

An Identity Based Encryption Scheme based on Quadratic Residues

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Outline

1

Introduction

- Legendre symbol
- Jacobi symbol
- Quadratic residues

2

Cocks's IBE scheme

- System parameters
- Extraction
- Encryption
- Decryption
- Security

Legendre symbol

Definition

If p is an odd prime and $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, then the **Legendre symbol**

$$\left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } p \mid a \\ 1, & \text{if } \exists k \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ such that } k^2 \equiv a \pmod{p} \\ -1, & \text{if } a \text{ is not a square modulo } p \end{cases}$$

Example:

In \mathbb{Z}_5 :

$x \pmod{5}$	0	1	2	3	4
$x^2 \pmod{5}$	0	1	4	4	1

Then

$$\left(\frac{0}{5}\right) = 0, \quad \left(\frac{1}{5}\right) = \left(\frac{4}{5}\right) = 1, \quad \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) = \left(\frac{3}{5}\right) = -1$$

Jacobi symbol

✉ Definition

Let $n > 0$ be odd and let $n = p_1^{\alpha_1} p_2^{\alpha_2} \cdots p_k^{\alpha_k}$ be the prime factorization of n .

For any integer a , the **Jacobi symbol**

$$\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{a}{p_1}\right)^{\alpha_1} \left(\frac{a}{p_2}\right)^{\alpha_2} \cdots \left(\frac{a}{p_k}\right)^{\alpha_k}$$

where the symbols on the right are all Legendre symbols.

✉ Example:

1.

$$\left(\frac{8}{15}\right) = \left(\frac{8}{3}\right) \left(\frac{8}{5}\right) = \left(\frac{2}{3}\right) \left(\frac{3}{5}\right) = (-1)(-1) = 1$$

2.

$$\left(\frac{4}{15}\right) = \left(\frac{4}{3}\right) \left(\frac{4}{5}\right) = (1)(1) = 1$$

Compute Jacobi symbol

✉ We can compute Jacobi symbol without knowing the factorization of n by using the following properties:

1. $\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{b}{n}\right)$, if $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$
2. $\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) = 1$ and $\left(\frac{0}{n}\right) = 0$
3. $\left(\frac{2m}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{m}{n}\right)$, if $n \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{8}$. Otherwise, $\left(\frac{2m}{n}\right) = -\left(\frac{m}{n}\right)$
4. If m, n are both odd, then $\left(\frac{m}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{n}{m}\right)$ unless both m and n are congruent to 3 mod 4, in which case $\left(\frac{m}{n}\right) = -\left(\frac{n}{m}\right)$

✉ Example:

1.

$$\left(\frac{8}{15}\right) = \left(\frac{4}{15}\right) = \left(\frac{2}{15}\right) = \left(\frac{1}{15}\right) = 1$$

2.

$$\left(\frac{11}{15}\right) = -\left(\frac{15}{11}\right) = -\left(\frac{4}{11}\right) = \left(\frac{2}{11}\right) = -\left(\frac{1}{15}\right) = -1$$

Quadratic residues

⊠ Definition

A number q is called a **quadratic residue** modulo n if there exists an integer x such that

$$x^2 \equiv q \pmod{n}$$

Otherwise, q is called a quadratic non-residue.

⊠ Example:

In \mathbb{Z}_5

$x \pmod{5}$	0	1	2	3	4
$x^2 \pmod{5}$	0	1	4	4	1

Then 0, 1, 4 are quadratic residues and 2, 3 are quadratic non-residues.

Cocks's IBE Scheme

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Introduction

- ✉ Proposed by Clifford Cocks in 2001.
- ✉ Based on the hard problem of composite quadratic residues.
- ✉ It is currently the only IBE scheme which does not use bilinear pairing.
- ✉ Disadvantage:
Encrypt each single bit

The hard problem - (1/2)

✉ Let $n = p \times q$ where p, q are odd primes and let

$$\mathbf{QR}(n) = \left\{ x \mid \left(\frac{x}{p} \right) = \left(\frac{x}{q} \right) = 1 \right\}$$

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{QR}}(n) = \left\{ x \mid \left(\frac{x}{p} \right) = \left(\frac{x}{q} \right) = -1 \right\}$$

Example:

Since

$$\left(\frac{8}{15} \right) = 1, \left(\frac{8}{3} \right) = \left(\frac{8}{5} \right) = -1; \quad \left(\frac{4}{15} \right) = 1, \left(\frac{4}{3} \right) = \left(\frac{4}{5} \right) = 1$$

Then $8 \in \widetilde{\mathbf{QR}}(n)$ and $4 \in \mathbf{QR}(n)$


The hard problem - (2/2)

✉ Composite quadratic residue problem:

Given $\left(\frac{x}{n}\right) = 1$ (p, q are unknown), it is hard to decide whether

$$x \in \mathbf{QR}(n) \quad \text{or} \quad x \in \widetilde{\mathbf{QR}}(n)$$

Cocks's IBE scheme



System parameters

☒ Public parameters:

1. number n (where $n = p \times q$)
2. hash function $h : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$, such that

$$\left(\frac{h(ID)}{n} \right) = 1, \quad \text{for all ID}$$

☒ Private parameters:

1. odd primes p , q

Extraction

- ✉ When an user identifies himself to TA, TA extracts the key of the user as following:

Assume the ID of the user is ID_U

⚡ Public key:

$K_U^{pub} = h(ID_U)$, where

$$\left(\frac{h(ID_U)}{n} \right) = 1$$

⚡ Private key:

$K_U^{priv} = r_U$, where

$$r_U^2 = \begin{cases} h(ID_U) \bmod n , & \text{if } h(ID_U) \in \mathbf{QR}(n) \\ -h(ID_U) \bmod n , & \text{if } h(ID_U) \in \widetilde{\mathbf{QR}}(n) \end{cases}$$

Encryption

- ✉ Assume Bob wants to send message to Alice, he sends to Alice each bit as follows:

0. For each single bit x of the message, code it as $+1$ or -1
1. For $x \in \{+1, -1\}$, choose random number $t_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ where

$$\left(\frac{t_1}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{t_2}{n}\right) = x$$

2. Compute

$$\begin{aligned}y_1 &= t_1 + h(ID_{Alice}) \cdot t_1^{-1} \mod n \\y_2 &= t_2 - h(ID_{Alice}) \cdot t_2^{-1} \mod n\end{aligned}$$

3. Send (y_1, y_2) to Alice.

Decryption

✉ When Alice receives (y_1, y_2) , she can recover x as follows:

1. If $r_{Alice}^2 = h(ID_{Alice})$, set $y = y_1$.

Otherwise, set $y = y_2$.

2. Compute

$$x = \left(\frac{y + 2r_{Alice}}{n} \right)$$

✉ Verify: (assume $r_{Alice}^2 = h(ID_{Alice})$)

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{y + 2r_{Alice}}{n} \right) &= \left(\frac{y_1 + 2r_{Alice}}{n} \right) = \left(\frac{t_1 + h(ID_{Alice}) \cdot t_1^{-1} + 2r_{Alice}}{n} \right) \\ &= \left(\frac{t_1(1 + r_{Alice}^2 \cdot t_1^{-2} + 2r_{Alice} \cdot t_1^{-1})}{n} \right) = \left(\frac{t_1(1 + r_{Alice} \cdot t_1^{-1})^2}{n} \right) \\ &= \left(\frac{t_1}{n} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{(1 + r_{Alice} \cdot t_1^{-1})^2}{n} \right) = \left(\frac{t_1}{n} \right) = x \end{aligned}$$

Security proof - (1/3)

- ✉ It can be proved that if $y = y_1$, then y_2 provides no information about $x (= (\frac{t_2}{n}))$, vice versa.

Proof:

Suppose that $r_{Alice}^2 = h(ID_{Alice})$

$$\begin{aligned} y_2 &= t_2 - h(ID_{Alice}) \cdot t_2^{-1} \pmod n \\ \rightarrow t_2^2 - y_2 t_2 - h(ID_{Alice}) &= 0 \pmod n \\ \rightarrow t_2^2 - y_2 t_2 - h(ID_{Alice}) &= 0 \pmod p \text{ and } (1) \\ t_2^2 - y_2 t_2 - h(ID_{Alice}) &= 0 \pmod q \quad (2) \end{aligned}$$

Let t_{21}, t_{22} be the roots of equation (1), and t_{23}, t_{24} be the roots of equation (2).

→ There will be 4 possible values of t_2

Security proof - (2/3)

✉ **Proof:** (continue)

Since

$$\begin{aligned}t_{21} \cdot t_{22} &= -h(ID_{Alice}) \pmod p \\t_{23} \cdot t_{24} &= -h(ID_{Alice}) \pmod q\end{aligned}$$

Then

$$\left(\frac{t_{21} \cdot t_{22}}{p}\right) = \left(\frac{-h(ID_{Alice})}{p}\right) = -1 = \left(\frac{t_{21}}{p}\right) \left(\frac{t_{22}}{p}\right)$$

$$\left(\frac{t_{23} \cdot t_{24}}{q}\right) = \left(\frac{-h(ID_{Alice})}{q}\right) = -1 = \left(\frac{t_{23}}{q}\right) \left(\frac{t_{24}}{q}\right)$$

So

$$x = \left(\frac{t_2}{n}\right) = \begin{cases} +1, & \text{possibility} = 1/2 \\ -1, & \text{possibility} = 1/2 \end{cases}$$

Security proof - (3/3)

- ✉ Assume someone can recover message x by using $n, h(ID), (y_1, y_2)$, then we can solve the composite quadratic residue problem.
1. Let the decrypt function be $F(n, h(ID), (y_1, y_2))$
 2. We can choose $x = +1$ (or -1), compute corresponding y_1 and give y_2 randomly.
 3. See if the output is correct or not, then we can decide whether $h(ID) \in \mathbf{QR}(n)$ or not.