

ECONOMICS 201B, WINTER 2020
OVERVIEW (TENTATIVE)

GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION: STRATEGIC FORM

- Dominance & iterated dominance
- Beliefs and Rational Behavior
 - Reasonable beliefs: Rationalizability
 - Correct Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium
- Mixed strategies
 - Nash Equilibrium (mixed strategies)
 - Interpretation of mixed strategies and Nash Equilibrium
- Existence of Nash Equilibrium
 - Mixed strategies
 - Pure strategies
- Other notions
 - Correlated Equilibrium
- Examples & applications

GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: STRATEGIC FORM

- Bayesian games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Examples & applications

DYNAMIC GAMES: COMPLETE AND PERFECT INFORMATION

- Inadequacy of NE
 - Commitment & Subgame Perfection
 - Dynamic Programming & Backward Induction
- Bargaining
 - Nash solution
 - Rubinstein alternating offers model

DYNAMIC GAMES: INCOMPLETE AND/OR IMPERFECT INFORMATION

- Inadequacy of subgame perfection
- Extending the spirit of subgame perfection
 - Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
 - Sequential equilibrium
- Reputation
- Signaling
- Examples & applications

REPEATED GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION

- Histories & strategies
- Discounting and average payoffs
- Subgame perfection
- Folk Theorems
- Cooperation and Collusion