Adversarial examples

Overview

- What are adversarial examples?
- Why do they happen?
- How can they be used to compromise machine learning systems?
- What are the defenses?
- How to use adversarial examples to improve machine learning, even when there is no adversary

Since 2013, deep neural networks have matched human performance at...



(Szegedy et al, 2014)

...recognizing objects and faces….

(Taigmen et al, 2013)

(Goodfellow et al, 2013)

...solving CAPTCHAS and reading addresses...

(Goodfellow et al, 2013)

and other tasks...

Adversarial Examples



Timeline:

“Adversarial Classification” Dalvi et al 2004: fool spam filter

“Evasion Attacks Against Machine Learning at Test Time”

Biggio 2013: fool neural nets

Szegedy et al 2013: fool ImageNet classifiers imperceptibly

Goodfellow et al 2014: cheap, closed form attack

(Goodfellow 2016)

Turning Objects into “Airplanes”

(Goodfellow 2016)

Attacking a Linear Model



(Goodfellow 2016)

Not just for neural nets

- Linear models
  - Logistic regression
  - Softmax regression
  - SVMs
- Decision trees
- Nearest neighbors

Adversarial Examples from Overfitting



(Goodfellow 2016)

Adversarial Examples from Excessive Linearity



(Goodfellow 2016)

Modern deep nets are very piecewise linear

Rectified linear unit



Maxout



Carefully tuned sigmoid



LSTM



(Goodfellow 2016)

Nearly Linear Responses in Practice





(Goodfellow 2016)

Small inter-class distances

Clean example

Perturbation

Corrupted example



Perturbation changes the true class

Random perturbation does not change the class

Perturbation changes the input to “rubbish class”

All three perturbations have L2 norm 3.96

This is actually small. We typically use 7!

(Goodfellow 2016)

The Fast Gradient Sign Method

$$J(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) \approx J(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) + (\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}} - \boldsymbol{x})^\top \nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{x}).$$

Maximize

$$J(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) + (\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}} - \boldsymbol{x})^\top \nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{x})$$

subject to

$$||\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}} - \boldsymbol{x}||_\infty \leq \epsilon$$ (maxnorm)

$$\Rightarrow \tilde{\boldsymbol{x}} = \boldsymbol{x} + \epsilon \mathrm{sign}\left(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{x})\right).$$

(Goodfellow 2016)

Maps of Adversarial and Random Cross-Sections





(collaboration with David Warde-Farley and Nicolas Papernot)

Maps of Adversarial Cross-Sections



(Goodfellow 2016)

Maps of Random Cross-Sections

Adversarial examples
are not noise





(collaboration with David Warde-Farley and Nicolas Papernot)

Estimating the Subspace Dimensionality



MNIST

(Tramèr et al, 2017)

(Goodfellow 2016)

Wrong almost everywhere



(Goodfellow 2016)

High-Dimensional Linear Models

Weights

Signs of weights

Clean examples



Adversarial



(Goodfellow 2016)

Linear Models of ImageNet



(Andrej Karpathy, “Breaking Linear Classifiers on ImageNet”)

RBFs behave more intuitively



(Goodfellow 2016)

Cross-model, cross-dataset generalization



(Goodfellow 2016)

Cross-technique transferability



(Papernot 2016)

Transferability Attack

Target model with unknown weights, machine learning algorithm, training set; maybe non-differentiable

Train your own model

Substitute model mimicking target model with known, differentiable function

Adversarial crafting against substitute

Adversarial examples

Deploy adversarial examples against the target; transferability property results in them succeeding

(Goodfellow 2016)

Cross-Training Data Transferability



Strong



Weak



Intermediate

(Papernot 2016)

Enhancing Transfer With Ensembles

	RMSD	ResNet-152	ResNet-101	ResNet-50	VGG-16	GoogLeNet
-ResNet-152	17.17	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
-ResNet-101	17.25	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
-ResNet-50	17.25	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%
-VGG-16	17.80	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%
-GoogLeNet	17.41	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%

Table 4: Accuracy of non-targeted adversarial images generated using the optimization-based approach. The first column indicates the average RMSD of the generated adversarial images. Cell (i, j) corresponds to the accuracy of the attack generated using four models except model i (row) when evaluated over model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Results of top-5 accuracy can be found in the appendix (Table 14).

(Liu et al, 2016)

Adversarial Examples in the Human Brain



These are concentric circles, not intertwined spirals.

(Pinna and Gregory, 2002)

(Goodfellow 2016)

Practical Attacks

- Fool real classifiers trained by remotely hosted API (MetaMind, Amazon, Google)
- Fool malware detector networks
- Display adversarial examples in the physical world and fool machine learning systems that perceive them through a camera

(Goodfellow 2016)

Adversarial Examples in the Physical World



(a) Image from dataset (b) Clean image (c) Adv. image, $\epsilon = 4$ (d) Adv. image, $\epsilon = 8$

(Kurakin et al, 2016)

Failed defenses

Generative pretraining

Removing perturbation with an autoencoder

Adding noise at test time

Ensembles

Confidence-reducing perturbation at test time

Error correcting codes

Multiple glimpses

Weight decay

Double backprop

Adding noise at train time

Various non-linear units

Dropout

(Goodfellow 2016)

Training on Adversarial Examples



(Goodfellow 2016)

Adversarial Training

Labeled as bird

Decrease probability of bird class

Still has same label (bird)

(Goodfellow 2016)

Virtual Adversarial Training

Unlabeled; model guesses it's probably a bird, maybe a plane

New guess should match old guess (probably bird, maybe plane)

Adversarial perturbation intended to change the guess

(Goodfellow 2016)

Text Classification with VAT



Zoomed in for legibility

(Goodfellow 2016)

Universal engineering machine (model-based optimization)

Make new inventions by finding input that maximizes model's predicted performance

Training data | Extrapolation

(Goodfellow 2016)

Conclusion

- Attacking is easy
- Defending is difficult
- Adversarial training provides regularization and semi-supervised learning
- The out-of-domain input problem is a bottleneck for model-based optimization generally