



# Hacking The Hallways: Physical and Logical Security Convergence



**Colby DeRodeff**  
**Enterprise Strategist**

# Agenda

- Background: Convergence
- Ripped from the news
- Case Studies - Powered by Security Information Management

“A worldwide survey of IT and security executives reports 53% of organizations have some level of integration between their physical and IT security divisions. That’s up from just 29% in 2003.”

***—PricewaterhouseCoopers and CIO magazine, April 2005***

# Background

- Security is Security
  - Environmental Threats
  - Physical Threats
  - Critical Infrastructure
  - Holistic view of the organization's security posture
- Monitor for blended threats (physical & logical)
  - Sophisticated Social Engineers
- ROI on physical security solutions
  - Video Analytics
- Correlate and investigate across systems

**“If physical access to a computer is achieved, gaining logical access to the information on that computer is guaranteed. The two disciplines must work together to help organizations manage risk”**  
—Eric Maiwald of the Burton Group

# Background

- Organizational Challenges
  - Historically disparate
  - Requires executive sponsorship
  - Poor communication between physical and logical security teams
- Different responsibilities
- Legacy Protocols
- Legacy technologies - What is an event log?
  - real-time - good luck!

“Physical security” today often means “plant or facilities” security using the same methods that were used 50 years ago –i.e. guards and analog cameras.”

—Regis McKenna

## Evolution: The PSIM

- Focused on visibility into all of the physical security devices
  - Heating, AC, Fire Alarms, Building Alarms, Video Analytics
- Great aggregation point for integration into ArcSight
  - Don't need to build as many flex connectors
  - Observe alarm locations and alerts on a geospatial map
  - Snap video images and export video
  - Control cameras and door access
- Examples
  - Lenel, Proximex, Vidsys, Cisco, others



## Ripped from the News

# Ripped From The News

## BlackBerry-based SCADA

### *InfoSec News*

A German software developer and systems integrator has developed a mobile SCADA system based on BlackBerry smartphones. Hamburg-based Schad says that its Extend 7000 system, which relies on Java applications running on the BlackBerries, can control and monitor industrial processes controlled by Siemens S7 PLCs.

## Hacking Truckers

### *Forbes*

sniffing the truck's payload could also provide criminals with intelligence they wouldn't otherwise be able to get very easily, thus helping them target their holdups or other heists, he says. "Unless they had a lot of inside information, they don't have enough information to rob that truck. Now they can scan it if it's not secure -- they don't want to rob that toilet paper truck, but if it's got plasma TVs with surround sound, [that's their] target."

## Hackers Clone E-Passports

### *Wired*

Radio tags used in everything from building access cards to highway toll cards to passports are surprisingly easy to copy and pose a grave security risk, researchers said this week.



# Ripped From The News

## UK smoking ban opens doors for hackers

*vmunet.com*

**"It used to be that companies 'left the back door open' in terms of internet security. Now they are literally leaving their buildings open to accommodate smokers.**

## Smart Chip Credit Cards

*News.com*

As part of his presentation Wednesday, Laurie asked for someone from the audience to volunteer a smart card. Without taking the card out of the volunteer's wallet, Laurie both read and displayed its contents on the presentation screen--the person's name, account number, and expiration clearly visible.

## MIT Students Hack The Boston Subway

*ISN Security News*

**Defcon two years ago several MIT students presentation was forcefully removed from the lineup at defcon due to the detailed explanation of hacking the Boston Subway system**



# *Video Analytics*

# Logical and Video Surveillance

- Critical server resides in operations center
- There appears to be a brute force login attempt
- Actions triggers a physical and logical response



“Addressing information assets and physical assets in tandem through a centralized solution is practical and will eventually become the norm.”

**—William P. Crowell, Former NSA Deputy Director**

# Logical and Video Surveillance

Triggers the CCTV  
to take a Live Photo

Brute Force Logins

ArcSight コンソール 35141660 [arcsightadmin@ast] トライアル版ライセンス ライセンス発行先: Nimsa Research Institute 有効期限: 2/20/2016

ファイル 編集 表示 ツール ウィンドウ ヘルプ

ナビゲーター ツールバー

表示チャンネル: MyLive

開始時刻: 26/1/2006 13:42:00 JST  
終了時刻: 26/1/2006 14:42:59 JST  
フィルタ: MatchesFilter(1)3ip50g-sAAB0APjopCdL0w==/All Filters/System Filters/ArcSight System Event Filters/Non-ArcSight Internal Events(1)

合計イベント数: 20

重要度 Very High(最高): 2  
重要度 High(高): 1  
重要度 Medium(中): 0  
重要度 Low(低): 18  
重要度 Very Low(最低): 12

Time	Device	Name	Target	Device Custom	Attacker	Target	Device	Priority
26/1/2006 14:42:00 JST	Webvisor	Manual Trigger		2000012614410283			Hilashi	2
26/1/2006 14:41:49 JST	Webvisor	Manual Trigger		2000012614410283			Hilashi	2
26/1/2006 14:40:29 JST	Webvisor	Manual Trigger		2000012614410283			Hilashi	2
26/1/2006 14:38:23 JST	Unix	Login failure	root	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:37:15 JST	Unix	login	arcsight	pts/5		172.16.1.102	Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:37:02 JST	Unix	Login failure	root	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:36:44 JST	Unix	logout	arcsight	Hp7460		172.16.1.102	Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:36:14 JST	Unix	login	arcsight	Hp7460		172.16.1.102	Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:28:11 JST	Unix	REPEATED LOGIN FAILURES		login		172.16.1.101	Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:28:10 JST	ArcSight	Application: Brute Force Logins				172.16.1.101	ArcSight	3
26/1/2006 14:28:06 JST	Unix	Login failure		login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:28:01 JST	Unix	Login failure		login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:27:56 JST	Unix	Login failure		login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:27:48 JST	Unix	Login failure	root	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:27:38 JST	Unix	Login failure	root	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:26:53 JST	Unix	logout	arcsight	pts/5		172.16.1.102	Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:23:48 JST	Unix	login	arcsight	pts/5		172.16.1.102	Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:22:51 JST	Unix	REPEATED LOGIN FAILURES	horiuchi	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:22:46 JST	Unix	Login failure	horiuchi	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:22:41 JST	Unix	Login failure	horiuchi	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:22:31 JST	Unix	Login failure	arcsight	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:19:58 JST	Unix	Login failure	horiuchi	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:19:46 JST	Unix	Login failure	horiuchi	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4
26/1/2006 14:08:12 JST	Unix	login	root	dtrmote			Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:08:11 JST	Unix	logout	arcsight	pts/2		172.16.1.102	Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:08:11 JST	Unix	login	LOGON	dtrmote			Unix	3
26/1/2006 14:08:11 JST	Unix	Login failure	arcsight	login		172.16.1.101	Unix	4

10/1/2001/4 ユーザーへのログインが拒否されました: webvisor

# Logical and Video Surveillance

ArcSight コンソール 3.5.14156.0 [arcmanager.admin.jst] トライアル版ライセンス、ライセンス発行先: Nomura Research Institute, 有効期限: 2/20/2006

ファイル 編集 表示 ツール ウィンドウ ヘルプ

ナビゲータパネル ビューパネル

Ctrl+Alt+E リアルタイム MyLive ワーム感染

表示チャンネル: MyLive

開始時刻: 26 1 2006 13:43:00 JST  
終了時刻: 26 1 2006 14:43:59 JST  
フィルタ: MatchesFilter( "2j650e=AABCAFyopOdLChw==/All Filters/System Filters/ArcSight System Event Filters/Non-ArcSight Internal Events:" )

合計イベント数: 28

重要度 Very High(最高): 2  
重要度 High(高): 1  
重要度 Medium(中): 0  
重要度 Low(低): 13  
重要度 Very Low(最低): 12

レーダー


Manager	Device	Name	Target	Priority
26 1 2006 14:42:09 JST	Webvisor	Door Opened	1	2
26 1 2006 14:41:49 JST	Webvisor	Manual Trigger	2006012614410283	2
26 1 2006 14:40:29 JST	Webvisor	Manual Trigger	2006012614394483	2
26 1 2006 14:38:23 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:37:15 JST	Unix	login		
26 1 2006 14:37:02 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:30:44 JST	Unix	logout		
26 1 2006 14:30:14 JST	Unix	login		
26 1 2006 14:28:11 JST	Unix	REPEATED L		
26 1 2006 14:28:10 JST	ArcSight	Application B		
26 1 2006 14:28:06 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:28:01 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:27:56 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:27:46 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:27:36 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:26:53 JST	Unix	logout		
26 1 2006 14:23:48 JST	Unix	login		
26 1 2006 14:22:51 JST	Unix	REPEATED L		
26 1 2006 14:22:46 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:22:41 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:22:31 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:19:56 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:19:46 JST	Unix	Login failure		
26 1 2006 14:08:12 JST	Unix	login		
26 1 2006 14:08:11 JST	Unix	logout		
26 1 2006 14:08:11 JST	Unix	login		

A right mouse click displays the insider's photo

http://172.16.1.207/scene/image/2006012614410283.jpg - Microsoft Internet Explorer



アドレス http://172.16.1.207/scene/image/2006012614410283.jpg

# Mapping IP Cameras to Assets / Zones



# Video Analytics

- Video analytics
  - Emerging technology
  - Behavior recognition
  - Active monitoring





# Not Such an Exact Science

Alert Monitor Console: Con

User Camera Groups Console Settings Events Log Options Help

Video 1

Executive Airport

1:11:18 PM

06, 11:11:16 PM

- Airport/ Single Person
- re/ Single Car
- Airport/ Fast Person
- Airport/ Erratic Person
- Airport/ Single Person
- re/ Single Car
- Airport/ Erratic Person
- re/ Single Car
- Airport/ Single Person

Cernium Technician  
www.arcsight.com

© 2009 ArcSight Confidential

15

# Sample Events

<...snip...>

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE alert SYSTEM "file:/C:/Temp/example-alert.dtd">
<alert id="1">
  <timestamp>1115403748202</timestamp>
  <priority level="1">High</priority>
  <facility id="1">VIDIENT</facility>
  <location id="1">LOCATION</location>
  <type>Tailgate</type>
  <description>Access Door Tailgate Violation
  Detected</description>
  <vpk>2</vpk>
  <vpu>vpu-JC00K-PC</vpu>
  <sequence>0</sequence>
  <store>c:\SmartCatch\vpv\archive\2005-05-06</store>
  <uri available="0">/media?vpu=vpu-JC00KPC&
  amp;vpk=2&amp;st=1115403697000&amp;seq=0</uri>
  <attributes>
    <.snip...>
    <attribute>
      <name>vpk.starttime</name>
      <value>1115403697000</value>
    </attribute>
    <.snip...>
    <attribute>
      <name>walk out</name>
      <value>0</value>
    </attribute>
    <attribute>
      <name>walk in</name>
      <value>2</value>
    </attribute>
  </attributes>
</alert>
```

Camera Name

Lobby-1

ParkingLot-1

Section3-2

ent ID

1654

1655

1656




# RFID



# RFID - Cloned Badges

- ▶ Most Physical Access Systems Use an RF reader and fob
- ▶ Fob contains an identifier
- ▶ Identifier is transmitted when placed near the reader
- ▶ Identifier can be read using an electromagnetic field



Source: T

2/2 1:14:30


Data last refreshed: 2/2 1:26:08

t: Name, Ev

## Physical and Logical Access



# Converged Threat—Access Control




1 + 1 = ? ?

1. Sam's credentials are logged when accessing network resources within a secure facility in Washington DC
2. A few hours later, Sam uses his badge to enter a facility in London
3. Events are correlated; something doesn't add up; an alert is triggered
4. Both physical and logical access is temporarily disabled until the "real SAM" can be identified



# Preventative Threat Management



## Physical + VPN Access: Identity Correlation

### Key reasons to map between physical and logical security devices

- User remains active after leaving the building
- Account sharing
- Logged in remotely and physically
- After hours building access
- Contractor access, former employee
- Audit trails for sensitive areas
- Multiple, concurrent physical logins



# Physical + VPN Access: Identity Correlation

- Badge ID to VPN ID

Identifiers

Identity

rjackson

348924323

jackson@arc.com

Ronaldj

rjackson\_dba

510-555-1212

Badge Reader  
Auth Event

Ronald  
Jackson

SSH Auth. Event

Event	
Name	jackson@arc.com
Type	Bad
End Time	15 Mar 2006 18:18:56 PDT
Customer Resource	510-555-1212
Aggregated Event Count	1
Correlated Event Count	0

Radar

End Time	Device Product	Name	Target User Name	getIdentityFullName.AttributeValue	Role.UserRole
9/10 9:44:34	ArcSight	Add Identity to Suspicious List	RJACKSON_DBA	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:32	Microsoft Windows	Successful Logon	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:32	Microsoft Windows	User Logged In - Added to Active Accounts List	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:32	ArcSight	Role Violation	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:32	ArcSight	Add Identity to Suspicious List	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:17	Cisco VPN	Authentication successful	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:17	Cisco VPN	User Logged In - Added to Active Accounts List	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:17	ArcSight	Physical Plus VPN Access	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:17	ArcSight	Organizational Data Information Leak	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:17	ArcSight	Add Identity to Malicious List	rjackson	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:44:17	ArcSight	Organizational Data Information Leak			
9/10 9:43:59	Doors	Physical Access Granted	46526374635	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:43:59	Doors	User Logged In - Added to Active Accounts List	46526374635	Robert Jackson	Facilities
9/10 9:43:59	ArcSight	Add to Badged In List - Robert Jackson	46526374635	Robert Jackson	Facilities



# SCADA


**No wires. No limits.**  
 The future of wireless is here today.

**The Smart Wireless Advantage**

			
Security	Ease of use	Reliability	Standards

[Why Wireless?](#)
[Economics](#)
[SmartPack™ Starter Kit](#)
[Contest](#)
[Self Organizing](#)
[Products](#)
[Applications](#)



# SCADA: Protecting Critical Infrastructure


- SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
  - Distributed measurement and control system
  - Used to Collect Data from RTU (Remote Terminal Unit)
- Remote temperature monitoring
- Flow pressure
- Open and close switches



**Flow  
Measurement**



**RTU  
Controllers**



**SCADA  
Console**

# Cyber Security Issues

- Disappearing air gaps
  - Past security based solely on physical
- Common practice for systems
  - Un-patched
  - No Host-based IPS
  - No Host-based Firewall
  - No Anti-Malware
  - Shared or embedded passwords
- Poor log management and analysis or...
  - even worse - no logs
- Hardened case available
- Built in Ethernet and FTP server
- Running Linux - patch level????
- Wireless




“ Security has become an increasingly critical factor ... Wonderware offers robust data-level security, in addition to the standard security features provided by the **Microsoft Windows operating system**, to protect your control system from cyber or physical risks.

—*Wonderware product advertisement*



”

# SCADA: Protecting Critical Infrastructure





# SCADA: Protecting Critical Infrastructure




# Root Cause
























**Viewer** □ ? ✕

▶ Live


∞ Active Channel: Live Total Events: 85 ▢

**Radar** —



	 Manag ↓ 1	 Name	 Priority	 Device Vendor	 Device Product
					
	2/19 22:09:50	Failed Communication to Flow Computer	 7	ArcSight	ArcSight
	2/19 22:09:50	PCN - Rogue System Detected	 8	ArcSight	ArcSight
	2/19 22:09:50	Failed Communication to Flow Computer	 7	ArcSight	ArcSight
	2/19 22:09:50	Failed Communication to Flow Computer	 7	ArcSight	ArcSight
	2/19 22:09:50	Failed Communication to Flow Computer	 7	ArcSight	ArcSight
	2/19 22:09:50	Failed Communication to Flow Computer	 10	ArcSight	ArcSight
	2/19 22:09:48	Modbus timeout	 2	OMNI	OmniSE
	2/19 22:09:48	Modbus timeout	 2	OMNI	OmniSE

# Environmental Controls



# Environmental Controls

- Early warning
- Reduce response to resolution times
- Minimize financial impact
- Controls
  - Water
  - Temperature
  - Humidity
  - Dew point
  - Air flow

# Heads Up

Viewer

Environmental Controls Environmental Controls

ArcNet - West Campus

Boston/ArcNet-East: Sales Office Los Angeles/ArcNet-West: Sales Office New York/ArcNet-East: NYC-MAIN New York/ArcNet-East: NYDC1

San Francisco/ArcNet-West: SFDC1

San Francisco/ArcNet-West: SF-HQ

Status: Normal

Status: Temp Critical

Status: Normal

Select

Select an override status:

- Status: Temp Critical
- Status: Audible Alarm
- Status: Line Voltage Spike
- Status: Fluid Detected
- Status: Normal
- Status: Alarm Glass Break
- Status: Temp Warn

OK Cancel Help

1/16 15:53:46 - 1/16 18:26:27

Data last refreshed: 1/16 18:26:37

© 2009 ArcSight Confidential

32



## Environmental Controls

- ▶ Audio – audible alarms
  - Integration with video surveillance
  - Snapshot when alarm sounds
  - Append photo to trouble ticket in ESM
- ▶ Integration: remote management software (IPMI)
  - ▶ Intelligent Platform Management Interface
    - Reboot
    - Shutdown
- ▶ Integration: physical access
  - Who accessed area
- ▶ ESM flexibility



# Shameless Plug (Trying to Get Famous!!!)

“The convergence of physical and information security is a vital development in the corporate world and a critical success factor for all organizations. This book will be an invaluable guide to anyone involved in guiding security convergence or simply wanting to understand the power and benefits of convergence.”—**John Gallant, Editorial Director, Network World**

“Filled with historical anecdotes and interesting facts, “Physical & Logical Convergence” is a comprehensive definition of converged security threats and considerations.  
components.” —**Mark Fernandes, Senior Manager, Deloitte**

