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LIVING OFF THE LAND REFERENCE INDICATOR OF BEHAVIOR DOCUMENTATION

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), under sponsorship from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), is supporting operational improvements to cyber defense through integration, automation, and standardized information sharing. To this end, APL has prepared an example STIX bundle to represent cyber adversary behaviors—specifically, tactics that rely on “Living off the Land” (LOTL) approaches—using machine-readable Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) format.

This report provides an overview of the content and structure of the example bundle, along with guidance to help operational users interpret and apply the information in support of detection, correlation, and automation workflows.

2. BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATION OVERVIEW

The current focus of APL’s work in support of cyber adversary behavior representation is the preparation and delivery of machine-readable objects that can express adversary behaviors observed on a target network. This effort builds upon prior activities completed under the Integrated Adaptive Cyber Defense (IACD)¹ framework and other efforts for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

Earlier work established an approach for representing adversary behavior using custom object types defined within the STIX 2.1 standard. In this update, APL provides a structured content bundle intended for community sharing and integration into automated and analyst-driven workflows. The resulting STIX bundle enables defenders to detect and respond to observed behavior more effectively by supporting consistent interpretation, correlation, and sharing across operational environments.

2.1 Overview

This section provides a structured summary of the LOTL behavior bundle, formatted using the STIX 2.1 standard with Open Cybersecurity Alliance (OCA) Indicators of Behavior (IOB) extensions. The included behaviors represent a pattern of stealthy, post-compromise activity that involves the use of legitimate tools and credentials—tactics commonly associated with advanced persistent threat (APT) actors such as Volt Typhoon².

The content is organized to present an overarching threat narrative, detailed behavioral representations, placeholders for detection rules, and an explanation of the correlation logic used to elevate otherwise low-confidence events into actionable alerts. Sigma rules may be inserted in

¹ <https://iacdautomate.org>

² https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf

the designated areas, and optional workflow illustrations can be included to support visualization of the correlation scoring mechanism.

2.2 Threat Narrative

The behaviors described in this bundle represent steps an adversary may take once initial access has been established on a target network. Rather than relying on malware or noisy exploit chains, the attacker uses legitimate administrative tools—particularly PowerShell, Windows Remote Management (WinRM), and registry or file system access—to enumerate systems, harvest credentials, and move laterally while avoiding traditional signature-based detection.

The sequence begins with reconnaissance, followed by credential access via memory dumping and file extraction, and concludes with log removal to hinder forensic recovery. These behaviors mirror previously reported Volt Typhoon tradecraft and are typical of campaigns aiming for long-term persistence and operational secrecy within critical infrastructure environments.

2.3 Behaviors and Detections Within the Example

This section provides detailed descriptions of five key behaviors associated with the Living Off the Land campaign. Each behavior includes a summary of the observed activity, its mapping to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, and the corresponding detection rule expressed in Sigma format. The behaviors are:

- Dumping hashes from Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory
- Loading the PowerView reconnaissance module
- Extracting the NT Directory Services (NTDS) Active Directory database
- Deleting Windows event logs
- Executing commands via Windows Remote Shell (WinRS)

These behaviors reflect common post-compromise techniques used by advanced threat actors to evade detection, escalate privileges, and maintain persistence.

2.3.1 Dumping Hashes from LSASS Memory

Computer Generating Hashes from LSASS describes the use of a process to dump memory from the LSASS process in order to extract password hashes or plaintext credentials. This behavior maps to ATT&CK technique **T1003.001 – OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory**.

Detection logic focuses on identifying suspicious memory dump activity targeting the lsass.exe process, especially using tools such as procdump.exe, comsvcs.dll, or WerFault.exe. Relevant process creation and command-line patterns in Windows event logs and Sysmon telemetry can be used to flag this behavior. It is detected with the following Sigma rule:

title: Computer generating hashes

```

id: 1C2B0F31-64F3-4B4A-A0F6-CCFDF2E98CD
status: experimental
description: Process causing computer to dump hashes with lsass
references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
author: OCA
date: 2024/10/21
modified: 2024/10/21
tags:
  - attack.t1033.001
  - attack.execution
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_1:
    event.code: 8
  selection_2:
    winlog.event_data.TargetImage: '*lsass*'
  condition: selection_1 and selection_2
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate lsass usage
level: high

```

2.3.2 Loading the PowerView Reconnaissance Module

Load PowerView Recon Module describes the loading of PowerSploit's PowerView module, a PowerShell-based tool used for Active Directory enumeration and reconnaissance. This behavior maps to ATT&CK technique **T1059.001 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell**.

Detection focuses on specific PowerShell commands such as Get-Domain*, which are commonly used in enumeration activity, and script block logs that reveal indicators of PowerView usage. These detections are effective when script logging is enabled and correlated with known patterns of domain discovery. It is detected with the following Sigma rule:

```

title: Command and Scripting Interpreter - PowerShell Powersploit
id: t42kn5m8-9v7r-5102-3841-p3j1r26b90w2
status: experimental
description: Powersploit usage to enumerate network
references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
author: OCA
date: 2024/10/17
modified: 2024/10/17
tags:
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.execution
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_1:
    event.code: 4104
  selection_2:
    winlog.event_data.ScriptBlockText: '*Get-DomainComputer*'
  selection_3:
    winlog.event_data.ScriptBlockText: '*Get-NetComputer*'
  condition: selection_1 and selection_2 and selection_3
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate powershell scripts
level: high

```

2.3.3 Extracting the NTDS Active Directory Database

Extract NTDS File describes an adversary copying the ntds.dit file, which contains Active Directory user credentials and directory structure data, often for offline password cracking or privilege escalation. This behavior maps to ATT&CK technique **T1555 – Credentials from Password Stores**.

Detection logic involves monitoring access to ntds.dit, the use of Volume Shadow Copy or similar methods, and file transfer attempts from domain controllers. Indicators such as “event.code: 325” and file creation events referencing ntds.dit are relevant. It is detected with the following Sigma rule:

```

title: Credentials from Password Stores
id: q34np6k7-2m9r-7501-1842-x1v1j57b09t3
status: experimental
description: credentials sought to perform lateral movement and access restricted information privileges
references: hhttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
author: OCA
date: 2024/10/23
modified: 2024/10/23
tags:
  - attack.t1555
  - attack.credential_access
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    event.code: 325
    message: '*ntds.dit*'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - legitimate token
level: high

```

2.3.4 Deleting Windows Event Logs

Log Deletion describes the clearing of Windows Event Logs in order to remove traces of the attacker’s presence and evade forensic investigation. This behavior maps to ATT&CK technique **T1070.001 – Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs**.

Detection strategies look for the execution of tools like wevtutil, the Clear-EventLog PowerShell cmdlet, or direct access to .evtx files. The activity may also involve privilege escalation and typically occurs shortly after other malicious actions. It is detected with the following Sigma rule:

```

title: Indicator Removal - Clear Windows Event Logs
id: m58kp2j4-7v3h-9102-6521-p4b1n39t06d1
status: experimental
description: Windows Event Logs cleared to hide the activity of an intrusion
references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/
author: OCA
date: 2024/10/23
modified: 2024/10/23
tags:
  - attack.t1070.001
  - attack.defense_evasion

```

```

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_1:
    event.code: 1
  selection_2:
    winlog.event_data.CommandLine.keyword: "*wevtutil*"
  selection_3:
    winlog.event_data.CommandLine.keyword: "*cl*"
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - legitimate administrator activity
level: high

```

2.3.5 Executing Commands via Windows Remote Shell (WinRS)

Winrs Running Commands describes the use of WinRS to execute commands on remote systems, enabling lateral movement using valid credentials. This behavior maps to ATT&CK technique **T1021.006 – Remote Services: Windows Remote Management**.

Detection involves identifying the use of winrs in command lines, particularly across hosts, and correlating this with credential reuse and administrative user activity. Remote execution events and child processes spawned remotely are key indicators. It is detected with the following Sigma rule:

```

title: Winrs running commands
id: 215bc1ed-cf6b-4af8-8fbe-979aeca97c6d
status: experimental
description: This detection looks for winrshost.exe running commands with cmd.exe or powershell
references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/
author: JHUAPL
date: 2025/03/06
modified: 2025/03/06
tags:
  - attack.t1021.006
  - attack.execution
logsource:
  category: process
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_1:
    EventCode: 4688
  selection_2:
    parent_process_name: "winrshost.exe"
  selection_3:
    process_name:
      - "cmd.exe"
      - "*powershell*"
  condition: selection_1 and selection_2 and selection_3
falsepositives:
  - legitimate administrator activity
level: high

```

2.4 Correlation Logic

The behavioral indicators in this bundle are not intended to be evaluated in isolation. Instead, they are meant to be correlated to raise confidence in detecting adversary operations. To support this, the bundle includes a correlation workflow that is modeled using a course-of-action object

titled Correlate and Score Behaviors, which references an associated x-oca-playbook object. This playbook is provided in two interoperable formats: CACAO (Collaborative Automated Course of Action Operations) for automation in threat response platforms, and BPMN (Business Process Model and Notation) for visualizing and understanding the logic as a workflow diagram.

The playbook defines a scoring mechanism in which each behavior, when detected, adds to a cumulative score associated with a host or user session. The scoring model also incorporates temporal thresholds—behaviors must occur within a defined window to be considered correlated—and evaluates contextual information such as whether the actions were taken by privileged users or from high-value systems. Once a defined score threshold is exceeded, the playbook triggers an alert, representing a higher-confidence detection than any single behavior alone would provide.

This approach allows analysts or automated systems to move beyond signature-based or one-off detections and instead recognize attack progression through weak signals that form a meaningful pattern when combined. The inclusion of both CACAO and BPMN formats ensures compatibility with orchestration platforms and supports transparency and analyst review through visual representation.




Figure 1 BPMN Representation of Correlation Logic




Figure 2 CACAO Representation of Correlation Logic

3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The IOB Sub-Project wishes to thank Dr. Vasileios Mavroeidis and his teams at University of Oslo / Cyentific AS for their technical discussions on best practices to represent CACAO playbooks within STIX.

4. CONCLUSION

APL provides this IOB example bundle and accompanying report to support consistent representation of adversary behavior using machine-readable formats. The material is intended to assist the cyber defense community with operational integration, improve information sharing, and promote standardization across tools and workflows.

For any questions regarding this report, please contact the authors at Charles.Frick@jhuapl.edu.

5. APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definition
APL	Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
APT	Advanced Persistent Threat
ATT&CK	Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
BPMN	Business Process Model and Notation
CACAO	Collaborative Automated Course of Action Operations
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
COA	Course of Action
IOC	Indicator of Compromise
IOB	Indicator of Behavior
LOTL	Living Off the Land
NTDS	NT Directory Services
OCA	Open Cybersecurity Alliance
STIX	Structured Threat Information eXpression
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
WinRM	Windows Remote Management
WinRS	Windows Remote Shell

6. APPENDIX B: COMPLETE BEHAVIOR SET STIX BUNDLE

```
{
  "spec_version": "2.1",
  "id": "bundle--14e1d58f-4c98-42b2-877d-6f5c24fd895d",
  "type": "bundle",
  "objects": [
    {
      "type": "extension-definition",
      "spec_version": "2.1",
      "id": "extension-definition--9c59fd79-4215-4ba2-920d-3e4f320e1e62",
      "created_by_ref": "identity--b085a68a-bf48-4316-9667-37af78cba894",
      "created": "2022-03-31T13:00:00.000Z",
      "modified": "2025-06-18T12:00:00.000Z",
      "name": "x-oca-behavior Extension Definition",
      "description": "Behavior objects define adversary behaviors associated with higher level MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. The Attack Pattern SDO may have multiple behaviors associated with it. For example, a spearphishing attack may employ multiple behaviors (usage of email attachments, process modifying a registry key, network patterns, etc.).",
      "schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/opencybersecurityalliance/stix-extensions/main/2.x/schemas/x-oca-behavior.json",
      "version": "1.0.1",
      "extension_types": [
        "new-sdo"
      ]
    },
    {
      "type": "extension-definition",
      "spec_version": "2.1",
      "id": "extension-definition--c4690e13-107e-4796-8158-0dcf1ae7bc89",
      "created_by_ref": "identity--b085a68a-bf48-4316-9667-37af78cba894",
      "created": "2022-03-31T13:00:00.000Z",
      "modified": "2025-06-18T12:00:00.000Z",
      "name": "x-oca-detection Extension Definition",
      "description": "Detections contain logic to detect an adversary behavior.",
      "schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/opencybersecurityalliance/stix-extensions/main/2.x/schemas/x-oca-detection.json",
      "version": "1.0.1",
      "extension_types": [
        "new-sdo"
      ]
    },
    {
      "type": "extension-definition",
      "spec_version": "2.1",
      "id": "extension-definition--5cccba5c-0be4-450c-8672-b66e98515754",
      "created_by_ref": "identity--b085a68a-bf48-4316-9667-37af78cba894",
      "created": "2023-05-01T12:00:00.000Z",
      "modified": "2025-06-18T12:00:00.000Z",
      "name": "x-oca-detector Extension Definition",
      "description": "Detector objects define tools, software, products, etc. that are capable of performing detection. They should likely be related to one or more Detection objects.",
      "schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/opencybersecurityalliance/stix-extensions/main/2.x/schemas/x-oca-detector.json",
      "version": "1.0.1",
      "extension_types": [
        "new-sdo"
      ]
    },
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      "spec_version": "2.1",
      "id": "extension-definition--809c4d84-7a6e-4039-97b4-da9fea03fcf9",
      "created_by_ref": "identity--b085a68a-bf48-4316-9667-37af78cba894",
      "created": "2022-03-31T13:00:00.000Z",
      "modified": "2025-06-18T12:00:00.000Z",
      "name": "x-oca-playbook Extension Definition",
```

```

    "description": "A Playbook object represents a structured process, such as an orchestration
workflow, alongside associated metadata.",
    "schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/opencybersecurityalliance/stix-
extensions/main/2.x/schemas/x-oca-playbook.json",
    "version": "4.0.0",
    "extension_types": [
      "new-sdo"
    ]
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    "type": "identity",
    "spec_version": "2.1",
    "created": "2022-03-31T13:00:00.000Z",
    "modified": "2023-05-23T10:09:00.000Z",
    "revoked": false,
    "confidence": 0,
    "lang": "en",
    "name": "OCA"
  },
  {
    "id": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
    "type": "identity",
    "spec_version": "2.1",
    "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
    "created": "2017-06-01T00:00:00.000Z",
    "modified": "2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z",
    "revoked": false,
    "confidence": 0,
    "lang": "en",
    "object_marking_refs": [
      "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
    ],
    "name": "The MITRE Corporation",
    "identity_class": "organization"
  },
  {
    "id": "attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90",
    "type": "attack-pattern",
    "spec_version": "2.1",
    "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
    "created": "2020-02-11T18:41:44.783Z",
    "modified": "2024-08-13T13:52:45.379Z",
    "revoked": false,
    "confidence": 0,
    "lang": "en",
    "external_references": [
      {
        "source_name": "mitre-attack",
        "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001",
        "external_id": "T1003.001"
      },
      {
        "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory",
        "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory.
Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
        "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-
558f16dce4ea"
      },
      {
        "source_name": "Deep Instinct LSASS",
        "description": "Gilboa, A. (2021, February 16). LSASS Memory Dumps are Stealthier than Ever
Before - Part 2. Retrieved December 27, 2023.",
        "url": "https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-
part-2"
      },
      {
        "source_name": "Graeber 2014",

```

```

    "description": "Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider
DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
    "url": "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
  },
  {
    "source_name": "Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021",
    "description": "Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active
Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.",
    "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-
day-vulnerabilities/"
  },
  {
    "source_name": "Powersploit",
    "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
    "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
  },
  {
    "source_name": "Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector",
    "description": "Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved
September 28, 2021.",
    "url": "https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf"
  },
  {
    "source_name": "TechNet Blogs Credential Protection",
    "description": "Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for
Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
    "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-
and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/"
  }
],
"object_marking_refs": [
  "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"name": "LSASS Memory",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory
of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and
stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be
harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral
Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication
Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).\n\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS
process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the
target host use procdump:\n\n* <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code>\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be
run using:\n\n* <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>\n\n*
<code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>\n\nBuilt-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be
used:\n\n* <code>rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp
full</code>(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government
Sector)\n\nSimilar to [Image File Execution Options
Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012), the silent process exit mechanism can be abused
to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).(Citation: Deep
Instinct LSASS)\n\nWindows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system
start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored
in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is
stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code>
and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary
may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or
when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nThe following SSPs
can be used to access credentials:\n\n* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done
through the MSV authentication package.\n\n* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use
with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL)
exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\n\n* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server
domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\n\n* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level
Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\n",
    "kill_chain_phases": [
      {
        "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
        "phase_name": "credential-access"
      }
    ]
  }
]

```

```

    },
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      "revoked": false,
      "confidence": 0,
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          "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001",
          "external_id": "T1059.001"
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        {
          "source_name": "Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014",
          "description": "Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved
April 22, 2019.",
          "url": "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/"
        },
        {
          "source_name": "SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015",
          "description": "Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell
Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.",
          "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170150/https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-
jobs-without-powershell-exe/"
        },
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          "source_name": "FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016",
          "description": "Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING.
Retrieved February 16, 2016.",
          "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibility.html"
        },
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          "description": "Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved September 27, 2024.",
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          "description": "Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved
December 1, 2021.",
          "url": "https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/"
        },
        {
          "source_name": "Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet",
          "description": "Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win
7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.",
          "url": "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-
2016-v2.pdf"
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        {
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          "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.",
          "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx"
        },
        {
          "source_name": "Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016",
          "description": "Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell - A Red Teamer's Tale of
Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.",
          "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160327101330/http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367"
        }
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```



```

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powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating
system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions,
including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code>
cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a
command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell
to connect to remote systems).\n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the
Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nA number of PowerShell-
based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363),
[PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378),
and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without
directly invoking the <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying
<code>System.Management.Automation</code> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows
Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS
Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)",
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      },
      {
        "source_name": "F-Secure The Dukes",
        "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian
cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.",
        "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf"
      }
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    "description": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user
credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending
on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and
services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password
managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral
movement and access restricted information.",
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      {
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        "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018.",
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eventlog"
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        "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, 2018.",
        "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx"
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      {
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        "description": "Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018.",
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Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined
sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information,
Success Audit, and Failure Audit.\n\nWith administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with
the following utility commands:\n\n* <code>wevtutil cl system</code>\n* <code>wevtutil cl
application</code>\n* <code>wevtutil cl security</code>\n\nThese logs may also be cleared through other
mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command <code>Remove-EventLog -LogName Security</code> to
delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging. Note: events may still be
generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.(Citation:
disable_win_evt_logging)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log
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        "description": "French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
        "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc"
      },
      {
        "source_name": "Jacobsen 2014",
        "description": "Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell&#91;slides&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
        "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2"
      },
      {
        "source_name": "MSDN WMI",
        "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
        "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx"
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        "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
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    "confidence": 0,
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      "x-oca-detection--334886c6-cb58-4aba-b470-0ddc361ace33",
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[illegible]

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[illegible]

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  "schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/opencybersecurityalliance/stix-extensions/main/2.x/schemas/x-oca-coa-playbook-ext.json",

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