

7th Lab - Windows malware

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1 Theoretical Lab

1.1 Read the introduction to the Section "Analyzing Malicious Windows Programs" and explain why is it important to know the details of Windows OS (Windows API, user/kernel mode, execution of code outside a file)?

As a computer science student, is important to know details about Windows OS because is the most used operating system , as a forensics investigator, is important because most of the malware works for windows, sometimes, malware will use those libraries and services making the acknowledgment of those libraries really important for understanding and studying malware and how it works.

1.2 Read the section "The Windows API" and identify which are the Windows API Types

types of windows api:

- WORD: is a unsigned 16bit value .
- DWORD: is a unsigned 32bit value .
- HANDLES: is a reference to an object , is not documented so it should only be managed by windows APIs.
- Long Pointer is a pointer to another type of variable.
- Callback represents a function that is going to be called by a windows API.

1.3 Read the section "File System Functions" and explain the difference between shared files and files accesible via namespaces

shared files are special files which paths looks like `//nameserver/share` **or** `//?/nameserver/share`. the symbol tells the operating system to not parse the string, in order to access longer file-names. Files accesible via namespaces: namespaces can be understood as the number of a folder, each one store different type of objects. lowest namespace is called **NT** and it has access to all devices and all namespaces exist inside **NT**. An example of files found within the NT namespace can be seen in the following figure:




Figure 1: Namespace NT

1.4 Read the section "The Windows Registry" and identify the place where executables (.exe) that start up when user log in may be configured.

A program that needs to start when a user logs in can be configured using the Run subkey using the Autoruns tool, that is a free tool from Microsoft that list code and executables that will be executed on start up. In the following figure we can see the default programs that starts when the user logs in, and we can validate it is located in the Run subkey.




Figure 2: Startup programs

And here a screenshot of the Run subkey location using regedit:




Figure 3: Run location

1.5 Read the section "Common Registry Functions" and explain the difference between RegOpenKeyEx, RegSetValueEx and RegGetValue

- **RegOpenKeyEx**
Opens a registry for editing a query it contains a functions that allows to edit the registry without open it. Most of the programs use this one.
- **RegSetValueEx**
It adds a value to a registry and modifies the data
- **RegGetValue**
It returns the data found inside a registry.

2 Explain the following assembly code. What is the purpose?

In the first place it calls the function RegOpenKeyEx to open the Run subkey, then it start handling and processing what we identified as a string to finally putting it in the Run registry using the function RegSetValueEx.

2.1 Read the Section "The WinINet API" (Pag 178) and describe what the function InternetOpen does?

The WinInet API is a high level API which functions are stored in wininit.dll, if a program imports functions from this library, it's using high level functions with networking purposes. One of those functions is InternetOpen that initialize an internet conection. But there are also other functions such as InternetOpenURL and InternetReadFile.

2.2 Read the section "Services" (Pag 185) and explain which are the main functions to manage services?

Another way to execute additional code is stalling a *service*, because windows allows to run tasks using services. To achive this we have the three following functions:

- OpenSCManager, it returns a handle to the service, all code that wants to use a service approach must call this function.
- CreateService, This function adds a new service to the service control manager, this allows the caller to specify where it will be executed and when it's going to be called.
- StartService, It starts a new service, it is only used if such service is going to be configured manually.

2.3 Read the section "Interprocess Coordination with Mutexes" (Pag 184), understand the following code and explain why is important a mutex?

Mutex refers to global objects, that coordinates several processes and execution threads, generally they are used to control access to shared resources, but they are also used in malware, because if two different threads need to access the same space, a mutex can control this operations. The assembly code what is basically doing is trying to open a mutex using the three arguments pushed to the stack, we assume that if the operation was successful, it jumps to another part of the execution, else it proceed to create a the mutex with those three arguments, we can interpret that as creating the execution of a malware if and only if such malware is not already in execution.

2.4 What is a SYSTEMTIME structure?

The systemtime structure specifies date and time, using members like month, day, year, weekday, minute, second and millisecond, it is either in UTC or in local time.

2.5 What the SetWaitableTimer function does?

It activates a specified waitable timer, when the due time arrives, the timer is signaled and the thread of the timer calls an optional routine.

2.6 Read the section "Creating a Thread" (Pag 182), understand the following code and explain in detail how a thread is set?

CreateThread function creates a new thread of execution, so what we can see in the code is how the malware is creating 2 different threads with several malicious purposes, for example load libraries in parallel to avoid stopping the malware execution or to avoid exiting a while, etc.

3 Practical Lab

- 3.1 Identify in the "Strings" tab, some functions that may indicate that the malware configure a service (OpenSCManager, CreateService, etc).




Figure 4: Strings related to services

here, we can see that the functions that we identified previously are in the source binary of the program, that mean that probably the program is consuming them. This make the previus section important to understand this kind of malware.

3.2 location of main

Using Ida we identified the location of main main fuction is locaten at 0x00401000 .

```
.text:00401000 ; int __cdecl main(int argc,const char **argv,const char *envp)
.text:00401000 _main      proc near      ; CODE XREF: start+AFip
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 ServiceStartTable= SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRYA ptr -10h
.text:00401000 var_8      = dword ptr -8
.text:00401000 var_4      = dword ptr -4
.text:00401000 argc      = dword ptr 4
.text:00401000 argv      = dword ptr 8
.text:00401000 envp      = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 sub     esp, 10h
.text:00401000 lea     eax, [esp+10h+ServiceStartTable]
.text:00401003 mov     [esp+10h+ServiceStartTable.lpServiceName], offset aMalService ; "MalService"
.text:0040100F push    eax ; lpServiceStartTable
.text:00401010 mov     [esp+14h+ServiceStartTable.lpServiceProc], offset sub_401040
.text:00401018 mov     [esp+14h+var_8], 0
.text:00401020 mov     [esp+14h+var_4], 0
.text:00401028 call    ds:StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA
.text:0040102E push    0
.text:00401030 push    0
.text:00401032 call    sub_401040
.text:00401037 add     esp, 10h
.text:0040103A retn
.text:0040103A _main      endp
```

Figure 5: location of main function

3.3 Review the code inside function `sub_401040` and observe that inside there is also a call to the function `OpenMutexA`.

is calling a mutex function to check if malware is already created, if the malware is created, the function call ends, but if is not created yet, the mutex for the malware is created.

```
.text:00401040 sub_401040      proc near          ; CODE XREF: _main+32↑p
.text:00401040                                     ; DATA XREF: _main+10↑o
.text:00401040 SystemTime    = SYSTEMTIME ptr -400h
.text:00401040 DueTime      = LARGE_INTEGER ptr -3F0h
.text:00401040 BinaryPathName = byte ptr -3E8h
.text:00401040
.text:00401040      sub     esp, 400h
.text:00401046      push    offset Name      ; "HGL345"
.text:00401048      push    0                  ; bInheritHandle
.text:0040104D      push    1F0001h          ; dwDesiredAccess
.text:00401052      call     ds:OpenMutexA
.text:00401058      test     eax, eax
.text:0040105A      jz      short loc_401064
.text:0040105C      push    0                  ; uExitCode
.text:0040105E      call     ds:ExitProcess
.text:00401064
.text:00401064 loc_401064:      ; CODE XREF: sub_401040+1A↑j
.text:00401064      push    esi
.text:00401065      push    offset Name      ; "HGL345"
.text:0040106A      push    0                  ; bInitialOwner
.text:0040106C      push    0                  ; lpMutexAttributes
.text:0040106E      call     ds:CreateMutexA
.text:00401074      push    3                  ; dwDesiredAccess
.text:00401076      push    0                  ; lpDatabaseName
.text:00401078      push    0                  ; lpMachineName
.text:0040107A      call     ds:OpenSCManagerA ; Establish a connection to the service
.text:0040107A                                     ; control manager on the specified computer
.text:0040107A                                     ; and opens the specified database
.text:0040107A      ....
```

Figure 6: Mutex call

3.4 Analyze the code at the address 401064 and observe that at 40106E there is a call to the function ds:CreateMutexA. Then, there is also a call to functions ds:OpenSCManager and ds:GetModuleFileName. ds:GetModuleFileName gets the full pathname to the running executable or Loaded DLL.

```
.text:00401064 loc_401064: ; CODE XREF: sub_40104B+167j
.text:00401064 push esi
.text:00401065 push offset Name ; "HQL3NS"
.text:00401066 push 0 ; InitialOwner
.text:00401067 push 0 ; lpMutexAttributes
.text:0040106E call ds:CreateMutexA
.text:00401074 push 3 ; dwDesiredAccess
.text:00401076 push 0 ; lpDatabaseName
.text:00401078 push 0 ; lpMachineName
.text:0040107A call ds:OpenSCManager ; Establish a connection to the service
; control manager on the specified computer
; and opens the specified database
.text:00401080 mov esi, eax
.text:00401082 call ds:GetCurrentProcess
.text:00401088 lea eax, [esp+40h+BinaryPathName]
.text:0040108C push 0 ; nSize
.text:00401091 push eax ; lpFileName
.text:00401092 push 0 ; Module
.text:00401094 call ds:GetModuleFileNameA
.text:0040109A push 0 ; lpPassword
.text:0040109C push 0 ; lpServiceStartName
.text:0040109E push 0 ; lpDependencies
.text:004010A0 push 0 ; lpDelayId
.text:004010A2 lea ecx, [esp+414h+BinaryPathName]
.text:004010A6 push 0 ; lpLoadOrderGroup
.text:004010A8 push ecx ; lpBinaryPathName
.text:004010AA push 0 ; dwErrorControl
.text:004010AC push 2 ; dwStartType
.text:004010AD push 10h ; dwServiceType
.text:004010AF push 2 ; dwDesiredAccess
.text:004010B1 push offset DisplayName ; "Halservice"
.text:004010B6 push offset DisplayName ; "Halservice"
.text:004010BB push esi ; hSCManager
.text:004010BC call ds:CreateServiceA
;
.text:004010BC call ds:CreateServiceA
.text:004010C2 xor edx, edx
.text:004010C4 lea eax, [esp+404h+DueTime]
.text:004010C6 mov dword ptr [esp+404h+SystemTime.wYear], edx
.text:004010C8 lea ecx, [esp+404h+SystemTime]
.text:004010CA mov dword ptr [esp+404h+SystemTime.wDayOfWeek], edx
.text:004010CC push eax ; lpFileTime
.text:004010CE mov dword ptr [esp+404h+SystemTime.wHour], edx
.text:004010D0 push ecx ; lpSystemTime
.text:004010D2 mov dword ptr [esp+404h+SystemTime.wSecond], edx
.text:004010D4 mov [esp+40Ch+SystemTime.wYear], 834h
.text:004010D6 call ds:SystemTimeToFileTime
.text:004010D8 push 0 ; lpTimerName
.text:004010DA push 0 ; hManualReset
.text:004010DC push 0 ; lpTimerAttributes
.text:004010DE call ds:CreateWaitableTimerA
.text:004010E0 push 0 ; hResume
.text:004010E2 push 0 ; lpArgToCompletionRoutine
.text:004010E4 push 0 ; pfnCompletionRoutine
.text:004010E6 lea edx, [esp+410h+DueTime]
.text:004010E8 mov esi, eax
.text:004010EA push 0 ; lPeriod
.text:004010EC push edx ; lpDueTime
.text:004010EE push esi ; hTimer
.text:004010F0 call ds:SetWaitableTimer
.text:004010F2 push 0 ; dwMilliSeconds
.text:004010F4 push esi ; hHandle
.text:004010F6 call ds:WaitForSingleObject
```

Figure 7: service path

3.5 Observe that at address 004010C2 existst a SYSTEMTIME... SystemTime.wYear is 834h. What does it mean

it means that is taking a variable in system date, and is modifying this date to year 2100.

4 Question:

4.1 Q13: How does astaroth.exe ensure that it continues running (achieves persistence) when the computer is restarted?

creating itself as a service, as we know in previus section , creating services will execute as autostart in windows when the sytem boots.

4.2 Q14: Why does astaroth.exe use a mutex?

creating itself as a service but only the first time or if the service was elimitated inorder to avoid creating the same service several times.

4.3 Q15: What is a good host-based signature to use for detecting astaroth.exe?

if there is a service that is waiting until year 2100 and it also importing mutex as a library is highly probable that this program is astaroth or similar malware. there are other several dll files that can be used to identify astaroth with more efficiency .

4.4 Q16: When will astaroth.exe finish executing?

in a day of the year 2100 .