

CHINMAYA KUMAR

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Office Contact Information

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Undergraduate Studies:

B.A. (Hons), Economics,
University of Delhi, 2008

Masters:

M.Phil, Development Studies,
University of Oxford (on Rhodes Scholarship), 2011

Graduate Studies:

University of Chicago, 2017 to present
Ph.D. Candidate in Public Policy
Thesis Title: Essays in Development Economics
Expected Completion Date: June 2023

References:

Professor Marianne Bertrand
University of Chicago
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Professor Christopher Blattman
University of Chicago
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Professor Leonardo Bursztyn
University of Chicago
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Professor Michael Kremer
University of Chicago
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Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary fields: Development Economics, Political Economy

Secondary fields: Behavioral Economics Labor Economics

Teaching Experience:

2022, 2021 Political Economy of Development (PhD)
Teaching Assistant for Prof. James Robinson and Christopher Blattman

2020 Advanced Microeconomics (PhD)
Teaching Assistant for Prof. Damon Jones

2020, 2019 Order and Violence (MPP)
Teaching Assistant for Prof. Christopher Blattman

2018 Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
Teaching Assistant for Prof. Kerwin Charles

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2011-2016 International Growth Centre, India-Bihar, Country Economist

2008-2009 Center for Development Finance, Chennai, India, Research Associate

Research Grants:

2020-2022 NSF's Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant in Economics: \$ 25,000

2020-2022 J-PAL's Jobs and Opportunity Initiative: \$ 37,000

2019-2022 BFI's Development Economics Initiative: \$ 15,000

2018-2019 The Weiss Fund (with M R Sharan): \$ 31, 385

2018-2020 Rockefeller Grant for Technology and Governance (with M R Sharan through the IDFC Institute, Mumbai): \$ 300,000

2015-2017 International Growth Centre (with Pankaj Verma and Aaditya Dar): \$ 23,290

2014-2017 International Growth Centre Research Programme (with Sanjay Jain): \$ 20,173

2012-2013 International Growth Centre (with Maitreesh Ghatak and Sandip Mitra): \$ 22,387

Professional Activities:

Presentations NEUDC 2022, IGC Growth Week 2013, IGC South Asia Growth Conference 2013

Discussant American Economic Association: ASSA 2021 Annual Meeting, NEUDC 2019

Research Papers:

“Complaint Resolution Systems: Experimental Evidence from Rural India” ([Job Market Paper](#))

Abstract: We study whether access to complaint resolution systems can resolve hold-up problems in the implementation of public good projects. We run a field experiment involving 1629 low-caste local representatives who were unable to start public goods projects in their constituencies due to bureaucratic hurdles. We randomize offers to file complaints regarding public good project initiation on their behalf and track its effects. Our treatment leads to a 40 percentage points jump in complaint filing rate and is effective in improving project implementation: treated constituencies see a 26% rise in public good projects. We also find that the treatment increases project initiation in neighboring constituencies by 23%. Our analysis suggests that the mere threat of a formal complaint technology could cause project initiation in neighboring wards. However, when multiple complaints are filed against the same higher bureaucrat, resolution rates go down. Surprisingly, treated representatives do not gain any electoral returns in the local elections that were held two years after the treatment.

“The Distributional Consequences of Political Reservation” (with M. R. Sharan)

Abstract: A key goal of affirmative action policies is to reduce disparities between disadvantaged minority groups and others. We study one such policy: mandated political representation in favor of low caste (Scheduled Castes/SC) groups in Bihar, India. Using a regression discontinuity design framework, we study how political reservation affects inter-group disparities in the short- and long run. We show that political reservation in favor of SCs for the post of local government head (a) lowers SC-non-SC disparities in access to public goods in the short-run (5 years later) and long-run (13 years later) (b) lowers inter-group private asset inequality modestly in the short-run and

substantially in the long-run (c) has no efficiency consequences in the short-run and (d) increases political participation and presence of low caste members in local government in the long-run. Turning to mechanisms, we show that government programs are better targeted towards low castes in reserved constituencies. Our results suggest a virtuous cycle between political representation and resource access, which reap significant benefits for minority groups in the long run.

Research Papers in Progress:

“Selection, Sorting and Discrimination in Labor Supply Decisions: Experimental Evidence from India”

Abstract: Minorities are underrepresented in enterprise ownership and leadership positions in big firms. Why? This paper empirically investigates the role of one potential reason for this: discrimination against minority employers by subordinate workers. I embed a field experiment in the recruitment of entry-level workers by a set of firms based in India. The field experiment aims to answer two main research questions: 1) Do minority employers face discrimination from below in labor markets? 2) What are the underlying motivations? I specifically test for two potential motives: attention discrimination, social image concerns. Preliminary results show that applicants are 30% less likely to apply for jobs advertised by minority employers. I also find strong evidence for attention discrimination against minority employers.

“Persistent Prejudice: De-Biasing and the Demand for News”, with [Christopher Blattman](#), [Leonardo Bursztyn](#), Kailash Rajah, Chris Roth

Abstract: Identity groups often hold incorrect and biased beliefs about competing groups. These beliefs may be persistent and difficult to correct. Why is that? One reason, we hypothesize, is that people exposed to the information counter to their group identity may work to re-bias themselves by increasing their selective exposure--their consumption of biased news and information. We design an experiment in which we randomly provide Hindu respondents with information to correct a biased belief about Muslims, using informational videos. We first confirm that the videos shift their beliefs during the experiment. We then examine their demand for new information—having been de-biased, are they more likely to seek information from a biased source?

“Leader Led Growth: Social Identity and Performance of Economic Enterprises in Rural India”, with M. R. Sharan

Abstract: Minority groups face discrimination across multiple markets – capital, product, labor – that limits the entry and growth of their enterprises. This paper empirically investigates whether exposure to minority leaders at the local level can help minority entrepreneurs overcome some of the barriers and improve the performance of their enterprises. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that exogenous exposure to minority leaders results in a strong positive effect on the entry and growth of minority-run enterprises: there is a 20% increase in the number of enterprises and a 27% increase in workers employed by minority-owned enterprises. We find evidence for positive spillover effects on social groups closer to status hierarchy but no effects on high-status social groups.

“Strengthening Citizen Led Monitoring: Experimental Evidence from India”, with Aaditya Dar and M R Sharan

“Bargaining Out of Poverty? Experimental Evidence on Income Shocks and Pricing Behavior of Microentrepreneurs in India”, with Varun Kapoor