
LIFK NOT Bullow, 8x 422, India HOTA 1863, [WH TOWNIT!

SECRET

McGB

How does this strike you? I thought that, rather than ask questions, the best tack was to show continuing interest, and make a few quiet points.

Bill Smith has seen and likes. I do not like to show this stuff to Shepard who has quite a vested interest here.



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MEMORYNDOW FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

his visit to Fakistan. You recall my previous interest in this Indian Ocean task force as one of the matters arising out of note that Goorge Ball has recommended consideration of an

well as military purposes such a task force might serve. As I One reason for my interest is the multiplicity of political as or of explaining to the Shah why we pro-stocked in Pakistan rather ing many of the political complications of getting new base rights us more flexibility than pre-stockege, for example, while avoidin the entire area from Aden to Surabaya. ses it, it would provide tangible evidence of US military power It would seem to give

realise that putting a new tack force in the Indian Ocean, while However, I have no desire to prejudice your view of this matter. I maintaining existing carrier deployments elsewhere, could be a impression that the ASW and counter-sir threat to carriers in the very expensive proposition. So I have in mind redeployment of make do with less in the way of costly escepting ressels, for example. Indian Ocean would be far less than in other areas, so that we nuight existing assets rather than any new capital outlays. It is also my

about this chink in our deterrent armer. ployable power than is presently available. I am rather concerned options in an area where we probably need much more quickly destockage, and use of CASF less as competing than as complementary Perhaps we ought to regard a carrier task force, certain pre-

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