

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SIG-03 MMO-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 HA-05 COME-00 EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00  
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FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS  
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S E C R E T PORT LOUIS 1413

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/8/84 (BURKE, THOMAS J.) OR-M  
TAGS: AMGT OGEN PEPR MP  
SUBJECT: US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR FY-81

REF: (A) CERP-0001; (B) STATE 287307; (C) STATE 295542;  
(D) PORT LOUIS A-11, FEBRUARY 10, 1978; (E) PORT  
LOUIS A-29, APRIL 13, 1978

1. THE EMBASSY SUBMITS HEREIN ITS UPDATED STATEMENT OF  
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AS INSTRUCTED BY REFERENCE (B).  
THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN REF (C) AND REF  
(D) REMAIN VALID WITH ONLY MINOR VARIATIONS. THE  
DEPARTMENT SHOULD TAKE NOTE THAT A NEW AMBASSADOR  
WILL ASSUME CHARGE OF THE EMBASSY IN DECEMBER 1978.  
THIS STATEMENT IS, THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO SUCH MODI-  
FICATION AS MAY BE DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE NEW GOM.

2. PART I: US INTERESTS IN MAURITIUS ARE LIMITED.  
THEY ARE PRIMARILY POLITICAL. WE SEEK TO MAINTAIN THE  
EXISTING EXCELLENT RELATIONS WE HAVE TIWH THE GOM IN  
ORDER TO FOSTER A CONTINUED CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BY  
MAURITIUS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND TO ENCOURAGE  
THE COUNTRY TO MAINTAIN ITS EXISTING COMMITMENTS AT  
HOME TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WOULD  
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LIKE TO EXPAND OUR OWN CONTACTS WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS TO ASSURE  
CONTINUED ACCESS TO POTENTIAL FUTURE POLICY-MAKERS. OUR ONLY  
DIRECT MILITARY/SECURITY INTEREST IS THE CONTINUANCE OF ACCESS  
TO PORT FACILITIES BY US NAVY SHIPS. US TRADE INVESTMENT HERE IS  
MINIMAL AND LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. THE ISLAND'S HISTORIC  
COMMERRIAL, FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE ORIENTED  
TOWARD EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE.

THERE ARE ALSO STRONG CULTURAL AND ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS TO INDIA. US-MAURITIAN RELATIONSHIPS AT THE MOMENT ARE GOOD AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE SO AS LONG AS THE PRESENT POLITICAL LEADERSHIP REMAINS IN POWER. HOWEVER, IT IS PROBABLY THAT THE AGING (78 YEAR-OLD) PRIME MINISTER RAMGOOLAM WILL NOT REMAIN IN OFFICE MUCH LONGER. FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, HE FACES AT THE MOMENT A STRONG CHALLENGE FROM DISSIDENTS WITHIN HIS OWN LABOR PARTY WHO WISH TO TAKE OVER AND REFORM THE PARTY MACHINERY; WAITING IN THE WINGS IS THE MARXIST-ORIENTED MMM PARTY WHICH WON MORE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY SEATS IN THE LAST ELECTION THAN THE LABOR PARTY. THE MMM IS LED BY A DYNAMIC AND UNSCRUPULOUS YOUNG POLITICIAN WHO HAS GRADUALLY ACQUIRED CONTROL OF THE KEY MAURITIAN TRADE UNIONS. EVEN IF RAMGOOLAM, WHOSE RECORD OF POLITICAL SURVIVABILITY IS FORMIDABLE, IS ABLE TO WARD OFF THE POLITICAL THREATS POSED TO HIM BY THESE TWO GROUPS, HAS AGE AND (PROBABLY DETERIORATING) HEALTH MAKE HIS CONTINUATION AS PRIME MINISTER FOR LONG PROBLEMATIC.

WHEN RAMGOOLAM DEPARTS THE SCENE, WE CAN EXPECT SOME DETERIORATION IN THE US-MAURITIAN RELATIONSHIP. BOTH THE MMM AND THE YOUNG TURK ELEMENTS OF THE LABOR PARTY SEEK A SHIFT TO THE LEFT IN DOMESTIC POLICY; THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH A SHIFT WOULD NOT BE PARALLELED IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY. AT THE PRESENT TIME AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE POSSIBILITY FOR MORE MODERATE AND PRAGMATIC POLITICAL GROUPINGS TO TAKE  
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CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT. WITH EITHER THE MMM OR THE DISSIDENT GROUP OF THE LABOR PARTY IN CHARGE, THE US COULD EXPECT TO SEE CURTAILMENT OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF ACCESS BY OUR NAVAL UNITS TO PORT FACILITIES HERE, INCREASING PRESSURE ON US FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN (INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL FROM DIEGO GARCIA) AND A SHIFT BY MAURITIUS AT THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA TOWARD POLICIES ESPOUSED BY THE MORE RADICAL THIRD WORLD GROUPINGS.

### 3. PART II

#### A. AID

WE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN OUR EFFORTS TO REINSTATE A MODEST ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR MAURITIUS. THE EMBASSY IS NOW AWAITING A FINAL DECISION ON A P.L. 480 TITLE I RICE PROGRAM (\$2.9 MILLION ANNUALLY) FOR FY-79 AND FY-80. (THE MOST RECENT INFORMAL WORD FROM WASHINGTON ON THIS PROGRAM HAS BEEN VERY POSITIVE.) WE HAVE REACHED PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AID-GUARANTEED LOAN OF \$10 MILLION FOR FY-79 AND 80 TO CONSTRUCT LOW-COST HOUSING FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES. THIS PROJECT IS TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY \$500,000 IN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. WE ARE AWAITING FURTHER WORD ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF MODEST AID ASSISTANCE FOR MAURITIUS IN RESEARCH ON NON-CONVENTIONAL ENERGY SOURCES. DURING FY-78 WE DOUBLED OUR SELF-HELP ASSISTANCE EXPENDITURES AND PROVIDED A TOTAL OF \$65,000 FOR POPULATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES, PRIMARILY IN TRAINING. FOUR MAURITIANS ARE CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN GRADUATE STUDIES UNDER THE AFGRAD/AMDP PROGRAM AND THREE MORE GRANTS ARE SCHEDULED FOR FY-79

B. CULTURAL AND INFORMATIONAL RELATIONS

THE INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM SPONSORED VISITS BY 21 MAURITIANS TO THE UNITED STATES LAST YEAR. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF VISITS BY PERFORMING ARTISTS AND GUEST LECTURERS TOOK PLACE DURING THE PAST YEAR.

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FILM SHOWS ARE OTHER ICA PRESENTATIONS CONTINUED AT A SATISFACTORY LEVEL. WITH THE IMPENDING ARRIVAL OF A PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, WE EXPECT TO DO EVEN BETTER IN THE FUTURE.

C. ACCESS TO AND INFLUENCE UPON GOVERNMENT

ACCESS TO THE GOVERNMENT AND, INDEED, TO ALL STRATA OF MAURITIAN SOCIETY CONTINUES TO BE EXCELLENT. WE HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING MAURITIAN SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITIONS AT THE UN AND IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA; WHERE WE HAVE NOT, THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN EITHER THE NEED FOR MAURITIUS TO MAINTAIN HER NON-ALIGNED CREDENTIALS OR THE LESS-THAN-RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE OF THE MAURITIAN UN AMBASSADOR. ACCESS HAS ENABLED THE MISSION TO MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF GOOD QUALITY SUBSTANTIVE REPORTING. WE HAVE MADE LITTLE HEADWAY IN EXPANDING CONTACTS WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MMM OPPOSITION AS ATTEMPTS BY DIPLOMATS OF ANY COUNTRY TO DO ANYTHING SERIOUS IN THIS AREA WORRY THE PRIME MINISTER.

D. HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS

WE WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL DURING THE PAST FISCAL YEAR IN ARRANGING ANY HIGH LEVEL GOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS. THE LAST VISIT BY A SENIOR WASHINGTON OFFICIAL (ABOVE THE LEVEL OF COUNTRY DIRECTOR) WAS THAT OF THEN-ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE IN SEPTEMBER 1976. ALTHOUGH THE PRIME MINISTER ATTENDED THIS SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR SEVERAL DAYS, HE DID NOT HAVE ANY HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WITH OFFICIALS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE OR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

E. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

THE EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS HAVE INHIBITED IT FROM ACHIEVING IN LARGE MEASURE THE GOALS THAT HAVE BEEN SET FOR THE MISSION.

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4. PART III:

PROBABLY THE ONLY KEY POLICY LEVEL ISSUE WHICH WILL EMERGE DURING THE NEXT TWO YEARS IS A DECISION ON HOW TO RELATE TO A POSSIBLY MORE RADICAL SUCCESSOR TO THE GOVERNMENT NOW LED BY PRIME MINISTER RAMGOOLAM. WE ASSUME THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AT LEAST REASONABLE ACCESS TO A SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, IF, AS NOTE ABOVE, A NEW MAURITIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO LIMIT OR CUT OFF OUR NAVAL ACCESS TO PORT FACILITIES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TAKES ON A MORE RADICAL INTERNATIONAL POSTURE, WE WILS HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER THESE DEVELOPMENTS WARRANT DECISIONS TO CURTAIL SUCH PROGRAMS AS THE P.L. 480 FOOD SHIPMENTS AND THE HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEE. SINCE WE CANNOT PREDICT, OF COURSE, EXACTLY HOW A SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT WILL JUMP, IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO MAKE ANDY HYPOTHETICAL RECOMMENDATIONS AT THIS TIME ON HOW WE SHOULD REACT TO A HYPOTHETICAL DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS. ONE OTHER POLICY LEVEL ISSUE, WHICH DOES NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT US DIRECTLY, MAY ARISE. SHOULD THE EEC DRASTICALLY CUT BACK EITHER THE QUOTA FOR MAURITIAN SUGAR OR THE PRICE IT CURRENTLY GUARANTEES (DOUBLE THE CURRENT WORLD MARKET PRICE) FOR THIS SUGAR, THE ECONOMY OF THE ISLAND WHICH ALREADY FACES SERIOUS PROBLEMS WOULD GO INTO A TAILSPIN. IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD BE REQUESTED (AT MINIMUM) TO GREATLY INCREASE P.L. 480 ASSISTANCE.

5. PART IV:

THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT OUR CURRENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES REMAIN VALID. AT THIS TIME WE DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY CHANGE IN OUR CURRENT POSTURE. IN THE TWO AREAS WHERE WE HAVE NOT BEEN AS SUCCESSFUL AS WE WOULD LIKE, THE NEW CHIEF OF MISSION WILL HAVE TO DETERMINE HOW FAR HE CAN GO IN SEEKING EXPANDED CONTACTS WITH THE OPPOSITION WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS MORE IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH PRIME MINISTER RAMGOOLAM, AND THE DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE TO ASSIST WITH HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS. IF IT IS LIKELY THAT RAMGOOLAM WILL NOT BE

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ABLE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AT THE NEXT SESSION OF THE UNGA, THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A VISIT TO MAURITIUS DURING THE COMING YEAR BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS OR, IF POSSIBLE, A SUB-CABINET OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCY.  
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## Message Attributes

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