

/α/Amaranth Failure




Chart 1: S&P500 vs Bonds vs Natural Gas




Chart 2: Natural gas Historic price movement




Chart 3: Natural Gas Historic Returns

Introduction

Amaranth Advisors LLC was a prominent hedge fund managed by trader Brian Hunter, known for his aggressive trading strategies in the natural gas markets.

In 2006, Amaranth suffered massive losses, estimated to be around \$6 billion, primarily due to bad bets on natural gas futures. The losses stemmed from a series of risky trades that went wrong, particularly related to natural gas derivatives. Brian Hunter had taken extremely large positions in natural gas futures, essentially betting that natural gas prices would rise. However, unforeseen market dynamics and adverse price movements caused these positions to turn against the fund.

This report reviews the incidence of the risk management failure, including a timeline of events leading up to the collapse. The outcome of this failure and its impact on different stakeholders within Amaranth Advisors LLC will be analysed. Additionally, the report provides a self-reflection and personal take on the case discussed.

Firm Background

Amaranth Advisors LLC was a hedge fund founded by Nicholas Maounis in 2000. Based in Greenwich, Connecticut, Amaranth quickly gained recognition in the financial industry for its aggressive investment strategies and impressive returns. The firm primarily focused on trading energy and commodity futures, with a particular emphasis on natural gas.

Under the management of trader Brian Hunter, Amaranth became known for its sizable bets on natural gas derivatives. Hunter's trading strategies were characterized by high risk and high reward, as he took large positions in natural gas futures contracts, often speculating on price movements.

Despite initial success and rapid growth, Amaranth faced a catastrophic collapse in 2006 due to massive losses incurred from bad bets on natural gas futures. These losses, estimated to be around \$6 billion, were a result of a series of risky trades gone wrong, exacerbated by unforeseen market dynamics and adverse price

Timeline of Events:

In 2005, Brian, a prominent trader at Amaranth Advisors LLC, made a significant bet on the rise in natural gas prices. This gamble paid off handsomely when two major hurricanes struck the United States, causing a disruption in supply and leading to a sharp increase in gas prices. Natural gas prices soared from just above six dollars at the beginning of 2005 to over 16 dollars after Hurricane Katrina hit in late August. Amaranth achieved a remarkable return of 21% in 2005, primarily driven by energy trades, generating profits exceeding one billion dollars.

Brian's trading style was marked by his aggressive approach, earning him a controversial reputation within the energy trading community. By early 2006, Amaranth's positions accounted for a significant portion, approximately 60 to 70%, of the open interest in futures contracts for natural gas, reflecting Brian's dominant presence in the market.

Trading Rationale:

Natural gas prices typically exhibit seasonal fluctuations, with prices tending to be higher during the winter due to increased demand for heating. This is because colder temperatures lead to greater reliance on natural gas for warmth. Conversely, during the spring to fall seasons, when temperatures are milder, demand for natural gas decreases, resulting in lower prices.

Brian's analysis led him to anticipate higher natural gas prices during the winter season compared to the summer and fall seasons. He executed a trading strategy based on this premise, buying natural gas futures contracts for delivery in the winter while shorting contracts for delivery in the fall. By April 2006, Brian had amassed profits nearing 2 billion dollars, representing a substantial portion of Amaranth's total profits for the year.

However, by May 2006, gas prices began to decline, reaching around six dollars per BTU. Natural gas producers increased production levels, resulting in a significant buildup of pre-winter inventory. At this point, Brian held over a hundred thousand futures contracts, amounting to nearly 40% of the total outstanding contracts on the exchange. The situation deteriorated further as gas prices continued to fall, and Brian's positions suffered substantial losses. Amaranth reported a loss of 560 million dollars, signalling the beginning of its downfall. Eventually, Amaranth was forced to sell its natural gas positions to JP Morgan and Citadel for 2.5 billion dollars, marking a significant loss for the firm. Meanwhile, gas prices rebounded sharply, benefiting other traders while exacerbating Amaranth's losses. Both JP Morgan and Citadel made over 1 billion dollar each.

Following Amaranth's collapse, Brian faced accusations of violating anti-manipulation rules by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, stemming from his trading activities in February and April 2006.




Chart 4: Timeline of events leading to Amaranth's Collapse

Outcome of the failure and its impact:

Following the significant losses incurred by Amaranth Advisors LLC, the firm took steps to manage and mitigate the impact of the failure. Amaranth decided to sell its natural gas positions for 2.5 billion dollars to JP Morgan and Citadel, marking a substantial loss for the company. This decision was made in response to the plummeting natural gas prices and the inability to sustain further losses. However, the sale of these positions did not prevent the ultimate collapse of Amaranth. Amaranth was forced to sell off other securities to avoid defaults with trading counterparties. For the year, the fund's assets were down 55 percent. Moreover, the forced sales succeeded in scaling back the firm's debt, reducing its leverage ratio from approximately \$4.30 reported in June to \$1.30 in borrowings for every dollar of equity. These figures, although lower, were significantly below the more than 50-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio observed in the collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management LP in 1998.

The outcome of the failure had a profound impact on various stakeholders within the firm. Firstly, investors faced significant financial losses as the value of their investments plummeted. Amaranth's reputation as a reputable hedge fund was tarnished, leading to a loss of trust among investors and counterparties. Additionally, employees of the firm likely experienced job losses or uncertainty about the future of their employment.

Furthermore, the failure of Amaranth had broader implications for the hedge fund industry and financial markets as a whole. It highlighted the risks associated with aggressive trading strategies and the importance of robust risk management practices. Regulatory authorities intensified scrutiny of hedge funds and implemented stricter oversight measures to prevent similar failures in the future.

The impact of the failure extended beyond Amaranth itself, affecting other market participants and counterparties. JP Morgan and Citadel, who acquired Amaranth's natural gas positions, profited from the subsequent rise in gas prices, while Amaranth incurred significant losses. This disparity in outcomes underscored the ripple effects of the failure across the financial ecosystem.

In summary, the handling of the loss by Amaranth involved selling off positions to mitigate further damage, but ultimately, the failure had far-reaching consequences for investors, employees, regulators, and counterparties. The collapse of Amaranth served as a stark reminder of the importance of effective risk management and transparency in the financial industry.

What went wrong???

Reflecting on the Amaranth case study, it becomes evident that several key factors contributed to the firm's downfall, highlighting important lessons for risk management and decision-making in the financial industry.

❖ Lack of Diversification:

One crucial aspect that could have been addressed differently is the overreliance on a single trader, Brian Hunter, and his aggressive trading strategies. While Brian's track record of success initially bolstered the firm's performance, his concentrated positions and risky bets ultimately proved detrimental when market conditions turned against him. Diversifying trading strategies and spreading risk across multiple traders or asset classes could have helped mitigate the impact of individual trading decisions and reduced the firm's vulnerability to adverse market movements.

❖ Inadequate Risk Management Framework:

Amaranth's risk management framework appears to have been inadequate in identifying and addressing the escalating risks associated with Brian's positions. There was a failure to effectively monitor and control the growing exposure to natural gas futures, as evidenced by the substantial buildup of positions and the inability to react swiftly to changing market conditions. Implementing more robust risk monitoring mechanisms, including stress testing and scenario analysis, could have provided early warning signals of potential vulnerabilities, and allowed for timely adjustments to trading strategies.

Contract Month	NYMEXFEQ	Weight	Dollar P/L (Aug 31,2006 – Sept 21, 2006)
Oct-2006	-94441	0.1068	\$1,196,571,821
Nov-2006	59247	0.0911	\$(1,313,512,297)
Dec-2006	-27757	0.0518	\$718,082,127
Jan-2007	61825	0.1228	\$(1,698,345,675)
Feb-2007	-7464	0.0149	\$204,658,602
Mar-2007	58365	0.1144	\$(1,597,458,370)
Apr-2007	-77527	0.1209	\$912,497,139
May-2007	-140	0.0002	\$1,491,906
Jun-2007	869	0.0013	\$(9,226,529)
Jul-2007	-1612	0.0025	\$17,362,443
Aug-2007	406	0.0006	\$(4,408,604)
Sept-2007	-1128	0.0018	\$12,318,357

Table 1: NYMEX Futures Equivalent Values of Positions for Amaranth on August 31, 2006

Furthermore, the lack of transparency and communication within Amaranth regarding the extent of its exposure to natural gas derivatives hindered the firm's ability to accurately assess its overall risk profile and take appropriate risk management measures. Improving transparency and fostering a culture of open communication among traders, risk managers, and senior management could have facilitated better decision-making and risk oversight within the firm.

What I would have done differently???

If I were able to influence the outcome and prevent this crisis, I would prioritize the following actions:

1. Implementing stringent risk management protocols: Establishing robust risk management frameworks with clear policies, procedures, and controls to identify, assess, and mitigate risks effectively.
2. Diversifying trading strategies: Encouraging diversification across traders, asset classes, and investment strategies to reduce concentration risk and enhance portfolio resilience.
3. Enhancing transparency and communication: Promoting transparency and open communication channels within the firm to facilitate better risk awareness and decision-making at all levels.
4. Strengthening risk monitoring and reporting: Investing in advanced risk analytics and reporting tools to monitor exposures in real-time and provide timely insights into emerging risks.

By proactively addressing these areas, firms can strengthen their resilience to market uncertainties and mitigate the likelihood of experiencing similar crises in the future.

Self-reflection:

The Amaranth case study serves as a poignant reminder of the critical importance of effective risk management practices in the financial industry. It highlights the dangers of overreliance on individual traders and the need for diversification and proactive oversight. The collapse of Amaranth underscores the significance of transparency, communication, and accountability within organizations. Moving forward, it is essential to apply the lessons learned from this case study to enhance risk management practices and foster a culture of resilience and integrity in the financial sector.

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