Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Ontology Considerations -= Track 2

Update 3/9/2022

Public Domain Dedication

The authors of this document, with this deed have dedicated the work to the public domain by waiving all of their rights to the work worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.

You can copy, modify, distribute and perform the work, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.


https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

Per Last Meeting

- Parking interactions with external groups until we are ready to form a project/sub-project.
- Proceeding with analysis for normalization cataloging the "gotchas" across *DR tooling (tooling capable of supporting *DR (EDR, NDR, XDR, ...) required functionality (emergent threat detection & response, intelligence ingestion, mal/anomalous detection, hunting, analysis, response...):
 - Comodo widely used
 - GRR cloud scale
 - BlueSpawn academic
 - Question 1: Others?
 - Question 2: How to include non-OSS products (proprietary integrations (commercial API), normalized mappings (ATT&CK), or only at the "indicator sharing" level (STIX)...)

Track 2 - Objective 1 - Status

- Indication and Behavior Normalization
- Indications and Behaviors are potentially invariant attributes across
 *DR tooling, so are important in normalizing across different *DR implementations.
- As Indications and Behaviors get exposed, across the security, dev and system disciplines, some implicit context around indications and behavior, need to be made more explicit.



Artifacts

Dev Context & Telemetry

- IDs: SW Component ID: SWID, CycloneDX, SPDX, GUID, "string"...
- Intended SW Component Configuration: Settings,
 Privilege, Dependencies, secrets, obj hashes, policy ...
- **Expected** SW Component Configuration (Test): DLLs Used.
- Intended SW Component Behavior: OpenAPI, RAML,
 ... (L7)
- Expected SW Component Behavior (Test): SysCall/ Res Profile, Memory, Network, Data, CPU

Operational Telemetry & Context

- IDs: Instance MAC, IP, SysSID, GUIDs, ... (stack)
- Provisioning Decisions (operationalization)
- Provisioned Configuration (deployment baseline)
- Mapping from SW Component Manifest -> Instance:
- Observed SW Component Configuration (Instances):
- Observed SW Component Behavior (Instances):
- **Observed** Telemetry Inconsistency:

Curated Intelligence

- IDs: Relevant Component ID Types specified, Malicious IDs identified, ...
 - "strings", SWID, SPDX, CycloneDX, (SCAP: CPE, CVE, ...)
- Relevant Indicators (Instances):
- **Relevant** Behaviors (Instances):
- Relevant Inconsistencies (anomaly): (telemetry)
- Mitigation **Verification**: State & behavior restriction
- Remediation Verification: Sustained resilience to repeat exploit
- Cleanup considerations

Ontology Consideration 1: Tense

- "Tense" is conventionally implicit in EDR ecosystem, and inconsistently selected & represented across EDR tools/svcs.
- EDR relevant artifacts are produced by different processes, at different times with different implications
 - Intended By design or decision. May be coverage tested. Ex. Supported API
 - Expected Observed under test. Cannot be coverage tested. Good automate-able baseline. Test Platform sensitive. Ex. SysCall pattern demonstrated during coverage testing.
 - Observed Runtime or forensic telemetry. Relevant by difference from Intended, Expected or by association with Vuln* or Mal* via Intelligence feed.
 - Verification What should I see post mitigation/remediation?
- Maybe be the same attribute across all tenses: Intended, Expected, Relevant, Verification Registry setting, DLL Hash
- But, may be different. May only be indirectly associated: Patch level vs. Patch Level Indication
- Recommendation: make provision to capture Intended, Expected, Observed, Verification, ... on Configuration and Behavior
- * Process , Ontologies (upper vs lower) Patrick