

Securing Microservices with OpenID Connect and Spring Security 5

Workshop


Andreas Falk

Agenda

- 1. Intro:
 - OAuth 2.0
 - Intro-Lab: OAuth2 in Action
 - OpenID Connect 1.0
- 2. Hands-On Part
 - Resource Server
 - Client (Auth Code Flow)
- 3. More Demos (as time allows)
 - Testing Support



Authentication & Authorization: Only ONE part of Security!





Authentication

Knowledge Factor (something the user knows): Password, PIN, security question,...



Ownership Factor (something the user has): ID card, security token, cell phone holding a software token,...

Inherence Factor (something the user is): Fingerprint, retinal pattern,...



Authentication

- Single-Factor Authentication
- Multi-Factor Authentication



Common Authentication Mechanisms

- Basic Authentication / Digest Access Authentication
- Form-based Authentication (i.e. using Session Cookies)
- Client-Certificates (Mutual TLS)
- Kerberos Tickets
- Proprietary mechanisms like API-Tokens, Siteminder etc.
- SAML Assertion Tokens
- JSON Web Tokens
- OAuth 2.0 & OpenID Connect 1.0
- WebAuthn / FIDO2



OAuth 2.0 & OpenID Connect

Introduction



OAuth 2.0

RFC 6749: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework




OAuth 2.0

"The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a **third-party application** to obtain **limited access to an HTTP service**, either **on behalf of a resource owner** by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on **its own behalf**"

(RFC 6749)



OAuth 2.0 - A bunch of RFC's (Request for Comments)






"OAuth 2.1" - Even more Draft Specifications...

"OAuth 2.1" JWT Response for OAuth JSON Web Token Best Current OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Token Introspection Practices Requests JWT Secured Authorization Resource Indicators for OAuth OAuth 2.0 Security Best Request 2.0 **Current Practice** OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client OAuth 2.0 for JWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 **Browser-Based Apps Access Tokens** Authentication




OAuth 2.0 is an authorization delegation framework






OAuth 2.0 Roles





OAuth 2.0 Protocol Flow






OAuth 2.0 Grant Flows

Client Type	Flow	Refresh Tokens
Confidential	Authorization Code	Χ
Public (Native)	Authorization Code (PKCE)	Х
Public (SPA)	Implicit	
Trusted	RO Password Creds	Χ
No Resource Owner	Client Credentials	




OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Grant Flow





Practice Time

Intro-Lab: Authorization Code Grant Flow in Action



OpenID Connect 1.0

Identity Layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 Protocol



OAuth 2.0 is NOT an Authentication Protocol!





Repeat after me: OAuth 2.0 is NOT AN AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL. oauth.net/articles/authe...

12:22 PM - 2 Feb 2017 from Kapaa, HI

OAuth 2.0 is not an authentication protocol



OpenID Connect 1.0 Standards Layer

OpenID Connect 1.0 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework (RFC 6749) Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) JSON Web Token (JWT) JSON Web Encryption (JWE) JSON Web Signature (JWS) JSON Web Key (JWK) JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)



JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)

- Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications
- Digital Signatures and MACs
- Algorithms for Key Management
- Algorithms for Content Encryption
- Algorithms for Keys

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518



JSON Web Key (JWK)

```
{"keys": [
    {"kty":"EC",
     "crv":"P-256".
     "x":"MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4",
     "y":"4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM",
     "use":"enc".
     "kid":"1"}.
     {"kty":"RSA",
     "n": "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nn...",
     "e":"AQAB",
     "alg":"RS256",
     "kid":"2011-04-29"}]}
```

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517



JSON Web Signature (JWS)

- JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures
- A document using JWS can answer two questions about the JSON payload:
 - Has the JSON object been altered after creation?
 - Who created this JSON object?

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515



JSON Web Encryption (JWE)

- Data structure representing an encrypted and integrity-protected message
- As of July 2019 only identity server of Pingldentity supports JWE
- NOT supported by Spring Security 5.x (See github issue 4435)!

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7516 https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/issues/4435



JSON Web Token (JWT)

- JSON Web Tokens consist of three parts separated by dots ("."), which are:
 - Header
 - Payload
 - Signature
- Each part is Base64Url encoded
- Signature supports symmetric or asymmetric algorithms (e.g. HMAC or RSA)
- Signature = HMACSHA256(base64UrlEncode(header) + "." + base64UrlEncode(payload), secret)


https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession



JSON Web Token (JWT) - Decoded Form


```
"alg": "RS256",
                                                      HEADER
"typ": "JWT",
"kid": "lp_FcMZ8D7U6EEUCiZyWAF21NcwjX_ddwJ5a3eCPMwQ"
"exp": 1571745342,
"iat": 1571745042.
                                                      ΡΔΥΙ ΟΔΟ
"iss": "http://localhost:8080/auth/realms/workshop",
"aud": ["library-service", "account"],
"sub": "08d3bcaa-5ffd-4b8d-909e-bb567881384b"
```

https://jwt.io





OpenID Connect 1.0 Standards Layer





OpenID Connect 1.0 (OIDC)

- Based on OAuth 2.0
- Additions:
 - ID Token (JWT format is mandatory)
 - User Info Endpoint (Mandatory)
 - Hybrid Grant Flow (Mandatory)
 - OpenID Provider Configuration Information (Discovery, Optional)

https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html




OpenID Connect 1.0 Claims

Claim	Required	Description
iss		Issuer Identifier
sub		Unique Subject Identifier
aud		Target audience(s) of an ID Token
ехр		Expiration time
iat		Time at which the JWT was issued
auth_time		Time of End-User authentication
nonce		Used to associate a client with an ID Token



OpenID Connect 1.0 Roles





OpenID Connect 1.0 User Info Endpoint

```
GET /userinfo HTTP/1.1
Host: identityserver.example.com
Authorization: Bearer SlAV32hkKG
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
 "sub": "248289761001",
 "name": "Jane Doe",
 "given name": "Jane",
 "family name": "Doe",
 "preferred username": "j.doe",
 "email": "janedoe@example.com",
 "picture": "http://example.com/janedoe/me.jpg"
```



OpenID Connect 1.0 Discovery

```
"authorization endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/auth",
"grant types supported": [
    "authorization code",
   "implicit",
    "refresh token"
"issuer": "https://idp.example.com",
"jwks uri": "https://idp.example.com/keys",
"token endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/token",
"userinfo endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/userinfo",
```

https://example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration




OpenID Connect 1.0: Access Token Types

JWT Token (Self-contained)	Opaque Token (Reference)	
Offline-Validation (Signature/Expiration)	Validation call to introspection-endpoint	
Contains all required information	Additional call to get required information	
Protocol agnostic	Bound to Http	
Cannot be revoked	May be revoked	



Token Validation



OAuth 2.0 Access Token JWT Profile (Draft)

- Required claims: iss, exp, aud, sub, client_id
- Consider privacy restrictions for identity claims
- Authorization claims according to SCIM Core (RFC7643):
 - Groups
 - Entitlements
 - Roles

System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM)

JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens



OpenID Connect Identity Providers

- RedHat/JBoss Keycloak (https://www.keycloak.org)
- Auth0 (https://auth0.com)
- Okta (<u>https://www.okta.com</u>)
- ForgeRock (https://www.forgerock.com/platform/identity-management)
- CloudFoundry UAA (https://github.com/cloudfoundry/uaa)
- PingFederate
 (https://www.pingidentity.com/en/platform/single-sign-on/sso-overview.html)
- Azure Active Directory (https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/active-directory)
- ...

See: https://openid.net/developers/certified/#OPServices




JBoss Keycloak as OIDC Identity Provider

- Open Source identity and access management product by RedHat/JBoss
- Currently based on JBoss Wildfly Application Server
- Implements OpenID Connect 1.0, OAuth 2.0 and SAML 2.0
- Provides a centralized user management
- Keycloak-X will move away from WildFly to Quarkus (https://quarkus.io)


https://www.keycloak.org/ https://www.keycloak.org/2019/10/keycloak-x.html



Spring Security 5 Basics




Spring Security High Level View






Authentication in Spring Security






Authentication in Spring Security







"Legacy" Spring Security 4.x OAuth2 Technology Stack

spring-security-oauth2-autoconfigure spring-security-oauth2 spring-security-jwt spring-boot-starter-security spring-boot



New Spring Security 5.x OIDC Technology Stack

spring-boot-starter-oauth2-client

spring-boot-starter-oauth2-resource-server

spring-security-oauth2-jose




com.nimbusds:oauth2-oidc-sdk

spring-boot




https://connect2id.com/products/nimbus-oauth-openid-connect-sdk

OpenID Connect on the Server side (The Resource Server)



Authentication in a single Resource server




GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: localhost:8080 Authorization: Bearer

eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1N...




JWT Authentication in Spring Security 5



Practice Time

Lab 1: Implementing a Resource Server




The Hands-On Application: Use Cases

- Online Book Library
 - Administer Library Users
 - Administer Books
 - List available Books
 - Borrow a Book
 - Return a previously borrowed Book

https://github.com/andifalk/secure-oauth2-oidc-workshop



The Hands-On Application: Architecture




http://localhost:9090/library-client

http://localhost:9091/library-server



OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner Password Credentials Flow (1)



OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner Password Credentials Flow (2)

POST /token HTTP/1.1

Host: server.example.com

Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=password&username=johndoe&password=A3ddj3w


POST /token HTTP/1.1

Host: server.example.com


Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=password&username=johndoe&password=A3ddj3w &client_id=123&client_secret=xyz



Advanced OpenID Connect Scenarios




Token-Relay with an API Gateway






Token-Exchange with an API Gateway





Microservice-to-Microservice calls



OpenID Connect on the Client side



OAuth 2.0 Grant Flows

Client Type	Flow	Refresh Tokens
Confidential	Authorization Code	Χ
Public (Native)	Authorization Code (PKCE)	Χ
Public (SPA)	Implicit	 :
Trusted	RO Password Creds	Χ
No Resource Owner	Client Credentials	




OpenID Connect Libraries

- oidc-client (Javascript) https://github.com/ldentityModel/oidc-client-js
- angular-oauth2-oidc (Typescript)
 https://github.com/manfredsteyer/angular-oauth2-oidc
- angular-auth-oidc-client (Typescript)
 https://github.com/damienbod/angular-auth-oidc-client
- IdentityModel.OidcClient (C#/.Net)
 https://github.com/IdentityModel/IdentityModel.OidcClient
- Nimbus OAuth 2.0 SDK (Java) https://connect2id.com/products/nimbus-oauth-openid-connect-sdk
- OIDC RP library (Python) https://github.com/openid/JWTConnect-Python-OidcRP
- ...

See: https://openid.net/developers/certified/#OPServices




Spring Security: ClientRegistration






Spring Security: OAuth2AuthorizedClient





Spring Security: OidcUser





Practice Time

Lab 2: Implementing the client side (Authorization Code Flow)



OAuth 2.0 / OIDC Client (Spring MVC / Thymeleaf)

Library Client

A nice library to borrow books

Hello Bruce Wayne

Author(s)	Title	Description	ISBN	
[Bob C. Martin]	Clean Code	Even bad code can function. But if code isn't clean, it can bring a development organization to its knees. Every year, countless hours and significant resources are lost because of poorly written code. But it doesn't have to be that way. Noted software expert Robert C. Martin presents a revolutionary paradigm with Clean Code: A Handbook of Agile Software Craftsmanship . Martin has teamed up with his colleagues from Object Mentor to distill their best agile practice of cleaning code "on the fly" into a book that will instill within you the values of a software craftsman and make you a better programmer—but only if you work at it.	9780132350884	Return
[Josh Long, Kenny Bastiani]	Cloud Native Java	What separates the traditional enterprise from the likes of Amazon, Netflix, and Etsy? Those companies have refined the art of cloud native development to maintain their competitive edge and stay well ahead of the competition. This practical guide shows Java/JVM developers how to build better software, faster, using Spring Boot, Spring Cloud, and Cloud Foundry.	9781449374648	
[Craig Walls]	Spring in Action: Covers Spring 4	Spring in Action, Fourth Edition is a hands-on guide to the Spring Framework, updated for version 4. It covers the latest features, tools, and practices including Spring MVC, REST, Security, Web Flow, and more. You'll move between short snippets and an ongoing example as you learn to build simple and efficient J2EE applications. Author Craig Walls has a special knack for crisp and entertaining examples that zoom in on the features and techniques you really need.	9781617291203	Borrov
[Gene Kim, Jez Humble, Patrick Deboisl	The DevOps Handbook	Wondering if The DevOps Handbook is for you? Authors, Gene Kim, Jez Humble, Patrick Debois and John Willis developed this book for anyone looking to transform their IT organization—especially those who want to make serious changes through the DevOps methodology to increase productivity, profitability and win the marketplace.	9781942788003	Borrov



Practice Time

Lab 3: Implementing the client side (Client Credentials Flow)



OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials Grant Flow (1)

POST /token HTTP/1.1

Host: server.example.com


Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=client_credentials



OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials Grant Flow (2)



POST /token HTTP/1.1

Host: server.example.com


Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=client_credentials&client_id=123&client_secret=xyz



Practice Time

Lab 4: Testing JWT Auth+Authz



General Testing Strategies for JWT Auth+Authz


- Using Spring JWT test support (MockMvc / WebTestClient)
- Using self-signed JWT Tokens
- Using real identity provider (using Testcontainers)
- Only test the authorization layer

https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/current/reference/htmlsingle/#testing-bearer-authentication https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/current/reference/htmlsingle/#testing-bearer-authentication-2 https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/current/reference/htmlsingle/#oauth2resourceserver-jwt-decoder-public-key https://www.testcontainers.org/

https://github.com/dasniko/testcontainers-keycloak



What about Single Page Applications?






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
OAuth 2.0 Implicit Flow





OAuth 2.0 Implicit Grant Flow is at Risk!

Don't use the OAuth Implicit Grant any longer!



https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics



"OAuth 2.1" Grant Flows

Client Type	Flow	Refresh Tokens
Confidential	Authorization Code (PKCE)	Х
Public (Native)	Authorization Code (PKCE)	Х
Public (SPA)	Authorization Code (PKCE)	
Trusted	RO Password Creds	X
No Resource Owner	Client Credentials	




Authorization Code + PKCE Grant Flow

- PKCE-Proof Key for Code Exchange ("pixy")
- Mitigates authorization code interception attack
- Public clients cannot keep secrets ("client_secret")
 - PKCE adds a dynamically created cryptographically random key: The "code verifier"



OAuth 2.0 Auth Code + PKCE Grant Flow



code_verifier: Random string (43-128 characters)

t(code_verifier):
"code_challenge",
Hashed
code verifier

t_m: Hashing algorithm to be used ("S256" or "None")

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636



What's new in Spring Security 5.2&5.3



Spring Security 5.2

- Client Support for PKCE
- OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout
- Support for OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection
- Resource Server Multi-tenancy (Servlet & Reactive)
- Use symmetric keys with JwtDecoder
- JWT Flow API in Test Support

https://spring.io/blog/2019/10/01/spring-security-5-2-goes-ga



Support for Opaque Tokens

```
class ResSrvConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
    @Override
    protected void configure(HttpSecurity http)
            throws Exception {
        http.oauth2ResourceServer()
                .opaqueToken()
                     .introspectionUri(this.introspectionUri)
                     .introspectionClientCredentials(
                        this.clientId, this.clientSecret);
```



Resource Server Multi-Tenancy

```
class ResSrvConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
    @Override protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) {
        http.oauth2ResourceServer()
            .authenticationManagerResolver(
                multitenantAuthenticationManager());
    @Bean AuthenticationManagerResolver<HttpServletReguest>
        multiTenantAuthMgr() {...}
    AuthenticationManager jwt() {...}
    AuthenticationManager opaque() {...}
```

Support for Symmetric Keys

```
class ResSrvConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
  @Value("${spring.security.oauth2.resourceserver.
                jwt.key-value}") RSAPublicKey key;
  @Override protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) {
    http.oauth2ResourceServer().jwt().decoder(jwtDecoder());
  @Bean JwtDecoder jwtDecoder() throws Exception {
      return NimbusJwtDecoder.
              withPublicKey(this.key).build();
```

JWT Flow API in Test Support

```
public class OAuth2ResourceServerTest {
    @Test
    public void testRequestPostProcessor() {
      mockMvc.perform(get("/message")
      .with(mockAccessToken().scope("message:read")))
      .andExpect(status().is0k())
      mockMvc.perform(get("/")
      .with(jwt().claim(SUB, "the-subject")))
      .andExpect(status().is0k())
```

Lambda DSL

```
protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
    http.authorizeRequests(authorizeRequests ->
        authorizeRequests
           .antMatchers("/blog/**").permitAll()
           .anyRequest().authenticated()
      ).formLogin(formLogin ->
        formLogin
           .loginPage("/login")
           .permitAll()
```

https://spring.io/blog/2019/11/21/spring-security-lambda-dsl



Spring Security 5.3

- Support OAuth 2.0 / OIDC Authorization Server:
 - OpenID Connect 1.0 (Authorization Code Flow)
 - PKCE
 - OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials Grant
 - JWT Access Token format
 - JWK Set Enapoint
 - Opaque Access Token format

Spring Security team has decided to no longer provide support for authorization servers (...but still in discussion...)

https://spring.io/blog/2019/11/14/spring-security-oauth-2-0-roadmap-update



Spring Security 5.3

- Resource server support for multiple trusted JWT access token issuers
- OidcIdToken.Builder & OidcUserInfo.Builder
- Opaque Token MockMvc & Reactive Test Support
- Oidc Login MockMvc & Reactive Test Support
- • •

https://spring.io/blog/2020/01/08/spring-security-5-3-0-m1-released



What about other Microframeworks?



OpenID Connect in other Micro-Frameworks

Already good support for JWT based authentication in:

- Micronaut
 https://micronaut-projects.github.io/micronaut-security/latest/quide/#jwt
- Quarkus https://quarkus.io/guides/jwt-guide







OpenID Connect in other Micro-Frameworks

See Bonus-Lab containing a demo for Micronaut!







Books and Online References



Books and Online References (1)

- Justin Richer et.al: OAuth2 in Action (Manning, 2017, ISBN 978-1617293276)
- Michael Schwartz et.al: Securing the Perimeter (Apress, 2018, ISBN 978-1484226001)
- RFC 6749: The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
- RFC 6750: OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
- RFC 6819: OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations
- RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange ("Pixy")
- OpenID Connect Core 1.0 Specification
- OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0
- OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
- RFC 7519: JSON Web Token (JWT)
- JSON Web Token Best Current Practices



Books and Online References (2)

- Why you should stop using the OAuth implicit grant
- OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
- OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
- OAuth 2.0 Mutual TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens
- JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens
- OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange



Books and Online References (3)

- Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0
- Spring Security 5.2 Reference Documentation
- Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with Spring Security (Devoxx Video)
- Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols (SpringOne Platform 2019 Video)
- How to secure your Spring apps with Keycloak by Thomas Darimont (Video)





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