

Open Source Technologies

CA-3

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Question: Using desired Open Source Software trace API calls and behavior of files; give detailed reports;analyze malicious files. Start UniFi Network Controller / Network Application and upgrade/update automatically

To trace Api calls and behaviour of files:

I have used remnux to trace api calls.

Remnux is used for malware analysis. It includes a variety of tools that can be used for tracing API calls in an application. To trace API calls in remnux you can use Strace tool. Strace is a command line tool that is used for tracing system calls and signals made by a program.

To use the command, first install the command:

```
sudo apt-get install strace
```

Identify the pid that you want to trace. To do that you need to type ps- aux to get all the processes that are running in the system.

We are considering to trace the Firefox application. To get the pid of the Firefox application we use pgrep Firefox.

Pic-1.0

```
remnux@remnux: ~$ ps -aux
USER          PID  %CPU  %MEM    VSZ   RSS  TTY      STAT START   TIME COMMAND
root           1   0.0   0.2 105432 12024 ?        Ss   07:32   0:04 /sbin/init splash
root           2   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        S    07:32   0:00 [kthreadd]
root           3   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        I<   07:32   0:00 [rcu_gp]
root           4   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        I<   07:32   0:00 [rcu_par_gp]
root           6   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        I<   07:32   0:00 [kworker/0:0H-kblockd]
root           9   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        I<   07:32   0:00 [mm_percpu_wq]
root          10   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        S    07:32   0:00 [ksoftirqd/0]
root          11   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        I    07:32   0:04 [rcu_sched]
root          12   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        S    07:32   0:00 [migration/0]
root          13   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        S    07:32   0:00 [idle_inject/0]
root          14   0.0   0.0      0     0 ?        S    07:32   0:00 [cpuhp/0]
```

The pid of the Firefox application is 29680.

Once the process Id is known you should run the strace command using -p to attach to the process.

We have to type:


```
strace -p <pid of the application>
```

for the firefox it is 29680.

strace -p 29680

when we run this command, the tracing starts and continues till you interrupt or keeps giving the trace data.

Pic-1.1



```
remnux@remnux: ~  
remnux 29680 0.8 6.9 2862264 280944 ? Sl 12:37 0:11 /usr/lib/firefox/firefox  
remnux 29732 0.0 1.1 208592 46184 ? Sl 12:37 0:00 /usr/lib/firefox/firefox -content  
remnux 29746 0.1 3.0 2423172 124448 ? Sl 12:37 0:01 /usr/lib/firefox/firefox -content  
remnux 29788 0.0 2.5 2424616 102092 ? Sl 12:37 0:00 /usr/lib/firefox/firefox -content  
remnux 29838 0.0 0.9 206540 38696 ? Sl 12:37 0:00 /usr/lib/firefox/firefox -content  
remnux 29843 0.0 1.9 2394564 77136 ? Sl 12:37 0:00 /usr/lib/firefox/firefox -content  
remnux 29844 0.0 1.8 2394564 76444 ? Sl 12:37 0:00 /usr/lib/firefox/firefox -content  
remnux 29854 0.0 1.9 2394560 76504 ? Sl 12:37 0:00 /usr/lib/firefox/firefox -content  
root 29907 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 12:37 0:00 [kworker/u4:2-events_unbound]  
remnux 30037 0.0 0.0 11680 3572 pts/0 R+ 12:59 0:00 ps -aux  
remnux@remnux:~$ pgrep firefox  
29680  
remnux@remnux:~$ sudo strace -p 29680clear  
strace: Invalid process id: '29680clear'  
remnux@remnux:~$ sudo strace -p 29680  
strace: Process 29680 attached  
restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted read ...>) = 1  
read(31, "\372", 1) = 1  
stat("/etc/fonts/fonts.conf", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2808, ...}) = 0  
stat("/etc/fonts/conf.d", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0  
stat("/etc/fonts/conf.d/10-antialias.conf", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=225, ...}) = 0  
stat("/etc/fonts/conf.d/10-hinting-slight.conf", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=696, ...}) = 0  
stat("/etc/fonts/conf.d/10-scale-bitmap-fonts.conf", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2228, ...}) = 0  
stat("/etc/fonts/conf.d/11-lcdfilter-default.conf", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=771, ...}) = 0  
stat("/etc/fonts/conf.d/20-unhint-small-dejavu-lgc-sans-mono.conf", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=874, ...}) = 0  
stat("/etc/fonts/conf.d/20-unhint-small-dejavu-lgc-sans.conf", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=864, ...}) = 0  
stat("/etc/fonts/conf.d/20-unhint-small-dejavu-lgc-serif.conf", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=866, ...}) = 0
```

Analyze malicious files

To analyze malicious file, I have used REMnux which is an open-source software.

About REMnux:

REMnux is a Linux-based operating system designed for malware analysis and reverse engineering. It is a lightweight, virtual appliance that comes pre-configured with a variety of powerful tools for analyzing and dissecting malware.

REMnux is built on top of the Ubuntu operating system and is designed to be used as a platform for investigating and analyzing malware in a safe and isolated environment. It includes a range of tools and utilities such as debuggers, disassemblers, memory analysis tools, and network traffic analysis tools that can help security professionals and researchers understand how malware works, identify its behavior, and develop ways to detect and mitigate it.

Pic-2.0

```

remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$ ls
OSX.OceanLotus      W32.Netsky          X97M.Sugar_Poppy.II
OSX.Xirenet         W32.Nimda.A         Yankee_Doodle.2881.A
OSX.XAgent          W32.Nimda.E         Yankee_Doodle.2997
Parity_Boot.B       W32.Slammer         Yankee_Login.3052
Phoenix.2000        W32.Sven            Vaunch.2537
PlugX               W97M.Class.AU       Yeke.1204
PotaoExpress        W97M.Melissa.A      ZeroAccess
Poweliks            W97M.Pri.A          ZeroLocker
Proteus             W97M.Pri.AB         ZeusBankingVersion_26Nov2013
Quax.A              Waski.Upatre        ZeusGameover_Feb2014
Ranscom.Stealer.v2  Win32.AgentTesla    Zherkov.1958
Ransomware.Cerber   Win32.Alna.3.4.B    Zherkov.2970
Ransomware.Cryptowall Win32.APT28.SekoiaRootkit

remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries$ cd Ransomware.WannaCry
remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$ ls
ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe  Ransomware.WannaCry.pass
ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe.overlay  Ransomware.WannaCry.sha256
Ransomware.WannaCry.md5  Ransomware.WannaCry.zip

remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$ file ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$ yara-rules ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
SEH_Init ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
win_registry ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
win_files_operation ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
str_win32_winsock2_library ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
CRC32_poly_Constant ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
CRC32_table ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
Rijndael_AES ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
Rijndael_AES_CBC ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
WannaCry_Ransomware ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
WannaCry_Ransomware_Dropper ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
WannaCry_Static_Ransom ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
ISPE32 ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
IsWindowsGUI ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
IsPacked ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
HasRichSignature ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
Microsoft_Visual_Cpp_v60 ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
Microsoft_Visual_Cpp_v50v60_MFC_additional ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
Microsoft_Visual_Cpp_50 ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
Microsoft_Visual_Cpp_v50v60_MFC ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe
Microsoft_Visual_Cpp ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c65babe8e080e41aa.exe

remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$

```

The above picture-2.0 shows that :

Let's take sha256sum value(which is the file name) as sample.exe

Command 1: file sample.exe

It checks whether the file is PE32 executable file or PECompact2 compressed. A PE is a file format developed by Microsoft used for executables (. EXE, . SCR) and dynamic link libraries (. DLL). A PE file infector is a malware family that propagates by appending or wrapping malicious code into other PE files on an infected system.

Command 2: yara-rules sample.exe


Shows about HTTP, registry, file operations, overlay

YARA is a tool used for identifying and classifying malware based on textual or binary patterns. YARA rules are the rules written in the YARA language to identify patterns of interest in files, processes, or network traffic.

Command-3: clamscan sample.exe

The clamscan command is a command-line antivirus scanner for Linux-based operating systems. It is part of the ClamAV open-source antivirus software package and is used to scan files, directories, and entire filesystems for viruses, malware, and other malicious software.

Pic-2.1



```
remnux@remnux: ~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry
remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$ clamscan ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa.exe
LibClamAV Error: cli_loaddbdir(): No supported database files found in /var/lib/clamav
ERROR: Can't open file or directory


----- SCAN SUMMARY -----
Known viruses: 0
Engine version: 0.103.8
Scanned directories: 0
Scanned files: 0
Infected files: 0
Data scanned: 0.00 MB
Data read: 0.00 MB (ratio 0.00:1)
Time: 0.009 sec (0 m 0 s)
Start Date: 2023-03-22 04:33:46
End Date: 2023-03-22 04:33:46
remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$ signsrch ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa.exe

Signsrch 0.2.4
By Luigi Auriemma
e-mail: aluigi@autistici.org
web: aluigi.org
optimized search function by Andrew http://www.team5150.com/~andrew/
disassembler engine by Oleh Yuschuk

- open file "ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa.exe"
- 3514368 bytes allocated
- load signatures
- open file /usr/share/signsrch/signsrch.sig
- 3075 signatures in the database
- start 2 threads
- start signatures scanning:

offset num description [bits.endian.size]
-----
0000683e 3052 function where is handled the ZipCrypto password [32.le.126]
000084b5 2417 MBC2 [32.le.2486]
000084b8 2418 MBC2 [32.be.2486]
000089fc 894 AES Rijndael S / ARIA S1 [..256]
00008afc 895 AES Rijndael S1 / ARIA X1 [..256]
00008bfc 896 Rijndael Te0 (0xc66363a5U) [32.le.1024]
00008ffc 898 Rijndael Te1 (0xa5c66363U) [32.le.1024]
000093fc 900 Rijndael Te2 (0x63a5c663U) [32.le.1024]
000097fc 902 Rijndael Te3 (0x6303a5c6U) [32.le.1024]
00009bfc 905 Rijndael Td0 (0x51f4a750U) [32.le.1024]
00009ffc 907 Rijndael Td1 (0x5051f4a7U) [32.le.1024]
0000a3fc 909 Rijndael Td2 (0xa75051f4U) [32.le.1024]
```

Pic-2.2



```
remnux [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
File Machine View Input Devices Help
Activities Terminal Mar 22
remnux@remnux: ~/theZoo/malwar

by Luigi Aurienma
e-mail: aluigi@autistici.org
web: aluigi.org
optimized search function by Andrew http://www.team5150.com/~andrew/
disassembler engine by Oleh Yuschuk

- open file "ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa.exe"
- 3514368 bytes allocated
- load signatures
- open file /usr/share/signsrch/signsrch.sig
- 3075 signatures in the database
- start 2 threads
- start signatures scanning:


offset num description [bits.endian.size]
-----
0000683e 3052 function where is handled the ZipCrypto password [32.le.126]
000084b5 2417 MBC2 [32.le.2486]
000084b8 2418 MBC2 [32.be.2486]
000089fc 894 AES Rijndael S / ARIA S1 [..256]
00008afc 895 AES Rijndael S1 / ARIA X1 [..256]
00008bfc 896 Rijndael Te0 (0xc6c363a5U) [32.le.1024]
00008ffc 898 Rijndael Te1 (0xa5c663a3U) [32.le.1024]
000093fc 900 Rijndael Te2 (0x63a5c663U) [32.le.1024]
000097fc 902 Rijndael Te3 (0x63a3a5c6U) [32.le.1024]
00009bfc 905 Rijndael Td0 (0x51f4a750U) [32.le.1024]
00009ffc 907 Rijndael Td1 (0x5051f4a7U) [32.le.1024]
0000a3fc 909 Rijndael Td2 (0xa75051f4U) [32.le.1024]
0000a7fc 911 Rijndael Td3 (0xf4a75051U) [32.le.1024]
0000bc03 2412 Noekeon Messle round [..17]
0000bc08 3038 unix table three [32.le.64]
0000ce6c 2291 inflate_lengthStarts [32.le.116]
0000cee5 2295 inflate_lengthExtraBits [32.be.116]
0000cee8 2294 inflate_lengthExtraBits [32.le.116]
0000cf64 2290 inflate_distanceStarts [32.le.120]
0000cf6c 2303 inflate_distanceExtraBits [32.le.120]
0000d054 641 CRC-32-IEEE 802.3 [crc32.0x04c11db7 le rev int min.1024]
0000d054 640 CRC-32-IEEE 802.3 [crc32.0xedb88320 lenorev 1.1024]
0000fd00 1289 Windows CryptDecrypt [..13]
0000f100 1285 Windows CryptImportKey [..15]
0000f110 1283 Windows CryptAcquireContext [..21]
00359fa0 3032 PADDINGXPADDING [..16]

- 26 signatures found in the file in 1 seconds
- done
remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$
```


Command-4: signsrch sample.exe

we can verify that the file has been signed using this specific digital signature algorithm.

A digital signature is a cryptographic technique used to ensure the authenticity and integrity of a digital document or file. In the case of executable files, a digital signature can be used to verify that the file has not been tampered with and was signed by a trusted entity.



Pic-2.3



Pic-2.4


Command-5: peframe sample.exe

It gives output of behaviour of files and clear report , file information, crypto, Hashes, sections code and .rsrc, entropy of .rsrc high, suspicious API references.

Pic-2.5

```
File Machine View Input Devices Help
Activities Terminal Mar 22 04:36
remnux@remnux: ~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry5

remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry5. pecheck ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf51071661840480439c6e5babe8e980e41aa.exe
PE check for 'ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf51071661840480439c6e5babe8e980e41aa.exe':
Entropy: 7.995471 (Min=0.0, Max=8.0)
Size: 3514368
MD5 hash: 84c82835a5d21bbc775a61706d8ab549
SHA-1 hash: 5ff465afabc0cf0150d1a3ab2c2e74f3a426467
SHA-256 hash: ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf51071661840480439c6e5babe8e980e41aa
SHA-512 hash: 90723a59c2bba3d43d625595f0dbedc8f8d70ff17f4b4719a88f655d5b3149a4231018ea30c37d517587a147e59f73478c0c27948590749544031e7d54b7244
Text entropy: 6.404235 (Min=0.0, Max=8.0)
.rdata entropy: 6.663571 (Min=0.0, Max=8.0)
.data entropy: 4.455750 (Min=0.0, Max=8.0)
.rsrc entropy: 7.999868 (Min=0.0, Max=8.0)
Dump Info:
-----DOS_HEADER-----
[IMAGE_DOS_HEADER]
0x0 0x0 e_magic: 0x5A4D
0x2 0x2 e_cblp: 0x90
0x4 0x4 e_cp: 0x3
0x6 0x6 e_crlc: 0x0
0x8 0x8 e_cparhdr: 0x4
0xA 0xA e_minalloc: 0x0
0xC 0xC e_maxalloc: 0xFFFF
0xE 0xE e_ss: 0x0
0x10 0x10 e_sp: 0xBB
0x12 0x12 e_csum: 0x0
0x14 0x14 e_ip: 0x0
0x16 0x16 e_cs: 0x0
0x18 0x18 e_lfarlc: 0x40
0x1A 0x1A e_ovno: 0x0
0x1C 0x1C e_res: 0x0
0x24 0x24 e_oemid: 0x0
0x26 0x26 e_oeminfo: 0x0
0x28 0x28 e_res2: 0x0
0x3C 0x3C e_lfanew: 0xFB
-----NT_HEADERS-----
[IMAGE_NT_HEADERS]
0xF8 0x0 Signature: 0x4550
-----FILE_HEADER-----
[IMAGE_FILE_HEADER]
0xFC 0x0 Machine: 0x14C
0xFE 0x2 NumberOfSections: 0x4
remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malw...
```

```
remnux@remnux: ~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry
0x10058 0x0 Characteristics: 0x0
0x1005C 0x4 TimeDateStamp: 0x0 [Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 UTC]
0x10060 0x8 MajorVersion: 0x4
0x10062 0xA MinorVersion: 0x0
0x10064 0xC NumberOfNamedEntries: 0x0
0x10066 0xE NumberOfIdEntries: 0x1
Id: [0x1]
[IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY]
0x10068 0x0 Name: 0x1
0x1006C 0x4 OffsetToData: 0x800000A0
[IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY]
0x100A0 0x0 Characteristics: 0x0
0x100A4 0x4 TimeDateStamp: 0x0 [Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 UTC]
0x100A8 0x8 MajorVersion: 0x4
0x100AA 0xA MinorVersion: 0x0
0x100AC 0xC NumberOfNamedEntries: 0x0
0x100AE 0xE NumberOfIdEntries: 0x1
\\- LANG [9:1][LANG_ENGLISH;SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US]
[IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY]
0x100B0 0x0 Name: 0x409
0x100B4 0x4 OffsetToData: 0xD8
[IMAGE_RESOURCE_DATA_ENTRY]
0x100D0 0x0 OffsetToData: 0x359AB0
0x100DC 0x4 Size: 0x4EF
0x100E0 0x8 CodePage: 0x4E4
0x100E4 0xC Reserved: 0x0

Signature:
No signature

PEID:
Error: signature database missing
Entry point:
ep: 0x000077ba
ep address: 0x004077ba
Section: .text
ep offset: 0x000077ba

TLS Callbacks:
No TLS

Overlay:
No overlay
remnux@remnux:~/theZoo/malware/Binaries/Ransomware.WannaCry$
```

Pic-2.6

Command-6: pecheck sample.exe


It gives output about Hashes, suspicious API references, overlay.

PECheck is a command-line tool that can be used to verify the PE header and section headers of PE files. It checks the file signature, the size of the image, the entry point, and other information in the PE header. It can also validate the section headers by checking their names, sizes, and attributes.

Unifi Controller:

I have downloaded the unifi controller and upgraded all the devices

The unifi network controller is a free software suite that allows you to set up, configure, manage and analyze your unifi network in a centralized manner.



```
remnux@remnux:~$ service status unifi
status: unrecognized service
remnux@remnux:~$ service unifi status
unifi.service - unifi
Loaded: loaded (/lib/systemd/system/unifi.service; enabled; vendor preset: enabled)
Active: active (running) since Wed 2023-03-22 01:55:05 EDT; 2h 0min ago
Main PID: 21743 (jvnc)
Tasks: 132 (limit: 4046)
Memory: 746.7M
CGroup: /system.slice/unifi.service
├─21743 unifi -csw /usr/lib/unifi -home /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64 -cp /usr/share
├─21745 unifi -csw /usr/lib/unifi -home /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64 -cp /usr/share
├─21746 unifi -csw /usr/lib/unifi -home /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64 -cp /usr/share
├─21745 /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64/jre/bin/java -Dfile.encoding=UTF-8 -Djava.net
└─21840 bin/mongod --dbpath /usr/lib/unifi/data/db --port 27117 --unifiSocketPrefix /u


Mar 22 01:54:42 remnux systemd[1]: Starting unifi...
Mar 22 01:54:42 remnux unifi: Starting Ubiquiti Unifi Network application unifi
Mar 22 01:54:43 remnux unifi[21745]: error: unable to load properties from /usr/lib/unifi/data/system
Mar 22 01:55:05 remnux systemd[1]: ...done.
Mar 22 01:55:05 remnux systemd[1]: Started unifi.
Press q to quit (INFO)
unifi.service - unifi
Loaded: loaded (/lib/systemd/system/unifi.service; enabled; vendor preset: enabled)
Active: active (running) since Wed 2023-03-22 01:55:05 EDT; 2h 0min ago
Main PID: 21743 (jvnc)
Tasks: 132 (limit: 4046)
Memory: 746.7M
CGroup: /system.slice/unifi.service
├─21743 unifi -csw /usr/lib/unifi -home /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64 -cp /usr/share/java/commons-daemon.jar:/usr/lib/unifi/lib/ace.jar -pidfile /var/run/unifi.pid -procname unifi -outfile SYSLOG
├─21745 unifi -csw /usr/lib/unifi -home /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64 -cp /usr/share/java/commons-daemon.jar:/usr/lib/unifi/lib/ace.jar -pidfile /var/run/unifi.pid -procname unifi -outfile SYSLOG
├─21746 unifi -csw /usr/lib/unifi -home /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64 -cp /usr/share/java/commons-daemon.jar:/usr/lib/unifi/lib/ace.jar -pidfile /var/run/unifi.pid -procname unifi -outfile SYSLOG
├─21745 /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64/jre/bin/java -Dfile.encoding=UTF-8 -Djava.awt.headless=true -Dapple.awt.UIElement=true -Dunifi.core.enabled=false -Xmx1024M -XX:ExitOnOutOfMemoryError -XX:
└─21840 bin/mongod --dbpath /usr/lib/unifi/data/db --port 27117 --unifiSocketPrefix /usr/lib/unifi/run --logrotate reopen --logappend --logpath /usr/lib/unifi/logs/mongod.log --pidfilepath /usr/lib/u

Mar 22 01:54:42 remnux systemd[1]: Starting unifi...
Mar 22 01:54:42 remnux unifi: Starting Ubiquiti Unifi Network application unifi
Mar 22 01:54:43 remnux unifi[21745]: error: unable to load properties from /usr/lib/unifi/data/system.properties' - /usr/lib/unifi/data/system.properties (No such file or directory)
Mar 22 01:55:05 remnux unifi: Starting unifi.
Mar 22 01:55:05 remnux systemd[1]: Started unifi.
```

Pic-3.0


The above screen shot(3.1) is about how to check the status of the unifi network controller.

Pic-3.1




The above picture – 3.1 shows the login page of the unifi controller. In order to login we have to create an account in unifi controller. In order to open this we have to use the url “https://127.0.0.1:8443/manage/account/login?redirect=%2Fmanage”

Pic-3.2




The above picture - 3.2 shows the available unifi devices in the unifi network. As I have no unifi devices which are adopted, I took the available devices.

Pic-3.3




The above picture - 3.3 shows the remote access status as connected. Remote access is to access and manage multiple installations at one time even when you are not physically connected to any networks.

pic-3.4



The above picture 3-4 shows that the user “Chandrika” is connected to which type of network.


Pic-3.5



The above picture-3.5 shows how to create backup automatically. Unifi os console backs save your network configuration hardware settings and usage history. We can also download the backup.

To do backup automatically go to settings -> system -> create backup automatically -> enable

Pic-3.6



The main task of this part of the project is to make the devices automatically upgrade or update. As there are no unifi devices have been adopted, I have used the available devices in the unifi network controller.

The above picture-3.5 shows how to enable the automatic updates for the unifi devices. To enable the option we have to go to settings -> system -> automatic unifi devices update -> enable.

Github:

<https://github.com/Chandrika1302/OpenSourceCA3>