

Phone projection


20210638 최무송

Phone projection(Apple Carplay & Android Auto)

- Phone (mirroring) → In-vehicle Infotainment display
 - Android Automotive: Android OS in vehicle
- Connected via USB cable / Wi-fi or Bluetooth
- Apps: GPS Navigation, Phone call, Message, Music player, ...
- Minimized driver distraction
 - Voice command integration, simple UI, no media play when driving

MirrorLink

- MirrorLink vulnerabilities
 - DAP does not restrict untrusted devices
 - Heap overflow
 - Functions that can access to CAN bus
- Terminated in 2023



Apple Carplay components

- Apple Device (iPhone, adapter)
- Carplay Accessory (IVI)
- MFi(Made for iPhone/iPad/iPod) chip
 - Security and Authentication




Figure 1: **CarPlay Overview.**

USB Connection between iPhone and IVI Systems

- USB connection (recognition)
- USB role switch
- iAP2(Inter-Accessory Protocol 2) session
 - Parameter negotiation
 - NCM configuration
 - IVI system Authentication
 - IVI system Identification
- CarPlay Session
 - IP Networking and Bonjour Discovery
 - CarPlay Session Authentication
 - Content Transfer and Application Launch






Figure 2: Steps of Connection Establishment between iPhone and IVI Systems.

IVI system Identification and Authentication

- Authorize accessories with Mfi chip



Packet Analysis (2025 paper)

- *The IVI system verifies only the product and vendor IDs from the USB descriptor to initiate the CarPlay session. Any device can easily forge these.*
- *However, contrary to the document's description, the authentication process does not include a packet requesting the serial number. Moreover, the identification process occurs prior to the authentication process in the iAP2 session.*
- By forging ID, Android OS can run within Carplay


Static Binary Analysis (2025 paper)

- *IVI systems are designed to accept any Apple device for CarPlay functionality without verifying whether the connected device is a genuine iPhone. Moreover, Apple assumes that only authorized iPhones will initiate CarPlay sessions, and therefore does not enforce an authentication mechanism on the IVI side.*

Julia Static Analysis (2018 paper)

- Android Auto는 플레이스토어에 등록된 앱만 사용 가능
- 앱 차원에서 보안 원칙을 위반하거나 (ex – Webview 사용으로 인한 XSS, javascript injection 가능성) Phone projection 규칙을 위반할 수 있음 (ex - 미디어 자동 재생 허용)
- *Results show that almost 80% of the apps are potentially vulnerable, out of which 25% poses security threats related to execution of JavaScript.*

Phone Projection Threats



References

- Vulnerability analysis of Android auto infotainment apps
- CarPlay at Risk: Unveiling Security Threats of Third-Party Infotainment Adapters
- A Security Analysis of an In Vehicle Infotainment and App Platform