Two future particles in Haitian Creole

In Haitian Creole (HC), future reference can be expressed by the morphemes pral and ap (a third future form, (a)(va), will not be discussed here). The meaning of the morpheme pral has not been well-characterized in existing research on HC; ap is generally described as a morpheme which expresses a "CERTAIN" future (Valdman, 1978; Damoiseau, 2005). Certainty does not distinguish ap from pral, however. Intuitively, pral is used when the causal processes leading to the future eventuality could not in principle be interrupted, while ap is used when such processes could be interrupted. For example, when a cup is on the edge of a table, threatening to fall, pral is acceptable, as in (1a), while ap is not so acceptable, as shown in (1b). However, with a ball rolling toward a cup which is secure in the middle of the table, pral as in (1a) is unacceptable while ap as in (1b) is acceptable.

cup teetering on edge ball rolling toward secure cup

(1) a. Tas la pral tonbe.

cup DET PRAL fall

'The cup PRAL fall
b. Tas la ap tonbe.

cup DET AP fall
'The cup AP fall.'

Likewise, if John wishes to buy a car and everything is already planned and he already has the money, both *pral* as in (2a) and *ap* in (2b) are acceptable; however, in the case where John has no money yet, *pral* as in (2a) is unacceptable while *ap* as in (2b) is acceptable.

money and plan no money yet

(2) a. Jan pral achte yon machin demen.

John PRAL buy a car tomorrow

'Jean PRAL buy a car tomorrow.'

b. Jan ap achte yon machin demen.

John AP buy a car tomorrow

'John AP buy a car tomorrow'

Note that *ap* and *pral* are not the same as familiar English forms that behave similarly on the tests in (1) and (2); e.g., *ap* is not like English *may*, and *pral* is not like English progressive.

- (3) #Tas la ap tonbe men tas la p ap tonbe. ap is not like may/might cup DET AP fall but cup DET NEG AP fall
 'The cup AP fall but the cup not AP fall.'
- (4) Jan pral gen eleksyon an demen. *pral* doesn't require plannability John PRAL win election DET tomorrow 'John PRAL win the election tomorrow.' (cf. English #John wins the election tomorrow.)

Building on the work of Copley (2005, 2018), we propose ((5a, b, d) below) that *pral*, like futurates in English (e.g. *John is buying a car tomorrow*, (5c)) expresses *ceteris paribus* direct causation between an ongoing situation and the situation that the prejacent is predicated of. The causation has to be direct because (1a) is unacceptable when the ball has to roll to get to the vase, and because (2a) is unacceptable when Jan has still to get the money. That is, the ongoing

situation including only the subject and its properties does not itself cause a situation of which the prejacent is true, under a *ceteris paribus* assumption (closed-world plus normality). Unlike futurates in English, however, *pral* does not require plannability ((4) above). Following Copley (2018), English futurates require plannability because (i) they require an extra causal relation introducing s so as to avoid the case where the agent's action occurs both now and tomorrow; (ii) direct causation enforces spatiotemporal contiguity between s and s' (Fodor 1970); (iii) spatiotemporal contiguity requires s to doubly access now and tomorrow; (iv) only statives do double access (Enç 1987); (v) hence s must be an intentional state which causes the agent's action, i.e., a plan.

We propose that HC verbs that allow *pral* even though unplannable (as in (4)) have an extra causal relation (Kratzer 2005, Alexiadou et al 2006). This makes (4) acceptable even though winning the election is unplannable: There is an extra causal relation between s and the situation of which the prejacent is true, namely s'', so there is no spatiotemporal contiguity required between s and s'' (cf. ii), so no double access is required (cf. iii and iv) so s need not be a plan (cf. v). (This analysis implies that such verbs in English don't have an extra causal relation.)

- (5) a. $[pral] = \lambda s \lambda p$. $\exists s'$: s DIRECTLY-CAUSES s' & p(s')b. $[(2a)] = \lambda s$. $\exists s'$: s DIRECTLY-CAUSES s' & AGENT(Jan, s') & buy(s') & tomorrow(s') & s' DIRECTLY-CAUSES <math>s'' & Jan-has-a-car(s'')
 - c. English futurates (modified from Copley 2018): [John is buying a car tomorrow] = λs. ∃s': s DIRECTLY-CAUSES s' & AGENT(Jan, s') & buy(s') & tomorrow(s') & s' DIRECTLY-CAUSES s'' & John-has-a-car(s'')
 - d. [[(4)]] = λs . $\exists s'$: s DIRECTLY-CAUSES s' & s'': s' DIRECTLY-CAUSES s'' & PATIENT(Jan, s'') & win-the-election(s'') & tomorrow(s'')

In contrast to pral, ap has a "ratificational" meaning (Giannakidou & Mari 2016, 2018) like will.

(6) a. Ariadne must/#will be sick.

b. I Ariadne tha ine arrosti DET Ariadne FUT be.3sg.pres sick c. Li dwe/#ap malad.

HC

Greek

she must/AP sick

Alexiadou, A., Anagnostopoulou, E., & Schäfer, F. (2006). The properties of anticausatives crosslinguistically. *Phases of interpretation*, *91*, 187-211. Copley, B. (2005). A conceptual and a grammatical distinction for modals. In Leah Bateman & Ussery Cherlon (eds.), NELS 35 vol. 1, 143–158. GLSA. Copley, B. (2018). Dispositional causation. Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics, 3(1), 137. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.507 Damoiseau, R. (2005). *Éléments de grammaire comparée Français-Créole haïtien*, Editions Ibis Rouge, Martinique. Giannakidou, A., & Mari, A. (2016). Epistemic future and epistemic MUST: nonveridicality, evidence, and partial knowledge. *Mood, aspect, modality revisited: New answers to old questions*, 75-117. Giannakidou, A., & Mari, A. (2018). A unified analysis of the future as epistemic modality. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory*, *36*(1), 85-129. Kratzer, A. (2005). Building resultatives. *Event arguments: Foundations and applications*, 177-212. Valdman, A. (1978). *Le créole: structure, statut et origine*, Editions Klincksieck, Paris.