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WASHINGTON

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July 30, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

INFORMATION

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

WILLIAM E. ODOM

SUBJECT:

MILCON: M-B-B Luncheon Item

State is raising the Military Construction funding issue as it concerns Sonalia, Oman, and Ras Banas. State fears that Komer is taking the money from our MILCON allocations for Somalia and Oman and shifting it to Ras Banas. I am attaching a paper with the details if you must discuss them. (S)

This issue is on the Security Framework SCC agenda for Monday. Defer as much of the discussion at the M-B-B lunch as possible to the SCC. (C)

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Declassify on July 30, 1986

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## Military Construction to Support the RDF

Present DoD plans for military construction to support the RDF are as follows:

Location	FY80(S)	FY81(A)	FY82	FY83-86
Oman Kenya Somalia Ras Banas Diego Garcia Lajes	\$23.5m 2.0m 2.0m - 37.5m 2.2m	99.2m 11.5m 10.0m 133.7m 27.8m	79.lm 17.6m* -** 119.9m 109.0m 48.8m	55.7m 22.0m 120.4m 28.3m 74.5m

<sup>\*</sup>Access agreement calls for \$36.5m

There are two basic issues at hand dealing with MilCon plans for the RDF. They are:

- Where will the construction funds for Ras Banas in FY81 come frcm; and
- How will DoD incorporate Somalia MilCon into its FY82 budget, should we reach an agreement in the next several weeks. (S)

These issues will probably be raised in the course of the MBB discussion on military construction. State is particularly concerned with the prospect that MilCon for Ras Banas might come at the expense of Oman and Kenya. (S)

- Money for Ras Banas. As is evident from DoD's plans, Ras Banas does not receive any money until FY82. DoD (Komer) wants to change this by shifting funds away from other MilCon projects to Ras Banas in FY81. He bases his desires on what he sees as the unparalleled strategic value of Ras Banas. This course of action carries with it some important political costs in that we have already committed ourselves, in the access agreements and on the Hill, to support certain military construction plans. Should we change these plans now, we risk alienating the host nations and the Congress. Moreover, it is not self-evident that, from a strategic point of view, Ras Banas should be funded at the expense of Oman, Somalia, or Kenya. A reasonably persuasive case can be made that facilities in Oman and Somalia are of significant value in a southern Arabian contingency and would be, in some ways, as useful as Ras Banas in an Iran contingency. (S)
  - Money for Somalia. Because of the uncertainty which surrounded our negotiations with Somalia and because of pressing demands for MilCon money elsewhere, DoD deleted Somalia from its FY82 budget

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<sup>\*\*</sup>Access agreement calls for \$74.0m (S)

plans. Should we achieve an agreement, we will need to restore this money. But DoD is no longer certain about the nature of the construction it wants in Somalia and is developing alternative schemes. Ras Banas again factors in prominently to this change of heart in DoD. It should be remembered that one of the principal objectives in our access plans is to achieve redundancy. We should not make ourselves dependent upon the survival of a single regime in order to protect our access. We should not sacrifice redundancy in the name of expediting plans for Ras Banas. (S)