FICTIONAL REPORT - FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY TLP CLEAR

Threat Bulletin: Operation SparkRainstorm (Fictional)



Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Date: April 2025

Prepared by: Cyber Threat Intelligence Division

Overview

Operation SparkRainstorm is a fictional cyber threat campaign developed for demonstration and training purposes. It simulates the tactics of a fabricated threat group, APT-C29 "RainDrift", modeled on the behaviors of advanced adversaries. The operation highlights malware staging, privilege escalation, internal reconnaissance, and credential theft using legitimate tools and behaviors.

△ DISCLAIMER: All indicators, threat actor details, and artifacts in this bulletin are fictional and intended solely for use in controlled educational environments. They are not associated with any real-world threat activity.

Threat Actor Profile

Name: APT-C29 "RainDrift"

Type: Fictional Nation-State Threat Group

Motivation: Intelligence Collection

Targeting Profile: Government, Healthcare, Academic Research

Key Behaviors:

- Uses offensive PowerShell tools (e.g., PowerSploit)
- Avoids compiled malware when possible
- Leverages cloud and decentralized storage for payload hosting

Threat Timeline (Simulated)

Date/Time	Event
2022-03-31 08:32	Initial access via download and execution of svhost32.exe
2022-03-31 08:45	Persistence established using scheduled task WinUpdateService
2022-03-31 09:35	C2 channel opened to 198.51.100.77 using HTTPS
2022-03-31 10:15	Domain enumeration initiated via

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	PowerView commands
2022-03-31 11:10	Lateral movement activity via SMB connections observed
2022-03-31 11:40	NTDS.dit file copied from Domain Controller

Kill Chain and Techniques

Phase	Technique (ID)	Description
Resource Development	T1608.001 – Upload Malware	Payload staged externally for download
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Execution	T1059.001 – PowerShell	PowerSploit used for
		discovery and network
		enumeration
Credential Access	T1555 - Credentials from	NTDS.dit extracted for
	Password Stores	credential harvesting

SOC Analyst Checklist

- Investigate abnormal PowerShell usage
- Review Sysmon logs for abnormal process execution
- Inspect Active Directory logs
- Monitor DNS and proxy logs for fake domains used in payload delivery
- Check for scheduled task creation: WinUpdateService
- Search for any known fake hashes in file inventory
- Trace outbound connections to known fake IP addresses
- Correlate SMB traffic logs for lateral movement timing
- Use ATT&CK Navigator to visualize attack surface coverage

MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Layer (Summary View)

Tactic	Technique ID	Technique Name
Resource Development	T1608.001	Upload Malware
Execution	T1059.001	PowerShell
Credential Access	T1555	Credentials from Password
		Stores

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

All IOCs below are fictional and for training purposes only. Do not use them for real-world alerting or blocking.

- IP Addresses:
 - 45.67.89.123 Staging server (FAKE)
 - 198.51.100.77 C2 endpoint (FAKE)
 - 203.0.113.44 Exfiltration server (FAKE)
- Domains:

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- stage.sparkrainstorm-demo.net
- updates.win-patchsafe.org
- login.corp-portal.spoofed.co
- Hashes (SHA256):
 - a8b3f6c7e2f9d4c8a9e3a6218cd230e5e9bcabf4e3ab96c1ad5fd9aef9c4c1e0 svhost32.exe
 - dd1f2a3e857d405d8d85b97b69e94656d8d7e827183b9e91850fdba0e5d7f3f3 update.dll
 - 8fa9c72b2c8e46a8c0b4d3cba73fc3df163928de2279d3c6d5e28c2b1b4e8e1d PowerView script
- Scheduled Task:
 - Name: WinUpdateService

Path: C:\ProgramData\WinUpdates\update.dll