III: MENDELEVICH SAID HE NEEDED TO THINK ABOUT
THIS BEFORE COMMENTING AND WARNKE SAID IT SHOULD BE
DISCUSSED BY AN EXPERTS GROUP.

12. ARTICLE IV: MENDELEVICH SAID THE US DEFINITION OF THE
AREA DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF MORE GENERALLY ACCEPTED

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INTERNATIONAL MAPS. IT WAS SATISFYING THAT THE US AGREED TO PUT A DEFINITION INTO THE TEXT, BUT THERE WERE MAJOR AUSTRALIAN BASES IN THE SOUTHERN QUADRANT AND HOW COULD THAT AREA BE EXCLUDED AND STILL SPEAK OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE INDIAN OCEAN? WARNKE REPLIED THAT THERE IS NO AGREED DEFINITION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE AREA HAD TO BE DECIDED ON A POLICY BASIS. ON PARA 2, MENDELEVICH HAD THE SAME COMMENT AS EARLIER ON ARTICLE II; HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT NO AIRCRAFT WERE LIMITED, YET AIRCRAFT WERE INCLUDED HERE UNTER TRANSIT. WARNKE REFERRED THIS TO THE EXPERTS GROUP. ON PARA 3, MENDELEVICH SAID THAT PERHAPS SOMETHING WAS NEEDED ON A DEFINITION OF ROUTINE PORT CALLS, BUT HE WAS NOT SURE; IT WAS CONNECTED WITH WHAT WENT INTO PARA 4 OF ARTICLE I.

13. ARTICLE V: MENDELEVICH SAID THE IDEA IS CORRECT BECAUSE IT MADES THE PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT. LANGUAGE COULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER. WARNKE EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD IN PRINCIPLE ACCEPTED A SUPPLEMENT.

14. ARTICLE VI. MENDELEVICH SAID PERIODIC REVIEW WAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE BUT LANGUAGE WAS NEEDED ON THE TIMING OF THE FIRST MEETING.

15. ARTICLE VII: MENDELEVICH SAID HE RECOGNIZED LANGUAGE FROM OTHER AGREEMENTS, AND SUCH BORROWED WORDING COULD BE USED. THE ARTICLE WAS QUITE SUBSTANTIAL AND A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK EXISTED FOR A FINAL TEXT. THREE MONTHS WAS AGREED BUT THE MAIN POINT NEEDING ATTENTION WAS AIMS AND FINAL OBJECTIVE. "POSSIBLE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS" SEEMED TOO GENERAL, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE VIEWS OF THE LITTORAL STATES. WARNKE REPLIED THAT OBJECTIVES WERE SUFFICIENTLY STATED
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AND THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD CONSIDER THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS AHEAD OF THE EMOTIONS OF THE LITTORAL STATES.

16. ARTICLE VIII: MENDELEVICH SAID THE SOVIET SIDE APPRECIATED THE US CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS BUT WANTED TO DISCUSS WORDING. ON PARA 3 HE NOTED THAT THE US STILL SETS NO TIME ON WITHDRAWLA; THE SOVIET SIDE STILL BELIEVES A TIME STIPULATION IS NECESSARY. WARNKE REPLIED THAT A RAPID RESPONSE TO THREATENING EVENTS SUCH AS FORCE

BUILDUPS WAS NECESSARY. THE SUPREME INTEREST CLAUSE
ALSO PROVIDED THE SOLUTION TO THE ALLIED AND ADJACENT
AREA FACTORS. MENDELEVICH, NOTING THAT US DRAFT OMITTED
THESE FACTORS, SAID THAT TO ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH ALLIES AND
ADJACENT AREAS, THROUGH THE SUPREME INTEREST CLAUSE
SEEMED LIKE "MASSIVE RETALIATION" AND WOULD MAKE
THE AGREEMENT FRAGILE. A MORE FLEXIBLE ARRANGEMENT WAS
NEEDED. PERHAPS, THE SIDE WHOSE ALLIES INCREASED THEIR
FORCES COULD DECREASE ITS OWN CORRESPONDINGLY.
WARNER

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