THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

Thursday, January 17, 1980

TIME AND PLACE:

9:00 a.m. - 10:45 a.m.

White House Situation Room

SUBJECT:

SCC Meeting on Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown Ambassador Robert Komer

JCS

Chairman General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

CIA

Deputy Director Frank Carlucci Robert Ames Charles Cogan OMB

Deputy Director John White

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White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Hamilton Jordan

Jody Powell

Hedley Donovan

David Aaron

NSC

Colonel William E. Odom

Captain Gary Sick

Thomas Thornton

Fritz Ermarth

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski explained that the purpose today is to cover a number of points, not all of them for decision, but as information and recommendations to the President as a backdrop for the decision he will shortly be making about our policy toward Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region. He noted the agreement about the strategic dynamics of the Soviet military move into Afghanistan expressed at the previous SCC, the consequences for Pakistan and Iran, and also the importance of Soviet influence in Yemen and Ethiopia.

Dr. Brzezinski also added that the Soviet publication "New Times" has issued a call for all Communist states and parties to seize new revolutionary opportunities created by the present political conditions in the world, disturbing evidence of present Soviet policy directions.

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Review on January 17, 2000 Extended by Z. Brzezinski

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

SANITIZED

E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER KIRLAN NSCHY RE WILL-96-217

NARS. DATE 123/98

-- Reaffirm publicly that the United States considers its interests in the region vital.

Agreed Action: A draft of the message proposed by Vance is to be cleared later today with the NSC staff.

Harold Brown said we need more flights into Djibouti. They pointed out that we already have access to Pakistan, but more permanent "military facilities" would be desirable. It was argued that we should not raise this issue with the Pakistanis until the military assistance package to Pakistan is worked out in more detail.

Agreed actions:

- -- Ask for more flights into Djibouti.
- -- Postpone discussion of "military facilities" in Pakistan for a few weeks.
- -- Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski will call about ten key Congressional leaders to give them a progress report on our efforts to acquire military facilities in the region. The NSC staff will provide talking points to ensure that the same message is given to all ten Congressmen.

Enroute Basing and Overflights

Secretary Brown said that Defense has been ready for some time and is waiting for State to go forward, asking Spain, Morocco, Portugal, Philippines, and others about contingency overflights and base use. Some argued that to ask now might ensure a turndown. Dr. Brzezinski argued that it is important to tell these countries now that we are serious, that we are making plans, and that we may be asking them in the future but we are not asking for a positive response at present. General Jones noted that we already have effective access to countries and need no commitment; furthermore, what we need in each country is different. In Morocco, for example, we would like to pre-position fuel. The two most urgent cases are Spain and Morocco. Secretary Vance insisted that he needed a chance to check once more on the Moroccan situation before taking a final position.

Agreed action: Pending Vance's check on the Moroccan situation, inform Spain and Morocco that we are planning for crises; vary the message to each according to what we want it to provide. State and Defense will prepare this message.

Military Exercises and Deployments in the Region

Secretary Brown raised Diego Garcia. There are two issues, present use, and longer term construction programs. Komer argued that

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because Diego Garcia is the only reliable base in the Indian Ocean, we need to undertake the expansion. General Jones said that it would cost about \$500 million spread over the next five years.

Agreed action: OMB will look into funding not for this year but for FY 1982 and later.

Next the discussion turned to military exercises. General Jones reported that a Marine amphibious unit, about 2,000 strong, and a group of four to six ships can exercise in any number of places in the region, Oman for example, and Egypt. Followup units, up to a Marine brigade, can also participate.

Dr. Brzezinski declared that an exercise is needed for its political effect as a demonstration of American determination to remain in the area. Secretary Vance replied that privately political leaders in the region will like it, but publicly they will have problems. He therefore recommended that an exercise be held in Diego Garcia. Secretary Brown insisted that such an exercise makes no sense, and therefore would have no desired political effect, perhaps even an undesired effect. Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt were discussed as possible exercise sites. Dr. Brzezinski proposed that we ask Oman and Saudi Arabia, and if they turn us down, we should ask Egypt where a positive response is almost assured. Secretary Vance asked that this be delayed ten days until after the President's speech.

Dr. Brzezinski next raised the question of a U.S. airborne brigade projected into the region for an exercise, possibly a combined exercise with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This could take place later in the spring or summer. Secretary Vance argued that the political problems are simply too great for us to attempt this. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that we should not overload ourselves with this undertaking but that Defense should look into the costs, planning, and other details.

Agreed actions:

- -- State will go forward and seek political assurances on enroute basing and overflights.
- -- We will wait ten days and seek permission for a military exercise in Oman or Saudi Arabia, then Egypt if the first two are not forthcoming.

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