

ESBMC memory model

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ESBMC in a nutshell

- “Do all ***reachable assertions*** in the program hold for all possible input values?”
- “Is there an input value that leads to an assertion violation?”
 - **No?** The program is ***safe/correct***
 - **Yes?** Return the ***bug-trace/counter-example/violation witness***

Example

C program

```
1. int main {  
2.   int x = __input();  
3.   assert(x > 0);  
4.   return 0;  
5. }
```

SMT formula

$$\exists x_1 \in Dom(x_1): x_1 \leq 0$$

Symbolic trace in SSA

```
int x_1 = __input();  
assert(x_1 > 0);
```

The verdict is: “one of the assertions does not hold”

line 2: $x = 0$

line 3: $\text{assert}(0 > 0)$

ESBMC memory model

- How are the objects created and destroyed?
- How are the objects accessed and modified?
- What is their relative location?

“ESBMC memory is a collection of typed symbols”

Creating and destroying objects (stack)

- Every time a new variable is declared, we create a new symbol

```
int x,y;  
float a,b;  
char p[5];  
void *q;
```

- Symbols are never removed from “memory”
- They are internally marked as ***dead*** when their lifetime ends

```
...  
int x;  
dead(x);  
return 0;  
...
```

Symbol	Type
x	int
y	int
a	float
b	float
p	int[5]
q	void*

Creating and destroying objects (heap)

- Every time memory is allocated dynamically, we create a new byte array symbol

```
int *ptr = malloc(42);
```

- All allocation sizes and validity are tracked through intrinsic data structure inside ESBMC

```
__ESBMC_alloc_size[dyn_obj_1] = 42;  
__ESBMC_is_allocated[dyn_obj_1] = true;
```

- `__ESBMC_is_allocated` is updated when memory is freed

```
__ESBMC_is_allocated[dyn_obj_1] = false;
```

Symbol	Type
ptr	int*
dyn_obj_1	char[]

Accessing and modifying objects (non-pointer)

- Every time a variable is updated, we create a new symbol
- Every time a variable is accessed via its most “recent” symbol

```
...  
int x = __input();  
x = x + 1;  
assert(x > 0);  
...
```

- This is better seen in SSA

```
...  
int x_1 = __input();  
x_2 = x_1 + 1;  
assert(x_2 > 0);  
...
```

Symbol	Type
x_1	int
x_2	int

Example with branches

C program

```
1. int main {  
2.   int x = __input();  
3.   if(x >= 0) {  
4.     x = x + 1;  
5.   }  
6.   assert(x > 0);  
7.   return 0;  
8. }
```

Symbolic trace in SSA

```
int x_1 = __input();  
x_2 = x_1 + 1;  
x_3 = phi(x_1 >= 0, x_2, x_1);  
assert(x_3 > 0);
```

SMT formula

$$\begin{aligned} \exists x_1 \in Dom(x_1): & (x_2 = x_1 + 1) \wedge \\ & ((x_1 \geq 0) \rightarrow (x_3 = x_2)) \wedge \\ & ((x_1 < 0) \rightarrow (x_3 = x_1)) \wedge \\ & (x_3 \leq 0) \end{aligned}$$

Accessing and modifying objects (pointers)

- Pointer accesses are done via a pair $\{obj, offset\}$
- Every time a pointer is dereferenced, we consider every possible access to every object with the corresponding offset
- All memory safety properties are encoded as assertions

```
...  
int x = __input();  
int *ptr;  
if(x>0) {  
    ptr = malloc(40);  
} else {  
    ptr = malloc(20);  
}  
ptr[5] = 0;  
...
```

Accessing and modifying objects (pointers)

```
...
if(x_1>0) {
    // int *ptr = malloc(40);
    char dyn_obj_1[40];
    __ESBMC_alloc_size[dyn_obj_1] = 40;
    __ESBMC_is_allocated[dyn_obj_1] = true;
} else {
    // int *ptr = malloc(20);
    char dyn_obj_2[20];
    __ESBMC_alloc_size[dyn_obj_2] = 20;
    __ESBMC_is_allocated[dyn_obj_2] = true;
}
dyn_obj_3 = phi(x_1 > 0, dyn_obj_1, dyn_obj_2);
// ptr[5] = 0;
assert(20 >= 0 && 20 + 4 <= __ESBMC_alloc_size[dyn_obj_3]);
assert(__ESBMC_is_allocated[dyn_obj_3]);
dyn_obj_3[20] = __extract_byte(0,0);
dyn_obj_3[21] = __extract_byte(1,0);
dyn_obj_3[22] = __extract_byte(2,0);
dyn_obj_3[23] = __extract_byte(3,0);
...
```

Additional assumptions

- Objects are completely disjoint from each other
 - It is impossible to “jump” between objects via pointer arithmetics
 - This is OK because we do not allow object bounds violations
- Objects can be allocated into previously freed memory
- Extra safety checks are encoded as assertions
 - Alignment requirements
 - Arithmetic overflows
 - Capability validity
 - ...

Thank you