## Networks Pset #1

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## Question 5

Without a network, the monopolist solves the problem

$$\max_{p} p \cdot q \qquad (Assume \ mc = 0)$$

$$\theta \sim U[0, 1] \implies q = 1 - p$$

$$\max_{p} p \cdot (1 - p)$$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial p} p - p^{2} = 0$$

$$1 - 2p = 0$$

$$p = \frac{1}{2}$$
(FOC)

Now let's put this on a network. We just need to cook up a counterexample, so here's a funny network that will work. Put all  $\theta < \frac{1}{2} + \delta, \delta > 0$  into singletons. Put all  $\theta \geq \frac{1}{2} + \delta$  in a completely connected network. Now, as we send  $\varepsilon \to 0$  we only hit the giant component (all of the  $\theta \in \left[\frac{1}{2} + \delta, 1\right]$ ). Let's see how the monopolist's price without a network does, and if we can do better.

$$\pi = p \cdot q$$

$$= p \cdot \left(1 - \left[\frac{1}{2} + \delta\right]\right)$$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^2 - \frac{\delta}{2}$$

But the monopolist can do better!  $\delta > 0 \implies \theta > p$  for all the guys that are actually buying this product. Everyone is getting some consumer surplus. We can squeeze *all* of this surplus out of the guy with  $\underline{\theta} = \frac{1}{2} + \delta$ , and we can squeeze *some* surplus ( $\delta$ ) out of everyone that's buying. Basically, increasing the price to  $p' \in \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} + \delta\right)$  doesn't cause anybody to stop buying the product, but does give a higher per-unit price to the monopolist.

$$\begin{aligned} \pi' &= p' \cdot q \\ &= \underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{2} + \delta\right)}_{\text{higher price}} \underbrace{\left(1 - \left[\frac{1}{2} + \delta\right]\right)}_{\text{same quantity}} \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^2 - \frac{\delta}{2} + \underbrace{\delta\left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta\right)}_{\text{additional profit}} \end{aligned}$$

<sup>\*</sup>I worked on this problem set with Aristotle Magganas, Antonio Martner and Koki Okumura.

This holds for all  $\delta \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$ .