

Assignment 3 – Network Security

CSCI 6706 Network Design

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ABSTRACT

The report is to utilize several tools and technologies to detect the issues efficiently and effectively we want. I broke down the improvement process into three stages: **original snort configuration, several snort rules customization such as ICMP and DOS detection and ACL deployment**. During each stage, I came up with snort statistics report. At the end, I accumulate those reports on these three stages and visualized the comparison among those.

This report conducted many experimental exercises via penetration tests and provided lots of evidence to prove the improvements finally can make Snort work just what we want.

KEYWORDS


Snort, TCPReplay, TCPRewrite, Wireshark, Argus, Penetration, Iptables

1 Introduction

Network vulnerability detection is the main topic of this report. In this report, I will utilize several very popular network security tools, such as Snort, TCPRewrite, TCPReplay etc., to detect network issues during the network traffic sniffing. The Wireshark can also help us with monitoring and preprocess the datasets captured from traffic. Moreover, I conducted many penetration tests against targeted victim machine installed on my GNS3 topology internal network (The internet connection was cut off during testing to prevent any packages leaking). As the result, I was able to accumulate and analyze the results from testing. At the end, I gave the conclusions based on my discovery and research. I also provision the further work based on this report.

2 Environment Configuration

The development work environment needs a little configuration, it is worth to mention in this document:



We are reusing the topology of lab 6 and 7 to complete this assignment. It needs a little more configuration on my local because I am using GNS 3 VM as the host machine. (GNS3 on Kali VM overloads my laptop, due to my limited resources on my laptop). Important, I imported “leemcjr-metasplorable” docker image as a vulnerable target in this assignment.

I needed to manually install following tools for this assignment:

Net tools

Argus-client

Besides, I need to configure a “virtual network interface” on my VM to connect with my topology.

TUN/TAP interfaces are virtual interfaces that are spawned from the base device /dev/net/tun and they pick up its system permissions so change the owning group to netdev instead of root[4].

```
sudo tunctl -u gns3 -g gns3 -t vip2
```

```
sudo ifconfig vip2 192.168.111.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 up  
sudo ip route add 172.16.0.0/22 via 192.168.111.2 dev vip2  
sudo ip route add 172.16.1.0/24 via 192.168.111.2 dev vip2  
sudo ip route add 172.16.2.0/24 via 192.168.111.2 dev vip2
```

```
sudo chown gns3:gns3 /dev/net/tun
sudo ip link delete vip2
sudo tunctl -u gns3 -g gns3 -t vip2
sudo ifconfig vip2 192.168.111.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 up
sudo ip route add 172.16.0.0/22 via 192.168.111.2 dev vip2
sudo ip route add 172.16.1.0/24 via 192.168.111.2 dev vip2
sudo ip route add 172.16.2.0/24 via 192.168.111.2 dev vip2
sudo iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -j MASQUERADE
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -i vip2 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -i vip2 -j ACCEPT
gns3@gns3vm:~$
```

Then I need to add IP route configure in GNS3 VM via IpTables , in order to share connection with connected topology:

```
sudo iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -j MASQUERADE  
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -i vip2 -j ACCEPT  
sudo iptables -A INPUT -i vip2 -j ACCEPT
```

After configuration above, `vip2` virtual network interface should now be available from GNS3 when run under your normal user account.

Then I tested on topology to make sure they can communicate with each other:


On sftp-filters:

On GNS3 VM:

```
gns3@gns3vm1:~/assign3$ ping 192.168.111.2
PING 192.168.111.2 (192.168.111.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 192.168.111.2: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.254 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.111.2: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.277 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.111.2: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.275 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.111.2: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=0.273 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.111.2: icmp_seq=5 ttl=64 time=0.229 ms
^C
--- 192.168.111.2 ping statistics ---
5 packets transmitted, 5 received, 0% packet loss, time 4065ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.229/0.261/0.277/0.025 ms
gns3@gns3vm1:~/assign3$ ping 172.16.1.11
PING 172.16.1.11 (172.16.1.11) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 172.16.1.11: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=1.64 ms
64 bytes from 172.16.1.11: icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=1.91 ms
64 bytes from 172.16.1.11: icmp_seq=3 ttl=63 time=1.84 ms
64 bytes from 172.16.1.11: icmp_seq=4 ttl=63 time=1.88 ms
^C
--- 172.16.1.11 ping statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3006ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 1.642/1.822/1.913/0.106 ms
gns3@gns3vm1:~/assign3$ ping 172.16.2.11
PING 172.16.2.11 (172.16.2.11) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 172.16.2.11: icmp_seq=1 ttl=62 time=75.4 ms
64 bytes from 172.16.2.11: icmp_seq=2 ttl=62 time=18.1 ms
64 bytes from 172.16.2.11: icmp_seq=3 ttl=62 time=13.3 ms
^C
--- 172.16.2.11 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2003ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 13.332/35.670/75.496/28.231 ms
gns3@gns3vm1:~/assign3$
```

2.1 Wireshark UI / Columns customization

Same as assignment 2, we want to customize the Wireshark UI a little for our assignment 3.



Flags: 0x010 (ACK)


- 000. = Reserved: Not set
- ...0 = Nonce: Not set
- 0.... . . . = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set
-0. = ECN-Echo: Not set
-0. = Urgent: Not set
-1 = Acknowledgment: Set
-0.... 0... = Push: Not set
-0.... .0... = Reset: Not set
-0.... .0. = Syn: Not set
-0.... .0. = Fin: Not set

[TCP Flags:A.....]


To be better to analyze the data, we might need extra columns for our convenient. Such as:

1. Source port
2. Desintation port
3. Timestamp
4. HTTP / HTTPS host
5. SNMP OID and Values


Remove unnecessary columns:




Adding wanted columns:



Adding custom columns (Src port, Dest port, TCP labels) as we need:




Customization result:



The screenshot above shows I successfully removed unnecessary columns, add my needed customized column Src port, Dest port and TCP labels. They can be prepared for data analytics in the later section.

2.2 Wireshark Monitoring

Assignment 3 - Network Topology Inspired by Lab 6 and 7



WireShark is our first step to sniff and monitor the packets during our detection period. It can help us with traffic identification and assurance. The screenshot above demonstrates the topology I will use for this investigation. It might be changed a little for complying with ACL testing in a later section.

2.3 Snort sniffing setup

On R1-FRR host, in order to transfer the traffic from GNS-VM to snort-IDS sever, we need to run the command on R1-FRR:

```
daemonlogger -i eth0 -o eth2
```

Because eth0 is the network interface to receive the traffic from GNS-VM and eth2 is the interface to talk with snort-IDS server.

Then on snort-IDS server side, we run the command:

```
snort -i eth0 -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -l /var/log/snort -A full
```

This command will sniff the packets on eth0, which is the interface connection with R1-FRR. Then it parses the configuration of snort to save the results in /var/log/snort folder.

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# show ip
alert
snort.log.1592870528
```

It will generate the “alert” file, which contains alert information triggered by snort configuration. Rest are the general log files for sniffed packages information.

At this point, it is worth to take a look at the content of snort configuration, and explain a little:

2.3.1 Snore configuration usages

Snort is immensely powerful and popular network security monitoring and reporting tool. We can maximize the network vulnerabilities detection via Snort configuration. Snort configuration can do following things. Please note this section we are talk about original Snore configuration; I might have to adjust configuration to the attack. It also answers part of question 1 and 2.

Before our actual refinement of Snort configuration in the later section, it is worth to warm up with the original Snort configuration [6].

- # This file contains a sample snort configuration.
- # You should take the following steps to create your own custom configuration:
 - # 1) Set the network variables.
 - # 2) Configure the decoder
 - # 3) Configure the base detection engine
 - # 4) Configure dynamic loaded libraries
 - # 5) Configure preprocessors
 - # 6) Configure output plugins
 - # 7) Customize your rule set
 - # 8) Customize preprocessor and decoder rule set
 - # 9) Customize shared object rule set

Specifically, we can follow the general steps introduced by Lab 6 and 7 [6], like :

Step 1: Set the network variables.

In our case, it is 172.16.0.0/16
ipvar HOME_NET 172.16.0.0/16

Also, we indicate to receive all the traffic from everywhere:
ipvar EXTERNAL_NET any

We have a SSH server on our network:
ipvar SSH_SERVERS 172.16.1.2/32

Step 2: configure the decoder.

We do not have to check TCP general alerts, so we disable them:
Stop generic decode events:
config disable_decode_alerts

```
# Stop Alerts on experimental TCP options
config disable_tcpopt_experimental_alerts
```

```
# Stop Alerts on obsolete TCP options
config disable_tcpopt_obsolete_alerts
```

```
# Stop Alerts on T/TCP alerts
config disable_tcpopt_ttcp_alerts
```

```
# Stop Alerts on all other TCPOption type events:
config disable_tcpopt_alerts
```

```
# Stop Alerts on invalid ip options
config disable_ipopt_alerts
```

However, we care about IP /TCP checksum:
 config checksum_mode: all

Step 3: Configure the base detection engine.

Firstly, we need to configure PCRE match limitations:

```
config pcre_match_limit: 3500
config pcre_match_limit_recursion: 1500
```

Secondly, we configure the detection engine:

```
config detection: search-method ac-split search-optimize max-pattern-len
20
```

Lastly, we configure the event log:

```
config event_queue: max_queue 8 log 5 order_events content_length
```

Additionally, we set protocol aware flushing threshold as 16000:

```
config paf_max: 16000
```

Step 4: we configure dynamic loaded libraries

This step generates configuration for configuring the working environment of Snort engine. So it is not related to alerts / events/ logs themselves.

```
# path to dynamic preprocessor libraries
dynamicpreprocessor directory /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicpreprocessor/
# path to base preprocessor engine
dynamicengine /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicengine/libsf_engine.so
# path to dynamic rules libraries
dynamicdetection directory /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrules
```

Step 5: We configure preprocessors

In this step, we normalize the packages information corresponding to different protocols, then we configure anomalies detection on different protocol.

```
preprocessor frag3_global: max frags 65536
preprocessor frag3_engine: policy windows detect_anomalies
overlap_limit 10 min_fragment_length 100 timeout 180
```

```
# Target-Based stateful inspection/stream reassembly. For more
information, see README.stream5
preprocessor stream5_global: track_tcp yes, \
  track_udp yes, \
  track_icmp no, \
  max_tcp 262144, \
  max_udp 131072, \
  max_active_responses 2, \
  min_response_seconds 5
preprocessor stream5_udp: timeout 180
```

Preprocessor also includes the part of requirements of our assignment. We can configure the performance statistics by sniffing the packets. In this part, we can configure inspection ports, parameters, heads etc.

Step 6: we configure output plugins

In this step, we can specify what kinds of output we need and what output files we need to generate. Like unified2, syslog and pcap dump files.

Step 7: we can customize our rule set

Original we include following rules for different attacks, later I will add my own rules to detect more potential issues, such as DoS / Port Scan:

```
include $RULE_PATH/local.rules
include $RULE_PATH/cs6706.rules
include $RULE_PATH/app-detect.rules
include $RULE_PATH/attack-responses.rules
include $RULE_PATH/backdoor.rules
include $RULE_PATH/bad-traffic.rules
include $RULE_PATH/ddos.rules
include $RULE_PATH/dns.rules
include $RULE_PATH/dos.rules
include $RULE_PATH/experimental.rules
include $RULE_PATH/exploit.rules
include $RULE_PATH/finger.rules
include $RULE_PATH/ftp.rules
include $RULE_PATH/icmp-info.rules
include $RULE_PATH/icmp.rules
include $RULE_PATH/imap.rules
include $RULE_PATH/info.rules
include $RULE_PATH/multimedia.rules
include $RULE_PATH/mysql.rules
include $RULE_PATH/netbios.rules
include $RULE_PATH/nntp.rules
include $RULE_PATH/oracle.rules
include $RULE_PATH/other-ids.rules
include $RULE_PATH/p2p.rules
include $RULE_PATH/policy.rules
include $RULE_PATH/pop2.rules
include $RULE_PATH/pop3.rules
include $RULE_PATH/rpc.rules
include $RULE_PATH/scan.rules
```

Above MySQL and Oracle might not do much with our assignment. We can consider removing them for performance purpose. However, the following rules need to be enabled, even they are coarse grained:

```
include $RULE_PATH/smtp.rules
include $RULE_PATH/snmp.rules
include $RULE_PATH/sql.rules
include $RULE_PATH/telnet.rules
include $RULE_PATH/tftp.rules
include $RULE_PATH/virus.rules
include $RULE_PATH/web-attacks.rules
include $RULE_PATH/web-cgi.rules
include $RULE_PATH/web-client.rules
include $RULE_PATH/web-coldfusion.rules
include $RULE_PATH/web-frontpage.rules
include $RULE_PATH/web-iis.rules
include $RULE_PATH/web-misc.rules
include $RULE_PATH/web-php.rules
include $RULE_PATH/x11.rules
```

Step 8, we might want to decode alerts, but skip it at this moment.

Step 9: we can customize our shared object snort rules. They are do nothing about our assignments, we can level them by now.

For testing purpose, we can look at DDoS Rules specified in configuration file:

```
# $Id: dos.rules,v 1.23.2.2.2.1 2005/10/16 22:17:51 mwatchinski Exp $
#-----#
# DOS RULES
#-----#
alert log $EXTERNAL_NET any > $HOME_NET any (msg:"DDOS TFn Probe"; icmp_id:678; itype:8; content:"1234"; reference:arachnids,443; class:typeattempted-recon; sid:221; rev:3)
alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"DDOS tfn2k icmp possible communication"; icmp_id:0; itype:0; content:"AAAAAAAAT"; reference:arachnids,425; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:222; rev:1)
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 2043 (msg:"DDOS Trin00 Daemon to Master PONG message detected"; content:"PONG"; reference:arachnids,187; class:typeattempted-recon; sid:223; rev:3)
alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET client command BE; (msg:"DDOS TFn client command BE"; icmp_id:456; icmp_seq:0; itype:0; reference:arachnids,18; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:228; rev:3)

alert tcp $HOME_NET 2043 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"DDOS shaft client login to handler"; flow:from_server,established; content:"login|3"; reference:cve,2000-0138; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:231; rev:2)
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 13135 (msg:"DDOS Trin00 Daemon to Master message detected"; content:"1234"; reference:arachnids,185; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:235; rev:3)
alert $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 13135 (msg:"DDOS Trin00 Daemon to Master \"HELLO\" message detected"; content:"HELLO"; reference:arachnids,186; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:236; rev:3)
alert $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 7665 (msg:"DDOS Trin00 Attacker to Master default password"; flow:established,to_server; content:"$telnetpassword"; reference:arachnids,179; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:237; rev:3)
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 7665 (msg:"DDOS Trin00 Attacker to Master default password"; flow:established,to_server; content:"$telnetpassword"; reference:arachnids,179; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:238; rev:3)
alert icmp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"DDOS shaft synflood"; flowstateless; flags:S,12; seq:674711609; reference:arachnids,253; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:241; rev:10)

# alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"DDOS shaft synflood"; flowstateless; flags:S,12; seq:674711609; reference:arachnids,253; class:typeattempted-dos; sid:241; rev:10);
```


It tells how to decoder DDoS attacker packages information and generate alert information. It includes but not limited:

- DDOS TFn Probe
- DDOS tfn2k icmp possible communication
- DDOS Trin00 Daemon to Master PONG
- DDOS TFn client command BE
- DDOS shaft client login to handler
- DDOS shaft handler to agent
- DDOS shaft agent to handler
- DDOS shaft synflood
- DDOS mstream agent to handler
- DDOS mstream handler to agent
- DDOS mstream handler ping to agent
- DDOS mstream agent pong to handler
- DDOS mstream client to handler
- DDOS mstream handler to client
- DDOS mstream client to handler
- DDOS mstream handler to client
- DDOS - TFn client command LE
- DDOS Stacheldraht server spoof
- DDOS Stacheldraht gag server response
- DDOS Stacheldraht server response
- DDOS Stacheldraht client spoofworks
- DDOS Stacheldraht client check gag
- DDOS Stacheldraht client check skillz
- DDOS Stacheldraht handler->agent niggahbitch
- DDOS Stacheldraht agent->handler skillz
- DDOS Stacheldraht handler->agent ficken

Here, I feel interested in “syn-flood” and “icmp-flood” attack, so that I will keep an eye at this alert during Snort sniffing. Moreover, our Snort rules customization will surround DoS attack in the sections later.


3 Question 1: Snort Detection of hands-on DDoS attack and DARPA Intrusion Detection Datasets

Before diving into this question, we need to recall SYN concepts[3]:



SYN is three ways hands sharking communication between server and client.

This type of communication can be compromised by malicious users to exploit its limited slots for pending connections. Like the screenshot below:



Note that during SYN flood the attacker usually spoofs and varies the source IP address, usually using PRNG, thus preventing the victim from inserting an IP filter for that IP address.

Since the attacker is spoofing the sources it is not easily possible to determine the number of attacking machines and it may also be just a single machine. One way to have an idea about the distance is to look at the packet TTL but be aware it can also be forged [6].

I made extra efforts on this question, besides testing existing datasets, I simulated DDoS attack for initial test.

3.1 Issuing the DDoS attack.

Before utilizing download files, I issued DDoS attack to test our topology a little bit.

Hping3 is a command-line oriented TCP/IP packet assembler/analyzer. The interface is inspired to the ping(8) Unix command, but Hping3 isn't only able to send ICMP echo requests. It supports TCP, UDP, ICMP and RAW-IP protocols, has a traceroute mode, the ability to send files between a covered channel, and many other features [9].

Basically, I am going to issue “**hping3**” command to simulate DDoS attack. However, before doing that, I was aware of SYN cookie configuration might impact on DDoS attack, because “**net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1**” will partially mitigate the DDoS attack. So, we should disable syncookies at this point.

- Start up daemonlogger at R1-FRR:

```
daemonlogger -i eth0 -o eth2
```

```
/ # daemonlogger -i eth0 -o eth2
[-] Interface set to eth0
[-] Log filename set to "daemonlogger.pcap"
[-] Tap output interface set to eth2[-] Pidfile configured to "daemonlogger.pid"
[-] Pidpath configured to "/var/run"
[-] Rollover size set to 18446744071562067968 bytes
[-] Rollover time configured for 0 seconds
[-] Pruning behavior set to oldest IN DIRECTORY

.*> Daemonlogger <*-
Version 1.2.1
By Martin Roesch
(C) Copyright 2006-2007 Sourcefire Inc., All rights reserved

sniffing on interface eth0
]
```

We execute this command to sniff traffic coming from R1-FRR at snort-IDS now:

```
snort -i eth0 -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -l /var/log/snort -A full
```

```
==== Initialization Complete ====
.*> Snort! <*-
Version 2.9.11.1 GRE (Build 268)
By Martin Roesch & The Snort Team: http://www.snort.org/contact#team
Copyright (C) 2014-2017 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Copyright (C) 1998-2013 Sourcefire, Inc., et al.
Using libpcap version 1.7.4
Using PCRE version: 8.38 2015-11-23
Using ZLIB version: 1.2.8

Rules Engine: SF_SNORT_DETECTION_ENGINE Version 3.0 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SSLP Version 1.1 <Build 4>
Preprocessor Object: SF_DNP3 Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SIP Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_MODBUS Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_IMAP Version 1.0 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_GTP Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_DCERPC2 Version 1.0 <Build 3>
Preprocessor Object: SF_FTPTELNET Version 1.2 <Build 13>
Preprocessor Object: SF_POP Version 1.0 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SDF Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SSH Version 1.1 <Build 3>
Preprocessor Object: SF_DNS Version 1.1 <Build 4>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SMTP Version 1.1 <Build 9>
Preprocessor Object: SF_REPUTATION Version 1.1 <Build 1>

Commencing packet processing (pid=3863)
```

Next, we will try to execute the following command to simulate DDoS attack to our ftp file server (172.16.1.12) on our topology network.

Just recall, there are two general types of DoS attack:

ICMP flood attack:

```
sudo hping3 -i vip2 -V 172.16.1.13
```

```
gns3@gns3vm:~$ sudo hping3 --flood -c 10000 -i vip2 --rand-source -V 172.16.1.13
using vip2, addr: 192.168.111.1, MTU: 1500
HPING 172.16.1.13 (vip2 172.16.1.13): NO FLAGS are set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
^C
--- 172.16.1.13 hping statistic ---
50056364 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
```

SYN flood attack:

```
sudo hping3 -S --flood -c 10000 -d 128 -w 64 -i vip2 --rand-source
-V -p 80 172.16.1.13
```

Nit is good practice to explain the options of “hping3” command to better understand malicious users’ behaviors:


- c send 10000 pkgs**
- d 128: each pkg size**
- w: tcp windows**
- i: targeted network interface**
- rand-source: simulate DDoS via randomized source IP**
- V: output verbose detailed**
- p: port number we are attacking**
- And destination IP: 172.16.1.13**

Now let us try SYN flood attack, later on I will test both after refining Snort rules, so that I saved results to **hping3-initial-test.pcap**, which can be replayed for comparison between Snort rules modification before and after:

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assn3$ sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 -K hping3-initial-test.pcap
File Cache is enabled
Actual: 251649 packets (35187106 bytes) sent in 67.74 seconds
Rated: 519407.6 Bps, 4.15 Mbps, 3714.66 pps
Flows: 250464 flows, 3697.17fps, 251635 flow packets, 14 non-flow
Statistics for network device: vip2
    Successful packets: 251649
    Failed packets: 0
    Truncated packets: 0
    Retried packets (ENOBUFS): 0
    Retried packets (EAGAIN): 0
gns3@gns3vm:~/assn3$
```

Above, I was trying to send 10000 packages over port 80 using random source IP address to our metasploitable2 within our network topology.

We can capture the traffic between R1-FRR and snort-IDS by Wireshark firstly:



We can say there are many abnormal unhealthy traffic were shown in wireshark UI.

To make it more precisely, I directly execute the command “netstat” on vulnerable targetted server “metasploitable2”:

- S: assign SYN flag**
- flood: work as flood mode**

```
root@t1eemcj1r:~# netstat
Active Internet connections (w/o servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            75.74.110.159:1749  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            209.194.36.253:1738  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            103.124.250.210:1730 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            136.207.56.221:1634 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            119.32.1.5:1725   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            1.90.79.26:sa-msg-port: SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            117.30.34.5:1663   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            77.237.45.195:1756  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            144.68.2.132:1734  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            118.31.36.49:1647  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            203.0.108.247:1683 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            184.68.220.28:1741 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            13.58.109.254:1681 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            163.162.244.113:1750 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            188.207.5.184:1768  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            76.216.156.216:1650 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            209.215.115.93:1711 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            243.89.145.50:1706 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            195.128.72.74:1760 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            203.246.216.145:1762 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            58.71.196.189:1753 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            44.65.166.92:1669 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            221.227.65.253:1666 SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0 172.16.1.13:www            9.93.36.149:1755 SYN_RECV
```

Let us recall SYN possible states of a connection are as follows[5]:

ESTABLISHED - Both hosts are connected.
 CLOSING - The remote host has agreed to close its connection.
 LISTENING - Your computer is waiting to handle an incoming connection.
 SYN_RECV - A remote host has asked for you to start a connection.
 SYN_SENT - Your computer has accepted to start a connection.
 LAST_ACK - Your computer needs to obliterate (i.e. erase from memory) the packets before closing the connection.
 TIME_WAIT - See above.
 CLOSE_WAIT - The remote host is closing its connection with your computer.
 FIN_WAIT 1 - A client is closing its connection.
 FIN_WAIT 2 - Both hosts have agreed to close the connection.

From the screenshot of “netstats” results on victim server. I can see that many connections stay in SYN_RECV state. And source IP are randomized to be simulated from different locations. The waiting time is the time between receiving the first and third packet in the 3-way handshake. It has been proved 5-6 packets stay in the same state SYN_RECV is overly aggressive case. The health situation is that only maximum 1/5 of the sockets should be in SYN_RECV and the majority should be in ESTABLISHED or TIME_WAIT state.

Therefor, I can tell something is abnormal when I observe many SYN_RECV packets constantly. In conclusion, having many SYN_RECV packets means a SYN Flood.

Next, I want to check Snort Statistics outputs on terminal console to hopefully identify those anomalies.

Packets I/O Total:

```
Run time for packet processing was 249.602703 seconds
Snort processed 141183 packets.
Snort ran for 0 days 0 hours 4 minutes 9 seconds
  Pkts/min:      35295
  Pkts/sec:      567
=====
Memory usage summary:
  Total non-mapped bytes (arena):      31608832
  Bytes in mapped regions (hb1khd): 29995008
  Total allocated space (wordblks):   23268816
  Total free space (fordblks):        8340016
  Topmost releasable block (keepcost): 2011424
=====
Packet I/O Totals:
  Received:      148010
  Analyzed:      141183 ( 95.387%)
  Dropped:       6827 (  4.409%)
  Filtered:      0 (  0.000%)
  Outstanding:   6827 (  4.613%)
  Injected:      0
```

Protocol Breakdowns

```
=====  
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets):
  Eth:          141183 (100.000%)
  VLAN:         0 (  0.000%)
  IP4:          141163 ( 99.986%)
  Frag:          0 (  0.000%)
  ICMP:          0 (  0.000%)
  UDP:          0 (  0.000%)
  TCP:          141163 ( 99.986%)
  IP6:          1 (  0.001%)
  IP6 Ext:      1 (  0.001%)
  IP6 Opts:      0 (  0.000%)
  Frag6:          0 (  0.000%)
  ICMP6:         1 (  0.001%)
  UDP6:          0 (  0.000%)
  TCP6:          0 (  0.000%)
  Teredo:        0 (  0.000%)
  ICMP-IP:      0 (  0.000%)
  IP4/IP4:      0 (  0.000%)
  IP4/IP6:      0 (  0.000%)
  IP6/IP4:      0 (  0.000%)
  IP6/IP6:      0 (  0.000%)
  GRE:          0 (  0.000%)
  GRE Eth:       0 (  0.000%)
  GRE VLAN:     0 (  0.000%)
  GRE IP4:       0 (  0.000%)
  GRE IP6:       0 (  0.000%)
  GRE IP6 Ext:   0 (  0.000%)
  GRE PPTP:      0 (  0.000%)
  GRE ARP:       0 (  0.000%)
  GRE IPX:       0 (  0.000%)
  GRE Loop:      0 (  0.000%)
  MPLS:          0 (  0.000%)
  ARP:          19 (  0.013%)
  IPX:          0 (  0.000%)
  Eth Loop:      0 (  0.000%)
  Eth Disc:      0 (  0.000%)
  IP4 Disc:      0 (  0.000%)
  IP6 Disc:      0 (  0.000%)
  TCP Disc:      0 (  0.000%)
  UDP Disc:      0 (  0.000%)
  ICMP Disc:    0 (  0.000%)
  All Discard:   0 (  0.000%)
  Other:         0 (  0.000%)
  Bad Chk Sum:   0 (  0.000%)
  Bad TTL:       0 (  0.000%)
  SS G 1:        0 (  0.000%)
  SS G 2:        0 (  0.000%)
  Total:         141183
```

Action Stats:

```
=====  
Action Stats:
  Alerts:        227 (  0.161%)
  Logged:        227 (  0.161%)
  Passed:        0 (  0.000%)
  Limits:
    Match:        0
    Queue:        0
    Log:          0
    Event:        0
    Alert:        0
  Verdicts:
    Allow:        141183 ( 95.387%)
    Block:        0 (  0.000%)
    Replace:      0 (  0.000%)
    Whitelist:    0 (  0.000%)
    Blacklist:    0 (  0.000%)
    Ignore:       0 (  0.000%)
    Retry:        0 (  0.000%)
```

Stream statistics:

```

Stream statistics:
  Total sessions: 84483
    TCP sessions: 84483
    UDP sessions: 0
    ICMP sessions: 0
      IP sessions: 0
        TCP Prunes: 0
        UDP Prunes: 0
        ICMP Prunes: 0
        IP Prunes: 0
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 84483
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 84483
  TCP Timeouts: 0
  TCP Overlaps: 0
  TCP Segments Queued: 0
TCP Segments Released: 0
  TCP Rebuilt Packets: 0
  TCP Segments Used: 0
  TCP Discards: 0
  TCP Gaps: 0
UDP Sessions Created: 0
UDP Sessions Deleted: 0
  UDP Timeouts: 0
  UDP Discards: 0
  Events: 58811
Internal Events: 0
TCP Port Filter
  Filtered: 0
  Inspected: 0
  Tracked: 141163
UDP Port Filter
  Filtered: 0
  Inspected: 0
  Tracked: 0

```

This screenshot shows the Snort log output. It displays various session statistics such as total sessions (84483), TCP sessions (84483), and UDP sessions (0). It also shows StreamTrackers statistics, including created (84483) and deleted (84483) sessions, and various TCP and UDP metrics like timeouts, overlaps, and segments released. The log ends with a summary of internal events (58811) and two port filters (TCP and UDP) with their respective tracked counts.

From above screenshots, I found there were 227 (0.16%) alerts reported at the end. Then, we might want to visit snort logs a little bit under /var/log/snort:

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | more
```

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
  227 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 3" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

We can see above there is no alerts higher than Priority 2 reported, therefore, we need to improve the snort rules in later section. The only 227 bad traffic alerts are quite general information. And it **does not explain the situation on victim server why there are so many “SYN_RECV” stated packets. We need more specific alert setting up for potential and hidden issues.** So, we are going improve it in question 2.

Then, I saved this PCAP file into assignment 3 folder, which is shared on OneDrive:

- hping3-initial.pcap

Next, we want to download a suggested dataset from DARPA Intrusion Detection Datasets.

3.2 DARPA Intrusion Detection Datasets.

<https://archive.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/2000data.html>

2000 DARPA Intrusion Detection Scenario Specific Data Sets
The content and labeling of data sets relies significantly on reports and feedback from consumers of this data. Please send feedback on this data set to Joshua W. Haines so that your ideas can be incorporated into future data sets. Thanks!

Overview

Off-line intrusion detection datasets were produced as per consensus from the Wisconsin Re-Think meeting and the July 2000 Hawaii PI meeting.


LLDOS 1.0 - Scenario One

This is the first attack scenario data set to be created for DARPA as a part of this effort. It includes a distributed denial of service


attack run by a novice attacker. Future versions of this and other example scenarios will contain more stealthy attack versions.

This attack scenario is carried out over multiple network and audit sessions. These sessions have been grouped into 5 attack phases, over the course of which the attacker probes the network, breaks in to a host by exploiting the Solaris sadmind vulnerability, installs trojan mstream DDoS software, and launches a DDoS attack at an off site server from the compromised host.

LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.dump > LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.pcap



LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.dump > LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap



Uploaded PCAP files to GNS3 VM:

```
D:\assign3-datasets>scap LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.pcap gns3@192.168.234.130:~/assign3/
gns3@192.168.234.130's password:
LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.pcap                                         100% 116MB 2.1MB/s 00:54

D:\assign3-datasets>scap LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap gns3@192.168.234.130:~/assign3/
gns3@192.168.234.130's password:
LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap                                         100% 85MB 4.4MB/s 00:19

D:\assign3-datasets>
```

Those generated datasets were saved on my shared OneDrive folder [10].

Next, we want to utilize the techniques we learned from Assignment 2 to visualize and analyze the original datasets a little bit.

We also can run the command “`tshark`” to get a host list for the security check later on in the later section.

```
D:\assign3-datasets>tshark -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-
inside_new_columns.pcap -q -z hosts > LLS_DDOS_1.0-
inside.hosts
```

```
D:\assign3-datasets>tshark -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_new_columns.pcap -q -z hosts
# TShark hosts output
#
# Host data gathered from LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_new_columns.pcap

208.237.193.111 www.apartments.com
134.205.165.120 afpubs.hq.af.mil
204.71.191.203 ad.linkexchange.com
205.181.112.70 computershopper.zdnet.com
192.254.26.2 www.gtsi.com
204.225.2.94 jump.altavista.com
209.185.69.11 altavista.looksmart.com
208.141.130.161 ShopWorks.com
207.25.71.141 cnnsi.com
209.1.12.219 www.inktomi.com
209.67.227.100 www.mapson.com
192.215.17.71 img.cmpnet.com
205.153.28.61 freedom.charter.com
197.182.91.233 mars.avocado.net
205.188.146.199 ads.web.aol.com
209.1.224.198 pic.geocities.com
128.197.100.11 bumet.bu.edu
32.97.253.109 search.borders.com
207.25.71.200 www.cnn.com
192.102.198.160 www.intel.com
135.8.60.182 beta.banana.edu
```

The result is quite long, I put in [LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.hosts](#) which can be analyzed later on. We will do the same on [LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns.pcap](#).


```
D:\assign3-datasets>tshark -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_columns.pcap -q -z hosts > LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_columns.hosts
# TShark hosts output
#
# Host data gathered from LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_columns.pcap

172.16.111.207 pigeon.syrinx.af.mil
132.52.128.21 www.vnc.net.af.mil
382.77.161.213 www.psp213.vtc.net.hk
193.114.243.78 www.sbcwburg.com
207.217.78.131 corp-ing.eartlink.net
143.166.224.32 commerce.us.dell.com
207.46.158.42 bbs.msrb.com
149.44.2.14 www.ctp.com
199.101.10.200 images2.nytimes.com
194.47.251.21 gutenberg.gratis.mil
205.181.112.67 www.zedt.com
196.227.33.20 ns.kiwi.org
207.87.128.113 counter.digits.com
199.94.99.2 uan.mitre.org
207.178.129.62 www.the-ebus.com
199.133.168.3 www.tso.osd.mil
199.133.168.50 my.excite.com
203.128.138.23 www.yahoo.com.au
192.58.219.60 uswestdtx.com
```

3.2.1 Wireshark UI Examine


Once we have customized UI setup, we can start up a little bit simple data analytics (We will talk about it specifically in the later section).

For example, if we want to identify the suspicious devices which joined in our network during the monitoring period. We can track `tcp.flags.syn` activity.



From the screenshot above, we firstly filter the keyword “`tcp.flags.syn`”, which is the criteria to examine the SYN issue. We loaded “[LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.dump](#)” which originally downloaded from “**DARPA Intrusion Detection Datasets**”. We can identify there were couple of suspicious activities caused “TCP FULL window” or “TCP Zero windows”. And the IP address seems unrecognized and randomized. Therefore it is worth to continuously investigated.

Let us take a look at another datasets “[LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.dump](#)”:



From the screenshot above, we can identify many repeated “TCP out-of-order” warning happened on SYN communication.

Next, we want to use Argus and Visualizaiton tools to study the datasets a little bit.

3.2.2 Data Pre-processing

From the generated data (especially by WireShark), I utilized Argus command line to convert PCAP files into ARGUS files firstly, so that we can prepare for the data analytics. For example:

```
sudo argus -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap -w LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.argus
```

Furthermore, we can consider about utilizing the RA command filter and fields parameters to generate customized statistical results:

Specify the fields to print. Ra uses a default printing field list, by specifying a field you can replace this list completely, or you can modify the existing default print list, using the optional ‘-’ and ‘#[#]’ form of the command. The available fields to print are [17]:

```
starttime, lasttime, count, dur, avgdur,
saddr, daddr, proto, sport, dport, ipid,
stos, dtos, sttl, dttl, bytes, sbytes, dbytes,
pkts, spkts, dpkts, load, loss, rate,
srcid, ind, mac, dir, jitter, status, user,
win, trans, seq, vlan, mpls
```

I was doing this process for all the records:

- Convert Wireshark PCAP data into ARGUS

```
sudo argus -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap -w LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.argus
```

```
sudo argus -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.pcap -w LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.argus
```

- Customize the format of output and save into CSV file

```
ra -c, -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.argus -s +label:20 +load +count + dur
+mac +win + trans + mpls +rate +stos +dtos +sttl +dttl >
LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.csv
```

```
ra -c, -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.argus -s +label:20 +load +count + dur
+mac +win + trans + mpls +rate +stos +dtos +sttl +dttl >
LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.csv
```

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ ra -c, -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.argus -s +label:20 +load +count +dur
+mac +win +trans +mpis +rate +stos +dtos +sttl +dttl > LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.csv
```

Then I was planning to visualize the results based on the data analyzing of Argus. The processed Argus files were converted into CSV formatted files, and they were uploaded to OneDrive[12]:

We can go to the next step to visualize the data to make the data more understandable and eventually transform the data into information to the user.

Here I want to exploit the power of Python preprocess the data and feed preprocessed data into Tableau, which is one of the most popular data visualization tools on the market, chart to compare three days traffic. And furthermore, we even can break it down into more subtle comparison among the applications and devices. which is attached in this assignment. We notice the data combined with several major features:

| | StartTime | Flgs | Proto | SrcAddr | Sport | Dir | DstAddr | Dport | TotPkts | TotBytes | State | Label | Load | Dur | Trans | Rate |
|---|-----------------|------|-------|-------------------|---------|-----|---------------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------|------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|
| 0 | 04:01:49.224899 | man | 0 | 0 NaN | 0 | 0 | 0 | STA | Nan | 0.000000 | 0.015157 | Nan | 0.000000 | | | |
| 1 | 17:20:45.042787 | e | loop | 0:10:7b:38:46:3b | Nan | > | 00:10:7b:38:46:3b | Nan | 1 | 60 | INT | Nan | 0.000000 | 0.500012 | 1.0 | 0.666576 |
| 2 | 17:20:46.259978 | * | Ic | 08:00:09:dd:ff:a0 | netbios | > | 08:00:09:dd:ff:a0 | Nan | 4 | 216 | INT | 287.960548 | 4.500012 | 1.0 | 0.666576 | |
| 3 | 17:20:52.256890 | * | Ic | 08:00:09:dd:ff:a0 | netbios | > | 08:00:09:dd:ff:a0 | Nan | 4 | 216 | REQ | Nan | 259.202850 | 4.999445 | 1.0 | 0.600007 |
| 4 | 17:20:54.221997 | * | Ic | 00:10:7b:38:46:3b | snap | > | 01:00:0ccc:cccc:0000:0000 | snap | 1 | 320 | INT | Nan | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 1.0 | 0.000000 |

The screenshot above shows the datasets finally includes following fields:

```
Index(['StartTime', 'Flgs', 'Proto', 'SrcAddr', 'Sport', 'Dir',
       'DstAddr', 'Dport', 'TotPkts', 'TotBytes', 'State', 'Load',
       'Dur', 'Trans', 'Rate', 'sTos', 'dTos', 'sTtl', 'dTtl', 'Label'],
      dtype='object')
```

We noticed there is “label” field. It can be used for classification. There are NA values in the dataframe, we need to cleanup the data firstly, I did it via Python Pandas Lib. There are several data cleanup processes, like dropna(), drop unnecessary columns etc.


```
def srcAddTraffic(df):
    f, ax = plt.subplots(1, 1, figsize=(6, 4))

    per_ip = df.groupby("DstAddr", as_index=False).agg({"TotBytes": [np.sum]})

    p = per_ip.sort_values(by=("TotBytes", "sum"), ascending=False)[:10]
    p[["TotBytes", "sum"]] = p[["TotBytes", "sum"]]/1000000
    sns.barplot(p["DstAddr"], p[["TotBytes", "sum"]], palette="Spectral_r", ax=ax)


    ax.set_xticklabels(ax.xaxis.get_majorticklabels(), rotation=45)
    ax.set_ylabel("Traffic volume (MB)")
    ax.set_title("Top 10 IP addresses by traffic volume")

srcAddTraffic(df_lls_ddos)
```




Top packages ranked by destination address

```
DstAddr  TotPkts
sum
4478    172.16.115.20  41933
3708    172.16.112.194  23179
4834    194.7.248.153  22623
3164    131.84.1.31   22318
4312    172.16.114.50  21597
4842    197.218.177.69 19162
4057    172.16.113.50  18362
3803    172.16.112.50  17346
3180    135.8.60.182   15442
4836    195.115.218.108 11387
```



Ranked by load

| | DstAddr | Load sum |
|------|----------------|--------------|
| 4312 | 172.16.114.50 | 4.398420e+08 |
| 3605 | 172.16.112.100 | 3.597730e+08 |
| 5280 | 209.67.29.11 | 3.409950e+08 |
| 5210 | 207.46.130.14 | 2.813516e+08 |
| 5196 | 207.25.71.141 | 2.603720e+08 |
| 5161 | 206.132.25.51 | 1.807246e+08 |
| 4864 | 199.95.74.90 | 1.355599e+08 |
| 5202 | 207.25.71.200 | 1.171785e+08 |
| 5144 | 205.181.112.65 | 1.163783e+08 |
| 4816 | 192.208.46.111 | 1.132706e+08 |



Next we need to utilize the TcpRewrite to rewrite the destination address in datasets. Let it can work with our customized topology.

3.2.3 Rewrite the destination address

TcpPrewrite usage:

```
gnutls@gnutls:~/src$ ./script3

--r, --portmap=str          Rewrite TCP/UDP ports
--s, --seed=num               Randomize src/dst IPv4/v6 addresses w/ given seed
--N, --pnat=str               Rewrite IPv4/v6 addresses using pseudo-NAT
--S, --srcmap=str             Rewrite source IPv4/v6 addresses using pseudo-NAT
--D, --dstmap=str             Rewrite destination IPv4/v6 addresses using pseudo-NAT
--e, --endpoints=str         Rewrite IP addresses to be between two endpoints
--b, --skipbroadcast         Skip rewriting broadcast/multicast IPv4/v6 addresses
--C, --fixsum                Force recalculation of IPv4/TCP/UDP header checksums
--m, --mtu=num                Override default MTU length (1500 bytes)
--mtu-trunc                 Truncate packets larger than specified MTU
--E, --efcs                  Remove Ethernet checksums (FCS) from end of frames
--F, --fixlen=str             Modify the IPv4/v6 TTL/Hop limit
--fuzz-seed=num              Set the IPv4 TOS/DiffServ/ECN byte
--fuzz-factor=num            Set the IPv6 Traffic Class byte
--fuzz-subclass=num          Set the IPv6 Flow Label
--F, --fixlen=str             Pad or truncate packet data to match header length
--fuzz=1                     Fuzz 1 in X packets. Edit bytes, length, or emulate packet drop
--fuzz-factor=num             Set the Fuzz 1 in X packet ratio (default 1 in 8 packets)
--skip12broadcast            Skip rewriting broadcast/multicast Layer 2 addresses
--dlt=str                    Override output DLT encapsulation
--enet-dmac=str              Override destination ethernet MAC addresses
--enet-snac=str               Override source ethernet MAC addresses
--enet-submac=str            Substitute MAC addresses
--enet-mac-seed=num          Randomize MAC addresses
--enet-mac-keep-bytes=num    Randomize MAC addresses
--enet-vlan=1str              Specify ethernet 802.1q VLAN tag mode
--enet-vlan-tag=num           Specify the new ethernet 802.1q VLAN tag value
--enet-vlan-cfi=num           Specify the ethernet 802.1q VLAN CFI value
--enet-vlan-pri=num           Specify the ethernet 802.1q VLAN priority
--hdlc-control=num            Specify HDLC control value
--hdlc-address=num            Specify HDLC address
--user-dlt=num                Set output file DLT type
--user-link=1str              Rewrite Data-Link layer with user specified data
--d, --debug=num               Enable debugging output
--i, --infile=1str             Input pcap file to be processed
--o, --outfile=1str            Output pcap file
--c, --cachefile=1str          Split traffic via tcpprep cache file
--v, --verbose                Print decoded packets via tcpcdump to STDOUT
--A, --decode=1str              Arguments passed to tcpcdump decoder
--o, --skip-soft-errors       Skip writing packets with soft errors
--V, --version                 Print version information
--h, --less-help               Display less usage information and exit
--H, --help                   display extended usage information and exit
--!, --more-help               extended usage information passed thru pager
--save-optvs=[-arg]            save the option state to a config file
--load-optvs=1str              load options from a config file
```

there are multiple usages to rewrite the destination IP, such as:

- Destipmap
 - Pnet
 - endpoints

I am here to using endpoints parameters, because destipmap and pnet only take IP map one time by another. Like the command below:

```
sudo tcprewrite --infile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-  
dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap --outfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-  
dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite2.pcap --  
dstipmap=172.16.113.204:172.16.1.12,172.16.115.20:172.16.2.12 -  
fixcsum
```

```
gns3@gns3vm:~$ assign3$ sudo tcprewrite --infile=LLS_DDOSS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap --outfile=LLS_DDOSS_1.0--dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite2.pcap --dstipmap=172.16.113.204:172.16.1.12,172.16.115.20:172.16.2.12 --fixsum
```

Considering about **LLS_DDOS** datasets contain randomized IP and mask, endpoints option is able to rewrite destination IP to a range of IP address. Our topology has the IP range: 192.16.1.11 – 192.16.1.12 and 192.16.2.11 – 192.16.2.12.

- Prepare the tcprewrite cache files:

Hoever endpoints needs cache files to parses the pcap file and keeps track each time a host either behaves like a client or like a server[6], so we need “**Tepprep**” to generate cache files firstly:

Prepare “LLS DDOS 1.0-dmz new columns.cache” cache file:

```
sudo tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_columns.pcap --cachefile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_columns.cache
```

Prepare “LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_new_columns.cache” cache file:

The results show as below in screenshot:

```

gns@nsmv:/$ ./assgn13s ls
172.112.128.100
LS_D005_1.0-dmc.args
LS_D005_1.0-dmc.csv
LS_D005_1.0-dmc.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns_rewrite2.args
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns_rewrite2.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns_rewrite.args
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns_rewrite.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-inside.args
LS_D005_1.0-inside.dump
LS_D005_1.0-inside_new_columns.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-inside_pcap
gns@nsmv:/$ sudo tcpreplay -a auto-bridge --pcap=LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns.pcap --cachefile=LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns.cache
gns@nsmv:/$ ./assgn13s sudo tcpreplay --auto-bridge --pcap=LS_D005_1.0-inside_new_columns.pcap --cachefile=LS_D005_1.0-inside_new_columns.ca

gns@nsmv:/$ ./assgn13s ls
172.112.194.107
LS_D005_1.0-dmc.args
LS_D005_1.0-dmc.csv
LS_D005_1.0-dmc.dump
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns.cache
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns_rewrite2.args
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns_rewrite2.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns_rewrite.args
LS_D005_1.0-dmc_new_columns_rewrite.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-inside.args
LS_D005_1.0-inside.dump
LS_D005_1.0-inside_new_columns.pcap
LS_D005_1.0-inside_pcap

```

By the way, in case our pcap file size is quite large, we might encounter “maximum size exceeding” issue, we need to run command “pcapfix” to adjust pcap file head [7].

- Rewrite the PCAP destination IP:

As mentioned before, I was utilizing different options to generate rewriting files. Finally, I found endpoints might be a good choice in our cases (Just imagine hacker is issuing attacks from local network host 192.168.111.1 to the ssh server 172.16.1.12):

Rewrite “LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap”:

```
sudo tcprewrite --infile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap --outfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_rewrite.pcap --endpoints=192.168.111.1:172.16.1.13 -b --cachefile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.cache
```

Rewrite “LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap”:

```
sudo tcprewrite --infile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.pcap --outfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap --endpoints=192.168.111.1:172.16.1.13 -b --cachefile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.cache
```

Test rewrite works:

```
gns3@gn3vm:~/assgn3$ ls
LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns.pcap          LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap          LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.pcap
LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap    LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_rewrite.pcap    LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap
LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap.gz  LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap.gz  LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap.gz
gns3@gn3vm:~/assgn3$ sudo tcprewrite -iinfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap -ooutfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite2.pcap
gns3@gn3vm:~/assgn3$ sudo tcprewrite -iinfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap.gz -ooutfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite2.pcap.gz
gns3@gn3vm:~/assgn3$ sudo ra -r LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite2.pcap | grep 172.16.2.12^
17.20.56.0.79547 e      udp 172.16.11.50.1968 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 172 INT
17.20.56.0.79547 e      udp 172.16.11.50.1968 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 172 INT
17.21.48.0.260888 e     tcp 194.7.248.153.3769 > 172.16.2.12.telnet 2 120 CON
17.21.49.747288 e     udp 192.168.1.20.domain > 172.16.2.12.33881 3 156 INT
17.21.53.0.935579 e     udp 192.168.1.20.domain > 172.16.2.12.33881 3 157 INT
17.21.53.0.935579 e     udp 192.168.1.20.domain > 172.16.2.12.33881 3 158 INT
17.21.56.145244 e      tcp 194.7.248.153.3769 > 172.16.2.12.telnet 4 240 CON
17.22.09.489834 e      udp 192.168.1.20.domain > 172.16.2.12.33881 4 173 INT
17.22.09.489834 e      udp 192.168.1.20.domain > 172.16.2.12.33881 4 200 INT
17.22.09.507913 e      udp 192.168.1.20.domain > 172.16.2.12.33881 4 175 INT
17.22.09.658358 e      udp 192.168.1.50.domain > 172.16.2.12.45249 5 192 INT
17.22.32.516689 e      udp 192.168.1.50.domain > 172.16.2.12.45249 5 193 INT
17.22.33.38938 e      tcp 194.7.248.153.3769 > 172.16.2.12.telnet 6 368 CON
17.22.33.38938 e      udp 172.16.11.50.1968 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 174 INT
17.22.33.413137 e     udp 172.16.11.50.1968 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 174 INT
17.22.33.453886 e     udp 172.16.11.50.1968 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 174 INT
17.22.33.453886 e     udp 172.16.11.50.1971 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 174 INT
17.22.38.2268086 e    tcp 194.7.248.153.3769 > 172.16.2.12.telnet 6 368 CON
17.23.14.446072 e     udp 172.16.11.50.1972 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 172 INT
17.23.14.446072 e     udp 172.16.11.50.1972 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 172 INT
17.23.27.495456 e     udp 172.16.11.10.3343 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 168 INT
17.23.44.591424 e     udp 172.16.11.50.1973 > 172.16.2.12.domain 2 172 INT
```

DaemonLogger starts up:

daemonlogger -i eth0 -o eth2

```
ssh-server host-2 sftp-filers host-2 sftp-filers snort-IDS R1-FRR

/ #
/ #
/ #
/ #

# daemonlogger -i eth0 -o eth2
[-] Interface set to eth0
[-] log filename set to "daemonlogger.pcap"
[-] Tap output interface set to eth2[-] Pidfile configured to "daemonlogger.pid"
[-] Pidpath configured to "/var/run"
[-] Rollover size set to 18446744071562067968 bytes
[-] Rollover time configured for 0 seconds
[-] Pruning behavior set to oldest IN DIRECTORY

-> DaemonLogger <-
Version 1.2.1
By Martin Roesch
(C) Copyright 2006-2007 Sourcefire Inc., All rights reserved

sniffing on interface eth0
start_sniffing() device eth0 network lookup:   eth0: no IPv4 address assigned
```

Snort IDS starts up:

snort -i eth0 -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -l /var/log/snort -A full

```
==== Initialization Complete ====
-> Snort! <-
Version 2.9.11.1 GRE (Build 268)
By Martin Roesch & The Snort Team: http://www.snort.org/contact#team
Copyright (C) 2014-2017 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Copyright (C) 1998-2013 Sourcefire, Inc., et al.
Using libpcap version 8.38 2015-11-23
Using ZLIB version: 1.2.8

Rules Engine: SF_SNORT_DETECTION_ENGINE Version 3.0 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SSLPP Version 1.1 <Build 4>
Preprocessor Object: SF_DNP3 Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SIP Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_MODBUS Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_IMAP Version 1.0 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_GTP Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_DCERPC2 Version 1.0 <Build 3>
Preprocessor Object: SF_FTPTELNET Version 1.2 <Build 13>
Preprocessor Object: SF_POP Version 1.0 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SDF Version 1.1 <Build 1>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SSH Version 1.1 <Build 3>
Preprocessor Object: SF_DNS Version 1.1 <Build 4>
Preprocessor Object: SF_SMTP Version 1.1 <Build 9>
Preprocessor Object: SF_REPUTATION Version 1.1 <Build 1>

Commencing packet processing (pid=3830)
```

2.1.1 Replay the rewritten pcap

```
tcpreplay (tcpreplay) - Replay network traffic stored in pcap files
Usage: tcpreplay [-flag] <val> | --name[={=}<val>] ... <pcap_file(s)>

-d, --debug-num           Enable debugging output
-q, --quiet                Quiet mode
-T, --timer=stn            Select packet timing mode: select, ioport, gtod, nano
--maxsleep=num             Sleep for no more than X milliseconds between packets
-v, --verbose               Print decoded packets via tcpdump to STDOUT
-A, --decode=str            Arguments passed to tcpdump decoder
-K, --preload-pcap         Preload packets into RAM before sending
-c, --cachefile=stn         Split traffic via a tcprep cache file
-2, --dualfile              Replay two files at a time from a network tap
-i, --infif1=stn            Client to server/RX-primary traffic output interface
-I, --infif2=stn            Server to client/TX/secondary traffic output interface
-l, --lennetics              List available network interfaces and exit
-1, --loop=ignum            Loop through the capture file X times
--loopdelay-ms=num          Delay between loops in milliseconds
-pktlen                   Override the snaplen and use the actual packet len
-L, --limit=num              Limit the number of packets to send
--duration=num              Limit the number of seconds to send
-X, --unique=multi          Modify replay speed to a given multiple
-p, --pps=stn                Replay packets at a given packets/sec
-M, --mbps=stn              Replay packets at a given Mbps
-t, --topspeed               Replay packets as fast as possible
-o, --oneatime                Replay one packet at a time for each user input
--pps-multi=num             Number of packets to send for each time interval
--unique-ip                 Modify IP addresses each loop iteration to generate unique flows
--unique-ip-loops=stn       Number of times to loop before assigning new unique ip
--no-flow-stats             Suppress printing and tracking flow count, rates and expirations
--flow-expiry=num            Number of inactive seconds before a flow is considered expired
-P, --pid                   Print the PID of tcpreplay at startup
--stats=num                 Print statistics every X seconds, or every loop if '0'
--version                  Print version information
-h, --less-help              Display less usage information and exit
-H, --help                   display extended usage information and exit
-!, --more-help              extended usage information passed thru pager
--save-optsvs=[arg]          save the option state to a config file
--load-optsvs=stn            load options from a config file
```

- Replay the new pcap files to vip2 virtual network interface of GNS3 VM.



sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 -K -x 7.0 LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap

- x play as 7 times speed (since -t will cause pkgs loss issue on my machine)
- K preload pcap to speed up replay

Above, as I investigated -t will omit many packages, because it transfers too fast. Then I switch to -x speedup options, it can not transfer all the packages. 7 times speedup is optimized number I can take, otherwise, it will take more than 4 hours to finish replaying by original speed.

First of all, let us activate the “capture” feature on GNS3 link between R1-FRR and Snort-IDS


Assignment 3 - Network Topology Inspired by Lab 6 and 7



From Wireshark UI screenshot above, we can see the traffic is sniffed between [R1-FRR eth2 to snort-IDS eth0]. The datasets were already rewritten to adapt to our topology.

The output is saved by me as “LLS_DDoS_1.0-inside_rewrite_reply.pcap”. The reviewer can find this file on my shared OneDrive [6].

Let us quickly examine the traffic displayed on Wireshark UI. Because there are a lot of packets, We need to utilize the filter “tcp.flags.syn” to discover any potentials issues related to DDoS.



From the screenshot above, I am put “tcp.flags.syn” as filter string. We can see couple of red dark color highlighted packages seemed to have problem. For example, it noted as “A new tcp session is started with the same ports as an earlier session”. However, it is hard to tell which one is actual attack from human's eyes. And it is tedious to check it one by one manly. Now we want to check Snort logs which automatically generated alerts and logs.

Run time for packet:

```
=====
Run time for packet processing was 1741.573787 seconds
Snort processed 562229 packets.
Snort ran for 0 days 0 hours 29 minutes 1 seconds
  Pkts/min: 19387
  Pkts/sec: 322
=====
```

Packet I/O Totals:

```
=====
Packet I/O Totals:
  Received: 562229
  Analyzed: 562229 (100.000%)
  Dropped: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Filtered: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Outstanding: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Injected: 0
=====
```

Breakdown by protocol

```
=====
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets):
  Eth: 563296 (100.000%)
  VLAN: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4: 560245 ( 99.458%)
  Frag: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP: 219 ( 0.039%)
  UDP: 124638 ( 22.127%)
  TCP: 435388 ( 77.293%)
  IP6: 1 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Ext: 1 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Opts: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Frag6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP6: 1 ( 0.000%)
  UDP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Teredo: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP-IP: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4/IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4/IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6/IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6/IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE Eth: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE VLAN: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP6 Ext: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE PPTP: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE ARP: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IPX: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE Loop: 0 ( 0.000%)
  MPLS: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ARP: 1934 ( 0.343%)
  IPX: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Eth Loop: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Eth Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4 Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  UDP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  All Discard: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Other: 1116 ( 0.198%)
  Bad Chk Sum: 7323 ( 1.300%)
  Bad TTL: 0 ( 0.000%)
  S5 G 1: 335 ( 0.059%)
  S5 G 2: 732 ( 0.130%)
  Total: 563296
=====
```

Alerts:

```
Action Stats:
Alerts:      394 ( 0.070%)
Logged:      394 ( 0.070%)
Passed:       0 ( 0.000%)
Limits:
Match:        0
Queue:        0
Log:          0
Event:        0
Alert:        18
Verdicts:
Allow:    555074 ( 98.727%)
Block:      0 ( 0.000%)
Replace:    0 ( 0.000%)
Whitelist:  7155 ( 1.273%)
Blacklist:   0 ( 0.000%)
Ignore:     0 ( 0.000%)
Retry:      0 ( 0.000%)
=====
```

Stream statistics:

```
Stream statistics:
Total sessions: 21725
  TCP sessions: 8785
  UDP sessions: 12940
ICMP sessions: 0
  IP sessions: 0
  TCP Prunes: 132
  UDP Prunes: 0
  ICMP Prunes: 0
  IP Prunes: 0
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 8825
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 8825
  TCP Timeouts: 41
  TCP Overlaps: 0
TCP Segments Queued: 123380
TCP Segments Released: 123380
TCP Rebuilt Packets: 21789
  TCP Segments Used: 65813
  TCP Discards: 5
  TCP Gaps: 6745
UDP Sessions Created: 13287
UDP Sessions Deleted: 13287
  UDP Timeouts: 347
  UDP Discards: 0
=====
```

HTTP Inspect – encodings:

```
HTTP Inspect - encodings (Note: stream-reassembled packets included):
POST methods:           0
GET methods:            7316
HTTP Request Headers extracted: 7319
HTTP Request Cookies extracted: 0
Post parameters extracted: 0
HTTP response Headers extracted: 7303
HTTP Response Cookies extracted: 592
Unicode:                0
Double unicode:          0
Non-ASCII representable: 3
Directory traversals:   0
Extra slashes ("//"):   21
Self-referencing paths ("./"): 0
HTTP Response Gzip packets extracted: 0
Gzip Compressed Data Processed: n/a
Gzip Decompressed Data Processed: n/a
Http/2 Rebuilt Packets: 0
Total packets processed: 54577
=====
```

SMTP Preprocessor Statistics

```
SMTP Preprocessor Statistics
Total sessions : 254
Max concurrent sessions : 184
Base64 attachments decoded : 0
Total Base64 decoded bytes : 0
Quoted-Printable attachments decoded : 0
Total Quoted decoded bytes : 0
UU attachments decoded : 0
Total UU decoded bytes : 0
Non-Encoded MIME attachments extracted : 0
Total Non-Encoded MIME bytes extracted : 0
SMTP Sessions fastpathed due to memcap exceeded: 3262
=====
```

Therefore, from the screenshots of statistics of different perspectives, we found it reports 338 alerts, which occupied 0.088 % of total packages. Let us take a look at the alert log and find any interesting things. I saved this file as “LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside-before.alert” which can be viewed in shared OneDrive Folder [6].

By checking Priority:1 in alert, we found all the attacks belong to “Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain”:

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
 17 [Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
```

- 17 [Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]

By checking “priority:2”, we found several attack types, such as:

- 16 [Classification: Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application] [Priority: 2]
- 27 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
- 89 [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
- 19 [Classification: Misc Attack] [Priority: 2]
- [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
 16 [Classification: Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application] [Priority: 2]
 27 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
 89 [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
 19 [Classification: Misc Attack] [Priority: 2]
 5 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]
```

priority:3 and below are not suspicious activities.

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 3" | sort | uniq -c
 204 [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
 17 [Classification: Not Suspicious Traffic] [Priority: 3]
```

- 204 [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
- 17 [Classification: Not Suspicious Traffic] [Priority: 3]

Next, LLS_DDOS datasets contains another PCAP file: LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap. We would better check it as well and make the comparison.


Same as “LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.dump” file, we do the same preparation for “LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap”. So, I setup daemonlogger on R1-RFF and started Snort command on the snort-IDS server. One more thing is I need to clear up logs under /var/log/snort/ to make sure new traffic obtains new logs. The I issued command on “GNS-VM” to replay the traffic:

```
sudo tcpreplay -i -x 7.0 vip2 LLS_DDOS_1.0-
dmz_rewrite.pcap
```

After executing the following command:

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_rewrite.pcap -t
```

I was continuously monitor sniffed traffic via Wireshark:



From the screenshot above, I did identify some issues related to SYN communication, like retransmission of suspected frame. I will show the Snort statistics results and related alerts logs.


Run time and average rates:

```
=====
Run time for packet processing was 1779.467369 seconds
Snort processed 362321 packets.
Snort ran for 0 days 0 hours 29 minutes 39 seconds
  Pkts/min:      12493
  Pkts/sec:     203
=====
```

Packet I/O totals:

```
=====
Packet I/O Totals:
  Received:      362321
  Analyzed:     362321 (100.000%)
  Dropped:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Filtered:       0 ( 0.000%)
  Outstanding:    0 ( 0.000%)
  Injected:       0
=====
```

Protocol breakdown:



Alerts Stats:

```
=====
Action Stats:
  Alerts:      1223 ( 0.337%)
  Logged:     1223 ( 0.337%)
  Passed:       0 ( 0.000%)
Limits:
  Match:        0
  Queue:        0
  Log:          0
  Event:        0
  Alert:        109
Verdicts:
  Allow:      346937 ( 95.754%)
  Block:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Replace:      0 ( 0.000%)
  Whitelist:   15384 ( 4.246%)
  Blacklist:     0 ( 0.000%)
  Ignore:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Retry:         0 ( 0.000%)
=====
```

Stream Stats:

```
Stream statistics:
  Total sessions: 10299
    TCP sessions: 8926
    UDP sessions: 1373
  ICMP sessions: 0
    IP sessions: 0
    TCP Prunes: 0
    UDP Prunes: 0
    ICMP Prunes: 0
    IP Prunes: 0
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 8927
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 8927
  TCP Timeouts: 3
  TCP Overlaps: 6
  TCP Segments Queued: 104853
TCP Segments Released: 104853
  TCP Rebuilt Packets: 22999
  TCP Segments Used: 69891
    TCP Discards: 13
    TCP Gaps: 6765
UDP Sessions Created: 1373
UDP Sessions Deleted: 1373
  UDP Timeouts: 0
  UDP Discards: 0
  Events: 88127
Internal Events: 0
TCP Port Filter
  Filtered: 0
  Inspected: 0
  Tracked: 351773
UDP Port Filter
  Filtered: 0
  Inspected: 0
  Tracked: 1373
```

HTTP Inspect:

```
HTTP Inspect - encodings (Note: stream-reassembled packets included):
  POST methods: 0
  GET methods: 7711
  HTTP Request Headers extracted: 7725
  HTTP Request Cookies extracted: 0
  Post parameters extracted: 1
  HTTP response Headers extracted: 7703
  HTTP Response Cookies extracted: 601
  Unicode: 0
  Double unicode: 0
  Non-ASCII representable: 0
  Directory traversals: 0
  Extra slashes ("//"): 24
  Self-referencing paths ("./."): 0
  HTTP Response Gzip packets extracted: 0
  Gzip Compressed Data Processed: n/a
  Gzip Decompressed Data Processed: n/a
  Http/2 Rebuilt Packets: 0
  Total packets processed: 57178
```

SMTP stats:

```
SMTP Preprocessor Statistics
  Total sessions : 247
  Max concurrent sessions : 184
  Base64 attachments decoded : 0
  Total Base64 decoded bytes : 0
  Quoted-Printable attachments decoded : 0
  Total Quoted decoded bytes : 0
  UU attachments decoded : 0
  Total UU decoded bytes : 0
  Non-Encoded MIME attachments extracted : 0
  Total Non-Encoded MIME bytes extracted : 0
  SMTP Sessions fastpathed due to memcap exceeded: 3242
```

POP Stats:

```
POP Preprocessor Statistics
  Total sessions : 16
  Max concurrent sessions : 12
  Base64 attachments decoded : 0
  Total Base64 decoded bytes : 0
  Quoted-Printable attachments decoded : 0
  Total Quoted decoded bytes : 0
  UU attachments decoded : 0
  Total UU decoded bytes : 0
  Non-Encoded MIME attachments extracted : 0
  Total Non-Encoded MIME bytes extracted : 0
```

Based on alerts logs, I found priority 1 and 2 information:

By checking Priority:1 in alert, we found all the attacks belong to “Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain”:

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
  38 [Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
```

- 38 [Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]

By examining the priority 2, we found the following unique alert types:

- 18 [Classification: Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application] [Priority: 2]
- 29 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
- 160 [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
- 123 [Classification: Misc Attack] [Priority: 2]
- 20 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
  18 [Classification: Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application] [Priority: 2]
  29 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
  160 [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
  123 [Classification: Misc Attack] [Priority: 2]
  20 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]
```

However, those alerts information are quite general, and I did not find DoS alert message, or they were overridden by other alerts. So, I am going to improve the configuration to discover those hidden issues.

Next section, I was going to seek efficient way to improve the Snort rules to detect potentials issues from previous samples.

4 Question 2: Improvement of detection rules

Here, in this section, I want to go further to discuss how to modify and refine the snort configuration to make it work just as what we want.

4.1 Locate Snort configuration file

Firstly, let us recall the Snort concepts: Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention system, capable of performing real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. It can perform protocol analysis, content searching/matching, and can be used to detect a variety of attacks and probes, such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, OS fingerprinting attempts, and much more [8].

Usually, it has a major configuration file specify global work environment. More important, it can include external configuration for each specific attack category. For example, ICMP.rule under /etc/snort/snort.config.

At this point, I want to create a brand-new rule file, especially for the DoS attack which the original datasets targets on. Then include this rule file into snort.config global configures.

4.2 Make the rule for DoS

A denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) is a cyber-attack in which the perpetrator seeks to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to the internet. Denial of service is typically accomplished by flooding the targeted machine or resource with superfluous requests in an attempt to overload systems and prevent some or all legitimate requests from being fulfilled [7].

Denial-of-service attacks are characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate use of a service. There are two general forms of DoS attacks: those that crash services and those that flood services. The most serious attacks are distributed. It is called DDoS. We can simulate it by issuing Hping3 command with randomized source IP [7].

To explain my motivation and method of the rules I made for DoS, I want to show a real example:

```
root@tleemcj-metasploitable2-1:~# netstat
Active Internet connections (w/o servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          75.74.110.159:1749   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          209.194.36.253:1738   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          103.124.250.210:1730  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          136.207.56.221:1634  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          119.32.1.5:1725    SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          1.90.79.26:sa-msg-port  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          117.30.34.5:1663    SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          77.237.45.195:1756   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          144.68.2.132:1734   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          118.31.36.49:1647   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          203.0.108.247:1683   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          184.68.220.28:1741   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          13.58.109.254:1681   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          163.162.244.113:1750  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          188.207.5.184:1768   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          76.216.156.216:1650  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          209.215.115.93:1711  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          243.89.145.50:1706   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          195.128.72.74:1760   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          203.246.216.145:1762  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          58.71.196.189:1753   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          44.65.166.92:1669   SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          221.227.65.253:1666  SYN_RECV
tcp     0      0    172.16.1.13:www          9.93.76.140:1755   SYN_RECV
```

From the screenshot of “netstats” results on victim server. I can see that many connections stay in SYN_RECV state. And source IP are randomized to be simulated from different locations. The waiting time is the time between receiving the first and third packet in the 3-way handshake. It has been proved 5-6 packets stay in the same state SYN_RECV is overly aggressive case. The health situation is that only maximum 1/5 of the sockets should be in SYN_RECV and the majority should be in ESTABLISHED or TIME_WAIT state.

Therefor, I can tell something is abnormal when I observe many SYN_RECV packets constantly. In conclusion, having many SYN_RECV packets means a SYN Flood.

At this point, Snort is tested a lot from last section. Now, we need to write our own rules that will enable snort to detect more potential attack, such as DDoS etc.

Inspired by the instruction [10], I created own rules file

- Step 1: define our own classification in classification.config under /etc/snort/:**

```
# our own classifications
config classification: icmp-flood,Potential DoS attack,1
config classification: syn-flood,Potential DoS attack,1

# our own classifications
config classification: icmp-flood,Potential DoS attack,1
config classification: syn-flood,Potential DoS attack,1
```

I shall give a brief explanation about above coding:

Classification definition is csv comma separated file, we need to follow the fields to define each attribute names, like:

```
# config classification:shortname,short description,priority
#
```

- Step 2: define HOME_NET value in snort.conf under /etc/snort**

```
# Setup the network addresses you are protecting
ipvar HOME_NET 172.16.1.0/24
```

```
# Setup the network addresses you are protecting
ipvar HOME_NET 172.16.1.0/24
```

Because our vulnerable target IP is 172.16.1.13, the line above will protect all subnets of 172.16.1.0/24.

- Step 3: create a customized rule file under “/etc/snort/rules/”, let us say “cs6706.rules”.**

```
root@snort-IDS:/etc/snort/rules# ls
VRT-License.txt          community-web-misc.rules      mysql.rules          pua-toolbars.rules
app-detect.rules          community-web-php.rules      netbios.rules        rpc.rules
attack-responses.rules   content-replace.rules      nntp.rules          rservices.rules
backdoor.rules            cs6706.rules              oracle.rules        scada.rules
bad-traffic.rules         ddos.rules               os-linux.rules      scan.rules
black_list.rules          deleted.rules            os-mobile.rules    server-apache.rules
blocklist.rules           dns.rules               os-other.rules     server-iis.rules
```

- Step 4: include this file in the Snore global configuration file: “/etc/snort/snort.conf”**

Sudo vim snort.conf:

```
root@snort-IDS:/etc/snort# ls
attribute_table.dtd      file_magic.conf  preproc_rules      rules      snort.conf  threshold.conf
classification.config    gen-msg.map       reference.config  sid-msg.map so_rules   unicode.map
root@snort-IDS:/etc/snort# sudo vim snort.conf
```

```
#####this is for customized rule files#####
include $RULE_PATH/cs6706.rules
```

```
#include $RULE_PATH/community-web-misc.rules
#include $RULE_PATH/community-web-php.rules
#####this is for customized rule files#####
include $RULE_PATH/cs6706.rules
```

The content I will add in shows below:

```
alert icmp any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Potential ICMP flood
attack detected"; sid:6706001; classtype:icmp-flood;
detection_filter:track by_dst, count 550, seconds 4;)
```

It is worth to explain the line above here:

Rule action includes several conditions which trigger the alerts, it includes Source IP, Source port

- icmp – protocol we are looking at
- any – we will look at all sources.
- any – we will look at all ports.
- \$HOME_NET –We are using the HOME_NET value from the snort.conf file.
- any – we will look at all ports on the protected network

there are also options for rules definition for customization:

- msg– we can customize the alert message at this point.
- sid:6706001 – snort rule ID. We should make it unique.
- classtype:I am using my own customized class “icmp-flood”.
- detection_filter:track by_dst – we are tracking the destination IP address for detection.
- seconds 4 – detection interval period 4 seconds

- count 550 – during the detection interval period, we are sampling 550 packets.

```
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (flags: S; msg:"Potential SYN flood Attack detected"; flow:stateless; sid:6706002; classtype:syn-flood;detection_filter:track by_dst, count 15, seconds 5);
```

In this rule we have changed the protocol to TCP and set the destination port number to 80. The keyword flag checks if specific TCP flag bits(in this case SYN flag) are present. The sampling period is set to 10 seconds. If during this time period more than 20 requests are detected, then we will receive the alert.

Finally, we have our own defined rules in cs6706.rules:



```
# Copyright 2001-2005 Sourcefire, Inc. All Rights Reserved
#
# This file may contain proprietary rules that were created, tested and
# certified by Sourcefire, Inc. (the "VRT Certified Rules") as well as
# rules that were created by Sourcefire and other third parties and
# distributed under the GNU General Public License (the "GPL Rules"). The
# VRT Certified Rules contained in this file are the property of
# Sourcefire, Inc. Copyright 2005 Sourcefire, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
# The GPL Rules created by Sourcefire, Inc. are the property of
# Sourcefire, Inc. Copyright 2002-2005 Sourcefire, Inc. All Rights
# Reserved. All other GPL Rules are owned and copyrighted by their
# respective owners (please see www.snort.org/contributors for a list of
# owners and their respective copyrights). In order to determine what
# rules are VRT Certified Rules or GPL Rules, please refer to the VRT
# Certified Rules License Agreement.
#
#
# $Id: cs6706.rules,v 0.9 2020/06/26 10:17:51 Christian Gang Liu Exp $
#-----
# Our Own DDoS RULES
#-----
```

```
alert icmp any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Potential ICMP flood attack detected"; sid:6706001; classtype:icmp-flood; detection_filter:track by_dst, count 550, seconds 4;)


alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (flags: S; msg:"Potential SYN flood Attack detected"; flow:stateless; sid:6706002; classtype:syn-flood; detection_filter:track by_dst, count 15, seconds 5);
```

Next, I want to retest it with ICMP and SYN DOS attack by Hping3 command.

4.3 Hping3 Simulation

Here, I was reusing the PCAP output of last time running Hping3 command: hping3-initial-test.pcap before we made rules change:

```
sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 -K -x 7.0 hping3-initial-test.pcap
```



```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 -K -x 7.0 hping3-initial-test.pcap
File Cache is enabled
Actual: 251649 packets (35187106 bytes) sent in 13.02 seconds
Rated: 2701910.8 Bps, 21.61 Mbps, 19323.36 pps
Flows: 250464 flows, 19232.36 fps, 251635 flow packets, 14 non-flow
Statistics for network device: vip2
    Successful packets: 251649
    Failed packets: 0
    Truncated packets: 0
    Retried packets (ENOBUFS): 0
    Retried packets (EAGAIN): 0
```

Then we should take a look at Snort stats and alerts:

Packet I/O Totals:

| Packet I/O Totals: | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| Received: | 104330 |
| Analyzed: | 90436 (86.683%) |
| Dropped: | 13894 (11.752%) |
| Filtered: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Outstanding: | 13894 (13.317%) |
| Injected: | 0 |

Breakdown by protocol

| Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets): | |
|---|-------------------|
| Eth: | 90436 (100.000%) |
| VLAN: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP4: | 90418 (99.980%) |
| Frag: | 0 (0.000%) |
| ICMP: | 0 (0.000%) |
| UDP: | 0 (0.000%) |
| TCP: | 90418 (99.980%) |
| IP6: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP6 Ext: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP6 Opts: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Frag6: | 0 (0.000%) |
| ICMP6: | 0 (0.000%) |
| UDP6: | 0 (0.000%) |
| TCP6: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Teredo: | 0 (0.000%) |
| ICMP-IP: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP4/IP4: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP4/IP6: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP6/IP4: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP6/IP6: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE Eth: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE VLAN: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE IP4: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE IP6: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE IP6 Ext: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE PPTP: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE ARP: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE IPX: | 0 (0.000%) |
| GRE Loop: | 0 (0.000%) |
| MPLS: | 0 (0.000%) |
| ARP: | 18 (0.020%) |
| IPX: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Eth Loop: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Eth Disc: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP4 Disc: | 0 (0.000%) |
| IP6 Disc: | 0 (0.000%) |
| TCP Disc: | 0 (0.000%) |
| UDP Disc: | 0 (0.000%) |
| ICMP Disc: | 0 (0.000%) |
| All Discard: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Other: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Bad Chk Sum: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Bad TTL: | 0 (0.000%) |
| SS G 1: | 0 (0.000%) |
| SS G 2: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Total: | 90436 |

Alerts stats:

| Action Stats: | |
|---------------|------------------|
| Alerts: | 37084 (41.006%) |
| Logged: | 37084 (41.006%) |
| Passed: | 0 (0.000%) |
| limits: | |
| Match: | 0 |
| Queue: | 0 |
| Log: | 0 |
| Event: | 0 |
| Alert: | 0 |
| Verdicts: | |
| Allow: | 90436 (86.683%) |
| Block: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Replace: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Whitelist: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Blacklist: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Ignore: | 0 (0.000%) |
| Retry: | 0 (0.000%) |

From above, we noticed alerts rates increased dramatically because of new rules setting. Let us look inside the logs:

```
cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
```

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
36939 [Classification: Potential DoS attack] [Priority: 1]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

- 36939 [Classification: Potential DoS attack] [Priority: 1]

We identified Priority 1 alerts which classified as “Potential DoS attack”. That means new rules worked. Same things we can do with priority 2 and 3

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
 145 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 3" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

- 145 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]

We find 145 bad traffic alerts, which come from the original alert rules.

4.4 Port scan detection

In addition, we might want to enable Port scan detection as well. It is easy to achieve [9].

Navigate to /etc/snort directory, and open /etc/snort/snort.conf. Then find the following line:

```
#preprocessor sfportscan: proto { all } memcap { 10000000 }
sense_level { low }
```

add the following below the line:

```
preprocessor sfportscan: proto { all } scan_type { all }
sense_level { high } \logfile { portscan.log }
```

```
... (snip)
# Portscan detection. For more information, see README_sfportscan
# preprocessor sfportscan: proto { (all) } memcap { (10000000) } sense_level { (low) }
preprocessor sfportscan: proto { (all) } scan_type { (all) } sense_level { (high) } \logfile { (portscan.log) }
```

Then run snort (monitor eth0)

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# ./snort -i eth0 -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -l /var/log/snort -A full
running in user mode
--- Initializing Snort ---
Initializing Output Plugins!
Initializing Input Plugins!
Initialization of Plugins!
Initialization of Plugins!
Parses Rules file '/etc/snort/snort.conf'
... (snip)
0002 51423 53331 55029 55555 56742 ] PortVar _SHELLCODE_PORTS_ defined : [ @:79 $1-$5535 ]
PortVar _SHMFILE_PORTS_ defined : [ @:30 $1-$5535 ]
```

perform port scan from my VM

```
$sudo nmap -sT -p1000-2000 172.16.1.13
```

```
gns3@gns3vm:~$ sudo nmap -sT -p 1000-2000 172.16.1.13
Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-06-27 15:53 +03
Nmap scan report for 172.16.1.13
Host is up (0.0050s latency).
Not shown: 999 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
1099/tcp   open  rmiregistry
1524/tcp   open  ingreslock

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.59 seconds
gns3@gns3vm:~$
```

Next, we want to check snort stats:

```
=====
Run time for packet processing was 29.20987 seconds
Snort processed 1576 packets.
Snort ran for 0 days 0 hours 0 minutes 29 seconds
Pkts/sec: 54
=====

Memory usage summary:
  Total non-mapped bytes (arena): 30081024
  Bytes in mapped regions (hb1khd): 29995008
  Total allocated space (wordblks): 23273216
  Total free space (fordblks): 6807808
  Topmost releasable block (keepcost): 461872
=====

Packet I/O Totals:
  Received: 1576
  Analyzed: 1576 (100.000%)
  Dropped: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Filtered: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Outstanding: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Injected: 0
=====

Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets):
  Eth: 1576 (100.000%)
  VLAN: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4: 1572 ( 99.746%)
  Frag: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP: 4 ( 0.254%)
  UDP: 0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP: 1568 ( 99.492%)
  IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Ext: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Opts: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ... (snip)
```

Alert stats:

```
=====
Action Stats:
  Alerts: 3 ( 0.190%)
  Logged: 3 ( 0.190%)
  Passed: 0 ( 0.000%)
Limits:
  Match: 0
  Queue: 0
  Log: 0
  Event: 0
  Alert: 0
Verdicts:
  Allow: 1576 (100.000%)
  Block: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Replace: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Whitelist: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Blacklist: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Ignore: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Retry: 0 ( 0.000%)
=====
```

From above, we did find alert. We want to see the details:

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert
[**] [1:469:3] ICMP PING NMAP [**]
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
06/27-13:01:07.333772 192.168.111.1 -> 172.16.1.13
ICMP TTL:39 TOS:0x0 ID:13233 Iplen:20 DgmLen:28
Type:8 Code:0 ID:59751 Seq:0 ECHO
[Xref => http://www.whitehats.com/info/IDS162]

[**] [1:384:5] ICMP PING [**]
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
06/27-13:01:07.333772 192.168.111.1 -> 172.16.1.13
ICMP TTL:39 TOS:0x0 ID:13233 Iplen:20 DgmLen:28
Type:8 Code:0 ID:59751 Seq:0 ECHO
[Xref => http://www.whitehats.com/info/IDS162]

[**] [1:453:5] ICMP Timestamp Request [**]
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
06/27-13:01:07.333772 192.168.111.1 -> 172.16.1.13
ICMP TTL:51 TOS:0x0 ID:25733 Iplen:20 DgmLen:40
Type:13 Code:0 ID: 38730 Seq: 0 TIMESTAMP REQUEST

root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
 1 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 3" | sort | uniq -c
 2 [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

We found priority 2 alert: Attempted Information Leak.

and check the logs at /var/log/snort.

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# ls
alert_portscan.log snort.log.1593262860
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat portscan.log
Time: 06/27-13:01:20.465030
event_ref: 0
192.168.111.1 -> 172.16.1.13 (portscan) TCP Portscan
Priority Count: 5
Connection Count: 11
IP Count: 1
Scanner IP Range: 192.168.111.1:192.168.111.1
Port/Proto Count: 11
Port/Proto Range: 443:1965

root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

Till now, we already setup snort configuration for tuning up.
Next, we want to test our real datasets downloaded from DARPA.

4.5 DARPA Intrusion Detection Datasets

However,

- 1) Replay LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap with new Snort rules:

```
sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 -K -x 7.0 LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap
```

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 -K -x 7.0 LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap
File Cache is enabled
Actual: 649787 packets (111685562 bytes) sent in 1698.07 seconds
Rated: 65771.8 Bps, 0.526 Mbps, 382.66 pps
Flows: 112405 flows, 66.19 fps, 646561 flow packets, 3084 non-flow
Statistics for network device: vip2
  Successful packets: 649787
  Failed packets: 0
  Truncated packets: 0
  Retried packets (ENOBUFS): 0
  Retried packets (EAGAIN): 0
```

On Snort side, we have stats like this:

Run time and average rates:

```
=====
Run time for packet processing was 1826.109403 seconds
Snort processed 507537 packets.
Snort ran for 0 days 0 hours 30 minutes 26 seconds
  Pkts/min:    16917
  Pkts/sec:    277
=====
```

Packet I/O totals:

```
=====
Packet I/O Totals:
  Received:      507537
  Analyzed:     507537 (100.000%)
  Dropped:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Filtered:       0 ( 0.000%)
  Outstanding:    0 ( 0.000%)
  Injected:       0
=====
```

Protocol breakdown:

```
=====
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets):
  Eth:      508664 (100.000%)
  VLAN:      0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4:      505757 ( 99.429%)
  Frag:      0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP:      207 ( 0.041%)
  UDP:      107547 ( 21.143%)
  TCP:      398003 ( 78.245%)
  IP6:        2 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Ext:    2 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Opts:    0 ( 0.000%)
  Frag6:      0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP6:      2 ( 0.000%)
  UDP6:      0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP6:      0 ( 0.000%)
  Teredo:      0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP-IP:    0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4/IP4:    0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4/IP6:    0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6/IP4:    0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6/IP6:    0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE:        0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE Eth:    0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE VLAN:   0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP4:    0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP6:    0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP6 Ext: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE PPTP:    0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE ARP:    0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IPX:    0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE Loop:    0 ( 0.000%)
  MPLS:        0 ( 0.000%)
  ARP:        1806 ( 0.355%)
  IPX:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Eth Loop:    0 ( 0.000%)
  Eth Disc:    0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4 Disc:    0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Disc:    0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP Disc:    0 ( 0.000%)
  UDP Disc:    0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP Disc:   0 ( 0.000%)
  All Discard: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Other:      1099 ( 0.216%)
  Bad Chk Sum: 10475 ( 2.059%)
  Bad TTL:      0 ( 0.000%)
  S5 G 1:      391 ( 0.077%)
  S5 G 2:      736 ( 0.145%)
  Total:      508664
=====
```

Alerts Stats:

```
=====
Action Stats:
  Alerts:      4753 ( 0.934%)
  Logged:      4753 ( 0.934%)
  Passed:      0 ( 0.000%)
Limits:
  Match:        0
  Queue:        0
  Log:          0
  Event:        0
  Alert:        18
Verdicts:
  Allow:      500836 ( 98.680%)
  Block:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Replace:      0 ( 0.000%)
  Whitelist:    6701 ( 1.320%)
  Blacklist:    0 ( 0.000%)
  Ignore:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Retry:         0 ( 0.000%)
=====
```

Stream Stats:

```
Stream statistics:
  Total sessions: 17555
    TCP sessions: 7202
    UDP sessions: 10353
  ICMP sessions: 0
    IP sessions: 0
    TCP Prunes: 348
    UDP Prunes: 0
  ICMP Prunes: 0
    IP Prunes: 0
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 7288
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 7288
  TCP Timeouts: 86
  TCP Overlaps: 0
  TCP Segments Queued: 109185
TCP Segments Released: 109185
  TCP Rebuilt Packets: 17276
  TCP Segments Used: 46988
    TCP Discards: 3
    TCP Gaps: 5418
  UDP Sessions Created: 11498
  UDP Sessions Deleted: 11498
    UDP Timeouts: 1145
    UDP Discards: 0
    Events: 115209
  Internal Events: 0
  TCP Port Filter
    Filtered: 0
    Inspected: 0
    Tracked: 386401
  UDP Port Filter
    Filtered: 0
    Inspected: 0
    Tracked: 10353
```

HTTP Inspect:

```
HTTP Inspect - encodings (Note: stream-reassembled packets included):
  POST methods:          0
  GET methods:           5822
  HTTP Request Headers extracted: 5825
  HTTP Request Cookies extracted: 0
  Post parameters extracted: 0
  HTTP response Headers extracted: 5791
  HTTP Response Cookies extracted: 528
  Unicode:               0
  Double unicode:        0
  Non-ASCII representable: 3
  Directory traversals:   0
  Extra slashes ("//"):  20
  Self-referencing paths ("./."): 0
  HTTP Response Gzip packets extracted: 0
  Gzip Compressed Data Processed: n/a
  Gzip Decompressed Data Processed: n/a
  Http/2 Rebuilt Packets: 0
  Total packets processed: 43591
```

SMTP stats:

```
SMTP Preprocessor Statistics
  Total sessions           : 300
  Max concurrent sessions : 184
  Base64 attachments decoded : 0
  Total Base64 decoded bytes : 0
  Quoted-Printable attachments decoded : 0
  Total Quoted decoded bytes : 0
  UU attachments decoded : 0
  Total UU decoded bytes : 0
  Non-Encoded MIME attachments extracted : 0
  Total Non-Encoded MIME bytes extracted : 0
  SMTP Sessions fastpathed due to memcap exceeded: 2575
```

POP Stats:

```
POP Preprocessor Statistics
  Total sessions           : 16
  Max concurrent sessions : 11
  Base64 attachments decoded : 0
  Total Base64 decoded bytes : 0
  Quoted-Printable attachments decoded : 0
  Total Quoted decoded bytes : 0
  UU attachments decoded : 0
  Total UU decoded bytes : 0
  Non-Encoded MIME attachments extracted : 0
  Total Non-Encoded MIME bytes extracted : 0
```

We can find above that Alerts reported 4753 (0.934%) which is much more than Snort rules customization. We can look inside Snort alerts to discover more:

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
  16 [Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
  4372 [Classification: Potential DoS attack] [Priority: 1]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
  15 [Classification: Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application] [Priority: 2]
  24 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
  84 [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
  27 [Classification: Misc Attack] [Priority: 2]
  5 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 3" | sort | uniq -c
  193 [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
  17 [Classification: Not Suspicious Traffic] [Priority: 3]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

Priority 1:

- 16 [Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
- 4372 [Classification: Potential DoS attack] [Priority: 1]

Priority 2:

- 15 [Classification: Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application] [Priority: 2]
- 24 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
- 84 [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
- 27 [Classification: Misc Attack] [Priority: 2]
- 5 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]

Priority 3:

- 193 [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
- 17 [Classification: Not Suspicious Traffic] [Priority: 3]

We can find Priority 1 has “• 4372 [Classification: Potential DoS attack] [Priority: 1]”, which reported by our new DoS rule. And 24 information leaking reported by port scan detection. Let us look at another dataset.

2) Replay LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_rewrite.pcap with new Snort rules:

```
sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 -K -x 7.0 LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_rewrite.pcap
gns3@gn3vm:~/assign3$ sudo tcpreplay -i vip2 -K -x 7.0 LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_rewrite.pcap
File Cache is enabled
Actual: 394089 packets (83138946 bytes) sent in 1704.59 seconds
Rated: 48773.4 Bps, 0.394 Mbps, 231.19 pps
Flows: 54230 flows, 31.81 fps, 388951 flow packets, 4264 non-flow
Statistics for network device: vip2
  Successful packets:      394089
  Failed packets:          0
  Truncated packets:       0
  Retried packets (ENOBUFS): 0
  Retried packets (EAGAIN): 0
gns3@gn3vm:~/assign3$
```

On Snort side, we have stats like this:

Run time and average rates:

```
=====
Run time for packet processing was 1742.78399 seconds
Snort processed 336040 packets.
Snort ran for 0 days 0 hours 29 minutes 2 seconds
  Pkts/min:      11587
  Pkts/sec:     192
=====
```

Packet I/O totals:

```
=====
Packet I/O Totals:
  Received:      336040
  Analyzed:     336040 (100.000%)
  Dropped:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Filtered:       0 ( 0.000%)
  Outstanding:    0 ( 0.000%)
  Injected:       0
=====
```

Protocol breakdown:

```
=====  
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets):  
=====  
Eth: 337136 (100.000%)  
VLAN: 0 ( 0.000%)  
IP4: 332957 ( 98.760%)  
Frag: 0 ( 0.000%)  
ICMP: 2891 ( 0.858%)  
UDP: 3284 ( 0.974%)  
TCP: 326782 ( 96.929%)  
IP6: 1 ( 0.000%)  
IP6 Ext: 1 ( 0.000%)  
IP6 Opts: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Frag6: 0 ( 0.000%)  
ICMP6: 1 ( 0.000%)  
UDP6: 0 ( 0.000%)  
TCP6: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Teredo: 0 ( 0.000%)  
ICMP-IP: 0 ( 0.000%)  
IP4/IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)  
IP4/IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)  
IP6/IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)  
IP6/IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE Eth: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE VLAN: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE IP6 Ext: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE PPTP: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE ARP: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE IPX: 0 ( 0.000%)  
GRE Loop: 0 ( 0.000%)  
MPLS: 0 ( 0.000%)  
ARP: 460 ( 0.136%)  
IPX: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Eth Loop: 1136 ( 0.337%)  
Eth Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)  
IP4 Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)  
IP6 Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)  
TCP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)  
UDP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)  
ICMP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)  
All Discard: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Other: 2582 ( 0.766%)  
Bad Chk Sum: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Bad TTL: 0 ( 0.000%)  
SS G 1: 427 ( 0.127%)  
SS G 2: 669 ( 0.198%)  
Total: 337136  
=====
```

Alerts Stats:

```
=====  
Action Stats:  
=====  
Alerts: 6697 ( 1.986%)  
Logged: 6697 ( 1.986%)  
Passed: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Limits:  
Match: 0  
Queue: 0  
Log: 0  
Event: 0  
Alert: 101  
Verdicts:  
Allow: 329059 ( 97.923%)  
Block: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Replace: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Whitelist: 6981 ( 2.077%)  
Blacklist: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Ignore: 0 ( 0.000%)  
Retry: 0 ( 0.000%)  
=====
```

Stream Stats:

```
=====  
Stream statistics:  
=====  
Total sessions: 9281  
TCP sessions: 7950  
UDP sessions: 1331  
ICMP sessions: 0  
IP sessions: 0  
TCP Prunes: 0  
UDP Prunes: 0  
ICMP Prunes: 0  
IP Prunes: 0  
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 7951  
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 7951  
TCP Timeouts: 2  
TCP Overlaps: 0  
TCP Segments Queued: 96399  
TCP Segments Released: 96399  
TCP Rebuilt Packets: 20035  
TCP Segments Used: 54818  
TCP Discards: 7  
TCP Gaps: 5925  
UDP Sessions Created: 1331  
UDP Sessions Deleted: 1331  
UDP Timeouts: 0  
UDP Discards: 0  
Events: 90635  
Internal Events: 0  
TCP Port Filter  
Filtered: 0  
Inspected: 0  
Tracked: 325686  
UDP Port Filter  
Filtered: 0  
Inspected: 0  
Tracked: 1331  
=====
```

HTTP Inspect:

```
=====  
HTTP Inspect - encodings (Note: stream-reassembled packets included):  
=====  
POST methods: 0  
GET methods: 6749  
HTTP Request Headers extracted: 6759  
HTTP Request Cookies extracted: 0  
Post parameters extracted: 0  
HTTP response Headers extracted: 6719  
HTTP Response Cookies extracted: 551  
Unicode: 0  
Double unicode: 0  
Non-ASCII representable: 0  
Directory traversals: 0  
Extra slashes ("//"): 23  
Self-referencing paths ("./"): 0  
HTTP Response Gzip packets extracted: 0  
Gzip Compressed Data Processed: n/a  
Gzip Decompressed Data Processed: n/a  
Http/2 Rebuilt Packets: 0  
Total packets processed: 50090  
=====
```

SMTP stats:

```
=====  
SMTP Preprocessor Statistics  
=====  
Total sessions : 249  
Max concurrent sessions : 184  
Base64 attachments decoded : 0  
Total Base64 decoded bytes : 0  
Quoted-Printable attachments decoded : 0  
Total Quoted decoded bytes : 0  
UU attachments decoded : 0  
Total UU decoded bytes : 0  
Non-Encoded MIME attachments extracted : 0  
Total Non-Encoded MIME bytes extracted : 0  
SMTP Sessions fastpathed due to memcap exceeded: 3027  
=====
```

POP Stats:

```
=====  
POP Preprocessor Statistics  
=====  
Total sessions : 16  
Max concurrent sessions : 12  
Base64 attachments decoded : 0  
Total Base64 decoded bytes : 0  
Quoted-Printable attachments decoded : 0  
Total Quoted decoded bytes : 0  
UU attachments decoded : 0  
Total UU decoded bytes : 0  
=====
```

We can find above that Alerts reported 6697 (1.986%) which is much more than Snort rules customization. We can look inside Snort alerts to discover more:

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
 37 [Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
 5498 [Classification: Potential DoS attack] [Priority: 1]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
 16 [Classification: Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application] [Priority: 2]
 25 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
 156 [Classification: Decode of an RPC query] [Priority: 2]
 124 [Classification: Misc Attack] [Priority: 2]
 20 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 3" | sort | uniq -c
 816 [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
 5 [Classification: Not Suspicious Traffic] [Priority: 3]
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

Priority 1:

- 37 [Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
- 5498 [Classification: Potential DoS attack] [Priority: 1]

Priority 2:

- 16 [Classification: Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application] [Priority: 2]
- 25 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
- 156 [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
- 124 [Classification: Misc Attack] [Priority: 2]
- 20 [Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]

Priority 3:

- 816 [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3]
- 5 [Classification: Not Suspicious Traffic] [Priority: 3]


We can find Priority 1 has “• 5498 [Classification: Potential DoS attack] [Priority: 1]”, which reported by our new DoS rule. And 25 information leaking reported by port scan detection.

Next, we want to step further to apply Access Control List on

4.6 Access Control List Deployment

In this stage, I want to step further to deploy ACL on R2 on my topology. The purpose is narrow down the detection sample and focus on the issues we want to detect. In order to achieve it, I need to move victim machine behind R2. Then it will be allocated in Internal network with 172.16.2.13 IP.

4.6.1 Topology revise



From the new topology above, we can see victim server is within 172.16.2.0/24 subnet. Therefore, our ACL on R2 will target on this victim machine. I am going to follow Lab 6 guideline to complete ACL creation [12].

4.6.2 ACL creation

Here, I want to do three things in term of detection efficiency.

```
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#show ip access-lists
R2-Cisco#enable
R2-Cisco#
```

From above, we can see R2 has nothing about access-lists

```
R2-Cisco#show ip interface brief
Interface          IP-Address      OK? Method Status      Protocol
FastEthernet0/0    172.16.1.2      YES NVRAM up        up
FastEthernet0/1    172.16.2.1      YES NVRAM up        up
FastEthernet1/0    unassigned     YES NVRAM administratively down down
FastEthernet2/0    unassigned     YES NVRAM administratively down down
R2-Cisco#
```

Screenshot above tells internet network 172.16.2.0 connect with f0/1

i. Block all ping traffic to Internal network.

From the screenshot below, I was running the commands chain:

```
R2-Cisco(config)#access-list 101 deny icmp any any echo
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#acces
R2-Cisco(config)#access-list 101 permit ip any any
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#end
R2-Cisco#
*Mar 1 01:21:58.247: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#conf t
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
R2-Cisco(config)#inter f0/0
R2-Cisco(config-if)#
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acces
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip access-group 101 in
R2-Cisco(config-if)#
R2-Cisco#
```

```
R2-Cisco(config)#access-list 101 deny icmp any any echo
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#acces
R2-Cisco(config)#access-list 101 permit ip any any
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#end
R2-Cisco#
*Mar 1 01:21:58.247: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#conf t
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
R2-Cisco(config)#inter f0/0
R2-Cisco(config-if)#
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acces
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip access-group 101 in
R2-Cisco(config-if)#
R2-Cisco#
```

As the result, all the pings to 172.16.2.0/24 internal network will be filtered. Please check screenshot below:

```

gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ ping 172.16.2.13
PING 172.16.2.13 (172.16.2.13) 56(84) bytes of data.
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=1 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=2 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=3 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=4 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=5 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=6 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=7 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=8 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=9 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=10 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=11 Packet filtered
^C
--- 172.16.2.13 ping statistics ---
11 packets transmitted, 0 received, +11 errors, 100% packet loss, time 10018ms

gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ ping 172.16.2.11
PING 172.16.2.11 (172.16.2.11) 56(84) bytes of data.
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=1 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=2 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=3 Packet filtered
^C
--- 172.16.2.11 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 0 received, +3 errors, 100% packet loss, time 2004ms

gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ ping 172.16.2.12
PING 172.16.2.12 (172.16.2.12) 56(84) bytes of data.
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=1 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=2 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=3 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=4 Packet filtered
From 172.16.1.2 icmp_seq=5 Packet filtered

```

ii. Deny SNMP queries to vulnerable metasploitable server.

For testing purpose, enable SNMP on metasploitable server firstly:

```
root@tleemcj-metasploitable2-1:/# nano /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf
```

```
agentAddress udp:161,udp6:[::1]:161
rocommunity public
```

Restarted snmp service:

```
root@tleemcj-metasploitable2-1:/# nano /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf
root@tleemcj-metasploitable2-1:/# service snmpd restart
Restarting network management services: snmpd.
root@tleemcj-metasploitable2-1:/#
```

Then, I extended 101 access list on R2:

```
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-list exten
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-list extended 101
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit ip host 172.16.2.13 any
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#deny udp any any eq snmp
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#deny udp any any eq snmptrap
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit ip any any
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#inter f0/0
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acc
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acce
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip access-group 101 in
R2-Cisco(config-if)#end
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#show
*Mar 1 01:54:36.603: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
R2-Cisco#show ip acce
R2-Cisco#show ip access-lists
Extended IP access list 101
 10 deny icmp any any echo (60 matches)
 20 permit ip any any
 30 permit ip host 172.16.2.13 any
 40 deny udp any any eq snmp
 50 deny udp any any eq snmptrap
R2-Cisco#
```

```

Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-list exten
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-list extended 101
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit ip host 172.16.2.13 any
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#deny udp any any eq snmp
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#deny udp any any eq snmptrap
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#inter f0/0
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acc
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acce
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip access-group 101 in
R2-Cisco(config-if)#end
R2-Cisco#
R2-Cisco#show
*Mar 1 01:54:36.603: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
R2-Cisco#show ip acce
R2-Cisco#show ip access-lists
Extended IP access list 101
 10 deny icmp any any echo (60 matches)
 20 permit ip any any
 30 permit ip host 172.16.2.13 any
 40 deny udp any any eq snmp
 50 deny udp any any eq snmptrap
R2-Cisco#
```

As the result, when we try to snmpwalk 172.16.2.13, it will end up with timeout. Please check screenshot below:

```

gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ sudo snmpwalk -Os -c public -v 2c 172.16.2.13
Timeout: No Response from 172.16.2.13
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$
```

iii. From internal network to the servers, allow only ssh, ftp, and http traffic.

Before doing modification of ACL, let us take a look at listening ports on metasploitable2s:

```
root@tleemcj-metasploitable2-1:/# netstat -tpl
```

| Active Internet connections (only servers) | | | | | |
|--|--------|-------------------|-----------------|--------|---------------------|
| Proto | Recv-Q | Local Address | Foreign Address | State | PTID/Program name |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:telnet | *.* | LISTEN | 920/xinetd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:postgresql | *.* | LISTEN | 602/postgres |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:sntp | *.* | LISTEN | 558/master |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:microsoft-ds | *.* | LISTEN | 716/smbd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:exec | *.* | LISTEN | 920/xinetd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:login | *.* | LISTEN | 920/xinetd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:shell | *.* | LISTEN | 920/xinetd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:8009 | *.* | LISTEN | 866/jsvc |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:6697 | *.* | LISTEN | 1010/unrealircd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:mysql | *.* | LISTEN | 271/mysql |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:ircd | *.* | LISTEN | 1010/unrealircd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:rmiregistry | *.* | LISTEN | 980/rmiregistry |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:netbios-ssn | *.* | LISTEN | 716/smbd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:5900 | *.* | LISTEN | 1005/Xtightvnc |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:46637 | *.* | LISTEN | 980/rmiregistry |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:sunrpc | *.* | LISTEN | 471/portmap |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:x11 | *.* | LISTEN | 1005/Xtightvnc |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:www | *.* | LISTEN | 85/apache2 |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:8787 | *.* | LISTEN | 984/ruby |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:8180 | *.* | LISTEN | 866/jsvc |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:ingreslock | *.* | LISTEN | 920/xinetd |
| tcp | 0 | 0 *:ftp | *.* | LISTEN | 920/xinetd |
| tcp6 | 0 | 0 [::]:ssh | [::]:* | LISTEN | 772/sshd |
| tcp6 | 0 | 0 [::]:postgresql | [::]:* | LISTEN | 602/postgres |
| tcp6 | 0 | 0 [::]:frox | [::]:* | LISTEN | 653/proftpd: (accep |
| tcp6 | 0 | 0 [::]:distcc | [::]:* | LISTEN | 175/distccd |

Then let us test another ports using **8009 opening port**, other than FTP, HTTP and SSH ports.

```

gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ telnet 172.16.2.13 8009
Trying 172.16.2.13...
Connected to 172.16.2.13.
Escape character is '^]'.

```

Above screenshot tells we can access victim server any opening ports.

Next, we need to modify the ACL on R2 to meet the requirements (FTP: TCP port 21, HTTP:80, HTTPS:443, SSH:22):

```
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-list ext
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-list extended 101
```

```
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit tcp any any eq 80
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit tcp any any eq 443
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit tcp any any eq 22
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit tcp any any eq 21
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#int
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#int f0/0
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acc
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acce
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip access-group 101 in
R2-Cisco(config-if)#end
R2-Cisco#
*Mar 1 02:54:04.891: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
R2-Cisco#show ip acce
R2-Cisco#show ip access-lists
Extended IP access list 101
 10 deny icmp any any echo (69 matches)
 20 permit ip any any (166 matches)
 30 permit ip host 172.16.2.13 any
 40 deny udp any any eq snmp
 50 deny udp any any eq snmptrap
 60 permit tcp any any eq www
 70 permit tcp any any eq 443
 80 permit tcp any any eq 22
 90 permit tcp any any eq ftp
```

```
R2-Cisco(config)#
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-list ext
R2-Cisco(config)#ip access-list extended 101
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit tcp any any eq 80
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit tcp any any eq 443
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit tcp any any eq 22
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#permit tcp any any eq 21
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#int
R2-Cisco(config-ext-nacl)#int f0/0
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acc
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip acce
R2-Cisco(config-if)#ip access-group 101 in
R2-Cisco(config-if)#end
R2-Cisco#
*Mar 1 02:54:04.891: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
R2-Cisco#show ip acce
R2-Cisco#show ip access-lists
Extended IP access list 101
 10 deny icmp any any echo (69 matches)
 20 permit ip any any (166 matches)
 30 permit ip host 172.16.2.13 any
 40 deny udp any any eq snmp
 50 deny udp any any eq snmptrap
 60 permit tcp any any eq www
 70 permit tcp any any eq 443
 80 permit tcp any any eq 22
 90 permit tcp any any eq ftp
R2-Cisco#
```

The commands chain and screenshot tell I just allow TCP connection through port 22, 21, 80 and 443.

Let us do some smoke tests on the result:

On my GNS3-VM:

The following screenshot shows we can SSH victim server:

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ ssh root@172.16.2.13
root@172.16.2.13's password:
Last login: Sat Jun 27 12:01:05 2020 from :0.0
Linux 3.2554753bfe5 4.13.0-21-generic #24-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 18 17:29:16 UTC 2017 x86_64

The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*copyright.

Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by
applicable law.

To access official Ubuntu documentation, please visit:
http://help.ubuntu.com/
You have mail.

root@clemcjr-metasploitable2-1:~#
```

The following screenshot shows we can HTTP victim server:

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ curl 172.16.2.13
<html><head><title>Metasploitable2 - Linux</title></head><body>
<pre>
[...]
</pre>
Warning: Never expose this VM to an untrusted network!
Contact: msfdev[at]metasploit.com
Login with msfadmin/msfadmin to get started
</body>
</html>
```

The following screenshot shows we can FTP victim server:

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ ftp 172.16.2.13
Connected to 172.16.2.13.
220 (vsFTPD 2.3.4)
Name (172.16.2.13:gns3):
```

The negative tests are shown below:

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ telnet 172.16.2.13 8009
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ telnet 172.16.2.13 8009
Trying 172.16.2.13...
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host: No route to host
```

The negative test above shows opening 8009 port does NOT work anymore, because “telnet: Unable to connect to remote host: No route to host”

The test cases above tells we can not telnet other ports than 22, 23, 80 and 443

4.6.3 Datasets destination IP rewriting

In this section, we need to rewrite destination IP of **LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside** and **LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz** dataset to 172.16.2.13, because we moved this victim machine in internal network.

Rewrite “**LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_new_c0lumns_rewrite.pcap**”:

```
sudo tcprewrite --infile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap --
outfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_acl_rewrite.pcap --
endpoints=192.168.111.1:172.16.2.13 -b --cachefile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.cache
```

Rewrite “**LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_rewrite.pcap**”:

```
sudo tcprewrite --infile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.pcap --
outfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_acl_rewrite.pcap --
endpoints=192.168.111.1:172.16.2.13 -b --cachefile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.cache
```

The results are shown below:

```
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ sudo tcprewrite --infile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.pcap --outfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz_acl_rewrite.pcap --
endpoints=192.168.111.1:172.16.2.13 -b --cachefile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.cache
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$ sudo tcprewrite --infile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.pcap --outfile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_acl_rewrite.pcap --
endpoints=192.168.111.1:172.16.2.13 -b --cachefile=LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.cache
gns3@gns3vm:~/assign3$
```

4.6.4 Tcpreplay

- Replay LLS_DDOSe_1.0-inside_acl_rewrite.pcap Results:

Run time and average rates:

```
Run time for packet processing was 2051.108195 seconds
Snort processed 529726 packets.
Snort ran for 0 days 0 hours 34 minutes 11 seconds
Pkts/min:      15580
Pkts/sec:     258
```

Packet I/O totals:

```
Packet I/O Totals:
  Received:      529726
  Analyzed:     529726 (100.000%)
  Dropped:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Filtered:       0 ( 0.000%)
  Outstanding:    0 ( 0.000%)
  Injected:       0
```

Protocol breakdown:

```
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets):
  Eth:          530812 (100.000%)
  VLAN:         0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4:          527891 ( 99.450%)
  Frag:         0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP:         210 ( 0.040%)
  UDP:          110437 ( 20.80%)
  TCP:          417244 ( 78.605%)
  IPG:          0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Ext:      0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Opts:      0 ( 0.000%)
  Frag6:         0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP6:        0 ( 0.000%)
  UDP6:          0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP6:          0 ( 0.000%)
  Teredo:        0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP-IP:      0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4/IP4:       0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4/IP6:       0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6/IP4:       0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6/IP6:       0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE:           0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE Eth:       0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE VLAN:     0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP4:       0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP6:       0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP6 Ext:   0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE PPTP:      0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE ARP:       0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IPX:       0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE Loop:      0 ( 0.000%)
  MPLS:          0 ( 0.000%)
  ARP:          1814 ( 0.342%)
  IPX:           0 ( 0.000%)
  Eth Loop:      0 ( 0.000%)
  Eth Disc:      0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4 Disc:      0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Disc:      0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP Disc:      0 ( 0.000%)
  UDP Disc:      0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP Disc:    0 ( 0.000%)
  All Discard:   0 ( 0.000%)
  Other:         1107 ( 0.209%)
  Bad Chk Sum:   15975 ( 3.010%)
  Bad TTL:        0 ( 0.000%)
  S5 G 1:        374 ( 0.070%)
  S5 G 2:        712 ( 0.134%)
  Total:         530812
```

Alerts Stats:

```
Action Stats:
  Alerts:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Logged:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Passed:        0 ( 0.000%)
Limits:
  Match:         0
  Queue:         0
  Log:           0
  Event:         0
  Alert:         0
Verdicts:
  Allow:        523070 ( 98.744%)
  Block:         0 ( 0.000%)
  Replace:       0 ( 0.000%)
  Whitelist:    6656 ( 1.256%)
  Blacklist:     0 ( 0.000%)
  Ignore:        0 ( 0.000%)
  Retry:         0 ( 0.000%)
```

Stream Stats:

```
Stream statistics:
  Total sessions: 17519
    TCP sessions: 7516
    UDP sessions: 10003
    ICMP sessions: 0
    IP sessions: 0
    TCP Prunes: 408
    UDP Prunes: 0
    ICMP Prunes: 0
    IP Prunes: 0
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 7588
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 7588
  TCP Timeouts: 76
  TCP Overlaps: 0
  TCP Segments Queued: 114002
TCP Segments Released: 114002
  TCP Rebuilt Packets: 18148
  TCP Segments Used: 49014
    TCP Discards: 57
    TCP Gaps: 5685
  UDP Sessions Created: 11493
  UDP Sessions Deleted: 11493
    UDP Timeouts: 1490
    UDP Discards: 0
    Events: 118310
  Internal Events: 0
  TCP Port Filter
    Filtered: 0
    Inspected: 0
    Tracked: 400183
  UDP Port Filter
    Filtered: 0
    Inspected: 0
    Tracked: 10003
```

HTTP Inspect:

```
HTTP Inspect - encodings (Note: stream-reassembled packets included):
  POST methods:            0
  GET methods:             6125
  HTTP Request Headers extracted: 6128
  HTTP Request Cookies extracted: 0
  Post parameters extracted: 0
  HTTP response Headers extracted: 6102
  HTTP Response Cookies extracted: 518
  Unicode:                 0
  Double unicode:          0
  Non-ASCII representable: 3
  Directory traversals:    0
  Extra slashes ("//"): 23
  Self-referencing paths ("./"): 0
  HTTP Response Gzip packets extracted: 0
  Gzip Compressed Data Processed: n/a
  Gzip Decompressed Data Processed: n/a
  Http/2 Rebuilt Packets: 0
  Total packets processed: 45874
```

SMTP stats:

N/A

POP Stats:

N/A

The interesting thing is there is NO alerts at all even though it confirmed to receive around 529726 packets. We still want to double check with alert logs:

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 3" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

The screenshot shown above tells NO alerts generated after we only allow FTP/HTTP/SSH via ACL. We want to take a look at another PCAP file.

- Replay LLS_DDOSe_1.0-dmz_acl_rewrite.pcap Results:

Run time and average rates:

```
Run time for packet processing was 1797.763877 seconds
Snort processed 337259 packets.
Snort ran for 0 days 0 hours 29 minutes 57 seconds
Pkts/min:      11629
Pkts/sec:      187
```

Packet I/O totals:

```
Packet I/O Totals:
Received: 337259
Analyzed: 337259 (100.000%)
Dropped: 0 ( 0.000%)
Filtered: 0 ( 0.000%)
Outstanding: 0 ( 0.000%)
Injected: 0
```

Protocol breakdown:

```
=====
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets):
  Eth: 338345 (100.000%)
  VLAN: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4: 334177 ( 98.768%)
  Frag: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP: 2970 ( 0.878%)
  UDP: 3330 ( 0.984%)
  TCP: 327877 ( 96.906%)
  IP6: 1 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Ext: 1 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Opts: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Frag6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP6: 1 ( 0.000%)
  UDP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Teredo: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP-IP: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4/IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4/IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6/IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6/IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE Eth: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE VLAN: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP4: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP6: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IP6 Ext: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE PPTP: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE ARP: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE IPX: 0 ( 0.000%)
  GRE Loop: 0 ( 0.000%)
  MPLS: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ARP: 461 ( 0.136%)
  IPX: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Eth Loop: 1132 ( 0.335%)
  Eth Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP4 Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  IP6 Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  TCP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  UDP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  ICMP Disc: 0 ( 0.000%)
  All Discard: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Other: 2574 ( 0.761%)
Bad Chk Sum: 0 ( 0.000%)
Bad TTL: 0 ( 0.000%)
  S5 G 1: 426 ( 0.126%)
  S5 G 2: 660 ( 0.195%)
  Total: 338345
```

Alerts Stats:

```
=====
Action Stats:
  Alerts: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Logged: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Passed: 0 ( 0.000%)
Limits:
  Match: 0
  Queue: 0
  Log: 0
  Event: 0
  Alert: 0
Verdicts:
  Allow: 330275 ( 97.929%)
  Block: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Replace: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Whitelist: 6984 ( 2.071%)
  Blacklist: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Ignore: 0 ( 0.000%)
  Retry: 0 ( 0.000%)
```

Stream Stats:

```
=====
Stream statistics:
  Total sessions: 9353
  TCP sessions: 8006
  UDP sessions: 1347
  ICMP sessions: 0
  IP sessions: 0
  TCP Prunes: 0
  UDP Prunes: 0
  ICMP Prunes: 0
  IP Prunes: 0
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 8006
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 8006
  TCP Timeouts: 2
  TCP Overlaps: 4
  TCP Segments Queued: 96053
TCP Segments Released: 96053
  TCP Rebuilt Packets: 20218
  TCP Segments Used: 56964
  TCP Discards: 15
  TCP Gaps: 5975
  UDP Sessions Created: 1347
  UDP Sessions Deleted: 1347
    UDP Timeouts: 0
    UDP Discards: 0
    Events: 93231
  Internal Events: 0
  TCP Port Filter
    Filtered: 0
    Inspected: 0
    Tracked: 326791
  UDP Port Filter
    Filtered: 0
    Inspected: 0
    Tracked: 1347
```

HTTP Inspect:

```
=====
HTTP Inspect - encodings (Note: stream-reassembled packets included):
  POST methods: 0
  GET methods: 6804
  HTTP Request Headers extracted: 6816
  HTTP Request Cookies extracted: 0
  Post parameters extracted: 1
  HTTP Response Headers extracted: 6777
  HTTP Response Cookies extracted: 569
  Unicode: 0
  Double unicode: 0
  Non-ASCII representable: 0
  Directory traversals: 0
  Extra slashes ("//"): 23
  Self-referencing paths ("./"): 0
  HTTP Response Gzip packets extracted: 0
  Gzip Compressed Data Processed: n/a
  Gzip Decompressed Data Processed: n/a
  Http/2 Rebuilt Packets: 0
  Total packets processed: 50368
```

SMTP stats:

N/A

POP Stats:

N/A

As expected, there is NO alerts like .Replay LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside_acl_rewrite.pcap file. We nearly can conclude that ACL can mitigate most of issues generated from original dataset.

```
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 1" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 2" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort# cat alert | grep "Priority: 3" | sort | uniq -c
root@snort-IDS:/var/log/snort#
```

From the results of two datasets, we can conclude ACL dramatically mitigate many types of attacks. Because we can only communicate with target via FTP/HTTP/SSH protocols.

Next, I want to create a tabular formatted data comparison among LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz.dump and LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.dump, based on three stages: Original, Applying new rules (DoS and Port detection) and ACL. Then visualize them based on statistic data. Finally, we can conclude from those comparison.

4.7 Visualization of DARPA and Hping3 Statistics Results Comparison

I accumulated the results from those several test cases and put into a single table. So, we can easily compare the values among each other. Besides, tabular formatted data will be used for Python Matplotlib visualization.

| dataset | dmz-before | dmz-after-dos | dmz-after-dos-acl | inside-before | inside-after-dos | inside-after-dos-acl |
|------------------|------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|----------------------|
| duration | 1779.467 | 1742.784 | 1797.764 | 1741.574 | 1826.109 | 2051.108 |
| packages | 362321 | 336040 | 337259 | 562229 | 507537 | 529726 |
| whitelist | 15384 | 6981 | 6984 | 7155 | 6701 | 6656 |
| Alerts Total | 1223 | 6697 | 0 | 394 | 4753 | 0 |
| Admin Gain | 38 | 37 | 0 | 17 | 37 | 0 |
| DoS | 0 | 5498 | 0 | 0 | 5498 | 0 |
| Vulnerable web | 18 | 16 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 0 |
| Information leak | 29 | 25 | 0 | 27 | 25 | 0 |
| Query decode | 160 | 156 | 0 | 89 | 156 | 0 |
| badtraffic | 0 | 20 | 0 | 5 | 20 | 0 |
| miscattack | 123 | 124 | 0 | 19 | 124 | 0 |

We can visualize analyzed results derived from the table above. I uploaded source code to my GitHub [12].

4.7.1 Pie chart of combination of alerts categories [\[https://matplotlib.org/3.1.1/gallery/pie_and_polar_charts/pie_features.html\]](https://matplotlib.org/3.1.1/gallery/pie_and_polar_charts/pie_features.html):

```
###snort data analytics###
import pandas as pd
import numpy as np
from sklearn import metrics
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import seaborn as sns
import collections

def snortPie(values, title):
    labels = ['Gain Admin','denial of service','vulnerable web','information leak','query decode','bad traffic','misc attack']
    sizes = np.array(values)
    explode = (0, 0.1, 0, 0.1, 0, 0, 0)



    def absolute_value(val):
        a = np.round(val/100.*sizes.sum(), 0)
        return a



    #autopct='%1.1f%', 
    fig1, ax1 = plt.subplots(1, 1, figsize=(8, 8))
    patches, texts, _ = ax1.pie(sizes, explode=explode, labels=labels, autopct=absolute_value, shadow=True, startangle=90)
    plt.legend(patches, sizes, loc="best")
    ax1.axis('equal')
    plt.title(title)
    plt.show()

#####dmz-before
```

```
snortPie([38, 0, 18, 29, 160, 0, 123],'LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz Alerts Before Rules')
####dmz-after-dos-rule
snortPie([37, 5498, 16, 25, 156, 20, 1243],'LLS_DDOS_1.0-dmz Alerts After Rules')
```

```
####dmz-before
snortPie([17, 0, 16, 27, 89, 5, 19],'LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside Alerts Before Rules')
####dmz-after-dos-rule
snortPie([37, 5498, 16, 25, 156, 20, 124],'LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside Alerts After Rules')
```





From the pie charts comparison, we can summarize several things:

- After refine Snort rules, we reported much more alerts than before.
- DoS attack is the most threats among all.
- ACL will mitigate most of threats

4.7.2 Stacked bar charts

At the end, we can conduct Stacked bar chart visualization to summarize the comparison of alerts among all the datasets, like the graph below:

```
# plot snorts alert of each alert category (https://stackoverflow.com/questions/44309507/stacked-bar-plot-using-matplotlib)
```

```
def plot_stacked_bar(data, series_labels, category_labels=None,
                     show_values=False, value_format='{:1f}', y_label=None,
                     colors=None, grid=True, reverse=False):
```

```
ny = len(data[0])
ind = list(range(ny))
```

```
axes = []
cum_size = np.zeros(ny)
```

```
data = np.array(data)
```

```
if reverse:
```

```
data = np.flip(data, axis=1)
category_labels = reversed(category_labels)

for i, row_data in enumerate(data):
    color = colors[i] if colors is not None else None
    axes.append(plt.bar(ind, row_data, bottom=cum_size,
                        label=series_labels[i], color=color))
    cum_size += row_data

if category_labels:
    plt.xticks(ind, category_labels, rotation=45, fontsize=8)
    # ax.set_xticklabels(ax.xaxis.get_majorticklabels(), rotation=45)

if y_label:
    plt.ylabel(y_label)

plt.legend()

if grid:
    plt.grid()

if show_values:
    for axis in axes:
        for bar in axis:
            w, h = bar.get_width(), bar.get_height()
            plt.text(bar.get_x() + w/2, bar.get_y() + h/2,
                    value_format.format(h), ha="center",
                    va="center", fontsize=5)

def snortStackedBar(df_snort, title):
    plt.figure(figsize=(10, 8))

    labels = ['Gain Admin','denial of service','vulnerable web','information leak','quer y decode','bad traffic','misc attack']
    labels_colors = ['tab:orange', 'tab:green', 'tab:blue', 'tab:red', 'tab:cyan', 'tab:purp le', 'tab:brown']


    data = [
        df_snort.admingain,
        df_snort.DoS,
        df_snort.vulnerableweb,
        df_snort.informationleak,
        df_snort.querydecode,
        df_snort.badtraffic,
        df_snort.misattack
    ]

    datasets = ['LLD_DDOS_DMZ_Before', 'LLD_DDOS_DMZ_After_Rules', 'LLD_DDOS_DMZ_After_ACL', 'LLD_DDOS_Inside_Before', 'LLD_DDOS_DMZ_Inside_Rules', 'LLD_DDOS_Inside_After_ACL']

    plot_stacked_bar(
        data,
        labels,
        category_labels=datasets,
        show_values=True,
        value_format="{:1f}",
        colors=labels_colors,
        y_label="Alerts Amount"
    )

    plt.title(title)
    plt.show()

snortStackedBar(df_snort, 'Amount of Alerts stacked by alerts categories for each dataset')
```



From the alerts stacked by categories chart, we can easily discover the same things as pie charts:

- After refine Snort rules, we reported much more alerts than before.
- DoS attack is the most threats among all.
- ACL will mitigate most of threats

5 Future work and Conclusions

In conclusions, I experienced hand-on practices on Snort sniffing packets via TcpReplay tools. And I witnessed how rules configuration significantly compact on the network attacks detection through penetration test. We can discover DoS /DDoS/ Ports scan threats through Snort toolsets.

I could conduct more penetration tests and design efficient and effective methods to mitigate the network threat as future work.

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