

PHL201 Lecture 01

May 13th

by Brooks Sommerville

Introduction

office hours: Wde. 5-6 pm or by appointment JHB 522 b.sommerville@utoronto.ca

TA: Ahlee Ferreira: ashlee.ferreira@mail.utoronto.ca

Dates: May 20: Victoria Day, no class.

Drop date: June 10.

Course Evaluation:

1. outline for assignment 1 (1-2 pages) (10%) May 22
2. assignment 1 (4-6 pages) (20%) June 3
3. assignment 2 (5-7 pages) (30%) June 19
4. final (40%) TBA

12pt. font, double-spaced, 1 inch margins.

Course Reading:

The elements of philosophy: readings from past and present

Reading Schedule:

May 13: [Introduction], [God]. Saint Anselm, "The Ontological Argument" and Gaunilo, "In Behalf of the Fool," pp. 15-17

May 15: William L. Rowe, "Why the Ontological Argument Fails," pp. 21-24. William Paley, "The Argument from Design," pp. 31-34. John Hick, "The Problem of Evil," pp. 39-44.

May 20: No class.

May 22: [Free Will]. A.J. Ayer, *Freedom and Necessity*, pp. 475-479. Roderick M. Chisholm, *Human Freedom and the Self*, pp. 480-487. ***Outline for assignment 1 due in class**

May 27: [Personal Identity]. John Locke, "Of Identity and Diversity," pp. 512-521. Thomas Reid, "Objection to Locke's Theory of Personal Identity" (supplementary reading). Derek Parfit, "Personal Identity," pp. 532-548

May 29: [Knowledge vs. Skepticism]. Plato, *Meno*, pp. 343-344. Edmund Gettier, *Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?*, pp. 345-346. Rene Descartes, *Meditations 1 and 2*, pp. 351-357.

June 3: G. E. Moore. *Proof of an External World*, pp. 358-360. G. E. Moore, *Certainty*, pp. 361-364. David J. Chalmers, *The Matrix as Metaphysics*, pp. 405-418. ***assignment 1 due in class**

June 5: [Ethics]. Plato, "Glaucou's Challenge," pp. 217-219. James Rachels, "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism," pp. 240-248. ***instructions for assignment 2 distributed in class**

June 10: James Rachels, "Egoism and Moral Skepticism," pp. 233-239. Derek Parfit, *What Makes Someone's Life Go Best?*, pp. 755-769.

June 12: Derek Parfit, *What Makes Someone's Life Go Best?*, continued. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, pp. 114-126.

June 17: Immanuel Kant, Selections from *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, pp. 105-111. John Stuart Mill, Selections from *Utilitarianism*, pp. 77-87.

June 19: [Political Philosophy]. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, pp. 296-308. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, pp. 309-318. ***assignment 2 due in class**

Class materials

Arguments are the way philosophers to convince people.

First lesson:

“

Arguments are not bad things!

Arguments are lists of propositions. 逻辑论证

Propositions are just statements, can be right or wrong. 命题

PHILOSOPHERS ARE TRYING TO CONVINCE PEOPLE, they are giving people reasons why they should believe your conclusion.

e.g.

reason1: no professors are ignorant.

reason2: all ignorant people are vain.

conclusion: no professors are vain.

- **ENTAILMENT** 蕴涵: A conclusion is entailed by its premises 前提 just in case it's impossible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion false.
entailment is the relationship between two sentences where the truth of one (A) requires the truth of the other (B).
- AN ARGUMENT IS VALID 有效 JUST IN CASE ITS CONCLUSION IS ENTAILED BY ITS PREMISES.
- In logic, an argument is valid if and only if its conclusion is logically entailed by its premises and each step in the argument is logical. A formula is valid if and only if it is true under every interpretation, and an argument form (or schema) is valid if and only if every argument of that logical form is valid.

- AN ARGUMENT IS SOUND合理 JUST IN CASE IT'S VALID AND ALL ITS PREMISES ARE TRUE.
 - An argument is sound if and only if a)The argument is valid. b)All of its premises are true.
-

MODUS PONENS:肯定前件

If P, then Q

P

Q

MODUS TOLLENS:否定后件

If P, then Q.

Not Q.

Not P.

DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM:选言三段论

EITHER P OR Q.

NOT P

Q

CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM:直言三段论

ALL Fs Are G.

x is an F.

x is G OR IF GIVEN

FALLACY OF EQUIVOCATION:一词多义

ALL POLITICIANS ARE *SNAKES*.

NO *SNAKE* HAS LEGS.

NO POLITICIAN HAS LEGS.

BEGGING THE QUESTION:乞題

THE BIBLE IS GOD'S WORD.

GOD'S WORD MUST BE CORRECT.

THE BIBLE SAYS GOD EXISTS.

GOD EXISTS.

- "GOD" = "SOMETHING THAN WHICH NOTHING CREATER CAN BE THOUGHT"
 - EXISTECE IS A "GREAT MAKING" PROPERTY
-

GOD EXISTS.

Saint Anselm, "The Ontological Argument"

next lecture.

READING NOTES

在《證據》（Proslogion）中，安瑟倫僅僅藉「神」的概念，就證明神的存在，並提出本體論的重要內涵：「我們不能夠想像得比它更大的東西，他就存在。」《證據》第二章。

所謂的上帝就是「無法設想比它更偉大或更完美的那一位存在者」，這是安瑟倫本體論證的邏輯前提。上帝是一切存有的原因，但祂自己卻不以任何他物為其原因，祂是「憑自身」而存在。即當本質上是最真、善、美的時候，那就是存在；當存在和本質相同的時候，那就是上帝。但若「最完美者」僅存於意識裡，而不存見於現實時，便不是最完美之存在。因為它還可以讓人思想一個更完全，且兼具觀念之存在與現實的存在者。因此，最完全者之概念不但具有思想上之實在，且須具有絕對之實在。

在安瑟倫的論述，以「最完美者」之概念，證明最完美者之現實存在，然而「最完美者」之概念為一思想，是建構在精神上的實質，即人的意識當中。而人對神的認知僅是心智直覺及客觀現象（絕對者之存在）之存在，他將「理想中的存在」與「現實中的存在」混為一談。安瑟倫的本體論論證，遭到了不少經院哲學家的批評，其中一位法國馬牟節的僧侶高尼羅（Gaunilon），以匿名出版的《為愚人辯》（Pro Insipiente）。綜合他對安瑟倫本體論的批評：「從思想與實體予以區別，我們或許儘可意想或想像一個實體，但此一實體儘可不全存在。」高尼羅指出理解的東西並非等於真實的東西，心靈中的存在未必等同現實中的存在。高尼羅身為僧侶，顯然不是無神論者。其相關批評只是挑剔安瑟倫本體論證上的邏輯破綻，並無意否認上帝的存在，卻使後人意識安瑟倫本體論證的不圓滿，從而轉向更嚴謹的認識論來思考。

In his Proslogion, Anselm put forward a proof of the existence of God called the "ontological argument". The term itself was first applied by Immanuel Kant to the arguments of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century rationalists. Anselm defined his belief in the existence of God using the phrase "that than which nothing greater can be conceived". He reasoned that, if "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" existed only in the intellect, it would not be "that than which nothing greater can be conceived", since it can be thought to exist in reality, which is greater. It follows, according to Anselm, that "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" must exist in reality. The bulk of the Proslogion is taken up with Anselm's attempt to establish the identity of "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" as God, and thus to establish that God exists in reality.

Anselm's ontological proof has been the subject of controversy since it was first published in the 1070s. It was opposed at the time by the monk Gaunilo, in his *Liber pro Insipiente*, on the grounds that humans cannot pass from intellect to reality. Anselm replied to the objections in his *Responsio*.

Gaunilo's criticism is repeated by several later philosophers, among whom are Thomas Aquinas and Kant. Anselm wrote a number of other arguments for the existence of God, based on cosmological and teleological grounds.

PHL201 Lecture 02

May 15th

by Brooks Sommerville

ASHLEE FERREIRA: MONDAYS 2-3 PM JHB 522 OR BY APPOINTMENT.

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Sometimes it's hard to come up with a direct prove of "p", instead, you can assume \sim ("p"), then if you can get something like both "q" and "not q", namely a CONTRADICTION, then you proved "p" now. The method is called REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM (反证法).

Omnipotence(全能): being able to DO anything it's possible to DO.

Omniscience(全知): being able to KNOW anything it's possible to KNOW.

Omnibenevolence(全爱): being COMPLETELY GOOD.

THEISM: GOD EXISTS. 有神论

RATIONAL THEISM: there is a rational basis for belief in god.

Both Anselm and Paley are rational theists.

“

You can still be a rational theists, if you don't think Anselm's and Paley's arguments are not good enough.

ARATIONAL THEISM: there's no rational basis for belief in god, but one should believe in god anyway.

“

You can be a rational theists, even if you don't have even any arguments that claim God exists. (NO rational basis for or against God.)

IRRATIONAL THEISM: there's a rational basis for believing that god DOESN'T exist, but one should believe in god anyway.

ATHEISM: GOD DOESN'T EXIST. 无神论

AGNOSTICISM: WE CAN'T KNOW WHETHER GOD EXISTS OR NOT. 不可知论

ANSELM:

Anselm didn't bring any evidence to prove his argument, he was doing something like, "existence is one part you should agree", "ontological".

“

His argument is always called [a priori](#) (先验).

“

Anselm thinks he can prove something with easily unpacking the definition of this "something". And he thinks he is giving a sound argument here.

“

But most people see this "lousy".

[Definition] "God" = "something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought", this is to say, God is something which has no room for improvement.

[Premise1] The fool understands what it means to speak of something than which nothing greater can be thought. (the fools: ATHEISM)

[Premise2] If someone understands what it means to speak of x, then x exists in their understanding.

[Conclusion1] God exists in the fool's understanding.

that's round 1.

*[Assumption] God exists ONLY in the fool's understanding.

[Premise3] We (including the fools) can conceive of God existing in reality.

[Conclusion2] God exists only in the fool's understanding, yet we can conceive of God also existing in reality.

[A, P3]

[Premise4] If x exists only in someone's understanding, yet we can conceive of it also existing in reality, then x can be conceived to be greater than it is. (There is room for improvement!)

[Conclusion3] God can be conceived to be greater than God is.

[Conclusion4]? Something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought can be conceived to be greater than something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.

[Conclusion5]? The denial of Assumption! Prove Assumption wrong.

ROWE:

Rowe is an atheist.

“

"possible things" means everything DOESN'T INVOLVE CONTRADICTION, including nonexistent things and existing things.

“

What is impossible? A round square.

“

Although Anselm doesn't say this in his argument, Rowe believes adding "God is a possible things" to Anselm's argument("God is a perfect existing thing") would be a sort of support, then prove God exists.

i.e. **existence = it's a possible thing + it's an existing thing**

magician:

- magican = existing magician
- magico = nonexsiting magician

[Premise1] Anselm defines God as a perfect existing thing.

[Premise2]

PALEY:

Paley's method is called "[a posteriori](#)"(后验)

Local vs. global

[Premise1] Fact: There are natural objects (e.g. eyes) that, like obvious creations of intelligence (e.g. watches), appear to have been designed for a purpose.

[Premise2] This fact requires explanation.

[Premise3] The only reasonable explanation of this fact (i.e. [Premise1]) is that natural objects are the creations of an extremely powerful intelligent designer.

[Premise4] "ITBE = Inference To the Best Explanation": If a fact F requires explanation, and if hypothesis H is the only reasonable explanation of F, then it's reasonable to believe H.

[Conclusion1]?

[Conclusion2]?

PHL201_Lecture_03

reading for next lecture: *Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity* by Thomas Reid.

- 1) Fact: there are natural objects (e.g. eyes) that, like obvious creations of intelligence (e.g. watches), appear to have been designed for a purpose.
 - 2) This fact requires explanation.
 - 3) The only reasonable explanation is that natural objects are the creations of an extremely powerful intelligent designer.
 - 4) ITBE (Inference To the Best Explanation): If a fact F requires explanation, and if hypothesis H is the only reasonable explanation for F, then it's reasonable to believe H.
- C1) It's reasonable to believe that an extremely powerful intelligent designer exists.
- C2) It's reasonable to believe that GOD EXISTS.
-

Problem of Evil

(our last problem in philosophy of religion)

- a) God is omnipotent.
- b) God is wholly good.
- c) Evil exists.

all these three cannot be true at the same time.

1. Good is opposed to evil: a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can.

2. There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.

- 1) assume that god - a la a, b, c - exists.
- 2) if something is good, then it always eliminates evil as far as it can (*).
- 3) God is wholly good (b).
- 4) so God always eliminates evils as far as god can (2, 3).
- 5) if something is omnipotent, then there are no limits to what it can do (**).
- 6) god is omnipotent (a).
- 7) so there are no limits to what god can do (5, 6).
- 8) so god eliminates evil completely.
- 9) there is evil.
- 10) so GOD DOES NOT EXIST.

Hick on moral evil

- A) something is a person only if it's genuinely free.
- B) something is genuinely free only if it can choose to do wrong.
- C) so something is a person only if it can choose to do wrong.
- D) a world with persons > world without

Hick on non-moral evil

F) persons can "make souls" only if the world contains non-moral evil.

G) a world in which persons can "make souls" > one in which they can't

H) so a world containing non-moral evil > one that doesn't

CAUSAL DETERMINISM (CD)

A statement of all the facts at time t (inc. facts about people's heredity, environment etc.), together with a statement of the law's of nature, logically entails what will happen at any future time $t + 1$.

Argument from determinism

- 1) Everything that happens is determined by prior events (CD).
 - 2) One acts freely only if one has the power to act otherwise (choice condition).
 - 3) If one's actions are determined, then one lacks the power to act otherwise.
-

NO ONE ACTS FREELY (1, 2, 3).

If CD is true, then we're not free.
CD is true.

so we're not free. (modus ponens)

If CD is true, then we're not free.
We are free.

so CD is false.

the difference between freedom or unfreedom is being caused in a right way or a wrong way.

PHL201_LECTURE_04

May 27th

What is Determinism? (causal determinism = CD)

Think about the "ball" example from last lecture, if we know everything physical laws we need, we can perfectly predict the motion in the ball, thus free will is impossible!

Arguments from DETERMINISM

1. Everything that happens is determined by *prior* events (CD)
2. One acts freely only if one has the power to do otherwise (choice condition)

if not, why should I go to jail for stealing, since I cannot avoid stealing?

3. If one's actions are determined, then one lacks the power to act otherwise

conclusion: No one ever acts freely (1, 2, 3)

INCOMPATIBILISM

only one of CD and human freedom is true.

hard determinism: a broad view that causal determinism is incompatible with human freedom, and CD is true, so human freedom must be false, it's an illusion.

libertarianism (Chisholm): it agrees with hard determinism if causal determinism were true that human freedom is false, but what they differ is that libertarianism believes that we are free, so it is that CD is false.

COMPATIBILISM

both of CD and human freedom are true, they accept 1 is true, gonna choose either 2 or 3 true) (Ayer chose 3 true.

here are two compatibilists:

Hume: You do X freely if and only if (I) you do X and (II) doing X is what you choose to do. (prototype of Compatibilism)

Why is this a prototype? It has some faults:

e.g. If my arm is forced to raise up and down forever by a robot, then I force myself to think, hmm I am wanting my arm to move up and down. Now, is it a freedom? No, I am "pretending to act freely".

Okay, here comes an updated/expanded version (with a longer clause):

Ayer: You do X freely if and only if (I) you do X, (II) doing X is what you choose to do, and **(III) if you had chosen to do something other than X, you would have succeeded.**

notes: even if I chose to raise my arm up and down at some point, I still cannot escape from this, that means I cannot have such a possibility to "succeed" from Ayer's view.

"conditional analysis":

- a. she has the power to act otherwise is equivalent to
- b. if she had chosen to do something other than what she did in fact do, then she would have succeeded.

BUT, is it the final definition of libertarianism?

No, take evil robot as example again, this time, an evil scientist takes away a part in my brain to control my mind by affecting my decision mechanism, then it "looks" like now I'm still acting freely. But IN FACT, I ain't.

As an incompatibilist, Chisholm thought:

Chisholm: What if you can't do otherwise because you **can't choose** to do otherwise?

Arguments from INDETERMINISM

1. **Not** everything that happens is determined by *prior* events (Indeterminism)
2. One acts freely only if one has the power to determine which actions one performs (control condition)

there is no causal connection between my actions and my will, it looks like my actions happen to me, they are coming out of blue. I have no control over what I do.

3. If one's actions are not determined by prior events, then one lacks the power to determine which actions one performs.

conclusion: No one ever acts freely (1, 2, 3)

The way out? (by Chisholm)

"Transcendent" causation = event causation

"Immanent" causation = agent causation (p.483)

If someone burns the school down, it is the person who would be on trial, not the "event".

“

A staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a man. --- Aristotle

one event: stone moves, caused by another event, a staff moves, caused by another event, hand moves, caused by an agent, namely, a man.

Personal Identity

The question of **personhood**: what is a person?

The question of **personal identity** over time: under what circumstances is a person? At a later time the same person as a person at an earlier time? (two different questions above)

Numerical identity: X and Y are numerically identical if and only if they are one and the same thing. (e.g. Bruce Wayne and Batman)

vs.

Qualitative identity: X and Y are qualitatively identical if and only if they have exactly the same properties. (e.g. identical watches, Big Macs)

Necessary conditions: P is a necessary condition for Q if and only if (iff) you can't have Q without P.

$Q \rightarrow P$

Sufficient conditions: P is a sufficient condition for Q iff you can't have P without Q

$P \rightarrow Q$

e.g Oxygen in a house is a necessary condition of a fire but not a sufficient condition of it.

??? \leftrightarrow personal identity

Body Theory: Persons are living, human bodies X is the same person as Y iff X and Y have the same living, human body.

~ **Brain Theory**: a more *specific* version of **Body Theory**. What a person is is a functioning brain.

Soul Theory: Persons are souls. X is the same person as Y iff X and Y have the same soul.

Psychological Theory (John Locke): Persons are ongoing streams of psychological connectedness. X is the same person as Y iff X

and Y are "Psychologically connected" in the right kind of way.

PHL201_Lecture_05

May 29th

Turnitin: hemlock

ClassID: 6507970

RECALL:



Body Theory/ Brain Theory

Psychological Theory

Persons are ongoing **STREAMS** of **psychological connectedness**. X is the same person as Y iff X and Y are psychologically connected in the right kind of way.

Memory Theory (Locke)

Persons are ongoing streams of **memory connections**. X is the same person as Y iff X remembers at least some of what Y did, thought, and felt.

What Locke is talking about is "**episodic**" memory

"EPISODIC" memory (doing, thinking and feeling)

vs.

"FACTUAL" memory (FACT; information)

vs.

"ACQUAINTANCE" memory (like how to ride a bike, what my cousin looks like, etc.)

Reid

He proposed a famous objection to Locke's theory of personal identity.



- Transitivity?
- Name schoolboy A, officer B and general C. then we assume general remembers when he was an officer, and the officer remembers when he was a schoolboy, but the general doesn't remember when he was a schoolboy.
- now we have: $B = C$, $A = B$, but $A \neq C$ (according to Locke)
- But we know that they are the same person, i.e. $A = B = C$.

Memory connection

X and Y are **memory connected** iff X remembers at least some of what Y did, thought, felt.

Memory Continuity

X and Y are **memory continuous** iff Y is the last link in a chain of persons beginning with X which is such that each person in the chain is memory connected with the preceding person.

Consequences of Locke/Reid's theory of PERSONAL IDENTITY:

SLEEP?

AMNESIA?

DRUNKENNESS?

Derek Parfit

Suppose we have a perfect teleporter that can make a blueprint for you while you are on it, which includes all of your psychological components, then the other end of the teleporter on Mars duplicate successfully and completely another "you". Does this mean "you" travelled to Mars? Or is that "you" or other person?

(Assume A is on earth, and B, C on Mars.)

$A = B, A \neq C$

$A = C, A \neq B$

$A = B \ \& \ A = C$

$A \neq B, A \neq C$

Justified True Belief (by Plato)

Justified true belief is a definition of knowledge that is most frequently credited to Plato and his dialogues.

The concept of justified true belief states that in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition, but one must also have justification for doing so. In more formal terms, a subject S knows that a proposition P is true if and only if:

1. P is true
2. S believes that P is true, and
3. S is justified in believing that P is true

This theory of knowledge suffered a significant setback with the discovery of Gettier problems, situations in which the above conditions were seemingly met but that many philosophers disagree that anything is known. Robert Nozick suggested a clarification of "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge

would be false.

PHL201_Lecture_06

Ability Knowledge

e.g. I know how to ride a bike

Factual Knowledge

e.g. I know that the giants won the world series last year.

Acquaintance Knowledge

e.g. I know Rob Ford.

"JTB = Justified True Belief" Theory of Knowledge

P stands for a statement / proposition. S stands for "somebody".

S knows that P iff:

1. P is **T**ue (Knowledge is "factive")
2. S **B**elieves that P (Psychological attitude)
3. S is **J**ustified in believing that P (Knowledge requires "having good reasons" for one's belief)

A true Belief is not enough to be a knowledge, needs good reasons to believe. One needs to know why the belief is true.

1-3 \Leftrightarrow knowledge

Edmund Gettier

Gettier problem

2 assumptions:

- I) In whatever sense of "justified" relevant to **3**.(up in JTB section), it's possible for someone to be justified in believing something false.
- II) For any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P and P entails Q and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. (page 345)
- D) "Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has 10 coins in his pocket."
- E) "The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket."
- F) "Jones owns a Ford."
- G) "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston."
- H) "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona."
- I) "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Berlin."

Conclusion from Gettier's argument: **JTB does not state a *sufficient* condition for someone's knowing a given proposition.**

Skepticism

The view that we lack knowledge, that we don't know things we may **think** we know.

... About the past; about other minds.

... About the "external world".

NB: **NOT** the view that there is no external world. Maybe that's true, maybe it isn't. Add this to the things we don't know!

Psychological Certainty

One is psychologically certain of proposition P iff one has no doubts regarding P.

vs.

Evidential Certainty

One is evidentially certain of proposition P iff one's evidence for P "guarantees" P, that is, iff one's evidence is logically incompatible without not-P.

P1: Our evidence for the external world propositions we believe doesn't guarantee that any of them is true.

C1: We're not evidentially certain of any propositions about the external world [P1, Definition of evidential certainty]

P2: Knowledge requires evidential certainty: one knows P only if one is evidentially certain of P.

C2: We don't know any propositions about the external world. [C1, P2]

Skeptical Hypothesis

A hypothesis that:

i) Renders false most (or all) of our beliefs about the external world, and yet

ii) We can't rule it out.

Moore

1) If one doesn't know that one isn't dreaming, then one doesn't know that one is standing and awake.

2) You don't know that you aren't dreaming.

Conclusion: You don't know you're standing and awake.

PHL201_Lecture_07

June 5th

Assignment 2 is coming.

Argument from Skepticism

P1) Our evidence for the external world propositions we believe doesn't guarantee that any of them is true.

C1) We aren't evidentially certain of any propositions about the external world. [**P1, definition of evidential certainty**]

P2) Knowledge requires evidential certainty.

C2) We don't know any propositions about the external world. [**C1, P2**]

Moore vs. The Skeptic

P1) If one doesn't know that one isn't dreaming, then one doesn't know that one is standing and awake. **SKPETIC**

P2) You don't know that you aren't dreaming. **MOORE CHALLENGES**

C2) You don't know that you're standing and awake.

Moore

P1) If one doesn't know that one isn't dreaming, then one doesn't know that one is standing and awake.

P2) You do know that you are standing and awake.

C) You do know that you aren't dreaming.

Moore's proof of an external world

P1) Here is a hand (said while gesturing with one's left hand).

P2) Here is another hand (said while gesturing with one's right hand).

C1) Two human hands now exist. **[P1, P2]**

P3) If two human hands now exist, then there are external objects. **(IMPLICIT)**

C2) There are external objects. **[C1, P3]**

Moore's "TEST" for a rigorous proof:

I) Premises are different from the conclusion (i.e. C1 *could* be true even if P1 & P2 were false).

II) Premises are known to be true (Moore: it could be "absurd" to deny he knows P1 & P2).

III) Conclusion follows from the premises (i.e. if two hands are here, then two hands now exist).

But what about the premises? Doesn't Moore have to *prove* P1 & P2?

“

Moore:

- 1. It may be impossible to prove P1 & P2.*
 - 2. Nevertheless, we can know things that we cannot prove.*
-

Chalmers

Skeptical Hypothesis:

1. Can't be ruled out. **[Moore's target]**
2. If true, it would render false most of our beliefs. **[Chalmers' target]**

A. Creation Hypothesis:

Physical space-time and its contents were created by beings outside physical space-time.

B. Computational Hypothesis:

Microphysical processes throughout space-time are constituted by underlying computational processes.

C. Mind-Body Hypothesis:

Our minds are (and always have been) constituted by processes outside physical space-time and receive their perceptual inputs from and send their outputs to processes in physical space-time.

Metaphysical Hypothesis:

A Hypothesis about the underlying nature of reality.

Chalmers believes even if A-C true, it doesn't prove the external world is false. So being in the Matrix for your whole life still can be true, it's true to "you".

Republic

What is JUSTICE & why does it PAY FOR THE PERSON WHO HAS IT?

NOMOS (custom) vs. PHYSIS

Thrasymachus

Glaucou

Glaucou is asking, why be moral?

Glaucou: assume three sorts of **goods**

1. For its **own** sake only. e.g. simple pleasures.
2. Good for their own sake **and** their consequences.
3. Good for consequences **only**.

take doing exercises as an example, people who only enjoy the process of doing itself would take it as a good for their own sake, but some other people would just take it as a good for consequences only.

another extreme example: a risky heart surgery...

Justice is like a "risky heart surgery".

PHL201_Lecture_08

June 10th

- Glaucon's Challenge
 - Cultural (moral) Relativism
 - Egoism
 - Parfit?
-

Glaucon:

NOMOS (Custom, convention) VS. **PHUSIS** (Nature)

e.g. for nomos, like drinking in different states/provinces/countries.

3 Goods:

1. for its own sake **only** (like fun?)
2. for its own sake **and** for its consequences (like education) *TEAM SOCRATES*
3. for its consequences **only** (like going to a dentist) *TEAM GLAUCON*

Socrates believes justice belongs to the *second* kind.

Glaucon believes justice belongs to the *third*.

3 Clams about justice:

1. its origins

2. that it's practiced "unwillingly" i.e. as good #3
 3. that people are **right** to take this view about justice
-

Moral (Cultural) Relativism

The elements of moral philosophy by James Rachels.

A. there is no universal moral truth. in other words, there are no moral truths that hold for all people at all time.

B. there are moral truths

C. moral truths are relative to a certain moral framework: claims like "Sam morally ought to give to charity" should be taken to be equivalent to claims like "relative to moral framework F, Sam morally ought to give more to charity."

"Moral framework" = a set of rules governing what kinds of actions to consider right/wrong, what sorts of situations to consider good/bad, what kinds of persons are praiseworthy/blameworthy.

(WEAK) Argument for Moral Relativism

1. Different cultures disagree, sometimes radically, about morality.

SO there is no universal moral truth.

WEAK because:

- Only establishes Moral Relativism's A not A, B, C
- Does even the stated conclusion follow from the premise? What about Rachels' geography example.

This is not *sound*. James Rachels uses the sentences:

“

We are not saying (not yet, anyway) that the conclusion of the argument is false. That is still an open question. The logical point is just that the conclusion does not follow from the premise. This is important, because in order to determine whether the conclusion is true, we need arguments in its support.

BETTER Argument for Moral Relativism

1. FACT: Different cultures disagree, sometimes radically, about morality.
2. This fact requires explanation.
3. ! The only reasonable explanation for this disagreement is the hypothesis of moral relativity. (i.e. **A, B, C**)
4. *Inference to the best explanation*: if a fact **F** requires explanation and if hypothesis **H** is the only reasonable explanation of **F**, then it's reasonable to believe **H**.

It's reasonable to believe **Moral Relativism**.

Objections to Moral Relativism: (P243)

1. If Moral Relativism is true, then we can't say that the customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own.
2. If Moral Relativism is true, then we can decide whether actions are right/wrong *just by* consulting the standards of our own society.
3. If Moral Relativism is true, then the idea of moral progress is called into doubt.

Using Rachels' words to answer why there is less disagreement than it seems:

“

The point is that many factors work together to produce the customs of a society. The society's values are only one of them. Other matters, such as the religious and factual beliefs held by its members, and the physical circumstances in which they must live, are also important. We cannot conclude, then, merely because customs differ, that there is a disagreement about values. The difference in customs may be attributable to some other aspect of social life. Thus there may be less disagreement about values than there appears to be.

WHY some values in common?

“

There are some moral rules that all societies must have in common.

Psychological Egoism:

the only thing anyone does pursue as *an end of itself* is her own self-interest.

PHL201_Lecture_09

June 12th

4-hour exam.

PART I: 20 marks, 10 questions. short-answer questions. may be multiple choices, may be definition, or may be just answers after reading a paragraph.

PART II: 60 marks, 6 questions. standard long essay questions.

today:

- Rachels: Egoism
- Parfit: "What makes someone's life go best?"
- Aristotle, NE

--

Rachels:

Psychological Egoism: The only thing anyone *does* pursue as an end in itself is her *own* self-interest. (*empirical, descriptive*)

vs.

Ethical Egoism: The only thing anyone *ought* pursue is her own self-interest. (*normative*)

Altruism / Beneficence: Pursuit of someone else's welfare *as an end in itself*.

Hedonistic Psychological Egoism: The only thing anyone does pursue as an end in itself is his or her own happiness / pleasure.

Argument A:

All voluntary actions are caused by one of the agent's own motives.

SO All voluntary actions are caused by selfish motives.

Argument B:

Every time an agent gets what she wants, she feels pleasure.

SO Agents always want only their own happiness.

Parfit:

A. Hedonism (Hedonistic Theory):

Well-being consists in enjoying pleasant experiences and avoiding painful ones.

X spring break, Charlie Sheen?

Is there such a feeling as "pleasure itself"?

Thomas Carlyle vs. J.S. Mill

Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine"

B. Desire Theory (Desire-Fulfilment Theory):

Well-being consists in the satisfaction of desires

Simple Desire Theory:

Well-being consists in satisfying present desires.

Comprehensive Desire Theory:

The more desires over the course of a whole life satisfied, the better.

X Addict

Informed Desire Theory:

Well-being in the satisfaction of the desires I would have if I were fully informed of all non-evaluative facts.

X Blades of Grass

C. Objective List Theory:

Well-being consists in living a life featuring items drawn from a list of things that are good in themselves.

e.g. Ross:

1. Virtue
2. Knowledge
3. The apportionment of pleasure to virtue and knowledge
4. Pleasure

PHL201_Lecture_10

June 17th

Assignment 2

Exam

Today:

- Aristotle
 - Kant
 - J.S.Mill
-

Aristotle (384-322BC)

Aristotle believes Ethics is a science.

Aristotle's categorized science into:

Science / Goal

1. Theoretical: Physics / Understanding
2. Productive: Medicine (any applied science) / Product
3. Practical: Ethics / Action

usually we ask, What are you doing and why? (Ethics is aim at actions)

Bridle making: you made a bridle not for your own sake, it must have other purposes. For ride a horse, a horse carries warrior, warriors win the battle...

Bridle making -> riding -> strategy -> victory -> power ->...

"HAPPINESS" - Flourishing

not equivalent to **"being pleased with how one's life is going"**

This is a good explanation for everything you do.

"Endoxil method" ?

Chase of lives

candidates of happiness:

Activity / Goal

1. Gratification / pleasure
2. Politics / honour? (no! honour is just the recognition) excellence (must be active excellence)
3. Contemplation / Study
4. Money? (no!)

Function Argument

- craft
- parts of the body (cannot judge some properties of parts also belong to the whole)

x Fallacy of composition?

e.g. If someone stands up out of their seat at a baseball game, they can see better. Therefore, if everyone stands up they can all see better.

If a runner runs faster, she can win the race. Therefore if all the runners run faster, they can all win the race.

Book II

Moral vs. Intellectual excellence

"Moral virtue lies in a mean"

i.e. **excellence** is between **deficiency** and **excess**

e.g **courage** is between **cowardice** and **rashness**

Kant (1724-1804)

Deontological (Duty-based) Theory

Theory of Ethics

Three mental causes of voluntary human action:

1) acting because one regards the action as a means to desired ends

e.g. DESIRE + BELIEF => ACTION

2) acting from immediate inclination

e.g. love or benevolence FEELING + BELIEF => ACTION

3) acting from the sense of duty

e.g. "The person of good will"

- When 1-3 motivate us to act, they determine our "maxim" for action, i.e. a general rule governing what one does.
- One's acting in some way only has "moral worth" i.e. "intrinsic value" if one does it from duty.

Less Plausible reading:

X's doing A has moral worth iff X ought do A, and X does A only "from duty" (i.e. is motivated to do A by and only by the thought that she ought do A.)

More Plausible reading:

X's doing A has moral worth iff X ought to do A, and X is motivated to do A by the thought that he ought to do A and whatever other motives she may also have, X would do A even if she had not had them.

Categorical Imperative:

1. "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."
2. "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."
3. "Act always so as to aid in bringing about the kingdom of ends."

PHL201_Lecture_11

June 19th

Exam:

- student id
- cell phones
- pen
- don't skip lines
- all answers in booklets

Utilitarianism

(1) You ought to do act A iff the happiness/unhappiness balance that would result from your doing A is **greater than** what would result from your not doing A;

(2) You ought **not** to act A iff the happiness/unhappiness balance that would result from your doing A is **less than** what would result from your not doing A.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), J.S. Mill (1806-1873)

4 "Elements" of Utilitarianism

1. **Consequentialism** - actions are judged right/wrong solely by virtue of their actual consequences.
2. **Aggregation** - One consequence C1 is better than - has a higher utility than - another C2 if the sum of what's good for each

person involved in C1 minus what's bad for them is greater than the sum of what's good for each person involved in C2 minus what's bad for them.

3. **Hedonism** - The only thing that is intrinsically good is happiness, i.e. "Pleasure and the absence of pain." All other things are merely instrumentally good.
4. **Agent Neutrality** - No one's happiness should be counted as more important than anyone else's. Your welfare and my welfare are equally important.

What makes Utilitarianism plausible?

It expresses **3 plausible moral ideas**:

1. that morality is concerned with human welfare;
 2. that what each of us ought morally to aim at is to bring about as much good as possible;
 3. that morality is impartial.
-

Rawls (1921-2002)

- "Problem of Justice"?
- 2 principles of Justice

Principle 1 (p302-303)

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of "equal basic liberties" compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.

e.g. Right to vote, freedom of speech, right to hold personal property etc...

Principle 2

aka the "**Difference Principle**": Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

1. reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and
2. attached to positions and offices open to all.

Principle 1 takes priority over Principle 2.

*Rawls is **Egalitarianism Libertarian**.*

Robert Nozick

A conception of Justice is "**Patterned**" if it aims to put into place a distribution of resources that varies along some natural dimension.

A conception is "**Historical**" if it sees the Justice of a distribution not in terms of whether the distribution conforms to some pattern, but in terms of the actual history of how persons come to acquire resources.

Entitlement Theory

Entitlement theory is a theory of distributive justice and private property created by Robert Nozick in his book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. The theory is Nozick's attempt to describe "justice in holdings" (Nozick 1974:150) - or what can be said about and done with the property people own when viewed from a principle of justice.

Nozick's entitlement theory comprises 3 main principles:

1. **A principle of justice in acquisition** - This principle deals with the initial acquisition of holdings. It is an account of how people first come to own common property, what types of things can be held, and so forth.
2. **A principle of justice in transfer** - This principle explains how one person can acquire holdings from another, including voluntary exchange and gifts.
3. **A principle of rectification of injustice** - how to deal with holdings that are unjustly acquired or transferred, whether and how

much victims can be compensated, how to deal with long past transgressions or injustices done by a government, and so on.

Nozick believes that if the world were wholly just, only the first two principles would be needed, as "the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings":

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. (p310)

Thus, entitlement theory would imply "a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution" (Nozick 1974:151). Unfortunately, not everyone follows these rules: "some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from competing in exchanges" (Nozick 1974:152). Thus the third principle of rectification is needed.

Entitlement theory is based on John Locke's ideas. Under entitlement theory, people are represented as ends in themselves and equals, as Kant claimed, though different people may own (i.e. be entitled to) different amounts of property. Nozick's ideas create a strong system of private property and a free-market economy. The only just transaction is a voluntary one. Taxation of the rich to support social programs for the poor are unjust because the state is acquiring money by force instead of through a voluntary transaction.

Wilt's example fails Rawls' theory, since if you really let people do what they want, they are going to mess up your pattern, then the only way to prevent this is to restrict people to do things freely.