

~~SECRET~~

October 1, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

UNDERSECRETARY BALL

Having waded through a mass of Bhutto briefing papers sent me by S/S, I'd like to say that their general thrust seems right to me. If the presentation is prolix, the substance is sound. More important, I think it is in line with the President's own thinking.

While the President ought to review the bidding well before he sees Bhutto, we will wait on this till we hear from you.

Two aspects of the NEA scenario need jacking up, however. First, I doubt that any amount of explication on our part about the Chicom threat is going to dent the Paks. Their reaction is based on emotion as much as reason. So, while making the effort, I would see us as finally agreeing to disagree; we just see the problem differently, and this being so, we intend to operate on the basis of our estimate not theirs.

Second, I am more convinced than ever that credible reassurances are what we most need to give the Paks, rather than more aid (which we won't have anyway). Here I am far less worried than most about the "dangerous ground of joint planning." If we expect Ayub to believe our protestations, we've got to show him we've plans to execute them. We need not get into detailed discussions, but at least we ought to describe what we might do. Our plans themselves, however, lack verisimilitude because of our paucity of quick reaction forces in the whole Indian Ocean area. This leads us directly to the carrier task force, which I see as a far more useful multi-purpose instrument than pre-stockage (though both might be needed). We just sound much more convincing if we say to Ayub we could bomb all India's key airfields within 48-72 hours, than if we say we could get one brigade there even by D+3 or so if we prestocked its heavy equipment.

I may be an inveterate optimist but I still think we can pull our Pak friends through this rough time for them without sacrificing our Indian enterprise. And this, after all, is the object of the exercise.

NLK-05-205a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
By NFP NARA, Date 1/06

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

NSF, Box 422, India, Indian Ocean (10TF) 1963 [WHMEMO]