



UNIVERSITÀ DI PISA

DIPARTIMENTO DI INFORMATICA


Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Informatica

TESI DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE

Data aggregation using Homomorphic Encryption in Mobile CrowdSensing context

Prof. Stefano Chessa
Dott. Michele Girolami

Chiara Boni
600159



MOBILE CROWDSENSING


METHODOLOGY

THESIS OBJECTIVES

TECHNOLOGIES EMPLOYED

Mobile CrowdSensing

The study that relies on a network of **mobile sensors**, which are able to collect information on the environment



END USERS

AGGREGATOR

CLOUD PLATFORM



Tasks



User Profiling



Confidentiality



MOBILE
CROWDSENSING

METHODOLOGY

THESIS
OBJECTIVES

TECHNOLOGIES
EMPLOYED

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

Arithmetic operations directly on encrypted data, **without** the need to **decrypt** them

$$E(a \circ b) = E(a) \diamond E(b)$$

CONFIDENTIALITY

REDUNDANT RESIDUE NUMBER SYSTEM

Redundancy is provided by encoding **more residues** than are necessary for representation

ROBUSTNESS



MOBILE
CROWDSENSING

METHODOLOGY

THESIS
OBJECTIVES

TECHNOLOGIES
EMPLOYED

01

Study a MCS
model, focusing
on the privacy-
preserving issues

02

Investigate
homomorphic
encryption into
the MCS model

03

Simulate such
research in a
real scenario

04

Strengthen the
data aggregation
model by using
redundancy with
RRNS

MOBILE
CROWDSENSING

METHODOLOGY

THESIS
OBJECTIVES

TECHNOLOGIES
EMPLOYED

03

Simulate such
research in a
real scenario



To test **homomorphic encryption** in an MCS context,
the chosen example relies on modelling GPS
coordinates to calculate the total **distance** covered

MOBILE
CROWDSENSING

METHODOLOGY

THESIS
OBJECTIVES

TECHNOLOGIES
EMPLOYED

**DATASET
MANAGEMENT**



GeoLife GPS Trajectories

This GPS trajectory dataset was collected in (Microsoft Research Asia) Geolife project by 182 users in a period of over three...


 Microsoft Download Center

**HOMOMORPHIC
ENCRYPTION**




PALISADE

OVERVIEW



END USERS

SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION



AGGREGATOR

CLOUD PLATFORM

OVERVIEW

SCHEME
IMPLEMENTATION

1

SETUP

Devices **collect** and
encrypt data

2

SENDING

Devices calculate the **RRNS**
representation of the ciphers
and send it to the aggregator

3

AGGREGATION

Aggregator receives
the ciphers and **sums**
them

OVERVIEW

SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION

2

SENDING

RRNS
ENCODING




CIPHERTEXT

.....



BINARY FILE

.....



INT VECTOR

RRNS ENCODING

OVERVIEW

SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION

3

AGGREGATION


RRNS
DECODING

RRNS ENCODING

INT VECTOR

BINARY FILE

CIPHERTEXT




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
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PALISADE

OVERVIEW

SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION

3

AGGREGATION

SUM



PALISADE

+



PALISADE

```
// homomorphic addition
```

```
auto ciphertextResult = cryptoContext->EvalAdd(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
```

CASE STUDY



The real example case concerns the manipulation of GPS coordinates, in order to calculate the **total distance** traveled by a group of users

DATASET PROCESSING

EVALUATIONS



lat	lon	tid	uid	date_time
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----------


Dataset Columns



CASE STUDY

DATASET PROCESSING

EVALUATIONS



Taking a trajectory, **distance** calculation is performed between pairs of its **consecutive** points

765.041 distances

CASE STUDY


DATASET PROCESSING

EVALUATIONS



Correctness

Despite the introduction of a over-structure, such as the one given by RRNS encoding, the system is still able to produce **correct results**



Efficiency

The analysis which concerns the correlation between the choice of parameters and the **execution time**

CASE STUDY

DATASET PROCESSING

EVALUATIONS


				BGV Integer Scheme							
				Sending Time*				Aggregator Time*			
		*average of 100 runs									
Multipl. Depth	Chunk Size	Plaintext Modulus**	# Modules RNS Base	Wall Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	CPU Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	Wall Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	CPU Time (s)	Conf. Interv.
1	5.000	65.537	12	3,15699	±0,004	8,44010	±0,045	3,50408	±0,014	3,61340	±0,008
2	5.000	65.537	12	7,56084	±0,021	25,47307	±1,012	7,08278	±0,019	7,32784	±0,020
0	5.000	65.537	12	0,89403	±0,008	3,00979	±0,058	0,93209	±0,003	0,98195	±0,022
1	10.000	65.537	12	1,63603	±0,013	4,63063	±0,066	1,76003	±0,005	1,84178	±0,021
1	50.000	65.537	12	0,40069	±0,002	1,20935	±0,030	0,37179	±0,004	0,42848	±0,036

CASE STUDY

DATASET PROCESSING


EVALUATIONS

average of 100 runs				Sending Time				Aggregator Time*			
Multipl. Depth	Chunk Size	Plaintext Modulus**	# Modules RNS Base	Wall Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	CPU Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	Wall Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	CPU Time (s)	Conf. Interv.
1	5.000	49.153	12	3,22643	±0,012	8,83064	±0,084	3,51076	±0,008	3,68469	±0,028
1	5.000	73.729	12	3,23130	±0,011	8,81470	±0,076	3,51627	±0,008	3,63185	±0,012
1	5.000	65.537	8	2,83338	±0,019	8,36826	±0,064	3,38839	±0,012	3,60736	±0,036
1	5.000	65.537	14	3,56004	±0,065	9,83674	±0,281	3,52046	±0,009	3,62886	±0,012
0	50.000	65.537	8	0,11994	±0,0004	0,45632	±0,006	0,09620	±0,001	0,09477	±0,001



Best
Run

CONCLUSIONS




The objective was to analyze a MCS architecture and focus on the **confidentiality** limit, addressing it via **homomorphic encryption**


Increasing robustness by inserting **redundancy** when sending data, from the devices to the aggregator, using **RRNS** encoding

This type of encryption is expensive: it requires **powerful** sensors such as smartphones


FUTURE WORK



Analyze how different **libraries** encrypt data, construct operations and behave computationally




Extend the use scenario to **other** homomorphic **operations** and contexts



Combining **HE** and **RRNS** to aggregate on the **encrypted fragments** instead of having to reconstruct the encrypted data

REFERENCES

ChiaraBn/Master-
Thesis



1Contributor

0Issues

0Stars

0Forks

ChiaraBn/Master-Thesis

Contribute to ChiaraBn/Master-Thesis development by creating an account on GitHub.

Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2017

link.springer.com


Homomorphic Encryption for Arithmetic of Approximate...

We suggest a method to construct a homomorphic encryption scheme for approximate arithmetic. It supports an...



Files · release-v1.11.2 · PALISADE / PALISADE Development · GitLab

This is the development repository of the PALISADE lattice cryptography library. The current development version is...



Implementation and Performance Evaluation of RNS Variants of the BFV...

Homomorphic encryption is an emerging form of encryption that provides the ability to compute on...



GeoLife GPS Trajectories

This GPS trajectory dataset was collected in (Microsoft Research Asia) Geolife project by 182 users in a period of over three years (from April 2007 to August 2012). Last...

CiteSeerX

=7M

CiteSeerX — Fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping

CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): We present a radically new...



(PDF) A reliable and energy efficient IoT data transmission...

PDF | On Jun 1, 2015, Chinmaya Mahapatra and others published A...

CASE STUDY

DATASET PROCESSING

EVALUATIONS


*average of 100 runs				CKKS Approximate Scheme							
				Sending Time*				Aggregator Time*			
Multipl. Depth	Chunk Size	Scale Factor	# Modules RNS Base	Wall Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	CPU Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	Wall Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	CPU Time (s)	Conf. Interv.
1	5.000	50	12	3,67258	±0,033	13,53826	±0,023	3,94596	±0,011	8,48766	±0,034
2	5.000	50	12	7,51354	±0,031	30,12514	±0,119	7,88696	±0,016	14,93852	±0,035
1	10.000	50	12	1,93718	±0,010	7,50640	±0,166	1,98382	±0,008	4,24750	±0,059
1	50.000	50	12	0,53840	±0,003	1,98702	±0,010	0,41315	±0,001	0,78828	±0,007

CASE STUDY

DATASET PROCESSING

EVALUATIONS


average of 100 runs				Sending Time				Aggregator Time*			
Multipl. Depth	Chunk Size	Scale Factor	# Modules RNS Base	Wall Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	CPU Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	Wall Time (s)	Conf. Interv.	CPU Time (s)	Conf. Interv.
1	5.000	20	12	3,68496	±0,014	13,52364	±0,033	3,99427	±0,034	8,50812	±0,062
1	5.000	50	8	3,29544	±0,024	13,40193	±0,068	3,76236	±0,006	8,37390	±0,051
1	5.000	50	14	3,85562	±0,017	13,95260	±0,118	3,93122	±0,006	8,50410	±0,036
1	50.000	50	8	0,49035	±0,005	1,93060	±0,007	0,39361	±0,001	0,76717	±0,004



Best
Run

REDUNDANT RESIDUE NUMBER SYSTEM

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




REDUNDANT RESIDUE NUMBER SYSTEM

These models employ complex structures such as **polynomial rings**, i.e. a ring formed from the set of polynomials in one or more variables, with coefficients in another ring, often a field.

Such ring is defined as $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$.

It can be parameterizable the **size** of each ring.

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



Plaintext example with $n = 16$


https://humanata.com/blog/illustrated_primer/

REDUNDANT
RESIDUE
NUMBER SYSTEM

HOMOMORPHIC
ENCRYPTION

The ciphertext is represented by **two** polynomials calculated as:

$$ct = ([pk_0 u + e_1 + qm/t]q, [pk_1 u + e_2]q)$$




First part of the cipher

https://humanata.com/blog/illustrated_primer/

REDUNDANT
RESIDUE
NUMBER SYSTEM

HOMOMORPHIC
ENCRYPTION

FRESH ENCRYPTION



- Horizontal: each coefficient in a polynomial or in a vector.
- Vertical: size of coefficients.
- Initial noise is small in terms of coefficients' size.

REDUNDANT RESIDUE NUMBER SYSTEM

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

AFTER SOME COMPUTATIONS

