

# Lecture 5

## Competitive Equilibrium in the Growth Model

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Macroeconomics EC417

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# Competitive Eqm in the Growth Model

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- There are two issues we are interested in regarding resource allocation problems
  1. efficient allocations
  2. decentralized equilibrium allocations
- So far did (1). Now consider (2).
- Focus on particular decentralized equilibrium concept:  
**competitive equilibrium**
  - benchmark notion of decentralized eqm, but not only one

# Competitive Eqm (CE) in the Growth Model

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- Static economies: one way to formulate CE
- Dynamic economies: **three** ways to formulate CE
  1. “Arrow-Debreu CE” (ADCE)
  2. “Sequence of Markets CE” (SOMCE)
  3. “Recursive CE” (RCE)
- Outcomes same for all three. Just different representations.
- Begin with ADCE
  - extension of static CE
  - but defining commodities as pairs of goods  $\times$  time

# Preliminaries: Ownership of Capital

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- Detail to consider in economy with capital: who owns capital?
  - households who then rent it to firms?
  - firms who own capital are in turn owned by households?
  - reality: see some of each
- Turns out this is of no substantive importance in this setting
  - lecture: assume capital owned by HH and rented to firms
  - exercise: other extreme
- Also assume single “stand-in” firm
  - exercise: show that this is harmless
- We also go back to discrete-time formulation

# Characterizing Competitive Equilibria

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- First Welfare Theorem applies (perfect info., perfect comp., complete markets), so could simply use fact that CE allocation = planner's allocation
- But will later consider environments with various distortions (financial frictions, incomplete insurance, ...) in which this fails
- $\Rightarrow$  want to know how to solve for CE even when First Welfare Theorem fails. Consider such method now.
- General idea:
  - max problem for hh's and firms  $\Rightarrow$  necessary conditions
  - + market clearing

# Arrow-Debreu CE

- **Definition:** An ADCE for the growth model are sequences  $\{c_t^h, h_t^h, k_t^h, k_t^f, h_t^f, p_t, w_t, R_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  s.t.

1. (HH max) Taking  $\{p_t, w_t, R_t\}$  as given,  $\{c_t^h, h_t^h, k_t^h\}$  solves

$$\max_{\{c_t^h, h_t^h, k_t^h\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (c_t^h + k_{t+1}^h - (1 - \delta)k_t^h) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (R_t k_t^h + w_t h_t^h)$$

$$c_t^h \geq 0, \quad 0 \leq h_t^h \leq 1, \quad k_{t+1}^h \geq 0, \quad k_0^h = \bar{k}_0$$

2. (Firm max) Taking  $\{p_t, w_t, R_t\}$  as given,  $\{k_t^f, h_t^f\}$  solves

$$\max_{\{k_t^f, h_t^f\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (p_t F(k_t^f, h_t^f) - w_t h_t^f - R_t k_t^f) \quad k_t^f \geq 0, \quad h_t^f \geq 0.$$

3. (Market clearing) For each  $t$ :

$$k_t^h = k_t^f, \quad h_t^h = h_t^f, \quad c_t^h + k_{t+1}^h - (1 - \delta)k_t^h = F(k_t^f, h_t^f)$$

# Comments

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- Single budget constraint for HH
- Prices take care of discounting implicitly
- Everything happens at  $t = 0$



# Simplifying

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- An ADCE are sequences  $\{c_t, h_t, k_t, p_t, w_t, R_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  s.t.
  1. (HH max) Taking  $\{p_t, w_t, R_t\}$  as given,  $\{c_t, h_t, k_t\}$  solves

$$\max_{\{c_t, h_t, k_t\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (R_t k_t + w_t h_t)$$

$$c_t \geq 0, \quad 0 \leq h_t \leq 1, \quad k_{t+1} \geq 0, \quad k_0 = \bar{k}_0$$

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3. (Market clearing) For each  $t$ :

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = F(k_t, h_t)$$

( $k$  and  $h$  markets clear implicitly)

# Characterizing ADCE

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- Necessary conditions for **consumer problem** ( $h_t = 1$  wlog)

$$c_t : \quad \beta^t u'(c_t) = \lambda p_t, \quad \lambda = \text{multiplier on b.c.} \quad (1)$$

$$k_{t+1} : \quad \lambda p_t + \lambda[-p_{t+1}(1 - \delta) - R_{t+1}] = 0 \quad (2)$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t(c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (R_t k_t + w_t) \quad (3)$$

$$\text{TVC} : \quad \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \beta^T u'(c_T) k_{T+1} = 0 \quad (4)$$

$$\text{initial} : \quad k_0 = \bar{k}_0 \quad (5)$$

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- Necessary conditions for **firm problem**

$$p_t F_k(k_t, h_t) = R_t \quad (6)$$

$$p_t F_h(k_t, h_t) = w_t \quad (7)$$

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$$p_t F_k(k_t, h_t) = R_t \quad (6)$$

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- Market clearing**

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = F(k_t, h_t) \quad (8)$$

# Characterizing ADCE: TVC?

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- As before, can think of TVC (4) as coming from finite horizon problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t, h_t, k_t\}} \quad & \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.} \\ & \sum_{t=0}^T p_t (c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^T (R_t k_t + w_t h_t), \quad k_{t+1} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- Denote multipliers by  $\lambda, \mu_t$ , necessary conditions at  $t = T$  are

$$\begin{aligned} \beta^T u'(c_T) &= \lambda p_T \\ \lambda p_T &= \mu_T \quad \Rightarrow \quad \beta^T u'(c_T) k_{T+1} = 0 \\ \mu_T k_{T+1} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

# Characterizing ADCE

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- Use (1) at  $t$  and  $t + 1$

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \quad (9)$$

# Characterizing ADCE

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- From (2)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} &= \frac{R_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} + 1 - \delta \\ \Rightarrow \frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} &= \frac{R_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} + 1 - \delta \end{aligned}$$

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- From (6)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{R_t}{p_t} &= F_k(k_t, 1) = f'(k_t) \\ \Rightarrow \frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} &= f'(k_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$



# Characterizing ADCE

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- Recall

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = f'(k_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta \quad (10)$$

- (10) + TVC (4) + initial condition (5) + market clearing (8) = same set of equations as for SP problem
- Hence: ADCE allocation is the same for the SP problem

# Characterizing ADCE

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- Recall

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = f'(k_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta \quad (10)$$

- (10) + TVC (4) + initial condition (5) + market clearing (8) = same set of equations as for SP problem
- Hence: ADCE allocation is the same for the SP problem
- How get prices?
  - can always normalize one price to unity: wlog set  $p_0 = 1$
  - get  $R_0, w_0$  from (6) and (7) at  $t = 0$
  - get  $p_1$  from (9) given  $c_0, c_1, p_0$
  - get  $R_1, w_1$  from (6) and (7) at  $t = 1$  given  $p_1$
  - ...

## Aside: Walras' Law

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- Q: Why didn't we use budget constraint (3)?
- A: because it is implied by the other equations, in particular firm's problem + market clearing (8)  $\Rightarrow$  (3)
- Firm's problem and market clearing are

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (p_t F(k_t, h_t) - w_t h_t - R_t k_t) = 0 \quad (11)$$

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = F(k_t, h_t) \quad (12)$$

Substituting (12) into (11) gives (3):

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} [p_t (c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t) - w_t h_t - R_t k_t] = 0$$

- This is “Walras' Law” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walras'\\_law](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walras'_law)
  - very general: all budget constraints  $\Rightarrow$  resource constraint
  - useful check when writing models: if Walras' Law doesn't hold, you did something wrong (e.g. forgot term in mkt clearing)

## Steady State (SS) ADCE

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- **Definition:** A SS ADCE is a value of  $k^*$  and an ADCE for the economy with  $\bar{k}_0 = k^*$  s.t.  $k_t = k^*$  (and  $c_t = c^*$ ) for all  $t$ .
- Clearly from (10)

$$\frac{1}{\beta} = f'(k^*) + 1 - \delta$$

- $\Rightarrow k^*$  same as in SP problem
- Question: what do you think prices look like in a SS ADCE?
  - $p_t = \text{constant?}$
  - $R_t = \text{constant?}$
  - $w_t = \text{constant?}$

# Steady State ADCE

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- Let's work it out
- Have

$$\frac{u'(c^*)}{\beta u'(c^*)} = \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \Rightarrow \frac{p_{t+1}}{p_t} = \beta$$

- normalizing  $p_0 = 1$

$$p_t = \beta^t$$

- Also

$$\frac{R_t}{p_t} = F_k(k^*, 1), \quad \frac{w_t}{p_t} = F_h(k^*, 1)$$

- Summary:
  - $R_t/p_t, w_t/p_t$  constant
  - $R_t, w_t, p_t$  decreasing at rate  $\beta$
- So prices are not constant in SS ADCE
  - prices implicitly reflect discounting of future values
  - price of future output is lower
  - return to future work is lower

# Alternative Pricing Convention

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- Denote factor prices relative to output price in each period
- Write budget constraint as

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t(c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \textcolor{red}{p}_t(\tilde{R}_t k_t + \tilde{w}_t h_t)$$

- This formulation is useful for thinking about real rates of return and interest rates in ADCE
  - no explicit credit market in ADCE
  - but can infer implicit real interest rate on one-period ahead borrowing and lending

# Alternative Pricing Convention

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- Denote real interest rate by  $r_t$
- Definition:  $1 + r_{t+1}$  = amount of consumption you can get tomorrow by giving up one unit of consumption today
  - giving up one unit today saves  $p_t$
  - with this you buy  $p_t/p_{t+1}$  tomorrow

$$\Rightarrow 1 + r_{t+1} = \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}}$$

- In steady state,  $1 + r_t = 1/\beta$
- Real rate of return on capital: from HH max. w.r.t.  $k_{t+1}$

$$p_t = p_{t+1}\tilde{R}_{t+1} + p_{t+1}(1 - \delta)$$

- buy 1 unit of  $k$  today, get  $p_{t+1}\tilde{R}_{t+1} + p_{t+1}(1 - \delta)$  tomorrow
- must equal cost of doing so  $p_t$

$$1 + r_{t+1} = \tilde{R}_{t+1} + 1 - \delta \quad \Rightarrow \quad \tilde{R}_t = r_t + \delta$$

- Terminology: rental rate  $\tilde{R}_t$  = “user cost of capital”  $r_t + \delta$

# Sequence of Markets CE



# Sequence of Markets CE

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- Arrow-Debreu CE
  - period 0: markets for everything
- Sequence of Markets CE: particular markets at particular points in time

Period 0	Period 1	Period 2	...
market for period 0 capital,	...	...	...
period 0 labor,	...	...	...
period 0 output,	...	...	...
1 period ahead borrowing/lending	...	...	...

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  - period 0: markets for everything
- Sequence of Markets CE: particular markets at particular points in time

Period 0	Period 1	Period 2	...
market for period 0 capital,	...	...	...
period 0 labor,	...	...	...
period 0 output,	...	...	...
1 period ahead borrowing/lending	...	...	...

- Individ. formulates plan at  $t = 0$ , but executes it in real time
  - in contrast, in ADCE everything happens in period 0
- SOMCE features explicit borrowing & lending
  - riskless one-period bond that pays real interest rate  $r_t$

# Sequence of Market CE

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- **Definition:** A SOMCE = sequences  $\{c_t, h_t, k_t, a_t, w_t, R_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  s.t.

1. (HH max) Taking  $\{w_t, R_t, r_t\}$  as given,  $\{c_t, h_t, k_t, a_t\}$  solves

$$\max_{\{c_t, h_t, k_t, a_t\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t + a_{t+1} \leq R_t k_t + w_t h_t + (1 + r_t)a_t$$

$$c_t \geq 0, \quad 0 \leq h_t \leq 1, \quad k_{t+1} \geq 0, \quad k_0 = \bar{k}_0, \quad a_0 = 0$$

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left( \prod_{t=0}^T \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \right) a_{T+1} \geq 0 \quad (*)$$

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$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t, h_t, k_t, a_t\}} \quad & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.} \\ c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t + a_{t+1} & \leq R_t k_t + w_t h_t + (1 + r_t)a_t \\ c_t \geq 0, \quad 0 \leq h_t \leq 1, \quad k_{t+1} \geq 0, \quad k_0 = \bar{k}_0, \quad a_0 = 0 \\ \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left( \prod_{t=0}^T \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \right) a_{T+1} & \geq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (*)$$

2. (Firm max) Taking  $\{w_t, R_t, r_t\}$  as given,  $\{k_t, h_t\}$  solves

$$\max_{k_t, h_t} F(k_t, h_t) - w_t h_t - R_t k_t \quad k_t \geq 0, \quad h_t \geq 0 \quad \forall t.$$

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$$\max_{k_t, h_t} F(k_t, h_t) - w_t h_t - R_t k_t \quad k_t \geq 0, \quad h_t \geq 0 \quad \forall t.$$

3. (Market clearing) For each  $t$ :

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = F(k_t, h_t)$$

$$a_{t+1} = 0$$

(\*\*) <sup>21</sup>

# Comments

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- $a_t$  = HH bond holdings
  - $a_t > 0$ : HH saves,  $a_t < 0$ : HH borrows
  - period- $t$  price of bond that pays off at  $t + 1$ :  $q_t = 1/(1 + r_t)$
  - some people like to write

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t + q_t b_{t+1} \leq R_t k_t + w_t h_t + b_t$$

- this is equivalent with  $b_t = (1 + r_t)a_t$  and  $q_t = 1/(1 + r_t)$

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$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t + q_t b_{t+1} \leq R_t k_t + w_t h_t + b_t$$

- this is equivalent with  $b_t = (1 + r_t)a_t$  and  $q_t = 1/(1 + r_t)$
- Interpretation of bond market clearing condition (\*\*)
  - bonds are in **zero net supply**
  - more generally, in economy with individuals  $i = 1, \dots, N$

$$\sum_{i=1}^N a_{i,t+1} = 0$$

- for every dollar borrowed, someone else saves a dollar
- here only one type, so  $a_{t+1} = 0$ .
- Q: since  $a_t = 0$ , why not eliminate? A: need to know eq.  $r_t$  22

# Comments

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- Could have written firm's problem as

$$\max_{\{k_t, h_t\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{s=0}^t \frac{1}{1+r_s} \right) (F(k_t, h_t) - w_t h_t - R_t k_t) \quad k_t \geq 0, \quad h_t \geq 0$$

but this is a sequence of static problems so can split them up



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but this is a sequence of static problems so can split them up

- (\*) is a so-called “no-Ponzi condition”
  - with period budget constraints only, individuals could choose time paths with  $a_t \rightarrow -\infty$
  - no-Ponzi condition (\*) rules out such time paths:  $a_t$  cannot become too negative
  - implies that sequence of budget constraints can be written as present-value (or time-zero) budget constraint
  - return to this momentarily

## Sequence BC + no-Ponzi $\Rightarrow$ PVBC

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- **Result:** If  $\{c_t, i_t, h_t\}$  satisfy the sequence budget constraint

$$c_t + i_t + a_{t+1} = R_t k_t + w_t h_t + (1 + r_t) a_t$$

and if the no-Ponzi condition (\*) holds with equality, then  $\{c_t, i_t, h_t\}$  satisfy the present value budget constraint

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{s=0}^t \frac{1}{1 + r_s} \right) (c_t + i_t) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{s=0}^t \frac{1}{1 + r_s} \right) (R_t k_t + w_t h_t)$$

- **Proof:** next slide

# Proof

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- Write period  $t$  budget constraint as

$$\frac{1}{1+r_t} a_{t+1} = \frac{1}{1+r_t} (R_t k_t + w_t h_t - c_t - i_t) + a_t$$

# Proof

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$$\frac{1}{1+r_t} a_{t+1} = \frac{1}{1+r_t} (R_t k_t + w_t h_t - c_t - i_t) + a_t$$

- At  $t = 0, t = 1, \dots$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1+r_0} a_1 &= \frac{1}{1+r_0} (R_0 k_0 + w_0 h_0 - c_0 - i_0) + a_0 \\ \frac{1}{1+r_0} \frac{1}{1+r_1} a_2 &= \frac{1}{1+r_0} \frac{1}{1+r_1} (R_1 k_1 + w_1 h_1 - c_1 - i_1) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1+r_0} (R_0 k_0 + w_0 h_0 - c_0 - i_0) + a_0 \end{aligned}$$

# Proof

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- At  $t = 0, t = 1, \dots$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1+r_0} a_1 &= \frac{1}{1+r_0} (R_0 k_0 + w_0 h_0 - c_0 - i_0) + a_0 \\ \frac{1}{1+r_0} \frac{1}{1+r_1} a_2 &= \frac{1}{1+r_0} \frac{1}{1+r_1} (R_1 k_1 + w_1 h_1 - c_1 - i_1) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1+r_0} (R_0 k_0 + w_0 h_0 - c_0 - i_0) + a_0 \end{aligned}$$

- By induction/repeated substitution

$$\left( \prod_{t=0}^T \frac{1}{1+r_t} \right) a_{T+1} = \sum_{t=0}^T \left( \prod_{s=0}^t \frac{1}{1+r_s} \right) (R_t k_t + w_t h_t - i_t - c_t)$$

- Result follows from taking  $T \rightarrow \infty$  and imposing  $(*)$

# Why no-Ponzi Condition?

---

- Expression also provides some intuition for no-Ponzi condition

$$\left(\prod_{t=0}^T \frac{1}{1+r_t}\right) a_{T+1} = \sum_{t=0}^T \left(\prod_{s=0}^t \frac{1}{1+r_s}\right) (R_t k_t + w_t h_t - i_t - c_t)$$

- Suppose for the moment this were a finite horizon economy
  - would impose: die without debt, i.e.

$$a_{T+1} \geq 0$$

- in fact, HH's would always choose  $a_{T+1} = 0$

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- in fact, HH's would always choose  $a_{T+1} = 0$
- Right analogue for infinite horizon economy

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left( \prod_{t=0}^T \frac{1}{1+r_t} \right) a_{T+1} \geq 0$$

and HH's choose  $\{a_t\}$  so that this holds with equality

- no-Ponzi condition **not needed** for **physical capital** because natural constraint  $k_t \geq 0$ .

# Characterizing SOMCE

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- Necessary conditions for **consumer problem** ( $h_t = 1$  wlog)

$$c_t : \quad \beta^t u'(c_t) = \lambda_t = \text{multiplier on period } t \text{ b.c.} \quad (13)$$

$$k_{t+1} : \quad \lambda_t = \lambda_{t+1}(R_{t+1} + 1 - \delta) \quad (14)$$

$$a_{t+1} : \quad \lambda_t = \lambda_{t+1}(1 + r_{t+1}) \quad (15)$$

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t + a_{t+1} = R_t k_t + w_t h_t + (1 + r_t)a_t \quad (16)$$

$$\text{no-Ponzi: } \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left( \prod_{t=0}^T \frac{1}{1+r_t} \right) a_{T+1} \geq 0 \quad (17)$$

$$\text{TVC on } k : \quad \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \beta^T u'(c_T) k_{T+1} = 0 \quad (18)$$

$$\text{TVC on } a : \quad \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \beta^T u'(c_T) a_{T+1} = 0 \quad (19)$$

$$\text{initial :} \quad k_0 = \bar{k}_0, \quad a_0 = 0 \quad (20)$$



# Characterizing SOMCE

---

- Necessary conditions for [firm problem](#)

$$F_k(k_t, h_t) = R_t, \quad F_h(k_t, h_t) = w_t \quad (21)$$

# Characterizing SOMCE

---

- Necessary conditions for **firm problem**

$$F_k(k_t, h_t) = R_t, \quad F_h(k_t, h_t) = w_t \quad (21)$$

- **Market clearing**

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = F(k_t, h_t), \quad a_{t+1} = 0 \quad (22)$$

# Characterizing SOMCE

---

- (13), (15) and (17)

$$\beta^T u'(c_T) = \lambda_T = \prod_{t=0}^T \frac{1}{1+r_t}$$

$$\Rightarrow \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \beta^T u'(c_T) a_{T+1} \geq 0$$

- No-Ponzi condition looks very similar to TVC on  $\{a_t\}$
- But no-Ponzi and TVC are **different conditions**
- Kamihigashi (2008) “A no-Ponzi-game condition is a constraint that prevents overaccumulation of debt, while a typical transversality condition is an optimality condition that rules out overaccumulation of wealth. They place opposite restrictions, and should not be confused.”

# Characterizing SOMCE

---

- (14) and (15)

$$1 + r_{t+1} = R_{t+1} + 1 - \delta$$

i.e. rate of return on bonds = rate of return on capital

- arbitrage condition
- if this holds, HH is indifferent between  $a$  and  $k$

# Characterizing SOMCE

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- (14) and (15)

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i.e. rate of return on bonds = rate of return on capital

- arbitrage condition
  - if this holds, HH is indifferent between  $a$  and  $k$
- (13), (14) and (21)  $\Rightarrow$

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = f'(k_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta \quad (23)$$

- (23) + TVC (18) + initial condition (20) + market clearing (22)  
= same set of equations as for SP problem
- Hence: SOMCE allocation is same as social planner's allocation
  - this is actually somewhat surprising, see next slide

## Why is SOMCE allocation =SP's alloc.?

---

- Relative to ADCE, we closed down many markets
- Q: Why do we still get SP solution even though we closed down many markets?
- A: We only closed down markets that didn't matter
- In fact, ADCE and SOMCE are equivalent

# Equivalence of SOMCE and ADCE

---

- Recall HH's problem in ADCE (first part of lecture):

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t, h_t, k_t\}} \quad & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.} \\ & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (R_t k_t + w_t h_t) \end{aligned}$$

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- Have shown earlier: HH's problem in SOMCE is same with present-value budget constraint

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{s=0}^t \frac{1}{1 + r_s} \right) (c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{s=0}^t \frac{1}{1 + r_s} \right) (R_t k_t + w_t h_t)$$

- Clearly these are equivalent
  - ADCE is SOMCE with  $p_t = \prod_{s=0}^t \frac{1}{1 + r_s}$
  - SOMCE is ADCE with  $1 + r_{t+1} = p_t / p_{t+1}$
- Firm's problems are also equivalent.



## Why is SOMCE allocation = SP's alloc.?

---

- riskless one-period bond is surprisingly powerful
- one period ahead borrowing and lending  $\Rightarrow$  arbitrary period ahead borrowing and lending

# Why is SOMCE allocation = SP's alloc.?

---

- riskless one-period bond is surprisingly powerful
- one period ahead borrowing and lending  $\Rightarrow$  arbitrary period ahead borrowing and lending
- When is SOMCE allocation with one-period bonds  $\neq$  SP's allocation? That is, when do the welfare theorems fail?
  - risk (idiosyncratic or aggregate)
    - welfare theorems may hold if sufficiently rich insurance markets
  - “financial frictions.” Examples:
    - interest rate =  $r_t(a_t)$  with  $r'_t \neq 0$ .
    - in more general environments: borrowing constraint  $-a_t \leq 0$  or collateral constraints (need to back debt with collateral)

$$-a_{t+1} \leq \theta k_{t+1}$$

- ...

# Infinitely-Elastic Long-Run Capital Supply

# Infinitely-elastic steady state capital supply

---

- Recall condition for  $k^*$  (as usual  $\rho = 1/\beta - 1$ )

$$\frac{1}{\beta} = f'(k^*) + 1 - \delta \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad f'(k^*) = \rho + \delta$$

- Can think of this in terms of demand and supply of capital
- Will draw demand-supply diagram with  $k$  on x-axis and  $r$  on y-axis

# Infinitely-elastic steady state capital supply

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$$\frac{1}{\beta} = f'(k^*) + 1 - \delta \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad f'(k^*) = \rho + \delta$$

- Can think of this in terms of demand and supply of capital
- Will draw demand-supply diagram with  $k$  on x-axis and  $r$  on y-axis
- Demand: from firm's problem, capital demand  $k^d(R)$  satisfies

$$f'(k) = R$$

This is a nice, well-behaved downward-sloping demand curve

- Supply: capital supply  $k^s(R)$  satisfies


$$R = \rho + \delta$$

This is an **infinitely-elastic** supply curve! Intuition in 3 slides.

- This infinite elasticity = important property of growth model

# Infinitely-elastic steady state capital supply

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# Capital Demand: Derivation

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- Recall representative firm's optimality condition

$$F_k(k_t, h_t) = R_t$$

- Defining  $f(k) := F(k, 1)$  and using  $h_t = 1$

$$f'(k_t) = R_t$$

- And in particular in steady state:

$$f'(k^*) = R$$

- This defines a downward-sloping capital demand curve  $k^d(R)$

# Capital Supply: Derivation

---

- Euler equation for capital

$$u'(c_t) = \beta(R_{t+1} + 1 - \delta)u'(c_{t+1})$$

- In steady state

$$1 = \beta(R + 1 - \delta)$$

- Therefore the steady state rental rate must equal

$$R = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta = \rho + \delta \quad (*)$$

- This is an **infinitely-elastic** supply curve! Intuition:
  - if  $\beta(R + 1 - \delta) > 1$ , households would accumulate  $k = \infty$

$$\beta(R_{t+1} + 1 - \delta) > 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad c_{t+1} > c_t$$

- if  $\beta(R + 1 - \delta) < 1$ , households would accumulate 0

$$\beta(R_{t+1} + 1 - \delta) < 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad c_{t+1} < c_t$$

- any equilibrium with  $0 < k^* < \infty$  has to feature  $(*)$



# Supply and demand in terms of interest rate $r$

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- Sometimes people also write this in terms of the steady-state interest rate  $r$  rather than rental rate  $R$ 
  - recall that alternative “decentralization” = firms own and accumulate capital (and firms in turn owned by households)
- Demand: capital demand  $k^d(r)$  satisfies

$$f'(k) = r + \delta$$

This is a nice, well-behaved downward-sloping demand curve

- Supply: capital supply  $k^s(r)$  satisfies

$$r = \rho$$

This is an **infinitely-elastic** supply curve! Intuition:

- if  $r > \rho$ , households would accumulate  $k = \infty$
- if  $r < \rho$ , households would accumulate 0
- any equilibrium with  $0 < k^* < \infty$  has to feature  $r = \rho$

# Supply and demand in terms of interest rate $r$

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