

8 Hash Functions

Ch11 in textbook

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Key Points of Lecture

- **Two security services:**
 - Authentication
 - Data Integrity
- **Two security mechanism: Irreversible encipherment mechanisms**
 - Hash function
 - Message Authentication Codes (MAC)
 - Based on cipher or hash function



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Security Service & Attack

Security Service


- Data Confidentiality
- Authentication
- Data Integrity
- Non-repudiation

Security Attack



- Disclosure (泄密)
Traffic analysis
- Masquerade (伪装)
Content modification
Sequence modification
Timing modification
- Source repudiation (否认)
- Destination repudiation




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
Relations among Security Services



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Basic security mechanism



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Hash Function


- **Hash function $h(m)$**
Basic Requirements

1) Public description, no key.


2) Compression

– arbitrary length input
→ fixed length output

4) $h(m)$ is easy to compute
(hw and sw).



Hash example



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Synonym(同义词) about Hash

- **hash function**
 - message digest
- **hash value**
 - hash total
 - fingerprint
 - imprint(印记)
 - cryptographic checksum
 - compressed encoding
 - MDC(Message Digest Code / Modify Detection Code)
 - message digest



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Outline

- **Applications**
- **Two simple hash functions**
- **Requirements and Security**
- **Hash function Construction**
 - Hash functions based on cipher block chaining
 - Secure hash algorithm (SHA)




Outline

- **Applications**
- **Two simple hash functions**
- **Requirements and Security**
- **Hash function Construction**
 - Hash functions based on cipher block chaining
 - Secure hash algorithm (SHA)




Hash Functions Applications(1)



(a) Use of hash function to check data integrity

Hash Functions Applications(1)



(b) Man-in-the-middle attack

Figure 11.2 Attack Against Hash Function




Figure 11.3 Simplified Examples of the Use of a Hash Function for Message Authentication

Choice for Only Authentication

- When confidentiality is not required, encryption to the entire message should be **avoid**:
 - Encryption software is relatively slow
 - Encryption hardware costs are not negligible
 - Encryption hardware is optimized toward large data sizes
 - Encryption algorithms may be covered by patents



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
More commonly, message authentication is achieved using message authentication code (MAC)

- **MAC:** known as a keyed hash function

$$\text{MAC} = C(k, m)$$

- **HMAC:** keyed hash functions


- **CMAC:** Cipher Block Chaining MAC




Hash Functions Applications(2)

- Digital Signatures

Alice



Bob



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Alice's private key

Alice's public key

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



Figure 11.4 Simplified Examples of Digital Signatures

Hash Functions Applications(3)

- **Fingerprint of a program or a document**
(e.g., to detect a modification by a virus or an intruder)



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
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
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Hash Functions Applications(4)

- Storing password: (ID, hash(password))



**UNIX
password
scheme**



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Outline

- Applications
- **Two simple hash functions**
- Requirements and Security
- Hash function Construction
 - Hash functions based on cipher block chaining
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Example: Simple Hash Functions

-----using XOR

- **Case 1:**

- $b \rightarrow C$, where $C_i = b_{i1} \oplus b_{i2} \oplus \dots \oplus b_{im}$

where

C_i = i th bit of the hash code, $1 \leq i \leq n$

m = number of n -bit blocks in the input

b_{ij} = i th bit in j th block

\oplus = XOR operation

- produces a simple parity for each bit position as a longitudinal(经度) redundancy check which is **effective for random data as a data integrity check.**
 - **easy to affected by data format**



Example: Simple Hash Functions

-----using XOR


- **Case 2: (improvement based on case 1)**
 - Process each successive n-bit block of data as follows:
 - Rotate the current hash value to the left by one bit.
 - XOR the block into the hash value.
 - E.g. if $m = m_1 || m_2$, then $H(m_1 || m_2 || \text{pad}(m_2)) = LR_1(H(m_1)) \oplus (m_2 || \text{pad}(m_2))$
 - **Easy to forge by appending a block**
 - Assume m and $H(m)$ is known, easy to find x s.t.
 $H(m || \text{pad}(m) || x) = H(m)$.
 - $H(m || \text{pad}(m) || x) = LR_1(H(m)) \oplus x = H(m) \Rightarrow x = LR_1(H(m)) \oplus H(m)$.



1st improvement based on case 2

——Append encrypted hash code

- Case3: using encrypted Hash code (improvement based on case 2)
 - where hash code is generated according method in case 2.
 - Easy to **forge** by appending a block, the same as Case 2.
 - easy to find x s.t. $H(m||\text{pad}(m)||x)=H(m)$
 - if $H(m||\text{pad}(m)||x)=H(m)$, then $E(H(m))=E(H(m||\text{pad}(m)||x))$



2nd improvement based on case 2

——Authenticate then Encrypt

Case 4: transit $Y = E(K, [M \parallel H(M)]) = Y_1 \parallel Y_2 \parallel Y_3 \parallel \dots$

1) where hash code is generated according method in case 2.

For a message M of 64-bit blocks X_1, X_2, \dots, X_N , appending hash value $X_1 \oplus X_2 \oplus \dots \oplus X_N$ as $H(M)$ (denoted as X_{N+1})

But X_{N+1} is the hash code:

$$\begin{aligned} X_{N+1} &= X_1 \oplus X_2 \oplus \dots \oplus X_N \\ &= [IV \oplus D(K, Y_1)] \oplus [Y_1 \oplus D(K, Y_2)] \oplus \dots \oplus [Y_N \oplus \dots \oplus D(K, Y_N)] \end{aligned}$$

2) Encrypt $X = X_1 X_2 \dots X_{N+1}$ by **CBC mode** as Y , then


$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} X_1 = IV \oplus D(K, Y_1) \\ X_i = Y_{i-1} \oplus D(K, Y_i) \\ X_{N+1} = Y_N \oplus D(K, Y_{N+1}) \end{array} \right.$$

- Case 4 is **Not secure**

- Hash code would not change if the ciphertext blocks were permuted



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$$Y' = Y2 || Y1 || Y3 || \dots$$

$$Y = Y1 || Y2 || Y3 || \dots \quad Y' = Y2 || Y1 || Y3 || \dots$$

• **A**



B

$$Y = E(K, [M || H(M)]) \\ = Y1 || Y2 || Y3 || \dots || Y_{n+1}$$

Compute $D(K, Y') = M' || X_{n+1}'$,
and Verify $X_{n+1}' == H(M')$?

If $X_{n+1}' == H(M')$, B think Y is not
changed during transmission.

$$\text{if } M = X1 || X2 || X3 || \dots || X_n, \\ H(M) = X_{n+1} = X1 \oplus X2 \oplus \dots \oplus X_n$$



- if Attacker can intercept $Y = E(K, [M \parallel H(M)]) = Y_1 \parallel Y_2 \parallel Y_3 \parallel \dots$ from A to B and modify Y to $Y' = Y_2 \parallel Y_1 \parallel Y_3 \parallel \dots$, then send Y' to B.
- B will decrypt and obtain M' and $H(M')$

- $X_1' = IV \oplus D(K, Y_2) \neq X_1$
- $X_2' = Y_2 \oplus D(K, Y_1) \neq X_2$
- $X_3' = Y_1 \oplus D(K, Y_3) = X_3$
- $X_4' = Y_3 \oplus D(K, Y_4) = X_4$
-
- $X_{n+1}' = Y_n \oplus D(K, Y_{n+1}) = X_{n+1}$

Obviously, $X_{n+1}' = H(M')$.
But M' was modified in fact

- and $X_{n+1} = (IV \oplus D(K, Y_1)) \oplus (Y_1 \oplus D(K, Y_2)) \oplus (Y_2 \oplus D(K, Y_3)) \oplus (Y_3 \oplus D(K, Y_4)) \oplus \dots \oplus (Y_{n-1} \oplus D(K, Y_n)) = (IV \oplus D(K, Y_2)) \oplus (Y_2 \oplus D(K, Y_1)) \oplus (Y_1 \oplus D(K, Y_3)) \oplus (Y_3 \oplus D(K, Y_4)) \oplus \dots \oplus (Y_{n-1} \oplus D(K, Y_n)) = X_1' \oplus X_2' \oplus \dots \oplus X_n'$
- so, $X_{n+1}' = X_1' \oplus X_2' \oplus \dots \oplus X_n'$, B verify M' is not modified during transimission. But M' was modified in fact.

$$X_1 = IV \oplus D(K, Y_1)$$

$$X_i = Y_{i1} \oplus D(K, Y_i)$$

$$X_{N+1} = Y_N \oplus D(K, Y_{N+1})$$

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- Applications
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Requirements for Hash Functions P349

1. can be applied to any sized message M
 2. produces fixed-length output h
 3. is easy to compute $h=H(M)$ for any message M
 4. One-way property: given h is infeasible to find x s.t. (满足) $H(x)=h$
 5. Weak collision resistance: given x is infeasible to find y s.t. $H(y)=H(x)$
 6. Strong collision resistance: is infeasible to find any x, y s.t. $H(y)=H(x)$
- Basic Requirements



Table 11.1 Requirements for a Cryptographic Hash Function H

Requirement	Description
Variable input size	H can be applied to a block of data of any size.
Fixed output size	H produces a fixed-length output.
Efficiency	$H(x)$ is relatively easy to compute for any given x , making both hardware and software implementations practical.
Preimage resistant (one-way property)	For any given hash value h , it is computationally infeasible to find y such that $H(y) = h$.
Second preimage resistant (weak collision resistant)	For any given block x , it is computationally infeasible to find $y \neq x$ with $H(y) = H(x)$.
Collision resistant (strong collision resistant)	It is computationally infeasible to find any pair (x, y) with $x \neq y$, such that $H(x) = H(y)$.
Pseudorandomness	Output of H meets standard tests for pseudorandomness.



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Birthday Attack

Appendix 11A P250

Q: How many students must be in a class so that there is a greater than 50% chance that

1. one of the students shares the teacher's birthday (up to the day and month)?


$$366/2=183$$

2. any two of the students share the same birthday (up to the day and month)?——Birthday paradox(悖论)

$$1.18*(366)^{1/2}\approx 23$$



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


Figure 11.6 Relationship Among Hash Function Properties

Table 11.2 Hash Function Resistance Properties Required for Various Data Integrity Applications



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	Preimage Resistant	Second Preimage Resistant	Collision Resistant
Hash + digital signature	yes	yes	yes*
Intrusion detection and virus detection		yes	
Hash + symmetric encryption			
One-way password file	yes		
MAC	yes	yes	yes*

*Resistance required if attacker is able to mount a chosen message attack

Table 11.2 shows the resistant properties required for various hash function applications.



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General Scheme for Constructing a Secure Hash Function




Figure 11.8 General Structure of Secure Hash Code

Outline

- Applications
- Two simple hash functions
- Requirements and Security
- **Hash function Construction**
 - Hash functions based on cipher block chaining
 - Secure hash algorithm (SHA)




Hash Function

- **Hash function $h(m)$**

Basic Requirements

- 1) **Public description, no key.**
- 2) **Compression**
 - arbitrary length input \rightarrow fixed length output
- 3) **$h(m)$ is easy to compute (hw and sw).**



Outline

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Hash functions based on cipher block chaining

- Divide a message M into fixed-size blocks M_1, M_2, \dots, M_N and use a symmetric encryption system such as DES to compute the hash code G as


$$H_0 = \text{initial value}$$


$$H_i = E(M_i, H_{i-1})$$

$$G = H_N$$



Hash Function Algorithms





• <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/index.html>

Table 11.3 Comparison of SHA Parameters

Algorithm	Message Size	Block Size	Word Size	Message Digest Size
SHA-1	$< 2^{64}$	512	32	160
SHA-224	$< 2^{64}$	512	32	224
SHA-256	$< 2^{64}$	512	32	256
SHA-384	$< 2^{128}$	1024	64	384
SHA-512	$< 2^{128}$	1024	64	512
SHA-512/224	$< 2^{128}$	1024	64	224
SHA-512/256	$< 2^{128}$	1024	64	256


Note: All sizes are measured in bits.



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
Hash Algorithm Structure



IV = Initial value
 CV_i = chaining variable
 Y_i = i th input block
 f = compression algorithm

L = number of input blocks
 n = length of hash code
 b = length of input block

General Scheme for Constructing a Secure Hash Function



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Secure Hash Algorithm

- **SHA originally designed by NIST & NSA in 1993**
- **was revised in 1995 as SHA-1**
- **US standard for use with DSA signature scheme**
 - **standard is FIPS 180-1 1995, also Internet RFC3174**
 - **nb. the algorithm is SHA, the standard is SHS**
- **based on design of MD4 with key differences**
- **produces 160-bit hash values**
- **recent 2005 results on security of SHA-1 have raised concerns on its use in future applications**



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Revised Secure Hash Standard

- **NIST issued revision FIPS 180-2 in 2002**
- **adds 3 additional versions of SHA**
 - **SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512**
- **designed for compatibility with increased security provided by the AES cipher**
- **structure & detail is similar to SHA-1**
- **hence analysis should be similar**
- **but security levels are rather higher**



SHA-1 Overview


- **Input:** message with length of less than 2^{64} bits
- **Output:** a 160-bit message digest
- **Process unit:** input is processed in 512-bit blocks



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$Y = Y_0 Y_1 \dots Y_{L-1}$ (Y_i has 16 words = 512 bits)

CV_0 (Initial Value of Buffer(ABCDE)) (5 word)

$CV_{q+1} = H_{SHA-1}(CV_q, Y_q)$

$MD = CV_{q+1}$ (Output)



- **Step 1: Append padding bits**
- **Step 2: Append length**
- **Step 3: Initialize hash buffer**

A=0x67453210, B=0xEFCDAB89

C=0x98BADCFE, D=0x10325476

E=0xC3D2E1F0


- **Step 4: Process message in 512-bit (16-word) blocks**



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$Y = Y_0 Y_1 \dots Y_{L-1}$ (Y_i has 16 words=512bits)

CV_0 (Initial Value of Buffer(ABCDE)) (5 word)

$CV_{q+1} = H_{SHA-1}(CV_q, Y_q)$

$MD = CV_{q+1}$ (Output)



SHA-1 Compression Function


- heart of the algorithm
- processing message in 512-bit blocks
- consists of 80 rounds, for each round t ($0 \leq t \leq 79$):
 - updating a 160-bit buffer
 - using a 160-bit value W_t derived from the current message block
 - has a round constant K_t



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


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$$CV_{q+1} = H_{\text{SHA-1}}(CV_q, Y_q)$$

SHA-1 Round Function




- ① $B \leftarrow S^{30}(B)$
- ② $E \leftarrow (E + f_t(B, C, D)) + S^5(A) + W_t + K_t,$
- ③ circular right shift (rotation) of ABCDE by 1 word

f_t

迭代的步数	函 数 名	定 义
$0 \leq t \leq 19$	$f_1 = f_t(B, C, D)$	$(B \wedge C) \vee (\bar{B} \wedge D)$
$20 \leq t \leq 39$	$f_2 = f_t(B, C, D)$	$B \oplus C \oplus D$
$40 \leq t \leq 59$	$f_3 = f_t(B, C, D)$	$(B \wedge C) \vee (B \wedge D) \vee (C \wedge D)$
$60 \leq t \leq 79$	$f_4 = f_t(B, C, D)$	$B \oplus C \oplus D$

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W_t



$K_t, 0 \leq t \leq 79$

$0x5A827999 \quad 0 \leq t \leq 19$


$0x6ED9EBA1 \quad 20 \leq t \leq 39$

$K_t = 0x8F1BDBDC \quad 40 \leq t \leq 59$

$0xCA62C1D6 \quad 60 \leq t \leq 79$



SHA-512



$+$ = word-by-word addition mod 2^{64}

Figure 11.9 Message Digest Generation Using SHA-512




Figure 11.10 SHA-512 Processing of a Single 1024-Bit Block

SHA-3

- The Sponge Construction
 - allows both variable length input and output
 - Used for hash function, PRNG, etc.
 - defined by three parameters:




Figure 11.14 Sponge Function Input and Output

f = the internal function used to process each input block

r = the size in bits of the input blocks, called the **bitrate**

pad = the padding algorithm




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- The Sponge construction consists of

- Only one phase: the absorbing phase (if output length l satisfies: $l \leq b$)
- two phases: the absorbing phase and the squeezing phase. (if output length l satisfies: $l > b$)



Absorbing phase




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- The Sponge construction consists of

- Only one phase: the absorbing phase (if output length l satisfies: $l \leq b$)
- two phases: the absorbing phase and the squeezing phase. (if output length l satisfies: $l > b$)



(a) Absorbing phase

(b) Squeezing phase

Key Terms

absorbing phase big endian birthday attack birthday paradox bitrate capacity Chi step function collision resistant compression function cryptographic hash function hash code hash function hash value	Iota step function Keccak keyed hash function lane little endian MD4 MD5 message authentication code (MAC) message digest one-way hash function Pi step function preimage resistant	Rho step function second preimage resistant SHA-1 SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-3 SHA-384 SHA-512 sponge construction squeezing phase strong collision resistance Theta step function weak collision resistance
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Review Questions

11.1 What characteristics are needed in a secure hash function?

11.2 What is the difference between weak and strong collision resistance?

11.3 What is the role of a compression function in a hash function?

11.5 What basic arithmetical and logical functions are used in SHA?



Thanks!



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