

The Geography of Development

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Outline

Introduction

The Model

The Balanced-Growth Path

Calibration and Simulation of the Model

Appendix

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Motivation

Why do we need to understand the Geography of Development?

- How do **migration restrictions** affect the evolution of the world economy?
- How do they interact with production centers to shape the economy of the future?

Driven Forces and Elements

- Unique relative to other locations \Rightarrow costs of trading, amenities, productivity
- Migration across/within countries \Rightarrow possible but limited, restrictions or frictions
- **Dynamic** labor productivity \Rightarrow institutions, infrastructure, education, capital stocks
- Population density \Rightarrow innovation, agglomeration effects and costs of congestion

What do the researchers do?

Structure

- Allen and Arkolakis (2014): **static** spatial equilibrium
- Eaton and Kortum (2002): migration, local factors, trade structure
- Kline and Moretti (2014): heterogeneous preferences
- Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014): **dynamic** version (invest in improving local technology, explicitly modeled)
- Zabreyko et al. (1975): uniqueness of the equilibrium, steady state, initial distribution, simulation

Contributions

- Identify local characteristics: land prices \Rightarrow income per capita + population counts (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2013) (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014) (Fajgelbaum and Redding, 2014) (Behrens et al., 2017)
- Free mobility \Rightarrow incorporate migration **frictions** within/across countries
- Subjective well-being data \Rightarrow information on the **welfare** of individuals (Deaton, 2008) (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010)
- ...

Preview of Findings

- Relaxing migration restrictions leads to large increases in **output** and **welfare** at impact
- One of key determinants is the correlation between GDP per capita and population density
- **Venezuela, Brazil, & Mexico**: become world's **densest** and most **productive** countries




Figure: Equilibrium with free migration (period **1**). **A** Population density; **B** Productivity; **C** Utility; **D** Real income per capita




Figure: Equilibrium with free migration (period **600**). **A** Population density; **B** Productivity; **C** Utility; **D** Real income per capita

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Setup

Geographic Space

- **closed** and **bounded** subset S of 2-dimensional surface, **location** is a point $r \in S$

Land Provision

- $H(r) > 0$ ($H(\cdot)$: exogenous given continuous function)
- $\int_S H(r) dr = 1$

Countries

- C countries, each location belongs to one country
- $S : (S_1, \dots, S_C)$

Population

- \bar{L} agents, endowed with one unit of labor (supply inelastically)
- initial distribution $\bar{L}_0(r)$

Time

- **discrete**, $T = 0$ is given

Goods

- continuum, $\omega \in [0, 1]$ (for both production and consumption)

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Consumer Problem)

Period Utility

- agent i resides in r this period t
- lived in a series of locations $\bar{r}_- = (r_0, \dots, r_{t-1})$
- $1/[1 - \rho]$ is the **C**onstant **E**lasticity of **S**ubstitution with $0 < \rho < 1$

$$u_t^i(\bar{r}_-, r) = a_t(r) \left[\int_0^1 c_t^\omega(r)^\rho d\omega \right]^{1/\rho} \varepsilon_t^i(r) \prod_{s=1}^t m(r_{s-1}, r_s)^{-1} \quad (1)$$

Four Parts

- $a_t(\mathbf{r})$: **amenities** at location r and time t (given for consumers)
- $c_t^\omega(\mathbf{r})$: consumption of good ω at location r and time t
- $\varepsilon_t^i(\mathbf{r})$: taste shock (idiosyncratic preferences) distributed to a Fréchet distribution (i.i.d.)
 - constant mean proportional to Ω and variance $\pi^2 \Omega^2 / 6$ with $\Omega < 1$
 - $\Pr[\varepsilon_t^i(r) \leq z] = e^{-z^{-1/\Omega}}$ (higher $\Omega \Rightarrow$ greater **heterogeneity**)
- $m(\mathbf{r}_{s-1}, \mathbf{r}_s)$: **permanent flow-utility** cost of moving from r_{s-1} to r_s

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Cont'd)

Congestion Externalities

$$a_t(r) = \bar{a}(r)\bar{L}_t(r)^{-\lambda} \quad (2)$$

- $\mathbf{a}(\mathbf{r}) > \mathbf{0}$: an exogenously given continuous function
- $\bar{L}_t(r)$: population per unit of land at r in period t
- $\lambda \geqslant 0$: fixed parameter, **elasticity** of amenities to population is $-\lambda$

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Cont'd)

Total Income

- $w_t(r)$: income from work
- $R_t(r)/\bar{L}_t(r)$: income from local ownership of land
 - rents are distributed uniformly across residents
 - alternative assumptions on land ownership can be found in [Caliendo et al. \(2018\)](#)
- no debt contracts \Rightarrow each period agents simply consume their income

$$\begin{aligned} u_t^i(\bar{r}_-, r) &= \frac{a_t(r)}{\prod_{s=1}^t m(r_{s-1}, r_s)} \frac{w_t(r) + R_t(r)/\bar{L}_t(r)}{P_t(r)} \varepsilon_t^i(r) \\ &= \frac{a_t(r)}{\prod_{s=1}^t m(r_{s-1}, r_s)} y_t(r) \varepsilon_t^i(r) \end{aligned}$$

- $y_t(r)$: **real income** of an agent in r
- $P_t(r)$: ideal **price index** at location r in t 🇺🇸

$$P_t(r) = \left[\int_0^1 p_t^\omega(r)^{-\rho/(1-\rho)} d\omega \right]^{-(1-\rho)/\rho}$$

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Cont'd)

Assumption 1


Bilateral moving costs can be decomposed into an origin- and a destination-specific component, so $m(s, r) = m_1(s)m_2(r)$. Furthermore, there are no moving costs within a location, so $m(r, r) = 1$ for all $r \in S$.

- **Migration cost:** measured as the percent of **permanent** welfare
- **Enter and leave:** pay the entry migration costs only while being in that country (compensation)
- focus on **net** (rather than gross) migration **flows**
- **Location choice:** depends only on current variables and not on history or future characteristics
- **Discounted total utility:** $\sum_t \beta^t u_t^i(r_{t-}^i, r_t^i)$

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Cont'd)

The **value function** of an agent living at r_0 in period 0, after observing a distribution of taste shocks in all locations, $\bar{\varepsilon}_1^i \equiv \varepsilon_1^i(\cdot)$

$$\begin{aligned} V(r_0, \bar{\varepsilon}_1^i) &= \max_{r_1} \left[\frac{a_1(r_1)}{m(r_0, r_1)} y_1(r_1) \varepsilon_1^i(r_1) + \beta E \left(\frac{V(r_1, \bar{\varepsilon}_2^i)}{m(r_0, r_1)} \right) \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{m_1(r_0)} \max_{r_1} \left[\frac{a_1(r_1)}{m_2(r_1)} y_1(r_1) \varepsilon_1^i(r_1) + \beta E \left(\frac{V(r_1, \bar{\varepsilon}_2^i)}{m_2(r_1)} \right) \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{m_1(r_0)} \left\{ \max_{r_1} \left[\frac{a_1(r_1)}{m_2(r_1)} y_1(r_1) \varepsilon_1^i(r_1) \right] \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \beta E \left(\max_{r_2} \left[\frac{a_2(r_2)}{m_2(r_2)} y_2(r_2) \varepsilon_2^i(r_2) + \frac{V(r_2, \bar{\varepsilon}_3^i)}{m_2(r_2)} \right] \right) \right\} \end{aligned}$$

- **Red part:** depends only on current variables and taste shocks
 - decision in period 1 is **independent** of history and future 
- **Orange part:** the value of leaving the current location, independent of current location r

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Cont'd)

Period t log utility of an agent

Using (1) and taking logs,

$$\tilde{u}_t^i(r_0, r_t) = \tilde{u}_t(r_t) - \tilde{m}_1(r_0) - \tilde{m}_2(r_t) + \tilde{\varepsilon}_t^i(r_t)$$

where $\tilde{x} = \ln x$ and $u_t(r)$ denotes the utility level associated with **local amenities** and **real consumption**

$$u_t(r) = a_t(r) \left[\int_0^1 c_t^\omega(r)^\rho d\omega \right]^{1/\rho} = a_t(r) y_t(r) \quad (3)$$

- desirability of a location, a measure to evaluate social welfare
- not include **mobility costs** and **idiosyncratic preferences**

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Cont'd)

Another measure of social welfare

- **include taste shocks**, ignore mobility costs
- **lack of migration**
 - legal impossibility of moving (lack of info or psychological impediments)
 - tend to overestimate the gains (when evaluating liberalizing restrictions)

Expected period t utility (with reimbursement) 📊

$$\begin{aligned} & E(u_t(r)\varepsilon_t^i(r) \mid i \text{ lives in } r) \\ &= \Gamma(1 - \Omega)m_2(r) \left[\int_S u_t(s)^{1/\Omega} m_2(s)^{-1/\Omega} ds \right]^\Omega \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Cont'd)

Shares of people moving

- density of individuals residing in location s in $t - 1$ who prefer location r in period t over all other locations

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(\tilde{u}_t(s, r) \geq \tilde{u}_t(s, v) \forall v \in S) &= \frac{\exp([\tilde{u}_t(r) - \tilde{m}_2(r)]/\Omega)}{\int_S \exp([\tilde{u}_t(v) - \tilde{m}_2(v)]/\Omega) dv} \\ &= \frac{u_t(r)^{1/\Omega} m_2(r)^{-1/\Omega}}{\int_S u_t(v)^{1/\Omega} m_2(v)^{-1/\Omega} dv}\end{aligned}\tag{5}$$

Corresponding to the **fraction of population in s that moves to r** :

$$\frac{\ell_t(s, r)}{H(s)\bar{L}_{t-1}(s)} = \frac{u_t(r)^{1/\Omega} m_2(r)^{-1/\Omega}}{\int_S u_t(v)^{1/\Omega} m_2(v)^{-1/\Omega} dv}\tag{6}$$

- $\ell_t(s, r)$: number of people moving from s to r in t
- $\mathbf{L}_{t-1}(s)$: total population per unit of land in s at $t - 1$

Preferences and Agents' Choices (Cont'd)

Number of people living at r at t must coincide with people who **moved** there or **stayed** there:

$$H(r)\bar{L}_t(r) = \int_S \ell_t(s, r) ds$$

Using (6), this equation can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} H(r)\bar{L}_t(r) &= \int_S \frac{u_t(r)^{1/\Omega} m_2(r)^{-1/\Omega}}{\int_S u_t(v)^{1/\Omega} m_2(v)^{-1/\Omega} dv} H(s)\bar{L}_{t-1}(s) ds \\ &= \frac{u_t(r)^{1/\Omega} m_2(r)^{-1/\Omega}}{\int_S u_t(v)^{1/\Omega} m_2(v)^{-1/\Omega} dv} \bar{L} \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

Technology (Producer Problem)

Production Function (per unit of land)


$$q_t^\omega(r) = \phi_t^\omega(r)^{\gamma_1} z_t^\omega(r) L_t^\omega(r)^\mu$$

- $\phi_t^\omega(\mathbf{r})$: innovation, employ $\nu \phi_t^\omega(r)^\xi$ **additional units of labor** per unit of land
- $z_t^\omega(\mathbf{r})$: exogenous local and good-specific productivity shifter
 - random and i.i.d. across good and time periods
 - Fréchet distribution: $F(z, r) = e^{-T_t(r)z^{-\theta}}$ where $T_t(r) = \tau_t(\mathbf{r})\bar{L}(r)^\alpha$
- $L_t^\omega(\mathbf{r})$: production workers per unit of land at location r at time t

Technology (Producer Problem)

Endogenous dynamic process of $\tau_t(r)$ (given initial productivity $\tau_0(\cdot)$)

$$\tau_t(r) = \phi_{t-1}(r)^{\theta\gamma_1} \left[\int_S \eta \tau_{t-1}(s) ds \right]^{1-\gamma_2} \tau_{t-1}(r)^{\gamma_2} \quad (8)$$

- η : constant such that $\int_S \eta dr = 1$
- $\gamma_2 = 1$ + constant population density: $\mathbb{E}(z_t) = \phi_{t-1}^{\gamma_1} \mathbb{E}(z_{t-1})$ 
 - the distribution of productivity draws is shifted up by past innovations
 - decreasing returns if $\gamma_1 < 1$
- $\gamma_2 < 1$: dynamic evolution of location's technology also depends on aggregate level of technology, $\int_S \eta \tau_t(s) ds$

$\gamma_1, \gamma_2 \in (0, 1)$

- $\gamma_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ in a BGP, economic activity end up concentrating in a unique point
- $\gamma_1 = \gamma_2 = 0 \Rightarrow$ no incentives to innovate
- **local decreasing returns** + **economywide linear technological progress**

Technology (Producer Problem)

Spatially correlated $z_t^\omega(r)$

- **perfectly correlated** for neighboring locations (distance $\rightarrow 0$)
- **independent** (large enough distance)
- $\zeta_t^\omega(r, s)$: correlation in $z_t^\omega(r)$ and $z_t^\omega(s)$
- $\delta(r, s) = d$ denote the distance between r and s
- $\lim_{d \rightarrow 0} \zeta_t^\omega(r, s(d)) \rightarrow 1$, $\zeta_t^\omega(r, s(d)) = 0$ when δ large enough

One easy example (land divided into regions)

- $\zeta_t^\omega(r, s) = 1$ within a region
- $\zeta_t^\omega(r, s) = 0$ otherwise

Technology (Producer Problem)

Market Structure: perfect local competition

- linear profits in land \Rightarrow small interval = continuum of firms compete in **prices** (Bertrand)
- factor prices and transport costs will be **similar** in a small interval
- pricing will be similar locally \Rightarrow **zero profits** (after covering investment $w_t(r)v\phi_t^\omega(r)^\xi$)
- **Firm:** bid for land \rightarrow win the land auction \rightarrow produce \rightarrow profits always zero
- dynamic innovation decision problem \Leftrightarrow a sequence of **static** innovation decisions (maximize static profits)
- solve only static optimization and disregard (8) (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2014)

Technology (Producer Problem)

Producer's problem

$$\max_{L_t^\omega(r), \phi_t^\omega(r)} p_t^\omega(r, r) \phi_t^\omega(r)^{\gamma_1} z_t^\omega(r) L_t^\omega(r)^\mu - w_t(r) L_t^\omega(r) \\ - w_t(r) \nu \phi_t^\omega(r)^\xi - R_t(r)$$

Two FOCs

$$\mu p_t^\omega(r, r) \phi_t^\omega(r)^{\gamma_1} z_t^\omega(r) L_t^\omega(r)^{\mu-1} = w_t(r) \quad (9)$$

$$\gamma_1 p_t^\omega(r, r) \phi_t^\omega(r)^{\gamma_1-1} z_t^\omega(r) L_t^\omega(r)^\mu = \xi w_t(r) \nu \phi_t^\omega(r)^{\xi-1} \quad (10)$$

Firm's bid rent per unit of land

$$R_t(r) = p_t^\omega(r, r) \phi_t^\omega(r)^{\gamma_1} z_t^\omega(r) L_t^\omega(r)^\mu - w_t(r) L_t^\omega(r) - w_t(r) \nu \phi_t^\omega(r)^\xi \quad (11)$$

which ensures all firms make **zero profits**.


Technology (Producer Problem)

Using (9) and (10) gives 

$$\frac{L_t^\omega(r)}{\mu} = \frac{\xi v \phi_t^\omega(r)^\xi}{\gamma_1} \quad (12)$$

Total employment = production + innovation

$$\bar{L}_t^\omega(r) = L_t^\omega(r) + v \phi_t^\omega(r)^\xi = \frac{L_t^\omega(r)}{\mu} \left[\mu + \frac{\gamma_1}{\xi} \right] \quad (13)$$

Note also that (in equilibrium $R_t(r)$ is **taken as given** by firms) 

$$R_t(r) = \left[\frac{\xi(1-\mu)}{\gamma_1} - 1 \right] w_t(r) v \phi_t^\omega(r)^\xi \quad (14)$$

Lemma 1

*The decisions of how much to innovate, $\phi_t^\omega(r)$, and how many workers to hire per unit of land, $\bar{L}_t^\omega(r)$, are **independent** of the local idiosyncratic productivity draws, $z_t^\omega(r)$, and so are identical across goods ω .*

Technology (Producer Problem)

Price of a good produced at r and sold at r 🖍

$$p_t^\omega(r, r) = \left[\frac{1}{\mu} \right]^\mu \left[\frac{\nu \xi}{\gamma_1} \right]^{1-\mu} \left[\frac{\gamma_1 R_t(r)}{w_t(r) \nu (\xi(1-\mu) - \gamma_1)} \right]^{(1-\mu) - (\gamma_1/\xi)} \frac{w_t(r)}{z_t^\omega(r)} \quad (15)$$

Rewrite this as

$$p_t^\omega(r, r) = \frac{mc_t(r)}{z_t^\omega(r)} \quad (16)$$

where $mc_t(r)$ (**given**) denotes the input cost in location r at time t

$$mc_t(r) \equiv \left[\frac{1}{\mu} \right]^\mu \left[\frac{\nu \xi}{\gamma_1} \right]^{1-\mu} \left[\frac{\gamma_1 R_t(r)}{w_t(r) \nu (\xi(1-\mu) - \gamma_1)} \right]^{(1-\mu) - (\gamma_1/\xi)} w_t(r) \quad (17)$$

Eaton and Kortum (2002): price distribution, probability of exporting, share of exports

Prices, Export Probabilities, and Export Shares

iceberg cost of transporting from r to s ($\varsigma(s, r) \geq 1$)

$$p_t^\omega(s, r) = p_t^\omega(r, r)\varsigma(s, r) = \frac{mc_t(r)\varsigma(s, r)}{z_t^\omega(r)} \quad (18)$$

Assumption 2

$\varsigma(\cdot, \cdot) : S \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is *symmetric*.

Probability density (produced in r is bought in s) 🇺🇸

$$\pi_t(s, r) = \frac{T_t(r) [mc_t(r)\varsigma(r, s)]^{-\theta}}{\int_S T_t(u) [mc_t(u)\varsigma(u, s)]^{-\theta} du} \quad \text{all } r, s \in S \quad (19)$$

Price index 🇺🇸

$$P_t(s) = \Gamma \left(\frac{-\rho}{(1-\rho)\theta} + 1 \right)^{-(1-\rho)/\rho} \left\{ \int_S T_t(u) [mc_t(u)\varsigma(s, u)]^{-\theta} du \right\}^{-1/\theta} \quad (20)$$

Trade Balance

Total revenue in r 

$$w_t(r)H(r)[L_t(r) + v\phi_t(r)^\xi] + H(r)R_t(r) = \frac{1}{\mu}w_t(r)H(r)L_t(r)$$

- location by location
- no mechanism for borrowing from or lending to other agents

Market Clearing (total revenue = total expenditure)

$$w_t(r)H(r)\bar{L}_t(r) = \int_S \pi_t(s, r)w_t(s)H(s)\bar{L}_t(s)ds \quad \text{all } r \in S \quad (21)$$

- Fraction of goods s buys from r , $\pi_t(s, r)$, is **equal** to fraction of expenditure on goods from r (Eaton and Kortum, 2002)
- ω is dropped: number of workers not depend on good
- \mathbf{L} is replaced by $\bar{\mathbf{L}}$: **proportion** of total workers to production workers is constant across r

Equilibrium


Define a dynamic competitive equilibrium

Definition 1


Given a set of locations, S , and their initial technology, amenity, population, and land functions $(\tau_0, \bar{a}, \bar{L}_0, H) : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$, as well as their bilateral trade and migration cost functions $\varsigma, m : S \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$.

A competitive equilibrium is a set of functions $(u_t, \bar{L}_t, \phi_t, R_t, w_t, P_t, \tau_t, T_t) : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$ for all $t = 1, \dots$, as well as a pair of functions $(p_i^t, c_i^t) : [0, 1] \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$ for all $t = 1, \dots$, such that for all $t = 1, \dots$:

Equilibrium

1. **Firms** optimize and **markets clear** ((9), (10) and (13) hold at all r).
2. The **share of income** of s spent on goods of r is given by (17) and (19) for all $r, s \in S$.
3. **Trade balance** implies that (21) holds for all $r \in S$.
4. **Land markets** are in equilibrium, so land is assigned to the highest bidder (by (14)). 

$$R_t(r) = \left[\frac{\xi - \mu\xi - \gamma_1}{\mu\xi + \gamma_1} \right] w_t(r) \bar{L}_t(r)$$

5. Given **migration** costs and idiosyncratic preferences, people choose where to live, (7) holds for all $r \in S$.
6. **Utility** associated with real income and amenities in r is given by (20) and 

$$u_t(r) = a_t(r) \frac{w_t(r) + R_t(r)/\bar{L}_t(r)}{P_t(r)} = \bar{a}(r) \bar{L}_t(r)^{-\lambda} \frac{\xi}{\mu\xi + \gamma_1} \frac{w_t(r)}{P_t(r)} \quad \forall r \in S \quad (22)$$

7. **Labor markets** clear: $\int_S H(r) \bar{L}_t(r) dr = \bar{L}$.
8. **Technology** evolves as (8) for all $r \in S$.

Equilibrium

Assumption 3

$\bar{a}(\cdot), H(\cdot), \tau_0(\cdot), \bar{L}_0(\cdot) : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$, and $m(\cdot, \cdot), \varsigma(\cdot, \cdot) : S \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$ are continuous functions.

No Discontinuity

- make functions steep at borders (natural geographic barriers)

Discrete approximation

- existence, uniqueness, parameter restrictions ([Allen and Arkolakis, 2014](#))
- for quantification and calibration

Simplification

- manipulate the system of equations
- reduce to **wages**, **employment levels** (labor density), and **utility** in all locations

Equilibrium

Lemma 2

For any t and for all $r \in S$, given $\bar{a}(\cdot)$, $\tau_t(\cdot)$, $\bar{L}_{t-1}(\cdot)$, $\varsigma(\cdot, \cdot)$, $m(\cdot, \cdot)$, and $H(\cdot, \cdot)$, the equilibrium wage, $w_t(\cdot)$, population density $\bar{L}_t(\cdot)$, and utility $u_t(\cdot)$ schedules satisfy equations (7) as well as

$$w_t(r) = \bar{w} \left[\frac{\bar{a}(r)}{u_t(r)} \right]^{-\frac{\theta}{1+2\theta}} \tau_t(r)^{\frac{1}{1+2\theta}} \bar{L}_t(r)^{\frac{\alpha-1+\left[\lambda+\frac{\gamma_1}{\xi}-[1-\mu]\right]\theta}{1+2\theta}} \quad (23)$$

and 🇲🇻

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[\frac{\bar{a}(r)}{u_t(r)} \right]^{-\frac{\theta(1+\theta)}{1+2\theta}} \tau_t(r)^{-\frac{\theta}{1+2\theta}} H(r)^{\frac{\theta}{1+2\theta}} \\ & \times \bar{L}_t(r)^{\lambda\theta - \frac{\theta}{1+2\theta} \left[\alpha-1+\left[\lambda+\frac{\gamma_1}{\xi}-[1-\mu]\theta\right] \right]} \\ & = \kappa_1 \int_S \left[\frac{\bar{a}(s)}{u_t(s)} \right]^{\frac{\theta^2}{1+2\theta}} \tau_t(s)^{\frac{1+\theta}{1+2\theta}} H(s)^{\frac{\theta}{1+2\theta}} \varsigma(r, s)^{-\theta} \\ & \times \bar{L}_t(s)^{1-\lambda\theta + \frac{1+\theta}{1+2} \left[\alpha-1+\left[\lambda+\frac{\gamma_1}{\xi}-[1-\mu]\right]\theta \right]} ds, \text{ where } \kappa_1 \text{ is a constant.} \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

Equilibrium

Lemma 3

A solution $w_t(\cdot)$, $\bar{L}_t(\cdot)$, and $u_t(\cdot)$ that satisfies (7), (23), and (24) exists and is unique if $\alpha/\theta + \gamma_1/\xi < \lambda + 1 - \mu + \Omega$. Furthermore, the solution can be found with an iterative procedure. (Zabreyko et al., 1975) 📖

Intuition: agglomeration do not dominate congestion forces

- α/θ : local production externalities
- γ_1/ξ : degree of returns to innovation
- λ : negative elasticity of amenities to density
- $1 - \mu$: decreasing returns to local labor
- Ω : variance of taste shocks

Proposition 1

An equilibrium of this economy **exists** and is **unique** if $\alpha/\theta + \gamma_1/\xi < \lambda + 1 - \mu + \Omega$.

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Appendix

The Balanced-Growth Path

Three Cases

- all regions **grow at the same rate**
- eventually concentrate to one point
- cycle without reaching a BGP

The growth rate of $\tau_t(\mathbf{r})$ from (8)

$$\frac{\tau_{t+1}(r)}{\tau_t(r)} = \phi_t(r)^{\theta\gamma_1} \left[\int_S \eta \frac{\tau_t(s)}{\tau_t(r)} ds \right]^{1-\gamma_2}$$

Divide both sides of the equation by the corresponding equation for s , combined with (12) 

$$\frac{\tau_t(s)}{\tau_t(r)} = \left[\frac{\phi(s)}{\phi(r)} \right]^{\frac{\theta\gamma_1}{1-\gamma_2}} = \left[\frac{\bar{L}(s)}{\bar{L}(r)} \right]^{\frac{\theta\gamma_1}{[1-\gamma_2]\xi}}$$

The Balanced-Growth Path

Unique positive solution existence (Zabreyko et al., 1975)

$$\frac{\alpha}{\theta} + \frac{\gamma_1}{\xi} + \frac{\gamma_1}{[1 - \gamma_2]\xi} \leq \lambda + 1 - \mu + \Omega \quad (25)$$

- **New term: dynamic agglomeration effect** from local investments in technology as well as diffusion
- $1 - \gamma_2 = 0$: no diffusion, no BGP
- Dispersion forces have to be large enough relative to all agglomeration forces

Lemma 4

If (25) holds, then there exists a **unique** BGP with a **constant distribution** of employment densities $\bar{L}(\cdot)$ and innovation $\phi(\cdot)$. In the BGP $\tau_t(r)$ grows at a constant rate for all $r \in S$. 📊

The BGP welfare grows uniformly everywhere at the rate $\frac{u_{t+1}(r)}{u_t(r)} = \left[\frac{\tau_{t+1}(r)}{\tau_t(r)} \right]^{1/\theta}$

The Balanced-Growth Path

The growth rate of world utility/real output (in the BGP)

- a function of population size, the distribution of employment in space

Lemma 5

In a balanced-growth path, under the condition of Lemma 4, aggregate welfare and aggregate real consumption grow according to 🇺🇸

$$\frac{u_{t+1}(r)}{u_t(r)} = \left[\frac{\int_0^1 c_{t+1}^\omega(r)^\rho d\omega}{\int_0^1 c_t^\omega(r)^\rho d\omega} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} = \eta^{\frac{1-\gamma_2}{\theta}} \left[\frac{\gamma_1/\nu}{\gamma_1 + \mu\xi} \right]^{\frac{\nu_1}{\xi}} \left[\int_S \bar{L}(s)^{\frac{\theta_1}{1-\gamma_{12}(\xi)}} ds \right]^{\frac{1-\gamma_1}{\theta}} \quad (26)$$

Strong scale effects

- growth of aggregate consumption would be an **increasing** function of world population
- **Debate:** **no acceleration** in the growth of income per capita in the US in spite of increase in its population (Jones, 1995)
- **Our model:** world economy not in the BGP + population is constant
- **Eliminate** by making the **cost of innovation** an increasing function of population size

Outline

Introduction

The Model

The Balanced-Growth Path

Calibration and Simulation of the Model

Appendix

Parameters and Inputs

To compute the equilibrium, we need

- 12 parameters used in the equations above
- initial productivity levels and amenities for all locations
- bilateral migration costs and transport costs between any two locations

Parameter Values

- Assigning parameter values from the existing literature and estimation by real data.

TABLE 1
PARAMETER VALUES

Parameter	Target/Comment
1. Preferences: $\sum_i \beta^i u_i(r)$, where $u_i(r) = \bar{a}(r) \bar{L}_i(r)^{-\lambda}(r) [\int_0^1 c_i^a(r)^a d\omega]^{1/\rho}$ and $u_0(r) = e^{\psi_0(r)}$	
$\beta = .965$	Discount factor
$\rho = .75$	Elasticity of substitution of 4 (Bernard et al. 2003)
$\lambda = .32$	Relation between amenities and population
$\Omega = .5$	Elasticity of migration flows with respect to income (Monte et al. 2018)
$\psi = 1.8$	Deaton and Stone (2013)
2. Technology: $q_i^a(r) = \phi_i^a(r) z_i^a(r) L_i^a(r)^\alpha$, $F(z, r) = e^{-T_i^a(r) z^a}$, and $T_i^a(r) = \tau_i(r) \bar{L}_i(r)^\alpha$	
$\alpha = .06$	Static elasticity of productivity to density (Carlino et al. 2007)
$\theta = 6.5$	Trade elasticity (Eaton and Kortum 2002; Simonovska and Waugh 2014)
$\mu = .8$	Labor or nonland share in production (Greenwood et al. 1997; Desmet and Rappaport 2017)
$\gamma_1 = .319$	Relation between population distribution and growth
3. Evolution of productivity: $\tau_i(r) = \phi_{i-1}(r)^{\gamma_1} [\int_s \eta \tau_{i-1}(s) ds]^{1-\gamma_1} \tau_{i-1}(r)^{\gamma_1}$ and $\psi(\phi) = \nu \phi^\xi$	
$\gamma_2 = .993$	Relation between population distribution and growth
$\xi = 125$	Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2015)
$\nu = .15$	Initial world growth rate of real GDP of 2%
4. Trade Costs	
$\zeta_{\text{rail}} = .1434$	Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
$\zeta_{\text{no_rail}} = .4302$	
$\zeta_{\text{major_road}} = .5636$	
$\zeta_{\text{other_road}} = 1.1272$	
$\zeta_{\text{no_road}} = 1.9726$	
$\zeta_{\text{water}} = .0779$	Elasticity of trade flows with respect to distance of $-.93$ (Head and Mayer 2014)
$\zeta_{\text{no_water}} = .0779$	
$T = .393$	

Amenity Parameter: $\lambda = 0.32$

From (2)

$$a_t(r) = \bar{a}(r)\bar{L}_t(r)^{-\lambda} \quad (27)$$

$$\log(a(r)) = \mathbb{E}(\log(\bar{a}(r))) - \lambda \log(\bar{L}(r)) + \varepsilon_a(r) \quad (28)$$

- $\mathbb{E}(\log(\bar{a}(r)))$: the mean of $\log(\bar{a}(r))$ across locations
- $\varepsilon_a(r)$: deviation of $\log(\bar{a}(r))$ from the mean
 - log-normally distributed across locations

Estimation

- Data: amenities and population for 192 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United States [Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg \(2013\)](#)
- Reverse causality
 - Instrument for population: an MSA's exogenous productivity level
 - Productivity that is not due to agglomeration economies

Trade Costs

Location

- location r : $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ grid cell ($180 \times 360 = 64,800$ grid cells in total)
- trade path $g(r, s)$: a continuous and once-differentiable path to ship a good from r to s

The cost of passing through location r (in logs)

$$\begin{aligned}\log \zeta(r) = & \log \zeta_{\text{rail}} \text{rail}(r) + \log \zeta_{\text{no_rail}} [1 - \text{rail}(r)] \\ & + \log \zeta_{\text{major_road}} \text{major_road}(r) + \log \zeta_{\text{other_road}} \text{other_road}(r) \\ & + \log \zeta_{\text{no_road}} [1 - \text{major_road}(r) - \text{other_road}(r)] \\ & + \log \zeta_{\text{water}} \text{water}(r) + \log \zeta_{\text{no_water}} [1 - \text{water}(r)]\end{aligned}$$

- $\text{rail}(r)$, $\text{major_road}(r)$, $\text{other_road}(r)$, $\text{water}(r)$: equals 1 if there is a road passing through r and zero otherwise
- ζ_{rail} , $\zeta_{\text{no_rail}}$, $\zeta_{\text{major_road}}$, $\zeta_{\text{other_road}}$, $\zeta_{\text{no_road}}$, $\zeta_{\text{no_water}}$: values in [Allen and Arkolakis \(2014\)](#)

Trade Costs

Compute the lowest cost between any two cells $r \neq s$ by Fast Marching Algorithm

$$\zeta(r, s) = \left[\inf_{g(r, s)} \int_{g(r, s)} \zeta(u) du \right]^\tau$$

- $\int_{g(r, s)} \zeta(u) du$: the line integral of $\zeta(\cdot)$ along the path $g(r, s)$

Migration Costs

From (7):

$$u_1(r) = H(r)^\Omega \bar{L}_1(r)^\Omega \bar{L}^{-\Omega} \left[\int_s u_1(v)^{1/\Omega} m_2(v)^{-1/\Omega} dv \right]^\Omega m_2(r) \quad (29)$$

Plugging this into equation (24) that relates the period 1 population distribution to amenities, land, and period 1 productivity and utility, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\bar{a}(r)}{\hat{m}_2(r)} \left[\tau_1(r)^{\frac{\theta}{1+\eta}} H(r)^{\frac{\theta(1+\eta)}{1+\eta\theta}} \right] \bar{L}_1(r)^\lambda \bar{L}^{-\frac{\theta}{1+\eta}} \left[\alpha - 1 + \left[\lambda + \frac{\gamma_1}{\xi} \right] [1 - \mu] \right]^{\frac{\theta(1+\eta\theta)}{1+\eta}} \\ & \times \bar{L}_1(r)^{\frac{(1+\theta)\Omega}{1+\eta}} = \kappa_1 \int_s \left[\frac{\bar{a}(s)}{\hat{m}_2(s)} \right]^{\frac{\theta\Omega}{1+\eta}} \tau_1(s)^{1+\frac{\theta\Omega}{1+\eta}} H(s)^{\frac{\theta\Omega}{1+\eta}} s(r, s)^{-\theta} \\ & \times \bar{L}_1(s)^{1-\lambda+\frac{\theta(1+\eta\Omega)}{1+\eta}} \left[\alpha - 1 + \left[\lambda + \frac{\gamma_1}{\xi} \right] [1 - \mu] \right]^{-\frac{\theta\Omega}{1+\eta}} ds \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

$$\hat{m}_2(r) = \frac{m_2(r)}{\bar{L}^\Omega \left[\int_s u_1(v)^{1/\Omega} m_2(v)^{-1/\Omega} dv \right]^\Omega} \quad (31)$$

Migration Costs

Lemma 6

The solution to (30), $\hat{m}_2(\cdot)$, exists, is unique, and can be found by iteration ω

- The solution to (30), yields a $\hat{m}_2(\cdot)$ for all $r \in S$
- The values of $m_2(\cdot)$ are identified only up to a scale by (31)

To solve for $m_2(\cdot)$, we need to know:

- productivity in period 1 ($\tau_1(\cdot)$): by productivity evolution (8) from $\tau_0(\cdot)$ and $\bar{L}_0(\cdot)$
- population levels in period 1 ($\bar{L}_1(\cdot)$): data on the population distribution in 2005

Thank You!

Outline

Introduction

The Model

The Balanced-Growth Path

Calibration and Simulation of the Model

Appendix

About the Researchers



- Klaus Desmet

- His research focuses on regional economics, climate change, and political economy.



- Dávid Krisztián Nagy

- His research focuses on international trade, economic geography and economic growth.



- Esteban Rossi-Hansberg

- His research specializes in international trade, regional and urban economics, as well as growth and organizational economics.

Read more about this paper in [The Economist](#) (in English) or the WeChat tweets [1](#) and [2](#) (in Chinese).

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