

Networks Pset #1

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November 9, 2021

Question 5

Without a network, the monopolist solves the problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_p p \cdot q & \quad (\text{Assume } mc = 0) \\ \theta \sim U[0, 1] & \implies q = 1 - p \\ \max_p p \cdot (1 - p) & \\ \frac{\partial}{\partial p} p - p^2 = 0 & \quad (\text{FOC}) \\ 1 - 2p = 0 & \\ p = \frac{1}{2} & \end{aligned}$$

Now let's put this on a network. We just need to cook up a counterexample, so here's a funny network that will work. Put all $\theta < \frac{1}{2} + \delta, \delta > 0$ into singletons. Put all $\theta \geq \frac{1}{2} + \delta$ in a completely connected network. I guess the best economic "story" for this is that all of the rich guys live in a gated community and hang out together, and all the poor guys are on their own somewhere else. So not *too* crazy. Now, as we send $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$ we only hit the giant component (all of the $\theta \in [\frac{1}{2} + \delta, 1]$). Let's see how the monopolist's price without a network does, and if we can do better.

$$\begin{aligned} \pi &= p \cdot q \\ &= p \cdot \left(1 - \left[\frac{1}{2} + \delta\right]\right) \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^2 - \frac{\delta}{2} \end{aligned}$$

But the monopolist can do better! $\delta > 0 \implies \theta > p$ for all the guys that are actually buying this product. Everyone is getting some consumer surplus. We can squeeze *all* of this surplus out of the guy with $\underline{\theta} = \frac{1}{2} + \delta$, and we can squeeze *some* surplus (δ) out of everyone that's buying. Basically, increasing the price to $p' \in (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} + \delta]$ doesn't cause anybody to stop buying the product, but does give a higher per-unit price

*I worked on this problem set with Aristotle Magganas, Antonio Martner and Koki Okumura.

to the monopolist.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \pi' &= p' \cdot q \\
 &= \underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{2} + \delta\right)}_{\text{higher price}} \underbrace{\left(1 - \left[\frac{1}{2} + \delta\right]\right)}_{\text{same quantity}} \\
 &= \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^2 - \frac{\delta}{2} + \underbrace{\delta \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta\right)}_{\text{additional profit}} \\
 &> \pi
 \end{aligned}$$

This holds for all $\delta \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$.