
#### **Statistical Inference**

Lecture 10a

ANU - RSFAS

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# **Changing Ideas**



# Some Thoughts on Probability (J. Kadane Text)

- Uncertainty is a fact of life! Let's think about the uncertainty related to the weather tomorrow.
- Let's consider the temperature and whether it rains tomorrow:
  - $A_1$ : Rain and High above 20 degrees C tomorrow
  - A2: Rain and High at or below 20 degrees C tomorrow
  - A<sub>3</sub>: No Rain and High above 20 degrees C tomorrow
  - A<sub>4</sub>: No Rain and High at or below 20 degrees C tomorrow.
- We know that one and only one of these will occur tomorrow (exhaustive and disjoint).
- Whatever you are uncertain about, I can ask you to specify a set of disjoint and exhaustive events that describe your categories.

- Consider a ticket that pays:
  - \$1 if event  $A_1$  happens
  - \$0 if  $A_1$  does not happen.
- A buyer of such a ticket pays the seller the amount p.
  - If the event  $A_1$  occurs, the seller pays the buyer \$1.
  - If the event  $A_1$  does not occur, the seller owes the buyer nothing.

- Let's suppose that your price for a \$1 ticket on  $A_1$  is  $Pr\{A_1\} = p$  (pronounced 'price of  $A_1$ ') is 30 cents.
  - If I sell the ticket to you and it rains tomorrow and the temperature is above 20 degrees C, I would have to pay you \$1.

$$\Rightarrow$$
 your total:  $-0.30 + 1.00 = 0.70$ 

 If it does not rain or if the temperature does not rise to be above 20 degrees C, I would not pay you anything.

$$\Rightarrow$$
 your total:  $-0.30 + 0 = -0.30$ 

- Similarly you can name prices for the events  $A_2$ ,  $A_3$ , and  $A_4$ .
- Once you set a price, then you are willing to buy or sell tickets at that price.
- It would be foolish for you to specify prices that have the property that I can be assured of making money from you, whatever the weather might be tomorrow (i.e., making you a sure loser).
- Avoiding being a sure loser does not make you a winner, or even likely to be a winner.

- Suppose you were willing to sell a ticket for a negative amount, say  $Pr\{A_1\} = -\$0.05$ .
- I buy a ticket from you. You give me the ticket and \$0.05.
  - If event  $A_1$  happens:

$$\Rightarrow$$
 your total:  $(-0.05) + (-1.00) = -1.05$ 

• If event  $A_1$  does not happen:

$$\Rightarrow$$
 your total:  $(-0.05) + 0 = -0.05$ 

- No matter what happens, you are a sure loser.
- To avoid this, for every event A:

$$Pr\{A\} \ge 0$$

- Now consider the sure event  $S = \{A_1 \cup A_2 \cup A_3 \cup A_4\}$ .
- What price should you give to the sure event *S*?
- If you give a price below \$1, say \$0.75 and I purchase a ticket you are sure to lose \$0.25:

$$\Rightarrow$$
 your total: (0.75) + (-1.00) = -0.25

• If you give a price above \$1, say \$1.25, and I sell you a ticket you are sure to lose \$0.25:

$$\Rightarrow$$
 your total:  $(-1.25) + (1.00) = -0.25$ 

• To make sure that you are not a sure loser you would like,

$$Pr{S}=1$$

Suppose you were willing to state the following prices for tickets:

$$Pr{A_1} = \$0.20$$
  
 $Pr{A_2} = \$0.25$   
 $Pr{A_1 \cup A_2} = \$0.40$ 

- I will sell you a ticket for  $A_1$  and a ticket for  $A_2$ .
- And buy a ticket for  $[A_1 \cup A_2]$ .
- Recall:
  - A1: Rain and High above 20 degrees C tomorrow
  - A2: Rain and High at or below 20 degrees C tomorrow

- Suppose it does not rain. Then none of the tickets have to be settled by payment.
  - You gave me \$0.20 + \$0.25 = \$0.45.
  - I gave you \$0.40.
  - You lost \$0.05.
- Suppose it does rain. Then either  $A_1$  or  $A_2$  occurred (only one).
  - I owe you \$1.
  - You owe me \$1.
  - In addition I still have the \$0.05 that I gained from the sale and purchase of the tickets.
- Either way, you lose \$0.05.

- The problem that you named too low a price for the ticket on the union  $[A_1 \cup A_2]$ .
- Any price less than \$0.45 leads to sure loss for you.

- Now suppose you raise the price on the union:  $Pr\{A_1 \cup A_2\} = \$0.60$ .
- I will now sell you the  $[A_1 \cup A_2]$ .
- I buy a ticket for  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ .
- Suppose it does not rain. Then none of the tickets have to be settled by payment.
  - You gave me \$0.60.
  - I gave you \$0.20 + \$0.25 = \$0.45.
  - You lost \$0.15.
- Suppose it does rain. Then either  $A_1$  or  $A_2$  occurred (only one).
  - I owe you \$1.
  - You owe me \$1.
  - In addition I still have the \$0.15 that I gained from the sale and purchase of the tickets.

• Hence if your price for the ticket on the union of the two events is too low or too high, you can be made a sure loser. Unless,

$$Pr\{A_1\} + Pr\{A_2\} = Pr\{A_1 \cup A_2\}$$

- Good news: If your prices satisfy those conditions, you cannot be made a sure loser.
- Prices satisfying these equations are said to be coherent.
- These prices satisfy the Kolmogorov's probability axioms. So based on decisions in the face of uncertainty we end up with probability!
- But note that the equations don't tell you exactly what prices to assign, as long as the equations are satisfied.
- We can each have different beliefs about the outcome of events and they can all be coherent.
- Personalistic (subjective view) of probability.
- From a set of 7 axioms on choice (extending the work of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern), Leonard Savage showed that you can derive utility, probability, conditional probability, all leading to the fact that in the face of uncertainty you should minimize posterior expected loss (a bit more to come on this).

- Bayesian inference is the application of Bayes' rule to the problem of 'guessing' an unknown quantity(ies).
- The key distinction between Bayesian and sampling theory statistics is the issue of what is to be regarded as random and what is to be regarded as fixed.
  - To a Bayesian, parameters are random and data, once observed, are fixed.
  - To a sampling theorist (classical statistician), data are random even after being observed (how inference is done), but parameters are fixed.

## A Very Stylized Example

- Let's consider an example that was discussed in *A First Course in Bayesian Statistics* by Hoff (2009).
- Consider determining the prevalence of an infectious disease in a particular city - say Canberra.
- ullet Our interest lies in the fraction of infected individuals in Canberra ( heta).
- We plan on taking a random sample of 20 individuals and determine how many of them are infected (y).

$$y|\theta \sim \text{binomial}(20,\theta)$$


- We conduct our sample and find that none of the individuals are infected (y = 0).
- What is our inference (best guess) for  $\theta$ ?

## Inferential Approach 1 - MLE

• We can use Maximum Likelihood Estimation:

$$\hat{\theta} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta} L(\theta|y) 
= \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta} \begin{pmatrix} N \\ y \end{pmatrix} \theta^{y} (1-\theta)^{N-y} 
= y/N = 0/20 = 0.$$

- Suppose in other studies of similar cities the infection rate ranges from about 0.05 to 0.20 with an average prevalence of 0.09.
- A *beta* distribution with parameters a = 2, b = 20 has a mean value of 0.091.



**Figure 1:** Proportion infected in the population.


Thus far the information we have is:

$$p(y|\theta) = \text{binomial}(20, \theta)$$
 &  $p(\theta) = \text{beta}(2, 20)$ 

• Now instead of maximizing we will use Bayes' rule to infer  $\theta$ :

$$p(\theta|y) = \frac{p(y \text{ and } \theta)}{p(y)} = \frac{p(y|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(y)} = \frac{p(y|\theta)p(\theta)}{\int_0^1 p(y|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta}$$

• If we do a little math  $\Rightarrow \theta | y \sim \text{beta}(2, 40)$ .



**Figure 2:** Proportion infected in the population (posterior in blue  $[p(\theta|y)]$ , prior in green  $[p(\theta)]$ 

 What is our estimate? The Bayesian approach provided a full distribution! We could use the mean or median as a point estimate:

$$E(\theta|y) = 2/42 \approx 0.048$$

• Or provide 95% credible interval for  $\theta|y$ :

$$Pr(0.006 \le [\theta|y] \le 0.129) \approx 0.95$$

### Inferential Approach 1 - MLE

- Back to the Maximum Likelihood estimation.
- Confidence intervals for ML estimators:

$$\hat{\theta} \pm 1.96 \times \text{S.E.}(\hat{\theta})$$

How are these intervals interpreted?

In our case:

$$\hat{\theta} \pm 1.96 \times \sqrt{\hat{\theta}(1-\hat{\theta})/\textit{N}} = [0,0]$$

• Of course there are frequentist approaches to deal with estimation of small proportions!

# Similar Example - Han Solo and Bayesian Priors

• For a fun similar example:

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https://www.statslife.org.uk/the-statistics-dictionary/2148-han-solo-and-bayesian-priors
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# Why consider Bayesian inference?

- Bayesian methods provide the user with the ability to formally incorporate prior information (Carlin and Louis, 2009).
- If  $p(y|\theta)$  and  $p(\theta)$  represent a rational person's beliefs then Bayes' rule is an optimal method for updating those beliefs.
- If  $p(y|\theta)$  and  $p(\theta)$  approximately represents beliefs then  $p(\theta|y)$  is also approximate and may be useful (Hoff 2009).

"All models are wrong, but some are useful" - Box and Draper.

## Why consider Bayesian inference?



- Inferences are conditional on the actual data (Carlin and Louis, 2009).
- Bayesian answers are more easily interpretable by non-statisticians (Carlin and Louis, 2009).
- All Bayesian analyses follow directly from the posterior; no separate theories of estimation, testing, multiple comparisons, etc. are needed (Carlin and Louis, 2009).
- In many complicated statistical problems there are no obvious non-Bayesian methods of estimation or inference (Hoff 2009).

 Bayesian Inference is simply the application of Bayes' Rule to infer about parameters:

$$\pi(\theta|\mathbf{x}) = \frac{f(\mathbf{x}|\theta)\pi(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} f(\mathbf{x}|\theta)\pi(\theta)d\theta}$$

$$= \frac{f(\mathbf{x}|\theta)\pi(\theta)}{m(\mathbf{x})} \quad \text{marginal}$$

$$\propto f(\mathbf{x}|\theta)\pi(\theta)$$

• It is important to remember though that in a Bayesian framework  $\theta$  is random. In the frequentist framework it is fixed!

- $\pi(\theta|\mathbf{x})$  is the posterior distribution for  $\theta$ .
- $f(x|\theta)$  is the joint sampling distribution for **X** or the likelihood for  $\theta$ .
- $\pi(\theta)$  is the prior distribution for  $\theta$ .
- m(x) is the marginal distribution for X.

- Bayesian approach:
  - We start with a prior belief about a situation (represented through a probability distribution parameterized by  $\theta$ ).
  - We observe data x.
  - Given the data x, we update our beliefs about  $\theta$  via Bayes' rule and obtain the posterior distribution.

• Many times you will just see this notation:

$$p(\theta|x_1,...,x_n) = \frac{p(x_1,...,x_n|\theta)p(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} p(x_1,...,x_n|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta}$$

$$= \frac{p(x_1,...,x_n|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(x_1,...,x_n)}$$

$$= \frac{p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(\mathbf{x})}$$

$$\propto p(\mathbf{x}|\theta)p(\theta)$$

- As  $\pi(\theta|\mathbf{x})$  is a probability distribution function, we can consider a number of summaries for  $\theta$  after we observe the data:
- ullet Posterior mode: the value of heta which maximizes the posterior distribution
- Posterior median
- Posterior mean

 For reasons of mathematical simplicity (though we shall see there are other good reasons), we shall focus on the posterior mean:

$$\hat{\theta}_B = E\{[\theta|\mathbf{x}]\} = \int_{\Theta} \theta \pi(\theta|\mathbf{x}) d\theta$$

• We can also consider functions of  $\theta$ ,  $\tau(\theta)$ :

$$\widehat{\tau(\theta)}_B = E\{[\tau(\theta)|\mathbf{x}]\} = \int_{\Theta} \tau(\theta)\pi(\theta|\mathbf{x})d\theta$$

Eg.  $X_1, \ldots, X_n \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} \text{Bernoulli}(\theta)$ . Additionally assume:

$$\pi(\theta) = 1 \quad \forall \ \theta$$

$$\pi(\theta|\mathbf{x}) = \frac{f(\mathbf{x}|\theta)\pi(\theta)}{m(\mathbf{x})}$$

$$\text{LODE } f(\mathbf{x}|\theta) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \theta^{x_i} (1-\theta)^{1-x_i} = \theta^{\sum x_i} (1-\theta)^{n-\sum x_i}$$

$$m(\mathbf{x}) = \int_0^1 f(\mathbf{x}|\theta)\pi(\theta)d\theta$$
$$= \int_0^1 \theta^{\sum x_i} (1-\theta)^{n-\sum x_i} (1)d\theta$$

Math fact (beta function):

$$B(x,y) = \int_0^1 t^{x-1} (1-t)^{y-1} dt = \frac{\Gamma(x)\Gamma(y)}{\Gamma(x+y)}$$

$$m(\mathbf{x}) = \int_0^1 \theta^{(\sum x_i + 1) - 1} (1 - \theta)^{(n - \sum x_i + 1) - 1} d\theta$$
$$= \frac{\Gamma(\sum x_i + 1) \Gamma(n - \sum x_i + 1)}{\Gamma([\sum x_i + 1] + [n - \sum x_i + 1])}$$

ullet So our posterior distribution for  $\theta$  is:

$$\pi(\theta|\mathbf{x}) = \frac{f(\mathbf{x}|\theta)\pi(\theta)}{m(\mathbf{x})}$$

$$= \frac{\theta^{\sum x_i}(1-\theta)^{n-\sum x_i}(1)}{\frac{\Gamma(\sum x_i+1)\Gamma(n-\sum x_i+1)}{\Gamma([\sum x_i+1]+[n-\sum x_i+1])}}$$

$$= \frac{\Gamma([\sum x_i+1]+[n-\sum x_i+1])}{\Gamma(\sum x_i+1)\Gamma(n-\sum x_i+1)}\theta^{\sum x_i}(1-\theta)^{n-\sum x_i}$$

$$= \frac{\Gamma(\alpha^*+\beta^*)}{\Gamma(\alpha^*)\Gamma(\beta^*)}\theta^{\alpha^*-1}(1-\theta)^{\beta^*-1}$$

$$\alpha^* = \sum x_i + 1$$
$$\beta^* = n - \sum x_i + 1$$

$$[\theta | \mathbf{x}] \sim \text{beta}(\alpha^*, \beta^*)$$

• Using the posterior distribution of  $\theta$  and use the posterior mean as an estimate! It turns out the posterior mean is:

$$\hat{\theta}_B = \frac{\alpha^*}{\alpha^* + \beta^*}$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n X_i + 1}{n+2}$$

Eg.  $X_1, \ldots, X_n \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} \text{Bernoulli}(\theta)$ . Additionally assume:

$$\theta \sim \text{beta}(a, b)$$

We can re-write that mean of the posterior:

$$\hat{\theta}_{B} = \frac{a + \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_{i}}{n + a + b}$$

$$= \frac{n}{n + a + b} \bar{X} + \frac{a + b}{n + a + b} \left(\frac{a}{a + b}\right)$$

$$= \frac{n}{n + a + b} \times \text{ data average } + \frac{a + b}{n + a + b} \times \text{ prior expectation}$$

$$= \frac{n}{n + a + b} \times \text{ MLE } + \frac{a + b}{n + a + b} \times \text{ prior expectation}$$

**Definition (Section 6.4.2):** Let  $\mathcal F$  denote the class of pdfs or pmfs  $f(x|\theta)$ . A class  $\mathcal P$  of prior distributions is a <u>conjugate family</u> for  $\mathcal F$  if the posterior distribution is in the class  $\mathcal P$  for all  $f\in \mathcal F$ , all priors in  $\mathcal P$ , and all  $x\in \mathcal X$ .

- In other words, if the prior distribution is in the same family of distributions as the posterior, then it is a conjugate prior distribution.
- For  $f(x|\theta)$  examine the kernel with regard to  $\theta$  and see if your recognize the distribution. This will be the conjugate distribution.

Eg. Let 
$$X_1, \ldots, X_n \sim \text{Poisson}(\lambda)$$
.

• Determine a conjugate prior distribution and then determine the posterior distribution for  $\lambda$ .

$$f(\mathbf{x}|\lambda) = \frac{\lambda^{\sum x_i} e^{-n\lambda}}{\prod x_i!}$$
  
$$\Rightarrow \lambda^{\sum x_i} e^{-n\lambda}$$

• This is a kernel for a gamma distribution. Thus we have the following conjugate prior:

$$\lambda \sim \operatorname{gamma}(a, b)$$

$$p(\lambda|\mathbf{x}) \propto p(\mathbf{x}|\lambda)p(\lambda)$$

$$\propto \left[\lambda^{\sum x_i}e^{-n\lambda}\right]\left[\lambda^{a-1}e^{-\lambda/b}\right]$$

$$= \lambda^{\sum x_i+a-1}e^{-\lambda(n+1/b)}$$

$$= \lambda^{a^*-1}e^{-\lambda/b^*}$$


$$[\lambda | \mathbf{x}] \sim \operatorname{gamma}(a^*, b^*)$$
 $a^* = \sum x_i + a$ 
 $b^* = \frac{b}{bn+1}$ 

- Are we restricted by conjugate priors? Do they represent my beliefs?
- No! A mixture of conjugate priors is also conjugate.


$$p(\theta) = pf_1(\theta) + (1-p)f_2(\theta)$$

- Eg. Example by Diaconis and Ylvisaker (1985)
- When a coin is spun on its edge, instead of being thrown in the air, the proportion of *heads* is rarely close to 1/2, but rather 1/3 or 2/3 because of irregularities in the edge that cause the [coin] to favor one side or the other.
- So suppose I have a coin, before I spin it what might my prior beliefs be about the probability of getting a heads?


$$p(\theta) = \text{beta}(a = 1, b = 1)$$



$$p(\theta) = \frac{1}{2} \text{beta}(a = 10, b = 20) + \frac{1}{2} \text{beta}(a = 20, b = 10)$$



$$p(\theta) = 0.5 \text{beta}(a = 10, b = 20) + 0.2 \text{beta}(a = 15, b = 15) + 0.3 \text{beta}(a = 20, b = 10)$$



• Now suppose I stip the coin 10 times and I see:

- Now update via Bayes' rule. We get the following posteriors:
  - $p(\theta|\mathbf{x}) = \text{beta}(1+y, n-y+1)$ , i.e., beta(4,8);
  - $p(\theta|\mathbf{x}) = 0.89 \text{beta}(13,27) + 0.11 \text{beta}(23,17)$ ; and
  - $p(\theta|\mathbf{x}) = 0.77$ beta(13, 27) + 0.17beta(18, 22) + 0.06beta(23, 17).





Figure 6: Posterior Beliefs

```
p \leftarrow seq(0,01, by=0.001)
post1 <- dbeta(p, 4, 8)
post2 \leftarrow 0.89*dbeta(p, 13, 27) + 0.11*dbeta(p, 23, 17)
post3 <- 0.77*dbeta(p, 13, 27) + 0.17*dbeta(p, 18, 22) +
  0.06*dbeta(p, 23, 17)
m.post1 <- 4/(4+8)
m.post2 \leftarrow 0.89*(13/(13+27)) + 0.11*(23/(23+17))
m.post3 \leftarrow 0.77*(13/(13+27)) + 0.17*(18/(18+22)) +
  0.06*(23/(23+17))
plot(p, post1, type="l", lwd=3, col="black",
     main="Posterior Beliefs", ylim=c(0,4))
lines(p, post2, col="red", lwd=3)
lines(p, post3, col="blue", lwd=3)
abline( v=c(m.post1, m.post2, m.post3),
        col=c("black", "red", "blue"), lwd=3)
```



• Posterior means: 0.3333333, 0.3525, 0.36125.