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Solana Bootcamp Lesson 1

ABOUT US

Extropy.io was founded 2015 by Laurence Kirk in Oxford to provide consultancy services in Distributed Ledger Technology. Laurence is also the founder of the Oxford Blockchain Society.

INNOVATE.
QUALITY.
CUTTING EDGE.

CONTACT US

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CONSULTANCY IN DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY

Providing Blockchain solutions
DApp development and customised blockchains
Security Audits

Free Developer Workshops

- Basic
- Enterprise
- Advanced EVM
- Zero Knowledge Proofs

Business Workshops

Website : https://extropy.io

Email : info@extropy.io

Twitter : @extropy

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Running workshops and hackathons since 2017







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Course Outline

Week 1 - Introduction to Blockchain, Solana and Rust
Week 2 - Rust / dev tools / token program
Week 3 - Anchor framework
Week 4 - Solana Program Library
Week 5 - Security, advanced features and review

We are aiming for a very practical course, our philosophy is that the best way to learn is to do
We encourage you to experiment, we are on hand to answer questions and support you.

We will provide homeworks after most lessons
During the final week we can review any material you would like to revisit

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Week 1

Today : Course Introduction and Blockchain theory
Tues : Blockchain and Solana theory
Weds : Introduction to Rust
Thurs : Rust

We assume development experience, but no blockchain experience

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How to ask questions ?

We have channels for questions

- Sli.do : https://app.sli.do/event/gPdZ6z6VF6FhjixuUazsS5
- Discord technical questions

How do practicals work ?

Most lessons will typically be split 50/50 into theory and practical
During the practical half of the lesson you can work on exercises and ask questions in the support channel

The tools we will be using are

- VSCode (in Gitpod)

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Lesson Plan

Decentralised Systems
Blockchain Components (simplified)
Cryptography and blockchain history

Decentralised Systems

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Problems with centralised systems

Monetary System

- Bank closure / insufficient capital reserves
  - greek debt crisis in 2015 ? banks closed and people lost savings, insurance schemes meant nothing, lead to an increase in Bitcoin use in Greece
- Availability of banks
- Inflation - money supply controlled by central authority
- Merchant accounts may be shut down
- Control of money for political reasons - wikileaks funding shutdown

There are layers of access control built into our banking systems to prevent fraudulent transactions, effectively security is achieved by closing the network.

See The Internet of Money - Andreas M. Antonopoulos

Goals of decentralisation

- Participation
- Diversity
- Conflict resolution
- Flexibility
- Moving power to the edge (user)

◯ Decentralized	△ Centralized
Inefficient	Efficient
Dangerous	Safe
No built-in trust framework	Trust through structure
Anarchy	Absolute Power / Absolute Corruption
Distributed Wealth	Consolidated Wealth
Generalized	Specialized
Flexible	Structured
Resilient	Fragile
Personal Sovereignty	Ceded Authority
Complex to manage	Simple to manage
Difficult to scale	Easy to scale
Local Overheads	Global Overheads

From

Betakit Blog

A prototype cryptocurrency ?

Rai Stones

The monetary system of Yap relies on an oral history of ownership. In the case of stones that are too large to move, buying an item with one simply involves agreeing that the ownership has changed. As long as the transaction is recorded in the oral history, it will now be owned by the person to whom it is passed and no physical movement of the stone is required.

Components of a blockchain

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Gossip Network

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Shared Public Ledger

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Cryptography

"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."

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Components of the Blockchain

- Shared public ledger updated by consensus
- P2P Network
- Cryptography

These components give a blockchain system

- Transparency and verifiable state based on consensus
- Resilience
- Censorship resistance
- Tamper proof interactions

Timeline of cryptographic systems


1973
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
What would later spawn the RSA encryption algorithm is first implemented
1979
MERKLE TREES
Ralph Merkle invents what would become the basis of git - and other versioning systems
1981
UNTRACEABLE ELECTRONIC MAIL, RETURN ADDRESSES, AND DIGITAL PSEUDONYMS
David Chaum proposes "mix networks" for anonymous communication
1983
E-CASH
David Chaum
1992
PRICING VIA PROCESSING OR COMBATTING JUNK MAIL
Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor present an "early iteration" of the Hashcash concept
1995
DIGICASH
David Chaum founds the first known "eletronic money corporation"
1997
HASCASH
Adam Back reproposes the Hashcash
1998
BITGOLD
Nick Szabo
B-MONEY
Wei Dai
2001
BITTORRENT
Bram Cohen designs BitTorrent, which soon becomes one of the most popular ways of sharing large files over the internet
FREENET
2000
Darknets are born
NAMECOIN
2011
...the first bitcoin fork
2013-14
DSNs
Decentralised Storage Networks
1969
ARPANET
The early internet was a peer to peer network
1979
USENET
Jurassic forums
1984
SONY X UNIVERSAL
The Betamax case, and jurisprudence in favour of P2P
1993
.RAR
The popular compression format is invented
1996
INDEPENDENCE!
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace is published by John Perry Barlow
1997
HOTLINE
Distributed shareware
MP3.COM
1998
DMCA
1999
NAPSTER
1999
MP3>SEX
"Mp3" becomes more popular in searches than "sex"
2000
GNUTELLA
Flooding query gets used in scale
2000
LIMEWIRE
One of the most popular Gnutella clients
2001
KAZAA
2001
NAPSTER SHUTDOWN
Napster is legally forced by the music industry to shutdown and pay a hefty settlement sum
2002
RAPIDSHARE
File sharing services begin to sprawl...
2004
PIRATE BAY
PTB is built as an easy gateway to torrents
2005
MEGAUPLOAD
...mostly around ad-based business models
2006
PIRATEBAY 1ST RAID
Servers are seized in Sweden - the pressure would only increase
2009
BITCOIN
Satoshi makes the first transaction
2012
DIASPORA
The first mainstream "decentralised social network"?
SIA
MASTER COIN
One of the earliest ICOs, later turned into Omni
2014-15
SWARM
Ethereum's vision of web 3 has Swarm as its file sharing pillar
IPFS
Juan Benet designs a trustless network upon a generalized Merkle DAG
STORJ
A decentralised, end-to-end encrypted Dropbox
MAID SAFE
A file sharing project fundraised and built on Omni
A BRIEF HISTORY OF P2P CONTENT DISTRIBUTION
medium.com/paratii
http://paratii.video

1970s

The Early days of internet

(1969)
The ARPANET
(early Internet) was a
p2p network

Problem = Security !

1) Privacy

- How do I ensure that my message has not been modified ?

2) Authenticity

- How do I ensure that the message comes from a legitimate person ?

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

<u>Problem 1 :</u> How do I ensure that my message has not been modified ?

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

<u>Problem 2 :</u> How do I ensure that the message comes from a legitimate person ?



1970's

(1969)
The ARPANET (early Internet) was a p2p network

1st Solution : Symmetric Cryptography !

- Alice and Bob **share the same key**.
- One key for **both encryption** and **decryption** of messages

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Symmetric Cryptography : encryption and decryption keys are the same



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Symetric Cryptography : encryption and decryption keys are the same



1970's

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

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Symetric Cryptography : encryption and decryption keys are the same



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Symetric Cryptography : encryption and decryption keys are the same



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Symetric Cryptography : encryption and decryption keys are the same



But what about key management ?

Can Alice and Bob share a key ?

- Without meeting
- Across a potentially hostile network

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Private

Public



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

EXTROPY.IO

Private

Public

Internet

Private



Step 1 :

Alice and Bob :

Select a random secret individually !

EXTROPY.IO

Private

Private Key A

Public



Private



Private Key B

Private

Public

Private

Internet



Private Key A

Private Key B

Step 2 :

Alice and Bob :

exchange **a common value** (*g)* on the internet !

(Insecure network)

EXTROPY.IO

Private

Private Key A

Public





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

Private Key B

EXTROPY.IO

Private

Public

Private





Private Key A

Private Key B

Step 3 :

Alice and Bob

combine their private key with the common value *g* !

(in their private network)

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Private

Private Key A

Public



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

Private Key B

A (*g*)

B (*g*)

Private

Public

Private

Alice

Internet

Bob

Step 4 :

Alice and Bob

Exchange both their combine value

A (*g*) and B (*g*)

(over the internet)

Private Key A

Private Key B

A (*g*)

B (*g*)

EXTROPY.IO

Private

Public

Private





Private Key A

Private Key B



A (*g*)

B (*g*)

Private

Public

Private

Alice

Private Key A

ey B

B (*g*)

A (*g*)

Final Step !

Alice and Bob

Combine their private key with the combine key of the other to obtain a shared secret key

PK(A) + B (*g*)
PK(B) + A (*g*)

(privately)

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Private

Private Key A

B (*g*)

Public



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

Private Key B

A (*g*)

EXTROPY.IO

Private

Private Key A

B (*g*)

Public



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

Private Key B



A (*g*)

EXTROPY.IO

Private

Public

Private

Private Key

Key B

Result !

Alice and Bob have created a secret key together without meeting / knowing each other

B (*g*)

A (*g*)

But what is even more interesting ?

- You can mix two colors to obtain one
- But **you can't unmix** to find out the colors you used !



Diffie and Hellman (1976, p1, para. 6)

> *Public key distribution systems* offer a different approach to eliminating the need for a secure key distribution channel. In such a system, two users who wish to exchange a key communicate back and forth until they arrive at a key in common. A third party eavesdropping on this exchange must find it computationally infeasible to compute the key from the information overheard. A possible solu-

Menezes, Van Oorstone, Van Stone (1996) – *Handbook of Applied Cryptography*

12.47 Protocol Diffie-Hellman key agreement (basic version)

SUMMARY: A and B each send the other one message over an open channel.
RESULT: shared secret K known to both parties A and B.

1. *One-time setup*. An appropriate prime p and generator α of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ ($2 \leq \alpha \leq p-2$) are selected and published.
2. *Protocol messages*.

$$A \rightarrow B : \alpha^x \bmod p \quad (1)$$
$$A \leftarrow B : \alpha^y \bmod p \quad (2)$$

3. *Protocol actions*. Perform the following steps each time a shared key is required.
   (a) A chooses a random secret x, $1 \leq x \leq p-2$, and sends B message (1).
   (b) B chooses a random secret y, $1 \leq y \leq p-2$, and sends A message (2).
   (c) B receives α^x and computes the shared key as $K = (\alpha^x)^y \bmod p$.
   (d) A receives α^y and computes the shared key as $K = (\alpha^y)^x \bmod p$.

The Basics of Public Key Cryptography

Given a **Private Key**,you can derive a **Public Key**

But you can't do the process in reverse (derive the Private Key from Public Key)



Keep it secret !

Available to everyone

Diffie and Hellman (1976, p1, para. 4)

without compromising the security of the system. In a *public key cryptosystem* enciphering and deciphering are governed by distinct keys, E and D, such that computing D from E is computationally infeasible (e.g., requiring 10^{100} instructions). The enciphering key E can thus be publicly disclosed without compromising the deciphering key D. Each user of the network can, therefore, place his enciphering key in a public directory. This enables any user of the system to send a message to any other user enciphered in such a way that only the intended receiver is able to decipher it. As such, a public key cryptosystem is a

1970’s

(1969)
The ARPANET
(early Internet) was a
p2p network

Diffie – Hellman
Key Exchange

1976

Public Key
Cryptography
is invented !

(= A[illegible]metric Cryptogr[illegible]y)



Public Key **Private Key**

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption

Step 1 :

Alice and Bob

Create their own private / secret key

(privately, on their computer)



Private Key

Private Key **A**

Malicious user

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption

Step 2 :

Alice and Bob

derive their public key based on their own private / secret key

(still privately, on their computer)



Private Key

Public Key

Private Key **A**

Public Key **A**

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

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

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

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

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Public-Key Cryptography : 2 keys, one for encryption, one for decryption



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Asymm

We still have a problem here !

ey **A**

Ye

Private Key **B**

Malicious user

1970’s

(1969)
The ARPANET
(early Internet) was a
p2p network

1976

Public Key Encryption solves :

<u>Problem 1 :</u> Key Management

- If I use a 3rd party to share my key, do I trust him ?

<u>Problem 2 :</u> Integrity

- How do I ensure that my message has not been modified ?

<u>Problem 3 :</u> Authenticity

- How do I ensure that the message comes from a legitimate person ?

1970's

Ron **R**ivest Adi **S**hamir Leonard **A**dleman → invent **RSA**



First implementation of

Digital Signature

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Digital Signature : Encrypt > Sign > Decrypt > Verify



1970’s

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Digital Signature : Encrypt > Sign > Decrypt > Verify

Step 1 :

Bob encrypts the document with his private key.

Thereby signing the document.





Malicious user

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Digital Signature : Encrypt > Sign > Decrypt > Verify



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Digital Signature : Encrypt > Sign > Decrypt > Verify



1970’s

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Digital Signature : **Encrypt > Sign > Decrypt > Verify**



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

<u>Digital Signature :</u> Encrypt > Sign > Decrypt > Verify



1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

Digital Signature : Encrypt > Sign > Decrypt > Verify

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

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

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

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

1970's

Secure Communication over Insecure Channel

<u>Digital Signature :</u> Encrypt > Sign > Decrypt > Verify



Digital Signature : 4 properties

- **Authentic** : when Alice verifies the message with Bob's public key, she know that he signed the message.
- **Unforgeable** : only Bob knows his private key.
- **Not Reusable** : the signature is a function of the document. It can't be transferred to any other document.
- **Unalterable :** if there is any alteration to the document, the signature can no longer be verified with Bob's public key.

EXTROPY.IO

1970's

(1969)
The ARPANET (early Internet) was a p2p network

1976
Public Key Cryptography
Diffie and Helman

1978
Distributed Consensus
Leslie Lamport

1979
Digital Signature
Rivest, Shamir and Adelman

Hash Functions (Merkle Tree)
Ralph Merkle

1970’s



Ralph Merkle

- Stanford University
- One of Larry Hellman’s doctoral student.
- Invents :
  - Hashing Function
  - Merkle Tree

https://www.merkle.com

1970’s



Objective : verify the presence of a document in a public directory

- Initially for digital certificates
- Undamaged and unaltered
- Securely and Efficiently

EXTROPY.IO

0's

Cryptography

TimeStamping



FIG. 1

Hash Functions (Merkle Tree)
Ralph Merkle



References

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EXTROPY.IO

Hash Function = Digital Fingerprint

Example :

(the example uses SHA256, try here > https://bit.ly/2YYMbF8

Input	Output
Hash(Loughborough)	acb208d3ac02ab6d5a4…
“L “ **upper** case	
Hash(loughborough)	1c2cc85d86f480bca5df0…
“l “ **lower** case	

A small change changes the whole digital fingerprint

EXTROPY.IO

Merkle Tree (the basic)



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

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

EXTROPY.IO

Consensus in Distributed Systems



Leslie Lamport

Operating Systems

R. Stockton Gaines
Editor

Time, Clocks, and the Ordering of Events in a Distributed System

Leslie Lamport
Massachusetts Computer Associates, Inc.

The concept of one event happening before another in a distributed system is examined, and is shown to define a partial ordering of the events. A distributed algorithm is given for synchronizing a system of logical clocks which can be used to totally order the events. The use of the total ordering is illustrated with a method for solving synchronization problems. The algorithm is then specialized for synchronizing physical clocks, and a bound is derived on how far out of synchrony the clocks can become.

Paper

EXTROPY.IO

1980's

1982

Byzantine Generals Problem

The Byzantine Generals Problem

LESLIE LAMPORT, ROBERT SHOSTAK, and MARSHALL PEASE
SRI International

Reliable computer systems must handle malfunctioning components that give conflicting information to different parts of the system. This situation can be expressed abstractly in terms of a group of generals of the Byzantine army camped with their troops around an enemy city. Communicating only by messenger, the generals must agree upon a common battle plan. However, one or more of them may be traitors who will try to confuse the others. The problem is to find an algorithm to ensure that the loyal generals will reach agreement. It is shown that, using only oral messages, this problem is solvable if and only if more than two-thirds of the generals are loyal; so a single traitor can confound two loyal generals. With unforgeable written messages, the problem is solvable for any number of generals and possible traitors. Applications of the solutions to reliable computer systems are then discussed.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.4. [**Computer-Communication Networks**]: Distributed Systems—*network operating systems*; D.4.4 [**Operating Systems**]: Communications Management—*network communication*; D.4.5 [**Operating Systems**]: Reliability—*fault tolerance*

General Terms: Algorithms, Reliability

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Interactive consistency

Paper

That is the cryptographic background, how did people try to use this technology ?

The development of

- Electronic cash
- Timestamping
- P2P Systems
- Consensus systems

1980's

1983

Blind Signature for Untraceable Payments
David Chaum

E-Cash

BLIND SIGNATURES FOR UNTRACEABLE PAYMENTS

David Chaum

Department of Computer Science
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA

INTRODUCTION

Automation of the way we pay for goods and services is already underway, as can be seen by the variety and growth of electronic banking services available to consumers. The ultimate structure of the new electronic payments system may have a substantial impact on personal privacy as well as on the nature and extent of criminal use of payments. Ideally a new payments system should address both of these seemingly conflicting sets of concerns.

On the one hand, knowledge by a third party of the payee, amount, and time of payment for every transaction made by an individual can reveal a great deal about the individual's whereabouts, associations and lifestyle. For example, consider payments for such things as transportation, hotels, restaurants, movies, theater, lectures, food, pharmaceuticals, alcohol, books, periodicals, dues, religious and political contributions.

On the other hand, an anonymous payments systems like bank notes and coins suffers from lack of controls and security. For example, consider problems such as lack of proof of payment, theft of payments media, and black payments for bribes, tax evasion, and black markets.

A fundamentally new kind of cryptography is proposed here, which allows an automated payments system with the following properties:

1980's

E-Cash



1983

Blind Signature for Untraceable Payments
David Chaum

Starts with online transactions

Untraceable Electronic Cash
Chaum, Fiat and Naor

Extends to Offline payments

1988

David Chaum founds the company

Digicash

1990

1990’s

TimeStamping

Haber & Stornetta
How to TimeStamp a Digital Document

1991

1992

Bayer, Haber & Stornetta
Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping

Benaloh and De Mare
Efficient Broadcast TimeStamping

Haber & Stornetta
Secure Name for BitStrings

1997

Massias, Avila and Quisquater
Design of a Secure Timestamping Service with minimal trust requirement

1999

1990's

TimeStamping

Haber & Stornetta
How to TimeStamp a Digital Document

1991

1992

Bayer, Haber & Stornetta
Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping

Benaloh and De Mare
Efficient Broadcast TimeStamping

Haber & Stornetta
Secure Name for BitStrings

Massias, Avila and Quisquater
Design of a Secure Timestamping Service with minimal trust requirement

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TimeStamping

Consensus Algorithm

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Dwork and Naor
Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail

1993

Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail*

Cynthia Dwork * Moni Naor †

Abstract

We present a computational technique for combatting junk mail, in particular, and controlling access to a shared resource, in general. The main idea is to require a user to compute a moderately hard, but not intractable, function in order to gain access to the resource, thus preventing frivolous use. To this end we suggest several *pricing functions*, based on, respectively, extracting square roots modulo a prime, the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme, and the Ong-Schnorr-Shamir (cracked) signature scheme.

EXTROPY.IO

1990's

Electronic cash

TimeStamping

Consensus Algorithm



Napster revolutionizes the music Industry

- Napster (1999) : peer-to-peer platform for sharing music
- Biggest Copyright Infringement
  - $26 million penalty fee to copyright owners
  - $10 million for future licensing royalties
- Shut Down on July 11, 2001

21st Century

Peer-to-Peer networks emerge

SoulSeek

Freenet

GNutella

2000 2001 2004

BitTorrent

eDonkey

FastTrack / KaZaa

Early Attempts at Electronic Cash

“the one thing that’s missing is a reliable e-cash, whereby on the internet you can transfer funds from A to B without A knowing B or B knowing A” - Milton Friedman 1999

1998 - b-money - Wei Dai (http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt)

1998 - Bit Gold - Nick Szabo (https://nakamotoinstitute.org/bit-gold/)

Differences between Bit Gold and Bitcoin

- PoW : Szabo’s concept of Bit Gold requires the amount of work required to create each piece to be quantifiable so that the market can price it.
- Szabo conceived Bit Gold as a reserve currency and not as a form of electronic money in itself.
- He thought his benchmark function impractical
- Double spending prevented by using a registry (distributed maintainers who vote)
- Nakamoto integrated the timechain and the registry
- Bitcoins are produced at a predictable rate and there is a finite supply

Bitcoin QR Code

Satoshi Nakamoto is the name used by the presumed pseudonymous person or persons who developed bitcoin, authored the bitcoin white paper, and created and deployed bitcoin's original reference implementation

Early Bitcoin History

August 2008 - domain name bitcoin.org registered
October 2008 - A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System posted to a cryptography mailing list
January 2009 - Software implementation released as open source

2010, the first known commercial transaction using bitcoin occurred when programmer Laszlo Hanyecz bought two Papa John's pizzas for 10,000 BTC

Blockchain events since 2009

2014 - Ethereum created

2017 - ICO Boom / Alternatives to Ethereum emerge

2017 - Proof of History paper

2018 - Loomprotocol -> Solana - > testnet launched

2018 - Crypto winter

2020 - DeFi summer

2021 - Rise of NFTs / Gaming

VRFs and VDFs

Verifiable Random Functions
From Algorand VRFs

A Verifiable Random Function (VRF) is a cryptographic primitive that maps inputs to verifiable pseudorandom outputs. VRFs were Introduced by Micali, Rabin, and Vadhan in ’99.

The owner of a secret key can compute the function value as well as an associated proof for any input value. Everyone else, using the proof and the associated public key or verification key can check that this value was indeed calculated correctly, yet this information cannot be used to find the secret key.

Verifiable Delay Functions

See paper

A VDF requires a specified number of sequential steps to evaluate, yet produces a unique output that can be efficiently and publicly verified.

From Introduction to VDFs

Think of VDF's as a time delay imposed on the output of some pseudorandom generator. This delay prevents malicious actors from influencing the output of the pseudorandom generator, since all inputs will be finalized before anyone can finish computing the VDF.

A VDF must be

- **Sequential**: anyone can compute f(x) in t sequential steps, but no adversary with a large number of processors can distinguish the output of f(x) from random in significantly fewer steps
- **Efficiently verifiable**: Given the output y, any observer can verify that y = f(x) in a short amount of time.

SUMMARY

Blockchains should be seen in the context of decentralisation

Cryptographic techniques have been crucial for solving the problems in implementing decentralised systems

Early electronic cash systems came part way to a practical implementation that could solve the double spend problem and achieve consensus across an open network.

Bitcoin solved these problems in 2009

After 2014 smart contract systems became the focus