

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2125

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 COLOMBO 5648

FOR NEA/INS FOR AMBASSADOR WRIGGINS FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/1/84 (DEBOLD, LEROY E.) OR-P
TAGS: AMGT, OGEN, PEPR, CE

SUBJ: U.S. GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

REF: (A) STATE 287307, (B) STATE 302163

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY RESPONSE TO REF A., SUBJECT TO APPROVAL
OF AMBASSADOR WRIGGINS NOW IN WASHINGTON

1. U.S. INTERESTS IN SRI LANKA AND THE MALDIVES.
A. U.S. INTERESTS IN SRI LANKA AND THE MALDIVES REMAIN MODEST.
BOTH COUNTRIES ARE SMALL, HAVE LIMITED RESOURCES, AND ARE OF
MARGINAL STRATEGIC VALUE TO US. NEITHER PRESENTS A THREAT TO
SECURITY IN THE REGION, NOR IS THEIR SECURITY THREATENED.
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN PRESENCE OR INVESTMENT IN
EITHER COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH IN SRI LANKA THIS MAY INCREASE OVER
THE NEXT FEW YEARS AS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRESSES.
B. AS AN ESSENTIALLY STABLE AND DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY WITH AN
ENVIABLE RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SRI
LANKA CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA AND

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TO FURTHERANCE OF U.S. REGIONAL AND WORLDWIDE OBJECTIVES. IT
IS A POOR NATION STRIVING TO ATTAIN A REASONABLE LEVEL OF
DEVELOPMENT WHILE MAINTAINING SOCIAL EQUITY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS. SRI LANKA COULD REMAIN AN EXAMPLE
TO OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT REPRESSION AND SOCIAL IN-
EQUITIES ARE NOT PREREQUISITES FOR DEVELOPMENT. ITS CONTINUED
STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

AND ITS MODERATING ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) GIVES IT MORE IMPORTANCE THAN OUR LIMITED BILATERAL INTERESTS SUGGEST. THE MALDIVES, A REMOTE ISLAND NATION, IN ONE OF THE "POOREST OF THE POOR". IT IS OF NO INTRINSIC VALUE TO US. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN INTEREST IN KEEPING IT NON-ALIGNED. IT IS CLOSE TO DIEGO GARCIA, AND THE ABANDONED BRITISH AIRBASE OF GAN IS LOCATED IN THE SOUTHERN-MOST ATOLL CLOSEST TO DIEGO GARCIA.

2. IMPLEMENTATION OF CURRENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

A. CONSOLIDATION AND MAINTENANCE OF GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS.

(1). WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE JAYEWARDENE GOVERNMENT ARE EXCELLENT. THE AMBASSADOR HAS GOOD ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS STAFF AND IS ABLE TO APPROACH THE PRESIDENT ON A PERSONAL AS WELL AS OFFICIAL BASIS. WE ALSO HAVE GOOD RAPPORT WITH KEY MEMBERS OF THE CABINET. OTHER EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING AND BROADENING CONTACTS WITH GSL OFFICIALS. OUR PROFILE IS SOMEWHAT HIGHER THAN UNDER THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AS WE BECOME INCREASINGLY RESPONSIVE TO SRI LANKA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. HOWEVER, OUR INCREASED PRESENCE HERE HAS BEEN DIFFUSED BY THE GREATER ACTIVITY OF OTHER DONOR NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND WE HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AS HAVING A POTENTIALLY HARMFUL SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JAYEWARDENE GOVERNMENT. WE MAY STRENGTHEN OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS AS OUR INCREASED
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POSSIBLE INCREASED PRIVATE AMERICAN BUSINESS INTERESTS IN SRI LANKA TAKE HOLE.

(2). BROADENING CONTACTS AND DIALOGUE WITH ALL ESTABLISHED POLITICAL PARTIES IS A CONTINUING PROCESS. WE HAVE HAD THE MOST SUCCESS WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S UNITED NATIONAL PARTY (UNP) AND THE TUGIL UNITED LIBERATION FRONT (TULF). THE SRI LANKA FREEDOM PARTY (SLFP) IS STILL IN DISARRAY AND MANY SLFP MEMBERS ARE MORE DEVOTED TO BUSINESS AND OTHER INTERESTS THAN TO PARTY POLITICS. THE AMBASSADOR MAINTAINS CORDIAL CONTACTS WITH MRS. BANDARANAIKE AND WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH OTHER SLFP MP'S. THE AMBASSADOR MEETS OCCASIONALLY WITH LEADERS OF THE LANKA SAMA SAMAJA PARTY (LSSP), AND WE HAVE SPORADIC CONTACT WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LSSP AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY (CP). BOTH PARTIES LOST MUCH OF THEIR VITALITY FOLLOWING THEIR SHATTERING DEFEAT AT THE POLLS IN 1977. THE JANATHA VIMUKTHI PERAMUNA (JVP), WHICH MOUNTED THE 1971 INSURGENCY, IS NOW A RECOGNIZED POLITICAL PARTY. IT CLAIMS TO HAVE ESCHEWED THE REVOLUTIONARY PATH TO POWER IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND HAS BEEN ASSIDUOUSLY ORGANIZING AND PROSELYTIZING. ONE EMBASSY FSN HAS ESTABLISHED DISCREET CONTACTS WITH A FEW MEMBERS OF THE JVP.

(3). THERE HAS BEEN AN UPSURGE IN U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY

INTEREST IN SRI LANKA OVER THE PAST YEAR. BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ENCOURAGING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND OF ESTABLISHING A FREE TRADE ZONE, AMERICAN BUSINESS VISITORS INCREASED FROM ABOUT 100 IN 1977 TO OVER 200 IN 1978. THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN RESIDENT IN SRI LANKA HAS ALSO INCREASED, FROM APPROXIMATELY 15 IN 1977 TO 20 IN 1978. THE UPWARD TREND WILL CONTINUE OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS. THE ECONOMIC/COMMERICAL SECTION HAS BEEN ABLE TO MEET THE INCREASED DEMAND FOR SERVICES BY AMERICAN BUSINESS INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE AN ADDITIONAL INCREASE OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS. HOWEVER, IF THE FREE TRADE ZONE CATCHES ON AND A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF AMERICAN COMPANIES INVEST IN SRI LANKA, THE ECONOMIC/COMMERICAL SECTION MAY HAVE TO LIMIT SERVICES TO AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN OR REDUCE ITS TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC

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REPORTING FUNCTIONS.

(4). WHAT FEW VISITS WE HAVE HAD BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN HELPFUL AND APPRECIATED BY THE GSL. A VISIT BY A STAFF MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WAS EXTREMELY WELL-RECEIVED AS WAS A USUN PRE-UNGA BRIEFING TEAM IN 1977. WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF MISSIONS ABROAD, CONCENTRATED MOSTLY IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND POOR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, THE GSL IS FREQUENTLY STARVED FOR INFORMATION. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) OFFICIALS THAT THE SOVIETS ANNUALLY SEND A SPECIAL ENVOY TO BRIEF MFA ON UNGA ISSUES. THE SOVIETS ALSO MADE AN EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION ON THE U.S.-SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN TALKS BY SENDING AN ENVOY DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE TALKS. WHILE EMBASSY DEMARCHES AND THE INFORMATION WE PROVIDE ARE APPRECIATED, IT IS CLEAR THAT VISITS AND BRIEFINGS BY USG OFFICIALS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. WOULD HAVE A GREATER EFFECT. SUCH VISITS WOULD PLAY UP THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO CERTAIN ISSUES AND TO SRI LANKA'S ASSISTANCE ON THEM AND MIGHT MAKE IT EASIER TO ENLIST GSL SUPPORT.

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R 061000Z DEC 78

FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2126

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 COLOMBO 5648

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T (SUB PARA C. (1).)

FOR NEA/INS FOR AMBASSADOR WRIGGINS FROM CHARGE

(5). WE HAVE HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH THE GSL ON CONTINUED ACCESS OF U.S. NAVY SHIPS TO SRI LANKAN PORTS AND ON THE CONTINUED USE OF OUR VOA FACILITIES.

(6). OUR CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS OPERATE FREELY AND EFFECTIVELY IN SRI LANKA AND ARE WELL-RECEIVED. VIRTUALLY ALL ICA COUNTRY PLAN PROGRAM AND PROJECT PROPOSALS FOR 1978 WERE CARRIED OUT. A TEN PERCENT BUDGET CUT WILL FORCE SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN NEXT YEAR'S PROGRAMS, BUT IT SHOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT LEVEL OF ACTIVITIES AND TO BROADEN THE TARGET AUDIENCE. MISSION OFFICERS HAVE HAD NO DIFFICULTY MEETING WITH KEY INDIVIDUALS IN THE MEDIA AND ACADEMIA AND EXPLAINING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. THE AMBASSADOR HAS SPOKEN IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY EXPLAINING OUR POLICY ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA.

(7). WE HAVE EXPANDED OUR CONTACTS WITH THE MALDIVES AND APPOINTED A CONSULAR AGENT THERE IN JULY 1978. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE NEW (NOVEMBER 1978) GOVERNMENT ARE OFF TO A GOOD START AND WE INTEND GRADUALLY TO STRENGTHEN THAT RELATIONSHIP
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BUT AVOID DIRECT BILATERAL U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. U.S. PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS ARE SHOWING INCREASING INTEREST IN STARTING PROGRAMS IN THE MALDIVES.

B. ADOPTION OF A MORE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.

(1). THE MISSION HAS GIVEN CLOSE AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO SRI LANKA'S REQUESTS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. SEVERAL SRI LANKAN REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN SPECIFIC AREAS HAVE AND ARE BEING STUDIED, AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMS ARE IN THE DESIGN STAGE, PARTICULARLY IN AGRICULTURE.

(2). AID ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN EXPANDING AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO IN ORDER TO MEET SRI LANKA'S DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. HOWEVER, THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT MANPOWER RESOURCES IS A CONSTRAINT AND SOME REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE HAVE NOT BEEN EVALUATED OR RESPONDED TO. DESPITE THE INCREASE IN AID PERSONNEL AND ADMINI-

STRATIVE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, EMBASSY ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY TWO AMERICAN AND ONE FSN. WE HAVE URGED ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS TO SUPPORT INCREASED AID CONTINGENT. THE ADDITIONAL POSITIONS HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED. WITHOUT THEM, THE EMBASSY CANNOT SUPPORT FURTHER INCREASES IN AID PERSONNEL AND HAS RECOMMENDED TO THE AMBASSADOR WITHDRAWAL OF MODE CLEARANCE FOR SIX UNFILLED AID POSITIONS. AID, AS AN ALTERNATIVE, HAS RECOMMENDED ESTABLISHING AN AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE. ANY AID PERSONNEL REDUCTION WILL SERIOUSLY HAMPER OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO FURTHER REQUESTS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND NEW PROGRAM COMMITMENTS MAY HAVE TO BE CANCELLED.

C. ENCOURAGEMENT OF AN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES.

(1). THE AMBASSADOR HAS MADE DEMARCHES TO THE PRESIDENT, THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND OTHER RANKING OFFICIALS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. WE HAVE NOT BEEN NOTABLY SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING SRI LANKA'S SUPPORT. WE WERE REBUFFED IN OUR ALL OUT EFFORTS TO HAVE SHIRLEY AMER-
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ASINGHE RETAINED AS A MEMBER OF SRI LANKA'S MISSION TO THE UN WHICH WOULD HAVE EASED THE QUESTION OF HIS CONTINUING AS PRESIDENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, THE NEGATIVE GSL DECISION ON AMERASINGHE REFLECTED PERSONAL SRI LANKAN ANIMOSITIES TOWARD HIM AND NOT A DIFFICULTY IN U.S.-SRI LANKAN RELATIONS. ON ISSUES THAT DID NOT TRANSGRESS NON-ALIGNED CONSENSUS, SUCH AS ADHERENCE TO THE NPT AND POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE BONN ANTI-HIJACKING DECLARATION, THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CAUTIOUSLY RESPONSIVE.

(2). ON OTHER ISSUES THAT DO NOT TRANSCEND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MOVE THE GOVERNMENT. SRI LANKAN OFFICIALS PLEAD THAT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NAM, SRI LANKA HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO GO WITH THE CONSENSUS. THEY OCCASIONALLY HINT TO US THAT THEY PLAY A MODERATING ROLE IN OUR FAVOR, BUT WE HAVE SEEN LITTLE DIRECT EVIDENCE OF IT. NEVERTHELESS, WE MAY HAVE GREATER SUCCESS IN GETTING SRI LANKA TO BE MORE ACTIVELY MODERATE AND SUPPORTIVE OF SOME OF OUR POSITIONS AFTER SHE RELINQUISHES THE NAM CHAIRMANSHIP TO CUBA IN SEPTEMBER 1979 IN HAVANA.

D. BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. INDIAN OCEAN POLICY.

(1). WE HAVE KEPT SRI LANKAN OFFICIALS FULLY BRIEFED ON U.S.-SOVIET TALKS ON MILITARY RESTRAINT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE BRIEFINGS WERE WELL-RECEIVED AND MUCH-APPRECIATED.

(2). THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT IN OFFICIAL SRI LANKAN FEELINGS ABOUT THE INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE. PRIVATELY, SRI LANKAN OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE TO US THAT THE CONCEPT IS UNREALISTIC, THAT IT IS NOT IN SRI LANKA'S BEST INTEREST, AND THAT THEY PREFER A CONTINUED BUT BALANCED AND POSSIBLY REDUCED U.S.-SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE PRIVATELY

BUT FRANKLY DO NOT WANT THE WESTERN POWERS - INCLUDING THE
U.S.- TO WITHDRAW AND LEAVE THEM AT THE MERCY OF ALWAYS
UNPREDICTABLE AND INCREASINGLY POWERFUL INDIA.

3. KEY POLICY-LEVEL ISSUES.

A. IN LIGHT OF THE UNCERTAINTIES IN SOUTH ASIA, CONTINUED
STABILITY IN SRI LANKA ASSUMES A VALUE DISPROPORTIONATE TO
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U.S. DIRECT INTERESTS HERE. THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE THREAT
TO STABILITY HERE BUT THE SITUATION AFTER 1980 WILL BE IN
ACCORD WITH THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AT THAT TIME.

B. OUR KEY POLICY-LEVEL ISSUES OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS ARE
THE DEGREE OF U.S. ASSISTANCE AND INVOLVEMENT IN SRI LANKA
THAT WILL GIVE REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF LONG-RUN STABILITY AND
PROGRESS UNDER A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

(1). TO WHAT EXTENT ARE WE WILLING AND ABLE TO ASSIST THE
GSL IN ITS PRIORITY OBJECTIVE - ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? AL-
THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACCEPT ASSISTANCE FROM WHATEVER
SOURCE, THERE IS A CLEAR BIAS TOWARD WESTERN COUNTRIES AND
A HIGH EXPECTATION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE. WE CAN EXPECT THAT
IF THE GOVERNMENT IS DISSATISFIED WITH ECONOMIC PROGRESS BY
THE END OF 1980, IT WILL INCREASE PRESSURES FOR ADDITIONAL
U.S. ASSISTANCE. THE POLICY DECISION WILL BE WHETHER THE
U.S. ROLE SHOULD BE TO PARTICIPATE IN A LONG-RANGE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY RESOURCES
OR TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE ONLY TO MEET U.S. AND GSL SHORT-
TERM POLITICAL NEEDS.

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FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2127

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 COLOMBO 5648

FOR NEA/INS FOR AMBASSADOR WRIGGINS FROM CHARGE

(2). IS THE "AMERICAN PROFILE" RELEVANT?

A RELATED ISSUE IS THE "AMERICAN PROFILE" IN SRI LANKA. THE AMERICAN PRESENCE HERE, OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL, HAS INCREASED SINCE THE UNP CAME TO POWER AND WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE AS AID AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ACTIVITIES EXPAND. IF WE ARE GOING TO STIMULATE AN EXPANDED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY, THEN MAINTAINING A MINIMUM "LOW-PROFILE" MAY BE INCONSISTENT WITH ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES. IN ALL OUR PROGRAMS, WE SHOULD SEEK MAXIMUM SRI LANKAN PARTICIPATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, BUT WE SHOULD NOT BLUNT PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS BY USING FEWER AMERICANS OR DOING FEWER PROGRAMS THAN NEEDED FOR THE SAKE OF A "LOW PROFILE". IT IS A QUESTION OF DEGREE, BALANCE, AND TIMING.

(3). CAN WE EXPECT GREATER SRI LANKAN SUPPORT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S.? WE ARE BEING REASONABLY RESPONSIVE TO GSL NEEDS AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE AND HAVE EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, WE HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN GAINING GSL SUPPORT IN INTERNATIONAL FORA ON KEY ISSUES OF INTEREST TO US. SRI LANKA ONCE IT GIVES UP THE NAM CHAIRMANSHIP MAY FEEL THAT IT HAS MORE FLEXIBILITY ON SOME OF THOSE ISSUES. IF, AS WE ANTICIPATE, THE GSL TURNS TO US FOR MORE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE,
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WE MAY HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY AND MOVE THE GSL TO AN EVEN MORE ACTIVE POLICY OF MODERATION IN THE NAM AND TO SUPPORT US ON ISSUES OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. WE SHOULD BE EXTREMELY SELECTIVE OF THE ISSUES, AVOIDING THOSE THAT ARE OF MARGINAL IMPORTANCE OR THOSE THAT MIGHT RUN UP AGAINST SRI LANKAN PRECEPTS OR PHILOSOPHY.

4. PROPOSED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

A. OUR RELATIONS WITH SRI LANKA HAVE BEEN EXCELLENT, WE HAVE NO MAJOR BILATERAL PROBLEMS, AND WE EXPECT NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS. OUR PRIMARY GOAL IS TO CONTINUE TO ENHANCE OUR RELATIONSHIP THROUGH THE JUDICIOUS USE OF PROGRAM RESOURCES AND TO ENCOURAGE THE GSL TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.
B. THE AMBASSADOR'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES, WITH MINOR CHANGES NOTED, REMAIN VALID. WE RECOMMEND NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE OR MAJOR SHIFT IN PROGRAMS OR PRIORITIES.

(1). CONSOLIDATION AND MAINTENANCE OF GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS.

-- MAINTAIN A LOW-PROFILE EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP

WITH PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE AND MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT.
CHANGES: WE HAVE CHANGED "PRIME MINISTER" TO "PRESIDENT"
TO REFLECT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE.

-- MAINTAIN CONTACTS AND GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ENTIRE
SPECTRUM OF ESTABLISHED POLITICAL PARTIES IN SRI LANKA, WITH
SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE SRI LANKA FREEDOM PARTY AND FORMER PRIME
MINISTER BANDARANAICKEN TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED U.S. IMPAR-
TIALITY TOWARD ALL SRI LANKA DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTIES.

-- FACILITATE AND PROMOTE VISITS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AND PRIVATE AMERICANS TO MANIFEST U.S. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS IN SRI LANKA.

-- ENCOURAGE CONTINUED ACCESS OF U.S. NAVY SHIPS TO SIR
LANKA AND THE PRESERVATION OF EXISTING VOA FACILITIES.

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-- PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
THROUGH DIRECT CONTACT WITH KEY INDIVIDUALS IN THE MEDIA,
ACADEMIA, AND BY EFFECTIVE USE OF THE INFORMATION, EDUCATION,
AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS.

-- ENCOURAGE GSL TO REMAIN ALERT TO INCREASE IN NARCOTICS'
TRAFFICKING. CHANGE: THIS IS A NEW GOAL. NARCOTICS IS NOT
MAJOR PROBLEM IN SRI LANKA. HOWEVER, THERE ARE INDICATIONS
THAT SRI LANKA HAS OCCASIONALLY BEEN USED AS A TRANSIT POINT
FOR SHIPMENT OF DRUGS. WITH EXPECTED SURGE IN TOURISM DURING
NEXT FIVE YEARS, THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR GREATER INFLOW OF
NARCOTICS INTO SRI LANKA AND WE WANT TO ENSURE THAT GSL STAYS
ON TOP OF PROBLEM.

-- FOR THE MALDIVES, CONTINUE TO EXPAND CONTACTS WITH
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND TO BUILD OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MALDIVIAN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND OF MALDIVIAN PERSONALITIES.

(2). ADOPTION OF A MORE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.

-- FOCUS U.S. ASSISTANCE ON PROGRAMS TO ACCELERATE ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY, INVESTMENT, AND EMPLOYMENT,
PARTICULARLY IN AGRICULTURE.

-- MINIMIZE THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL CONSISTENT
WITH OUR DESIRE TO ENHANCE SRI LANKAN SELF-RELIANCE AND TO
MANAGE EFFECTIVELY U.S. INPUTS TO ENSURE SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVE-
MENT OF AID OBJECTS. CHANGE: CHANGE OF WORKING FOLLOWING
"SELF-RELIANCE" TO ENSURE THAT WE HAVE SUFFICIENT AID PERSONNEL
TO MEET ALL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS IN ADMINISTERING OUR AID
PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

-- IN THE MALDIVES, CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE PVO INTEREST IN
PROVIDING ECONOMIC AND OTHER ASSISTANCE.

(3). ENCOURAGEMENT OF AN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN
THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES.

-- ENCOURAGE THE JAYEWARDENE GOVERNMENT TO PLAY A MORE
ACTIVE MODERATING ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.
CHANGES: WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SRI LANKA BE MORE ACTIVELY MODERATE
IN THE NAM AFTER HANDING OVER THE CHAIRMANSHIP TO CUBA AT THE
HAVANA SUMMIT.

-- CHANGE: SHIRLEY AMERASINGHE IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE AND
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OBJECTIVE IS DELETED.

-- ENCOURAGE SRI LANKA TO SUPPORT U.S. INITIATIVES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS' ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BY DRAWING ON
ITS OWN STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS.
-- GENERATE SUPPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT ON CERTAIN KEY ISSUES
OF IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. TO FACILITATE RALLYING BROADER NON-
ALIGNED SUPPORT (E.G., PUERTO RICO, GUAM, MIDDLE EAST PEACE,
ETC.). CHANGE: DROPPED PANAMA CANAL AS AN ISSUE; ADDED
MIDDLE EAST.

(4). BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. INDIAN OCEAN POLICY.

-- PROMOTE AN UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS INTO
THE INDIAN OCEAN AND OF THE RATIONALE FOR OUR DIEGO GARCIA
FACILITY.

-- ENCOURAGE THE JAYEWARDENE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE AN EVEN-
HANDED POSITION ON U.S. AND SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN
OCEAN.

-- PROMOTE AN UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. INITIATIVES IN THE
U.S. - USSR TALKS ON MUTAL RESTRAINT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.
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Status: NATIVE
Subject: U.S. GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
TAGS: AMGT, OGEN, PEPR, CE
To: STATE
Type: TE
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