Topics in Behavioral Decisons in Finance

Discussion by Christian Hilpert October 8, 2023

Topics in Behavioral Decisons in Finance

- 1. Organisation
- 2. Brief Overview of Behavioral Economy
- 3. Comulative Prospect Theory
- 4. Application and Dimits of CPT
- 5. Alternative Theories
- \Rightarrow Why?

- ► Barberis 2017, AEA
- ► Thalw 2016, AER
- Davida 2012 | IEE
- ► Barberis 2013, JEP

Ambiguity"

▶ Wakker 2010, Cambridge University Press, "Prospect Theory for Risk and

2. Brief Overview

1950s-1990s: "Traditional Finance"

- psychological shortcomings
- new way of thinking about Finance questions
 - 1. insurance
 - 2. portfolio choice
 - 3. corporate finance

. . .

▶ not alternative to mainstream economics (Micro)

2. Brief Overview

Some questions:

- Why do people buy insurance, gamble, and hold stocks?
- Why do people hold on to losing stocks?
- Why are IPOs underpriced?

Standard paradigm:

- t = 0, 1, 2, ... time
- \triangleright S_t possible states
- ▶ $p(s_t)$ probility of $s_t \in S_t$ occurring in t
- \triangleright X_t payoff/ consumption in t

2.Brief Overview

- Agent-utility function $U(X \mid S)$ - time-independent discount factor δ (implicitily: von-Neumann/Morgenstern axioms)
- $\Rightarrow \max_{x_t} \exp \text{exted lifetime utility} \\ \max_{x_t} \sum_{t} \delta^t \left(\sum_{s_t \in S_t} U(x_t \mid s_t) \rho(s_t) \right) \quad \text{s.t. } x_t \in X_t$
- Behavioral Decisions:
 - 1.) Non-standard preferences : "U "," δ "
 - 2.) Non-standard beliefs: " ρ "
 - 3.) Non-standard decision making: "max"

2.Brief Overview

- Reference-dependence, prospect theory, ambiguity Implies: loss aversion, time preferences (non-standard), self-control issues, time inconsistency, social preferences
- 2: Overconfidence, extrapolation, experience effects Implies: overestimation, confirmation bias, projection bias, law of small numbers.
- 3: Bounded rationality, cognitive limitations. Implies: rules of thumb??? , simplification, fruniing????(there are ??)

Not simply opparated 1 weakest, 3 strongest depf?? from EU

2.Brief Overview

Alternatives:

- ► Bounded rationality
- ► Evolutionary game theory
- Decision theory (unawareness, unforseen contingencies)

Behavioral economics is controversial!


- poor experimental standards
- depo?? from revealed preference approaches

3. Prospect Theory and Cumulative PT

- most finance models assume EU to evaluate risks
- experimentally, at least, not a good fit
- many alternatives
- ► (C)PT by Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman1992
- alternatives: disappointment aversion, rank-dependent utility, salume theory, regeret theory, SP8H Hec???

3. Prospect Theory and Cumulative PT

- A reference-dependent utility function is a family $\{U(\cdot \mid \gamma) : x \longrightarrow \mathbb{R} \mid \gamma \in X\}$ of utility functions over X indexed by $\gamma \in X$.
- ▶ the utility $U(X \mid \gamma)$ describes the utility of the consumption and the reference point is γ .
- Prospect Theory (1979) gramble (X, p, y, q)EU = pV(w + x) + qV(w + y)PT = w(p)V(x) + w(q)V(y)



Four key features

- 1. Reference-dependence
 - gains and losses, and final wealth
 - ▶ ⇒ experimental evidence, consistent with perception of alternative
- 2. Loss aversion
 - \triangleright V(x) has a kink?? in \bigcirc .
 - ▶ ⇒ losses loom larger than gains.
 - evidence: $(110, \frac{1}{2}, -100, \frac{1}{2})$ is unatterative.

Four key features

- 3. Dimisishing sensitivity
 - \triangleright $V(\cdot)$ concave over gains, convex over losses
 - evidence: $(500, 1) \succ (1000, \frac{1}{2})$ $(-500, 1) \preceq (-1000, \frac{1}{2})$
- 4. Probability weighting:
 - ransform probability with decision weights $w(\cdot)$ high weight on low probabilities
 - evidence: $(5,1) \prec (5000,0.001)$ lottery $(-5,1) \succ (-5000,0.001)$ insurance

Note: w are decision weights and beliefs

Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)

- address some limitations
- applies probability weighing to the comulative distribution function (gain at least

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50, lose 100 or more)  (x_{-m}, p_{-m}, ..., x_{-1}, p_{-1}, x_0, p_0, x_1, p_1, ..., x_n, p_n)   x_i < x_j \text{ for } i < j, x_0 = 0  is assigned  \sum_{i=-m}^n \pi_i V(x_i)  with
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$$\pi_{i} = \begin{cases} w(p_{i} + \dots + p_{n}) - w(p_{i} + \dots + p_{n}), & 0 \leq i \leq n \\ w(p_{-m} + \dots + p_{i}) - w(p_{-m} + \dots + p_{i-1}), & -m \leq i \leq 0 \end{cases}$$
(1)

- individuals overweight fails of a probability distribution
- preserves a taste for lottery like gambles

Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)

► Tversky and Kahneman suggest:

$$V(x) = \begin{cases} x^{\alpha}, & x \ge 0 \\ -\lambda(-x)^{\alpha}, & x < 0 \end{cases}$$

$$w(p) = \frac{p^{\delta}}{(p^{\delta} + (1-p)^{\delta})^{\frac{1}{\delta}}}$$

$$\alpha = 0.88, \quad \lambda = 2.25, \quad \delta = 0.69 ???$$

► (there are alternatives)

Challenges and Discussion

- how to define gains and losses?
- total wealth, financial wealth, stock holdings, individual stocks?
- what is a gain:
 exceeds zero?
 - risk-free rate?
 - Prisk-free rate
 expectation?
- probability weighting in many applications more important than loss aversion
- diminishing sensitivity ⇒ Rabin 2000
 (not as important feature theoretically)
- overweighting VS underweighting:??? events (Taleb ,2007),evidence for both
- Could be decision from description ⇒ overweighting decision from experience ⇒ underweighting
- Not ?? decv how to interpret: overestimation (belief) ⇒ mistake overweighting (preference) ⇒ not mistake??? (some evidence fro preference)