



**SHERLOCK**

# **SHERLOCK SECURITY REVIEW FOR**



**PERENNIAL**

**Prepared For:**

Perennial

**Prepared By:**

Sherlock

**Lead Security Expert:**

[WatchPug](#)

**Dates:**

November 7th - 14th, 2022

## Introduction

"Perennial is a cash-settled synthetic derivatives protocol. It allows developers to launch any synthetic market with just a few lines of code."

This report is a follow-up security review for Perennial Protocol that was prepared by [WatchPug](#) from November 7th - 14th, 2022.

## Scope

**Branch:** Dev (<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono>)

**Commit:** b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483

(<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages>)

**Change PR:** <https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/pull/75>

**Contracts:**

- packages/perennial/contracts/collateral/Collateral.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/controller/Controller.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/controller/UControllerProvider.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/incentivizer/Incentivizer.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/interfaces/types/PayoffDefinition.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/interfaces/types/PendingFeeUpdates.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/interfaces/types/Position.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/interfaces/types/PrePosition.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/multiinvoker/MultiInvoker.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/product/Product.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/product/UParamProvider.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/product/types/accumulator/VersionedAccumulator.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/product/types/position/AccountPosition.sol
- packages/perennial/contracts/product/types/position/VersionedPosition.sol

## Protocol Info

**Language:** Solidity

**Blockchain:** Ethereum

**L2s:** None

**Tokens used:** USDC, DSU, Reward ERC20 tokens

## Findings

Each issue has an assigned severity:



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- Informational issues are subjective in nature. They are typically suggestions around best practices or readability. Code maintainers should use their own judgement as to whether to address such issues.
- Low issues are objective in nature but are not security vulnerabilities. These should be addressed unless there is a clear reason not to.
- Medium issues are security vulnerabilities that may not be directly exploitable or may require certain conditions in order to be exploited. All major issues should be addressed.
- High issues are directly exploitable security vulnerabilities that need to be fixed.

## Total Issues

Informational	Low	Medium	High
5	0	0	0



## Issue I-01 (invalid issue)

boundedFundingFee should be reloaded after \_settleFeeUpdates()

### Summary

Once pending fee updates are applied with \_settleFeeUpdates(), boundedFundingFee may get updated to a new value, thus before settle position b→c, the boundedFundingFee should be reloaded.

### Severity

This was reported as Medium, but later confirmed to not be an issue, so it's left as Informational

### Issue Detail

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/product/Product.sol#L84-L132>

```
117 // short-circuit from a->c if b == c
118 if (settleOracleVersion.version != currentOracleVersion.version) {
119     // value b->c
120     accumulatedFee = accumulatedFee.add(
121         _accumulator.accumulate(boundedFundingFee, _position, settleOracleVersion, currentOracleVersion)
122     );
123
124     // position b->c (every accumulator version needs a position stamp)
125     _position.settle(settleOracleVersion.version, currentOracleVersion);
126 }
```

### Tool used

Manual Review

### Recommendation

Change to:

```
117 // short-circuit from a->c if b == c
118 if (settleOracleVersion.version != currentOracleVersion.version) {
119     // reload fundingFee to reflect any potential FeeUpdates
120     boundedFundingFee = _boundedFundingFee();
121     // value b->c
122     accumulatedFee = accumulatedFee.add(
123         _accumulator.accumulate(boundedFundingFee, _position, settleOracleVersion, currentOracleVersion)
124     );
125
126     // position b->c (every accumulator version needs a position stamp)
127     _position.settle(settleOracleVersion.version, currentOracleVersion);
128 }
```

### Perennial Comment

We're unsure if this is actually an issue because fundingFee can't change in \_settleFeeUpdates (code here:

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/product/UParamProvider.sol#L258-L267>) so the boundedFundingFee value will stay constant.



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Could you double check this? We acknowledge the comment in Product.\_settle a little misleading because it doesn't specify which fees might change, so we can update that.

### **WatchPug**

Sorry for the false alarm. We just confirmed that it is indeed not an issue, as the fundingFee will not be changed the same way the other 3 fee rate settings (`makerFee`, `takerFee`, `positionFee`).

### **Perennial Comment**

We'll update the comment because it is a little unspecific.



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## Issue I-02

Consider splitting depositTo() into two separate actions: PULL and DEPOSIT for a better action combination

### Severity

Informational

### Issue Detail

Most users will need to wrap before deposit anyway, there is no need to push the DSU to the user's wallet in in wrap() and pull it from the user in depositTo() again.

It helps to save some gas for the end user, and users don't need to approve DSU anymore, which is also an enhancement in user experience.

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/multiinvoker/MultiInvoker.sol#L103-L137>

```
103     /**
104      * @notice Deposits `amount` DSU from `msg.sender` into `account`s `product` collateral account
105      * @param account Account to deposit funds on behalf of
106      * @param product Product to deposit funds for
107      * @param amount Amount of DSU to deposit into the collateral account
108      */
109     function depositTo(address account, IProduct product, UFixed18 amount) private {
110         ICollateral _collateral = controller().collateral();
111
112         // Pull the token from the `msg.sender`
113         _collateral.token().pull(msg.sender, amount);
114
115         // Deposit the amount to the collateral account
116         _collateral.depositTo(account, product, amount);
117     }
118
119     /**
120      * @notice Wraps `amount` USDC into DSU, pulling from `msg.sender` and sending to `receiver`
121      * @param receiver Address to receive the DSU
122      * @param amount Amount of USDC to wrap
123      */
124     function wrap(address receiver, UFixed18 amount) private {
125         // Pull USDC from the `msg.sender`
126         USDC.pull(msg.sender, amount, true);
127
128         Token18 token = controller().collateral().token();
129         // If the batcher doesn't have enough for this wrap, go directly to the reserve
130         if (amount.gt(token.balanceOf(address(batcher)))) {
131             batcher.RESERVE().mint(amount);
132             token.push(receiver, amount);
133         } else {
134             // Wrap the USDC into DSU and return to the receiver
135             batcher.wrap(amount, receiver);
136         }
137     }
```



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## Recommendation

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/multiinvoker/MultiInvoker.sol#L51-L59>

```
51 function invoke(Invocation[] calldata invocations) external {
52     for (uint256 i = 0; i < invocations.length; i++) {
53         Invocation memory invocation = invocations[i];
54
55         // Pull DSU from `msg.sender` into address(this) for combo actions
56         if (invocation.action == PerennialAction.PULL) {
57             (UFixed18 amount) = abi.decode(invocation.args, (UFixed18));
58             controller().collateral().token().pull(msg.sender, amount);
59
60             // Deposit from `msg.sender` into `account`s `product` collateral account
61         } else if (invocation.action == PerennialAction.DEPOSIT) {
62             (address account, IProduct product, UFixed18 amount) = abi.decode(invocation.args, (address, I
63             controller().collateral().depositTo(account, product, amount);
64             // Open a take position on behalf of `msg.sender`
98     @@ 65,98 @@
99     }
100 }
```

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/multiinvoker/MultiInvoker.sol#L124-L137>

```
124 function wrap(address receiver, UFixed18 amount) private {
125     // Pull USDC from the `msg.sender`
126     USDC.pull(msg.sender, amount, true);
127
128     Token18 token = controller().collateral().token();
129     // If the batcher doesn't have enough for this wrap, go directly to the reserve
130     if (amount.gt(token.balanceOf(address(batcher)))) {
131         batcher.RESERVE().mint(amount);
132         if (receiver != address(this)) {
133             token.push(receiver, amount);
134         }
135     } else {
136         // Wrap the USDC into DSU and return to the receiver
137         batcher.wrap(amount, receiver);
138     }
139 }
```

## Perennial Comment

Acknowledged and fixed (<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/pull/81>). This is not exactly the recommended fix, but achieves the same result. We introduce two new actions WRAP\_AND\_DEPOSIT and WITHDRAW\_AND\_UNWRAP. Both of these combine two actions to circumvent the extraneous push/pull, saving a significant amount of gas.

## WatchPug Comment

Fix confirmed.



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## Issue I-03

Caching external call results can save gas

### Severity

Informational

### Issue Detail

Every call to an external contract costs a decent amount of gas. For optimization of gas usage, external call results should be cached if they are being used for more than one time.

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/multiinvoker/MultiInvoker.sol#L36-L45>

```
36     function initialize(IController controller_) external initializer(1) {
37         __UControllerProvider__ initialize(controller_);
38
39         ICollateral _collateral = controller().collateral();
40         Token18 token = _collateral.token();
41         token.approve(address(_collateral));
42         token.approve(address(batcher.RESERVE()));
43         USDC.approve(address(batcher));
44         USDC.approve(address(batcher.RESERVE()));
45     }
```

controller().collateral(), controller().collateral().token(), and batcher.RESERVE() can be cached in storage to save the external call.

### Perennial Comment

Acknowledged and partially fixed

(<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/pull/85>). We cached the `reserve` address usage in the `initialize` function but opted to still perform call-time reads for the values during the `invoke` stage, as it is possible that these addresses can change.

### WatchPug Comment

Fix confirmed.



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## Issue I-04

### Unused imports

#### Severity

Informational

#### Issue Detail

The following source units are imported but not referenced in the contract:

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/multiinvoker/MultiInvoker.sol#L4>

```
4 | import "hardhat/console.sol";
```

#### Recommendation

Check all imports and remove all unused/unreferenced and unnecessary imports.

#### Perennial Comment

Acknowledged and fixed (<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/pull/82>).

#### WatchPug Comment

Fix confirmed.



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## Issue I-05

Consider renaming `Product.positionFee` to `Product.positionFeeShare()` to avoid shadowed state var and misleading

### Severity

Informational

### Issue Detail

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/interfaces/IParamProvider.sol#L36-L37>

```
36 | function positionFee() external view returns (UFixed18);
37 | function updatePositionFee(UFixed18 newPositionFee) external;
```

The name of `Product.positionFee` is quite misleading, while it's actually the share of `positionFee` that belongs to the product, in many contexts it can be misunderstood as the amount of position fee.

<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/product/types/accumulator/VersionedAccumulator.sol#L180-L205>

```
180 | function _accumulatePositionFee(
181 |     Position memory latestPosition,
182 |     PrePosition memory pre,
183 |     IOracleProvider.OracleVersion memory latestOracleVersion
184 | ) private view returns (Accumulator memory accumulatedPosition, UFixed18 fee) {
185 |     if (pre.isEmpty()) return (accumulatedPosition, fee);
186 |
187 |     Position memory positionFee = pre.computeFee(latestOracleVersion);
188 |     Position memory protocolFee = positionFee.mul(_product().positionFee());
189 |     positionFee = positionFee.sub(protocolFee);
190 |     fee = protocolFee.sum();
191 |
192 |     // If there are makers to distribute the taker's position fee to, distribute. Otherwise give it to the
193 |     if (!latestPosition.maker.isZero()) {
194 |         accumulatedPosition.maker = Fixed18Lib.from(positionFee.taker.div(latestPosition.maker));
195 |     } else {
196 |         fee = fee.add(positionFee.taker);
197 |     }
198 |
199 |     // If there are takers to distribute the maker's position fee to, distribute. Otherwise give it to the
200 |     if (!latestPosition.taker.isZero()) {
201 |         accumulatedPosition.taker = Fixed18Lib.from(positionFee.maker.div(latestPosition.taker));
202 |     } else {
203 |         fee = fee.add(positionFee.maker);
204 |     }
205 | }
```

And sometimes, the local variable will shadow `Product.positionFee()`:



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<https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/blob/b2bed03b16ceb3bce5930f54a7db1aed60dcf483/packages/perennial/contracts/product/Product.sol#L260-L270>

```
260 function _closeTake(address account, UFixed18 amount) private {
261     IOracleProvider.OracleVersion memory latestOracleVersion = atVersion(latestVersion());
262
263     _positions[account].pre.closeTake(latestOracleVersion.version, amount);
264     _position.pre.closeTake(latestOracleVersion.version, amount);
265
266     UFixed18 positionFee = amount.mul(latestOracleVersion.price.abs()).mul(takerFee());
267     if (!positionFee.isZero()) controller().collateral().settleAccount(account, Fixed18Lib.from(-1, positionFee));
268
269     emit TakeClosed(account, latestOracleVersion.version, amount);
270 }
```

### Perennial Comment

Acknowledged but won't fix. We will clarify documentation around this parameter. For clarity, our thinking is as follows:

Product parameters for market economics (part of p&I directly):

- makerFee → product's fee for makers
- takerFee → product's fee for takers
- utilizationCurve → product's fee for funding

Traditional fee parameters (coordinator and protocol):

- fundingFee → coordinator's fee on funding interest
- positionFee → coordinator's fee on (maker / taker fees)
- protocolFee → protocol's fee on (funding and positions fees)

### WatchPug Comment

Ok.



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## Additional Fix 1

Mismatch variable names in Collateral and ICollateral

### Issue Detail

Fixed in <https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/pull/83>

### WatchPug Comment

Fix confirmed.



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## Additional Fix 2

Revert unnecessary initializer change

### Issue Detail

For simplicity and ease of upgrade, we are reverting the initialize changes in Controller. <https://github.com/equilibria-xyz/perennial-mono/pull/86>. Our plan is to upgrade the implementation and call `updateMultilInvoker` separately

### WatchPug Comment

Fix confirmed.



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