Introduction to Software Security Coursework 01

Introduction

This coursework introduces students to basic approaches to specify and verify security aspects concerning *confidentiality*, *integrity* and *availability* for software systems. In particular, this coursework provides theoretical and practical exercises to (i) identify and describe software vulnerabilities concerning memory safety in C programs; (ii) describe and evaluate typical examples of SQL injection, which can be exploited by an attacker; (iii) specify and verify race conditions in concurrent software; (iv) identity and describe cyberthreats in a simple embedded system, which can be remotely operated; and lastly (v) describe how (bounded) model checking techniques work.

Learning Objectives

By the end of this lab you will be able to:

- Define standard notions of security and use them to evaluate the system's confidentiality, integrity and availability.
- Explain standard software security problems in real-world applications.
- Use testing and verification techniques to reason about the system's safety and security.
- 1) (Critical Software Vulnerabilities) Identify and describe the critical software vulnerabilities from the program statements a) to e) considering the following C code.

```
int *zPtr;
int *aPtr = NULL;
void *sPtr = NULL;
int number, i;
int z[5] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
sPtr = z;
```

```
a) ++zPtr;
b) number = zPtr;
c) number = *zPtr[2];
d) number = *sPtr;
e) ++z;
```

2) **(SQL injection)** SQL injection allows an attacker to interfere with the queries to the database in order to retrieve data. For example, a programmer can construct a SQL query to check name and password as

```
query = "select * from users where
name='" + name + "'" and pw = '" +
password + "'"
```

Figure 2: SQL Injection Example.

If an attacker provides the name string, the attacker can set name to "John' -"; this would remove the password check from the query (note that -- starts a comment in SQL). Provide here other examples of SQL injection:

- i. Retrieving hidden data;
- ii. Subverting application logic;
- iii. UNION attacks;
- iv. Examining the database;
- v. Blind SQL injection.
- 3) (Race Condition) Specify the three properties described below for the following mutual exclusion algorithm using linear-time temporal logic (LTL).

int flag[2], turn, x, i;

```
void *t2(void *arg) {
void *t1(void *arg) {
 flag[0] = 1;
                                                  flag[1] = 1;
 turn = 1;
                                                  turn = 0;
 while (flag[1] == 1 && turn == 1) \{\};
                                                  while (flag[0] == 1 && turn == 0) \{\};
 //critical section
                                                  //critical section
 if (i==1) x=1;
                                                  if (i==2) x=2;
 //end of critical section
                                                  //end of critical section
 flag[0] = 0;
                                                  flag[1] = 0;
                                                  return NULL;
 return NULL;
```

- i. At most, one process in the critical region at any time.
- ii. Whenever a process tries to enter its critical region, it will eventually succeed.
- iii. A process can eventually ask to enter its critical region.
- 4) (Cyber-threats) A typical embedded system consists of *human-machine interface* (keyboard and display), *processing unit* (real-time computer system), and *instrumentation interface* (sensor, network, and actuator) that can be connected to some physical plant. Figure 1 illustrates a simple embedded system employed in a chemical process, which can be operated remotely via TCP/IP protocol. In particular, the overall objective of this simple embedded system is to keep the temperature and pressure of some chemical process within well-defined limits by a remote operator.




Figure 1: Simple Embedded System [1].

- i. Specify the following properties of this simple embedded system using LTL:
 - a) A T process reads the measured values from a temperature sensor and turns the heating system on if the temperature is below 20°C and turns off the heating system if the temperature is above 300°C.
 - b) Process **P** regulates pressure with a sensor opening the pump/valve when the pressure value is above 500bar and closing the pump/valve when the pressure value is below 100bar.
 - c) Whenever the **T** and **P** processes transfer data to an **S** process, the measured values will be shown on a liquid crystal display (LCD).
- ii. What are the **security objectives** of this simple embedded system?
- iii. What are the sources of **security problems** that can arise when operating this simple embedded system remotely?
- 5) (Bounded Model Checking) Describe the main steps involved in checking programs using the BMC technique, from reading the program to generating the SMT formulas [2]. Consider the following example to describe each step in the technique. The **assume** directive can define constraints over (non-deterministic) variables, and the **assert** directive is used to check system's correctness w.r.t. a given property.

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
  long long int i=1, sn=0;
  unsigned int n=5;
  assume (n>=1);
  while (i<=n) {
    sn = sn + a;
    i++;</pre>
```

```
assert(sn==n*a);
}
```

Marking Scheme

Note that this may be refined to introduce extra cases reflecting special cases if required.

| Question 1) Has the student Identified and described the critical software vulnerabilities | |
|--|-----|
| for all program statements? | |
| The student was able to identify and describe the vulnerabilities according to | (2) |
| the CIA principle. | |
| The student was able to identify the vulnerabilities but he/she is unable to | (1) |
| describe those vulnerabilities considering the CIA principle. | |
| No attempt has been made. | (0) |

| Question 2) Is the student able to provide all examples of SQL injection as requested in | |
|--|-------|
| the question? | |
| The student can provide all examples of SQL injections. | (2) |
| The student can provide four examples of SQL injections. | (1.5) |
| The student can provide two or three examples of SQL injections. | (1.0) |
| The student can provide one example of SQL injections. | (0.5) |
| No attempt has been made. | (0) |

| Question 3) Is the student able to specify the three LTL properties for | r the following |
|---|-----------------|
| mutual exclusion algorithm? | |
| The student can specify all three LTL properties. | (2) |
| The student can specify two LTL properties. | (1.5) |
| The student can specify one LTL property. | (1.0) |
| No attempt has been made. | (0) |

| Question 4) Is the student able to specify the LTL properties, security | objective and |
|---|---------------|
| problems? | |
| The student can specify all three LTL properties together with the security objective and problems. | (2) |
| The student can specify all three LTL properties together with the security objective. | (1.5) |
| The student can specify all three LTL properties together with the security problems. | (1.5) |
| The student can specify the security objective and problems only. | (1.0) |
| The student can specify all three LTL properties only. | (1.0) |
| The student can specify the security objective only. | (0.5) |
| The student can specify the security problems only. | (0.5) |
| The student can specify less than three LTL properties only. | (0.5) |
| No attempt has been made. | (0) |

| Question 5) Is the student able to explain the BMC technique using | the illustrative |
|--|------------------|
| example? | |
| The student can explain all the steps of the BMC technique using the | (2) |
| illustrative example. | |
| The student can explain only parts of the BMC technique. | (1) |
| No attempt has been made. | (0) |

References

- [1] Alan Burns, Andrew J. Wellings: *Real-Time Systems and Programming Languages Ada, Real-Time Java and C / Real-Time POSIX*, Fourth Edition. International computer science series, Addison-Wesley 2009, ISBN 978-0-321-41745-9, pp. I-XVIII, 1-602.
- [2] Lucas C. Cordeiro, Bernd Fischer, João Marques-Silva: *SMT-Based Bounded Model Checking for Embedded ANSI-C Software*. IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 38(4): 957-974 (2012)