

LIN241

Introduction to Semantics

Lecture 3

Conversational Implicatures

What are conversational implicatures?

- Consider the following discourse:

A: Are you hungry?

B: I just had dinner.

- You will certainly infer from B's answer that B is not hungry.
- Yet, this is not an entailment of B's answer, since it can be denied without contradiction:

A: Are you hungry?

B: I just had dinner, but I'm starving.

What are conversational implicatures?

- This inference is an implicature.
- This kind of inference is generated by reasoning about the communicative intentions of the speaker.

What are conversational implicatures?

- Here is a simplified description of the thought process through which the implicature could arise in our mind:
 1. A asked whether B was hungry, so B's answer ought to address this question.
 2. In general, when people have just eaten, they're not hungry.
 3. So it is reasonable to assume that B said that she had just eaten in order to convey that she was not hungry.

What are conversational implicatures?

- In a different context, the same sentence could have generated a different implicature:

A: Do you want to go skydiving?

B: I just had dinner.

- You will now infer from B's answer that B doesn't want to go skydiving.
- The reasoning that leads to the implicature is similar but uses different background assumptions.

What are conversational implicatures?

- Other examples of implicatures seem to be generated in a similar way.
- This example is due to the philosopher Paul Grice

A: **Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.**

B: **He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.**

Implicature: Smith has, or may have, a girlfriend in New York.

What are conversational implicatures?

- What is going on in these cases?
 - The literal meaning of a sentence does not fit the goals of the conversation.
 - Because of this, one tries to infer additional propositions from the literal meaning of this sentence.
 - This additional meaning is meant to make the sentence fit in the conversation.
 - The process of inference may exploit additional premises that are part of the common ground.

Gricean pragmatics

Conversational Maxims

- Grice's insight is that when a discourse participant interprets an utterance, she tries to make her interpretation consistent with the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative.
- Likewise, when a speaker plans her utterance, she assumes that the addressee will assume that she (the speaker) is being cooperative.
- What it means to be cooperative is fleshed out in the *cooperative principle*.

Conversational Maxims

The Cooperative Principle: Make your contribution as is required, when it is required, by the conversation in which you are engaged.

- **Quality:** Contribute only what you know to be true. Do not say false things. Do not say things for which you lack evidence.
- **Quantity:** Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not say more than is required.
- **Relation (Relevance):** Make your contribution relevant.
- **Manner:** (i) Avoid obscurity; (ii) avoid ambiguity; (iii) be brief; (iv) be orderly.

Conversational Maxims

- Let us illustrate how the maxims work with our two previous examples. First:

A: Are you hungry?

B: I just had dinner.

Conversational Maxims

- Here, A's question sets a topic that B should address.
- In other words, B's assertion will be relevant only if it is a proper answer to the question.
- Since this is a yes/no question, B's assertion will be relevant only if it can be interpreted as meaning one of two propositions:
 - B is hungry.
 - B is not hungry.

Conversational Maxims

- Let us now calculate B's implicature, from A's perspective.
- This calculation will make use of the following piece of common knowledge:

(X) People who have just had dinner are generally not hungry.

- In addition, we distinguish "what is said" from "what is meant":
 - what B said is the literal meaning of B's assertion.
 - what B meant is the proposition that B meant to convey.

Conversational Maxims

- Calculation of B's implicature, from A's perspective:
 - Let me assume that B is cooperative.
 - What B said appears to violate the maxim of relevance.
 - However, (X) is part of our common ground.
 - From (X) and what B said, one can infer that B is not hungry.
 - If we do so, B's utterance becomes relevant.
 - I can assume that B knows I can figure this out.
 - I conclude that B intended me to infer he wasn't hungry.

Conversational Maxims

- We have explained how A can infer that B meant to convey a certain implicature with his assertion.
- When we do this, we think about the implicature as an inference that is drawn by an interpreter (here: A).
- But we can also think about implicatures as propositions that the speaker intends to convey.
- On the next slide, we calculate the implicature from the perspective of the speaker (i.e. B).

Conversational Maxims

- Calculation of B's implicature, from B's perspective:
 - Let me assume that A will assume that I am cooperative.
 - What I said appears to violate the maxim of relevance.
 - However, (X) is part of our common ground.
 - From (X) and what I said, one can infer that I am not hungry.
 - If we do so, my utterance becomes relevant.
 - I can assume that A can figure this out.
 - Therefore, it is reasonable for me to expect that my utterance will convey that I am not hungry.

Conversational Maxims

- In these examples, we have used the maxim of relevance.
- Other implicatures may exploit other maxims.
- We will now discuss quantity implicatures.
- Note that this implicature will also depend on:
 - quality (do not say that for which you lack evidence)
 - relation/relevance (be relevant).

Conversational Maxims

- A is planning with B an itinerary for a holiday in France. Both know that A wants to see his friend C, if to do so would not involve too great a prolongation of his journey:

A: **Where does C live?**

B: **Somewhere in the South of France.**

Implicature: B does not know in which city C lives.

Conversational Maxims

- Calculation of B's implicature, from A's perspective:
 - Let me assume that B is cooperative.
 - It would have been more informative for B to tell me in which city C lives, and this would have been relevant.
 - On the other hand, if B didn't know in which city C lives, telling me in which city C lives would have been unreliable.
 - If B is cooperative, he might have given me less information than I wanted in order to give me reliable information.
 - I can assume that B knows I can figure this out.
 - I conclude B meant he doesn't know in which city C lives.

Conversational Maxims

- Finally, here is an example of manner implicature:

A: **What did you do this morning?**

B: **I replied to emails and I went to the gym.**

Implicature: B replied to emails first and then went to the gym.

- The maxim of manner enjoins us to say things in the order in which they happen ("be orderly").

Avoiding a misconception

- A misconception about Grice's account of implicature is that Grice argued that speakers always respect the cooperative principle.
- This is false. Grice never said that speakers are always cooperative as a matter of fact.
- What Grice argued is that speaker's utterances are interpreted (and planned) under the assumption that the speaker is cooperative.

Properties of Implicatures

Properties of Implicatures: calculability

- The most important property of conversational implicature is that they are **calculable**:
 - we can reason out how to derive the implicature from the literal meaning of a sentence
 - this reasoning will use the conversational principle

Properties of Implicatures: cancelability

- Another property of conversational implicatures is that we can cancel them without contradiction:

A: Are you hungry?

B: I just had dinner, but I'm starving.

- In this example, the implicature is cancelled by adding content that is inconsistent with it.

Properties of Implicatures: cancelability

- Note that some authors prefer to say that in such cases, the implicatures are just never calculated.
- What matters for us is that implicatures are not "tied" to a sentence in the same way as its entailments are.
- If you utter a sentence and deny one of its entailments, you get a contradiction.
- Not so with implicatures.

Properties of Implicatures: reinforceability

- Levinson (2000) observes that:

It is often possible to add explicitly what is anyway implicated with less sense of redundancy than would be the case if one repeated the coded content.

- Example:
 - I replied to emails and went to the gym, in that order.
- Compare:
 - ?I replied to emails, then I went to the gym, in that order.

Testing for implicature

- Check the three aforementioned properties:
 - calculability
 - cancellability
 - reinforceability
- Let's apply these tests to the following implicature:

John lives somewhere in the south of France.

↪ the speaker doesn't know in which city or town John lives

Testing for implicature: example

- Cancellation test (no contradiction):
 - John lives somewhere in the south France, in a small village called Roussillon.
- Reinforceability (no redundancy):
 - John lives somewhere in the south of France, but I don't know where.
- Calculability: see slide 20.

Discourse Connectives

Conjunctions

- Conjunction often convey that the first conjunct occurred before the second:
 - John walked in and sat down.

Conjunctions

- Order can be explained by reference to the maxim of manner:
 - Manner: (i) Avoid obscurity; (ii) avoid ambiguity; (iii) be brief; **(iv) be orderly.**
- When relevant, expect that events are described in the order in which they occur.

Conjunctions

- Is this an implicature? The inference certainly seems to depend on the context of use, and is not hard-wired in the lexical meaning of **and**:
 1. The musician saluted the audience and (afterwards) sang her most famous tune.
 2. The musician sang their most famous tune and (afterwards) saluted the audience.
 3. Chris is famous and (#afterwards) powerful.
 4. Chris is powerful and (#afterwards) famous.
- It is also reinforceable, as we saw already.

Disjunctions

- Lost in translation:
 - Exclusion:
 - You can have cheese or dessert.
 - Ignorance:
 - The book is in the office or in the library.

Disjunctions: Exclusion

- Exclusive uses of the disjunction could be explain by positing lexical ambiguity:
 - Inclusive disjunction
 - Exclusive disjunction
- We can also analyze them as implicatures.

Disjunctions: Exclusion

- $(p \text{ XOR } q)$ is equivalent to the conjunction of:
 - $(p \vee q)$
 - $\sim(p \ \& \ q)$
- $(p \text{ XOR } q)$ is equivalent to the conjunction of:
 - $(p \vee q)$
 - the rejection of $(p \ \& \ q)$
- Hypothesis: the rejection of $(p \ \& \ q)$ is an implicature.

Disjunctions: Exclusion

- We can derive this implicature as a conflict between quantity and quality:
 - If the speaker said X instead of a more informative alternative Y infer that the speaker meant $\sim Y$.
- We know that $(p \ \& \ q)$ is more informative than $(p \ \vee \ q)$:
 - $(p \ \& \ q)$ entails $(p \ \vee \ q)$
- If the speaker said $(p \ \vee \ q)$, infer that she meant $\sim(p \ \& \ q)$

Disjunctions: Exclusion

- Implicature calculation, in a context where $(p \ \& \ q)$ is relevant:
 - The speaker S said $(p \vee q)$
 - Let me assume that S is cooperative.
 - It would be more informative and relevant to say $(p \ \& \ q)$.
 - However, if S didn't know whether $(p \ \& \ q)$, saying it would have been unreliable.
 - If S is cooperative, she might have given me less information in order remain reliable.
 - I can assume that S knows I can figure this out.
 - I conclude S meant that she doesn't know if $(p \ \& \ q)$.

Disjunctions: Ignorance

- Remember ignorance inferences:
 - **The book is in the office or in the library.**
 - The speaker doesn't know if the book is in the office.
 - The speaker doesn't know if the book is in the library.
- We can also analyze these inferences as quantity implicatures.
- What entailment relations are relevant?

Disjunctions: Ignorance

- (2) entails (1), and (3) entails (1):
 1. The book is in the office or in the library.
 2. The book is in the office.
 3. The book is in the library.

Disjunctions: Ignorance

- Implicature calculation, in a context where p is relevant:
 - The speaker S said $(p \vee q)$
 - Let me assume that S is cooperative.
 - It would be more informative and relevant to say p .
 - However, if S didn't know whether p , saying it would have been unreliable.
 - If S is cooperative, she might have given me less information in order remain reliable.
 - I can assume that S knows I can figure this out.
 - I conclude S meant that she doesn't know if p .

Disjunctions: Ignorance

- Implicature calculation, in a context where q is relevant:
 - The speaker S said $(p \vee q)$
 - Let me assume that S is cooperative.
 - It would be more informative and relevant to say q .
 - However, if S didn't know whether q , saying it would have been unreliable.
 - If S is cooperative, she might have given me less information in order remain reliable.
 - I can assume that S knows I can figure this out.
 - I conclude S meant that she doesn't know if q .

Disjunctions: Ignorance

- In a context where p , q and $(p \ \& \ q)$ are relevant, (2), (3) and (4) can be generated as implicatures of an utterance of (1):
 1. $(p \vee q)$
 2. The speaker doesn't know if p .
 3. The speaker doesn't know if q .
 4. The speaker doesn't know if $(p \ \& \ q)$