

# Consistency and Trust

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## 1 Predictions

### Actor

1. The more consistent in his cooperative actions the actor is, the more consistent he will be in future action.
2. After a betrayal/cheating, the actor has no incentives to be consistent in his cooperative behaviour again and will not be.

### Observer

1. As the actor keeps behaving consistently, the observer's trust increases.
2. The first defection reduces how moral/trustworthy they find the person much more so than the second defection.
3. In the rare case where the actor tries to rebuild trust/consistency after a betrayal/cheating, the observer will never regain full trust again.
4. Conditional trust: how does one cooperative action increase trust vs how does one betrayal/cheating action decrease trust (difference of a difference)

## 2 Current experimental design

At this stage, we are only interested in testing the predictions of the actor/sender. Specifically we want to check that:

1. The more the sender cooperated in previous rounds, the more likely to cooperate now.
2. After just one defection, the sender "never" cooperate again.
3. monotonicity - when are costs higher, the sender cooperates less.

## 2.1 Key elements

**Dictator Game** We use a multi round DG reframed as a take rather give scenario to highlight the non desirability of the action. On every round, by default the two players have a half-spilt of the total pot. The dictator can choose to either leave it like that or steal the money of the recipient. It is important that a high enough amount of participant do steal in this design to be able to detect an effect.

**k rounds** For now 2 suffice to test consistency. we manipulate the number of rounds, but we could manipulate other things such as plausible deniability (to test intention) and observability (by a third party or someone who will interact with the sender later).

**stochastic cost levels** 2 suffice: low vs high.

The value of the cost must change across rounds in order to test consistency. At the moment the cost and benefit ratios are the same for both the high and low cost.

It's possible to have these costs be randomly assigned, but we would end up with combinations of high and low cost that do not serve any predictions. To avoid that, we can fix the combinations of costs that we need into treatments. This way we do not lose money and data points. However, the issue now is that which cost one encounters in a given round is not random. Only treatment assignment is. This means that we must be careful about what we tell our participants about the distribution of these costs. There is a tradeoff between what is convenient/cheaper and the level of deception we are willing to tolerate.

We also need to make sure that when the costs are higher, there is less cooperation (monotonicity). Players must be more likely to cooperate when the costs are lower than when they are higher.

**cooperative choices with different partners** We have a perfect random matching design.

**assume "zero-tolerance"** Something we need to check and be able to rule out is that some people might just cooperate more. We must be able to manipulate the degree of "zero-tolerance" to show that it doesn't merely reflect individual difference and rule that out as a possible confound.

we must show that there is no licensing as well.

## 2.2 Testing

### 2.2.1 Sender more likely to cooperate when facing a low cost.

We must check for monotonicity of costs. If players don't cooperate at significant rates depending on the cost level then the experiment fails. To do that we simply compare first round cooperation rates when facing a low or a high cost (second round too if taken independently from the first round).

### 2.2.2 Sender more likely to cooperate if cooperated in the past/ more likely (100%?) to defect if EVER defected

To test this we need to compare cooperation rates in the second round after having faced a high or low cost. As such, the comparison can be between either *low-low* vs *high-low* or *low-high* vs *high-high* and we compare round 2 cooperation across the two cost combinations.

We expect to find a difference in cooperation rates on round 2 between these two treatments based on what they faced in the first round and if they cooperated or not (coop if low and defect if high). We can also show that senders lose motivation after defecting.

Regression:

1. probit or logit regression
2. cluster standard errors on individual subjects error (there are no groups so no choice there)
3. round decisions are not independent from each other as it is played by the same participant.

Elements of the regression we would look at:

prob coop  $\sim$  round # + **stakes** + **whether defected in the past** + whether cooperated in the past + **# of coop** + **# of defection** + all 2-way interactions (**whether def in the past anything**)

# of cooperation only matter as long as never defected in the past. if defected then stops mattering - complementarity.

we can check if the # of cooperation effect and the interaction whether defected in the past \* anything disappear given there has been a defection.

potentially, we can add +subject as a control to make sure it's not just individual differences.

stakes will pick up on monotonicity already.

### 2.2.3 The longer until the sender faces high stakes for 1st time, the more likely to cooperate then (fully mediated by whether they cooperated prior to this)

By having the same definite cost on an early round vs a later round the sender can build social capital.

The comparison can be between either *low-high* vs *high-low* and we have two possibilities: compare cooperation rates between facing a high stake in the first round versus facing a high stake in the second round. Or compare over cooperation across the two rounds of these two combinations (compare sum).

Regression: probability of cooperation whether 1st see high cost  $\sim$  round 1st see high cost

### **2.2.4 if in (all) prior rounds the Sender only faces low stakes, they are more likely to cooperate on this round (for given cost level)**

2nd round is what we are interested in depending on what occurred in round 1. can be low-low ccs high-low or low-high vs high-high.

Regression:

proba coop in round 2  $\sim$  treatment + current cost

proba coop in round 2  $\sim$  earlier cost + whether coop in round 1

## **2.3 Experimental set-up**

Step 1: Only 1 round, either low or high stake (don't tell number of rounds).

Step 2: run all four combinations with 2 rounds.

Step 3: add more rounds.

### **Details**

- treatment vs full random
- number of subjects per combination = equal - 30pp in each
- do we tell pp the distribution of high/low stakes in advance  
→ we tell the pp that both cost and round are independent and chance of occurrence is 1/2 (50-50)
- amount of the costs in real money - test 10p, 50p, 1£
- likelihood of each cost →  $p = 1/2$
- we don't say number of round (?might be repeated?)

## **3 Design considerations for later**

### **3.1 Potential games**

In order to test the predictions above, we need a two-player game that induces a high amount of cheating/defection. There are three candidates:

**Cheating task** If the dictator game does not induce enough cheating/defecting, we could use a task specifically designed to test cheating behaviour. There exists are few different ones, we would have to discuss which ones fit best. See Mazar and Gneezy papers for examples.

- either a task in pairs where one has the opportunity to directly lie to the other
- or one does a task where he can cheat, and the other player may or may not be able to observe that

Advantage: we add principle (Lying/cheating is universally considered bad).

**Trust Game** Finally a trust game might be game we ultimately use. Just as with the dictator game we have different costs to test consistency. The advantage of the Trust game is that the recipient is now an active player and that trust can be measured directly (by the money sent back).

### 3.2 Other considerations

#### Observer

- The observer may or may not know the level of temptation of the actor (= cost on each round)
- The observer can be a third party who learns the history of play or the interaction partner who would have to know previous actions.
- We need to measure the observer's level of trust
  - Partner choice (choose who to they want to be paired with to play another DG)
  - Add a second stage and make it a trust game
  - Character judgment (asking directly to rate trustworthiness or morality)
  - Ask observer what how they expect the Actor to act
- We need to manipulate the history of play for the actor.
  - Strategy method (ask what they expect the actor will do for every possible scenario)
  - Hope enough subjects behave in all possible ways
  - Use deception

## 4 Model

### 4.1 Description of the signalling game

In the following we describe a simple signaling game. The game involves two players, a sender and a receiver. It consists of several rounds in which senders can decide whether or not to send a costly signal.

The exact cost in a given round is determined randomly and may depend on the type of the sender. We use this model to explore under which conditions we observe equilibria that show the characteristics of principled behavior, discontinuity and complementarity. In addition, the same model will also allow us to characterize other equilibria of interest (such as equilibria with moral licensing). The game proceeds as follows.

**Stage 0: Move of nature.** We assume that senders can be of two different types, they are either of the superior ( $S$ ) or of the inferior ( $I$ ) type. The type of the sender is randomly determined before the game starts. Let  $p_S$  be the probability that a given sender is superior. Senders learn their own type, but receivers do not know the type of sender they interact with.

**Stage 1– $n$ : Signaling rounds.** After the sender's type is determined, the sender faces  $n$  opportunities in which she can signal her type to the receiver. Each of these  $n$  rounds proceeds as follows:

First nature randomly determines the cost of the signal; this cost can be either low or high,  $c \in \{c_l, c_h\}$  with  $c_h > c_l > 0$ . The probability of having a high cost is independent of the round number and of previous realized costs. However, it depends on the type of the sender; superior senders experience a high cost with probability  $q_{S,h}$ , whereas this probability is  $q_{I,h}$  for inferior types. We use  $q_{S,l} = 1 - q_{S,h}$  and  $q_{I,l} = 1 - q_{I,h}$  for the probability that the respective cost is low. Moreover, we use  $\bar{c}_\theta := q_{\theta,l}c_l + q_{\theta,h}c_h$  to denote the expected cost that a sender of type  $\theta$  experiences in any given round. In the following we assume  $q_{S,h} \leq q_{I,h}$ . That is, superior types are less likely to experience a high cost. The sender (but not the receiver) learns the exact cost. Then the sender decides whether or not to pay the cost in order to send the signal.

**Stage  $n + 1$ : Receiver's decision.** After the sender has made her decisions, the receiver learns in how many of the  $n$  rounds the sender paid the signaling cost. The receiver then decides whether or not to accept the sender. If the receiver rejects the sender, the payoffs in that final stage are zero for both players. If he accepts the sender, the payoffs depend on the sender's type; the sender's payoff is  $a_\theta$  and the receiver's payoff is  $b_\theta$  with  $\theta \in \{S, I\}$ . Receivers get a positive payoff from accepting superior senders, but a negative payoff from accepting inferior senders,  $b_S > 0 > b_I$ .

In the following, we assume the senders' strategies take the form  $\sigma_\theta = \sigma_\theta(i, k, c)$ . Here, the input  $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$  is the given round for which a decision is to be made;  $k \in \{0, \dots, i - 1\}$  is the number of times a signal has been sent in the past, and  $c \in \{c_l, c_h\}$  is the current cost. The output takes the form  $\sigma_\theta(i, k, c) \in \{0, 1\}$  where 0 refers to not sending the signal for the given input. The receiver's strategy takes the form  $\rho = \rho(k)$ , where  $k \in \{0, \dots, n\}$  refers to the number of times the sender has sent the signal. Here, the output again takes values  $\rho(k) \in \{0, 1\}$ , where 0 means to reject the sender.

## 4.2 The case of two rounds

In the following, we first study the case in which there are two rounds only,  $n=2$ . We are interested in the following strategy profile

$$\sigma_S(i, k, c) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k = i - 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

$$\sigma_I(i, k, c) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (i=1 \text{ and } c=c_l) \text{ or } (i=2 \text{ and } k=1) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

$$\rho(k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k = n \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

We refer to the above strategy profile as the ‘zero tolerance profile’.

**Claim 1.** *The zero tolerance profile is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if the following conditions hold:*

$$\frac{b_S}{-b_I} \geq \frac{q_{I,l}(1-p_S)}{p_S} \quad (4)$$

$$a_S \geq c_h + \bar{c}_S$$

$$c_h + \bar{c}_I \geq a_I \geq c_l + \bar{c}_I.$$

All proof are provided in the **Appendix**. Here, we give the interpretation of these conditions. The first condition states that the receiver finds it worthwhile to accept if they observe their co-player sent the signal in both rounds. The second condition states that superior senders are willing to pay the high cost even if it occurs in the first round. The last condition states that the inferior sender would be willing to pay the low cost but not the high cost.

We are also interested in the following profile:

$$\sigma_S(i, k, c) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (i=1 \text{ and } c=c_l) \text{ or } (i=2 \text{ and } k=0) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

$$\sigma_I(i, k, c) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{otherwise} \\ 0 & \text{if } c=c_h \text{ or } (i=2 \text{ and } k=1) \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

$$\rho(k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k \geq n - 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

We refer to the above strategy profile as the ‘licensing profile’.

**Claim 2.** *The licensing profile is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if the following conditions*

hold:

$$\begin{aligned}
b_I &\leq \frac{q_{S,l}p_S b_S + q_{I,l}p_S b_S}{q_{S,l}p_S + q_{I,l}(1 - p_S)} \\
a_I &\leq q_{I,l}(a_I - c_l) + c_h \\
c_h &\geq \bar{c}_S \geq c_l.
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

All proof are provided in the **Appendix**. Here, we give the interpretation of these conditions.

Further notes on how to continue:

1. Write the proof of Claim 1 (CR)
2. Talk about complementarity and discontinuity in the context of the model.
3. Create analogous claim for licensing equilibrium (CR)
4. Ideally, characterize all equilibria, given natural assumptions.
5. Describe some characteristics of equilibria (e.g., when does being an equilibrium plus Eq. [3] imply Eqs. [1]-[2])

#### 4.2.1 The game

(a) Model

- (1) Players: Two players: Sender & Receiver  
Sender can be of two types: Superior  $S$  & Inferior  $I$  and  $p^S + p^I = 1$
- (2) Actions: 2 rounds in which sender can cooperate (c) or defect (d)  
Afterwards, Receiver accepts or rejects.
- (3) Order of moves:
  - (0) Nature determines types of Senders
  - Round 1
    - (1a) Nature determines costs
    - (1b) Sender decides whether to cooperate
  - Round 2
    - (2a) Nature determines costs
    - (2b) Sender decides whether to cooperate
  - Final stage
    - (3) Receiver decides whether to accept
- (4) Information that the players have:

Sender	• Current cost
• Own type	• Previous action



Receiver

• Actions of the Sender

(5) Payoffs:

- Costs
- Payoffs if rejected  $(0, 0)$
- Payoff if accepted  $\begin{pmatrix} a^S, b^S \\ a^I, -b^I \end{pmatrix} \quad \begin{matrix} b^S > 0 \\ b^I > 0 \end{matrix}$

(b) Assumptions

- (1) Receivers only want to pair with superior Senders  $b^S > 0 > -b^I$
- (2) Senders are generally willing to signal  $2c_l > a^t$
- (3) Some signalling is required  $p^S b^S - p^I b^I < 0$
- (4) Inferior senders do not signal at all costs  $2c_h < a^I$

(c) Specify players' strategies

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma^S &= (\sigma_h^{S1}, \sigma_l^{S1}, \sigma_{hc}^{S2}, \sigma_{hd}^{S2}, \sigma_{lc}^{S2}, \sigma_{ld}^{S2}) \\ \sigma^I &= (\sigma_h^{I1}, \sigma_l^{I1}, \sigma_{hc}^{I2}, \sigma_{hd}^{I2}, \sigma_{lc}^{I2}, \sigma_{ld}^{I2}) \\ \rho &= (\rho_{cc}, \rho_{cd}, \rho_{dc}, \rho_{dd}) \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where  $S, I$  is the Sender's type, 1, 2 the round number,  $h, l$  the cost on that round, and  $c, d$  the action on the previous round.

(d) Properties:

- (1) Threshold
- (2) Betweenness
- (3) Complementarity  $\sigma_{(c,...,c)}^{\theta, n+1} > \sigma_{(c,...,c)}^{\theta, n} \forall n$
- (4) Discontinuity  $\sigma_h^{\theta, n} = \underline{c} \quad \forall h : D \in h$
- (5) Existence of committed type  $\sigma^{S, n} = \bar{c}$
- (6) licensing (inverse of complementarity)  $\sigma_h^{\theta, n} < \sigma_{(d,...,d)}^{\theta, n} \quad h \text{ such that } c \in h$
- (7) Anti-complementarity  $\exists n \quad \sigma_{(c,...,c)}^{\theta, n+1} < \sigma_{(c,...,c)}^{\theta, n}$
- (8) Monotonicity in types  $\sigma_h^{S, n} > \sigma_h^{I, n}$

### 4.3 Signalling Game with 3 rounds

#### 4.3.1 The game

Equivalent to the 2 rounds version but the Sender gets an additional third round to send the signal or not. Players, Actions, Informations and Payoffs stay the same.

(a) New strategies

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma^S &= (\sigma_h^{S1}, \sigma_l^{S1}, \sigma_{hc}^{S2}, \sigma_{hd}^{S2}, \sigma_{lc}^{S2}, \sigma_{ld}^{S2}, \sigma_{hcc}^{S3}, \sigma_{hcd}^{S3}, \sigma_{hdc}^{S3}, \sigma_{hdd}^{S3}, \sigma_{lcc}^{S3}, \sigma_{lcd}^{S3}, \sigma_{ldc}^{S3}, \sigma_{ldd}^{S3}) \\
\sigma^I &= (\sigma_h^{I1}, \sigma_l^{I1}, \sigma_{hc}^{I2}, \sigma_{hd}^{I2}, \sigma_{lc}^{I2}, \sigma_{ld}^{I2}, \sigma_{hcc}^{I3}, \sigma_{hcd}^{I3}, \sigma_{hdc}^{I3}, \sigma_{hdd}^{I3}, \sigma_{lcc}^{I3}, \sigma_{lcd}^{I3}, \sigma_{ldc}^{I3}, \sigma_{ldd}^{I3}) \\
\rho &= (\rho_{ccc}, \rho_{ccd}, \rho_{cdc}, \rho_{cdd}, \rho_{dcc}, \rho_{dcd}, \rho_{ddc}, \rho_{ddd})
\end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

where  $S, I$  is the Sender's type, 1, 2, 3 the round number,  $h, l$  the cost on that round, and  $c, d$  the action on the two previous rounds.

### 4.3.2 Equilibrium analysis

**1st equilibrium of interest** The superior type cooperates on the first round regardless of costs, and then cooperates in subsequent rounds as long as he cooperated in all previous rounds. If he defected once, he does not cooperate. The Inferior type cooperates on the first round only when he sees a low cost. He cooperates on subsequent round in the same fashion as the superior type. The Receiver accept only and only if there are no defections at all.

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma^S &= (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) \\
\sigma^I &= (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) \\
\rho &= (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
\end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

We get:

Receiver:

- Receiver after  $ccc$   $\rightarrow$  *accept*  $\rightarrow \frac{b^S}{b^I} \geq \frac{q_l^I(1-ps)}{P_S}$
- Receiver after  $ccd, cdc, dcc, cdd, dcd, ddc, ddd$   $\rightarrow$  *reject*  $\rightarrow -b^I \geq 0$

Superior & Inferior Sender on Round 3:

- Sender after  $cc$  in  $r_{1,2}$  and  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow C_h \leq a^S$
- Sender after  $cc$  in  $r_{1,2}$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow C_l \leq a^S$
- Sender after  $cd, dc, dd$  in  $r_{1,2}$  and  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow 0 \geq C_h$
- Sender after  $cd, dc, dd$  in  $r_{1,2}$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow 0 \geq C_l$

Superior & Inferior Sender on Round 2:

- Sender after  $d$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow C_h \leq 0$

- Sender after  $d$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow$   $C_l \leq 0$
- Sender after  $c$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $a^S \geq C_h q_h^S + C_l q_l^S + C_h$
- Sender after  $c$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $a^S \geq C_h q_h^S + C_l q_l^S + C_l$

Superior Sender on Round 1:

- Sender after  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $a^S \geq C_h q_h^S + C_l q_l^S + C_h q_h^S + C_l q_l^S + C_h$
- Sender after  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $a^S \geq C_h q_h^S + C_l q_l^S + C_h q_h^S + C_l q_l^S + C_l$

Inferior Sender on Round 1:

- Sender after  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow$   $a^I \leq C_h q_h^I + C_l q_l^I + C_h q_h^I + C_l q_l^I + C_h$
- Sender after  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $a^I \geq C_h q_h^I + C_l q_l^I + C_h q_h^I + C_l q_l^I + C_l$

**2nd equilibrium of interest** Same as above for the Superior type and the Receiver. But now the inferior type may cooperate in the second round even after a defection in the first round.

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma^S &= (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) \\
\sigma^I &= (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) \\
\rho &= (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
\end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

## 5 Appendices

### 5.1 Proofs

**Claim 1** zero-tolerance equilibrium:

Consider a profile in which the receiver accepts only if the sender cooperated in both rounds. Superior senders pay the high cost even on the first round and inferior senders pay the low cost but not the high cost.

If the receiver observes a defection, following (1), it cannot be the superior type sending signal. This means that the benefit of accepting following cd, dc, or dd is lower than 0. If the receiver observes cc, he knows it is either a superior sender, or an inferior type if they faced a low cost in the first round.

When the benefit of accepting a superior type is larger than the expected cost + the high cost, the superior type prefers to cooperate in the first round regardless of what cost they are facing. and since the benefit of accepting a superior type is bigger than the high cost, they also find it worthwhile to keep cooperating in the second round. Everything that applies to the high cost applies to the low cost as the high cost is bigger and both are smaller than 0.

The inferior type only finds it worthwhile to cooperate in the first round when the costs are low as long as the benefit of the inferior type being accepted is bigger than the low cost but not the high cost.

Receiver:

- Receiver after  $cc$   $\rightarrow$   $accept$   $\rightarrow$   $\frac{b^S}{b^I} \geq \frac{q_l^I(1-p_S)}{P_S}$
- Receiver after  $cd, dc, dd$   $\rightarrow$   $reject$   $\rightarrow$   $-b^I \geq 0$

Superior & Inferior Sender on Round 2:

- Sender after  $d$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$   $defect$   $\rightarrow$   $C_h \leq 0$
- Sender after  $d$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$   $defect$   $\rightarrow$   $C_l \leq 0$
- Sender after  $c$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$   $cooperate$   $\rightarrow$   $a^S \geq C_h$
- Sender after  $c$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$   $cooperate$   $\rightarrow$   $a^S \geq C_l$

Superior Sender on Round 1:

- Sender after  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$   $cooperate$   $\rightarrow$   $a^S \geq C_h q_h^S + C_l q_l^S + C_h$
- Sender after  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$   $cooperate$   $\rightarrow$   $a^S \geq C_h q_h^S + C_l q_l^S + C_l$

Inferior Sender on Round 1:

- Sender after  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$   $defect$   $\rightarrow$   $a^I \leq C_h q_h^I + C_l q_l^I + C_h$
- Sender after  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$   $cooperate$   $\rightarrow$   $a^I \geq C_h q_h^I + C_l q_l^I + C_l$

**Claim 2** licensing equilibrium:

Receiver:

- Receiver after  $cc$   $\rightarrow$  Out of equilibrium!
- Receiver after  $cd, dc$   $\rightarrow$  *accept*  $\rightarrow$  ???
- Receiver after  $dd$   $\rightarrow$  *reject*  $\rightarrow$   $-b^I \geq 0$

Superior Sender on Round 2:

- Sender after  $c$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow$   $C_h \leq 0$
- Sender after  $c$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow$   $C_l \leq 0$
- Sender after  $d$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $a^S \leq C_h$
- Sender after  $d$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $a^S \leq C_l$

Inferior Sender on Round 2:

- Sender after  $d$  in  $r_1$  and  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow$   $a^I \geq C_h$

Superior Sender on Round 1:

- Sender after  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow$   $C_h \geq -C_h q_h^S - C_l q_l^S$
- Sender after  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $C_l \leq -C_h q_h^S - C_l q_l^S$

Inferior Sender on Round 1:

- Sender after  $C_h$  now  $\rightarrow$  *defect*  $\rightarrow$   $a^I \geq q_l^I(-C_l + a^I) + C_h$
- Sender after  $C_l$  now  $\rightarrow$  *cooperate*  $\rightarrow$   $C_l \leq -C_h q_h^I - C_l q_l^I$

## 6 oTree Screenshots

## Introduction

### Thank you for taking part in this study!

In this study, you are about to engage in 2 interactions with a **different participant** in each. Every participant taking part in this study will be given the role of either **decider** or **receiver**. This role is fixed throughout the whole study. You will keep the same in every interaction. In each interaction, one decider and one receiver are paired up. Only the decider, not the receiver, will have a decision to make.

In each interaction, there is the opportunity to earn a bonus payment. Both the bonus of the decider and the receiver depend on the decisions of the decider. At the end of the study, all the bonus you have earned from every interaction will be summed up and paid to you after completing the study.

You must stay on task at all times. Otherwise you will automatically be disconnected and lose your bonus.

### Please answer the following questions to continue:

With how many participants will you be playing in this study?

- ☐ 0 other participants
- ☐ 1 other participant
- ☐ Different participants

What will your bonus payment depend on?

- ☐ There is no bonus possible in this study.
- ☐ My bonus payment depends on luck.
- ☐ My bonus payment depends on a decision taken by one of the participants.

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## Instructions

You are the **Decider**. This means that in every interaction you have a decision to make. In each interaction, both you and the receiver are allocated with **£1.00** each. You have the opportunity to take the money of the receiver or leave it. If you decide to take it, you will earn **£2.00** in that interaction and the receiver gets nothing. If you decide to leave it, you keep your allocated **£1.00** and so does the receiver. The receiver will know his final amount, but not who decided.

Remember, in each interaction you are paired up with someone different and make a new decision. What happened previously is in the past and you are allocated £1.00 again.

Below you can see what your choices in each interaction will look like.

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### Interaction 1

Both you and the receiver have been endowed with **£1.00** each. You have the opportunity to take the money from the receiver, or to leave it.

- If you take it, your total payoff for this interaction will be **£2.00**.
- If you leave it, your total payoff for this interaction will be **£1.00**.

Do you want to take the £1.00 or leave it?

Leave

Take

### Please answer the following questions to continue:

Who makes the decision in each interaction?

- ☐ You, the decider.
- ☐ The receiver.
- ☐ Both the decider and the receiver.

What will be your total payoff in this round if you choose to take the £1.00?

- ☐ £0.
- ☐ £1.00.
- ☐ £2.00.

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## Your Decision

### Interaction 1

Both you and the receiver have been endowed with **£3.00** each. You have the opportunity to take the money from the receiver, or to leave it.

- If you take it, your total payoff for this interaction will be **£6.00**.
- If you leave it, your total payoff for this interaction will be **£3.00**.

Do you want to take the £3.00 or leave it?

Leave

Take

## Your Decision

### Interaction 1

Both you and the receiver have been endowed with **£1.00** each. You have the opportunity to take the money from the receiver, or to leave it.

- If you take it, your total payoff for this interaction will be **£2.00**.
- If you leave it, your total payoff for this interaction will be **£1.00**.

Do you want to take the £1.00 or leave it?

Leave

Take

## Results

You decided to leave the £3.00 of the receiver. Your payoff in this round is of **£3.00**.

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## Results

You decided to take the £3.00 of the receiver. Your payoff in this round is of **£6.00**.

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## The End

The task is now over. Here are your final results: In total across all rounds, you got **£9.00**.

Round	Bonus	Total
1	£3.00	
2	£6.00	£9.00

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## Quick Survey

We appreciate feedback. If you have any comments on the implementation of this study, or on the user interface, please write it down below.

Would you accept to be matched with another participant in order to be the receiver of another decider? tYou would receive the bonus for the receiver from their decisions. It would be at no cost to you, the payment would be directly made in Prolific at a later time.

- ☐ Yes  
☐ No

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## Payment

The study is now over. **Thank you for participating!** Below is your total score and the money you earned.

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<b>Total of the bonus in GBP</b>	£9.00
<b>Participation payment</b>	£2.00

<b>Final Payment to you (participation payment + bonus)</b>	<b>£11.00</b>
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Click on the **next button** to be redirected to Prolific and claim your payment.

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