Extensions

Cian Stryker

Table 1: Uzbek Confounders

	Dependent variable:				
	Prisoner's Dilemma (In-Group)	Dictator Game (In-Group)	Prisoner's Dilemma (Out-Group)	Dictator Game (Out-Group)	Cooperation-Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Destruction	−0.221** (0.068)	−0.428*** (0.066)	−0.143* (0.068)	−0.417*** (0.065)	−0.303*** (0.048)
Common Language Usage	0.054* (0.024)	0.109*** (0.023)	0.050* (0.024)	0.161*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.017)
Education	−0.014 (0.021)	−0.036 (0.021)	0.002 (0.021)	−0.043* (0.020)	−0.023 (0.015)
Kyrgyz Employer	0.149 (0.129)	0.202 (0.125)	0.158 (0.130)	0.187 (0.123)	0.174 (0.090)
Uzbek Employer	0.259 (0.312)	0.241 (0.303)	0.280 (0.314)	0.304 (0.298)	0.271 (0.219)
Russian Employer	0.131 (0.101)	0.217* (0.098)	0.205* (0.101)	0.283** (0.096)	0.209** (0.071)
Unemployed	0.369** (0.133)	0.180 (0.130)	0.320* (0.134)	0.196 (0.128)	0.266** (0.094)
Constant	−0.143 (0.164)	−0.153 (0.160)	−0.287 (0.165)	−0.333* (0.157)	−0.229* (0.115)
Observations	877	877	877	877	877
R^2	0.027	0.081	0.016	0.110	0.091
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.074	0.009	0.103	0.083
Residual Std. Error (df = 869)	0.990	0.963	0.996	0.947	0.695
F Statistic (df = 7; 869)	3.464**	10.941***	2.077*	15.399***	12.398***
Note:					*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 1 demonstrates the OLS regression results explaining all five prosocial outcomes as a result of the destruction dummy, common language usage, and the ethnicity of one's employer. Of note is that the destruction dummy still has a statistically significant negative correlation to prosocial behavior. That being said, the effect size is diluted across all five measures, which did not occur when the authors tested for their original confounders. Also of note is that common language use also has a statistically significant but positive correlation to all five prosocial measures. No employer ethnicity had consistently significant results, however, which suggests this particular measure does not affect prosociality as strongly as either common language usage or victimization.

Table 2: Uzbek Victimization and Common Language Usage Interaction

	Dependent variable:				
	Prisoner's Dilemma (In-Group)	Dictator Game (In-Group)	Prisoner's Dilemma (Out-Group)	Dictator Game (Out-Group)	Cooperation-Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Destruction	−0.350* (0.160)	−0.484** (0.156)	−0.267 (0.161)	−0.389* (0.154)	−0.372*** (0.113)
Common Language Usage	0.023 (0.031)	0.081** (0.030)	0.020 (0.031)	0.139*** (0.030)	0.066** (0.022)
Interaction	0.039 (0.046)	0.013 (0.045)	0.037 (0.046)	−0.016 (0.044)	0.018 (0.032)
Constant	0.037 (0.111)	−0.049 (0.109)	0.007 (0.112)	−0.236* (0.107)	−0.060 (0.079)
Observations	877	877	877	877	877
R^2	0.018	0.070	0.010	0.093	0.075
Adjusted R^2	0.015	0.067	0.006	0.090	0.072
Residual Std. Error (df = 873)	0.992	0.966	0.997	0.954	0.699
F Statistic (df = 3; 873)	5.411**	21.927***	2.904*	29.827***	23.619***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2 contains OLS regressions that explain prosocial outcomes as a result of only two variables: victimization and common language usage. Table 2 also includes an interaction between these two variables. The negative effect of victimization becomes even more muted than even Table 1's victimization coefficients. For PD outgroup, the coefficient is no statistically significant. Other measures also see their significance decreases as well. The same is true, however, for common language usage which is no longer statistically significant for either in or out-group PD scores in comparison to Table 1. None of the interaction coefficients are significant either. Overall, I believe that Table 2 further supports the author's initial findings that victimization has a strong negative correlation to Uzbek prosocial behavior. I would argue, though, that common language use is a more valid confounder than the authors' original confounders and that its inclusion is important to understanding how personal prosociality behavior might affect the results of the paper more broadly.

Model 1: Kyrgyz Prosocial Behavior



Model 1 consists of OLS linear regressions measuring prosocial outcomes as the result of victimization for the Kyrgyz sample of the authors' survey data. The most noteworthy results is that the prisoner's dilemma outgroup coefficient is positive. This suggests that Kyrgyz who were affected by the riots have on average higher levels of prosocial behavior towards Uzbeks. The variance is fairly high, but the positive nature of the coefficient is constant. For the other measures the coefficients are negative like the author's Figure 5, but noticeably less strong. This suggests that at least for the Kyrgyz portion of the authors' survey, prosocial behavior did not universally decrease, but that at least within the prisoner's dilemma—the measure of cooperation—affected Kyrgyz are more willing to cooperate with Uzbeks than non-affected.

Table 3: Kyrgyz Confounders

	Dependent variable:				
	Prisoner's Dilemma (In-Group)	Dictator Game (In-Group)	Prisoner's Dilemma (Out-Group)	Dictator Game (Out-Group)	Cooperation-Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Destruction	−0.078 (0.143)	−0.522*** (0.138)	0.391** (0.139)	−0.273 (0.142)	−0.121 (0.089)
Wealth index	−0.572 (0.660)	−0.436 (0.639)	0.020 (0.643)	0.039 (0.655)	−0.237 (0.412)
State capacity index	0.112 (0.256)	0.015 (0.248)	0.345 (0.250)	0.255 (0.254)	0.182 (0.160)
Community policing index	0.095 (0.070)	0.132 (0.067)	0.051 (0.068)	0.110 (0.069)	0.097* (0.043)
Accessibility index	−0.534 (0.619)	0.502 (0.599)	1.013 (0.603)	0.276 (0.614)	0.314 (0.386)
AJ Constant	0.252 (0.659)	−0.770 (0.638)	−0.400 (0.642)	−0.885 (0.654)	−0.451 (0.411)
Observations	222	222	222	222	222
R^2	0.018	0.080	0.068	0.034	0.043
Adjusted R^2	−0.009	0.055	0.042	0.007	0.016
Residual Std. Error (df = 215)	1.005	0.972	0.979	0.996	0.626
F Statistic (df = 6; 215)	0.654	3.133**	2.624*	1.263	1.614

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3 measures prosocial outcomes as a result of victimization and the five confounders the authors created in their original paper through OLS regressions. The results are mixed. First of all, almost none of the confounders have statistically significant results and the results are on par with the author's findings for confounder effects. When viewing the destruction dummy, however, a few key differences to the authors' findings are clear. Again PD Out-group behavior is statistically significant and positive in nature. Interestingly, PD In-group prosocial behavior is statistically negative, which suggests affected Kyrgyz have very different attitudes towards cooperation with their coethnics and non-coethnics. No other measure is statistically significant though, which differs from the authors' original findings for Uzbeks.

Model 2: Kyrgyz Prosocial Behavior with Instrumental Variable



Model 2 further tests the robustness of my Model 1's results by introducing the instrumental variable of distance to APC. Model 2 shows both the instrument's OLS regression, where the destruction dummy is replaced by the closeness instrument, and the 2SLS coefficients, where the destruction dummy is instrumented with APC location, for each prosocial measurement. The results show that both the instrument OLS regression sand 2SLS coefficients for PD out-group are positive, which means that victimization—instrumented—had a positive, causal effect on prosocial behavior in this measure. In viewing the other coefficients it is clear that while the other measures tend to be negative in nature, their variances now include some positive coefficients. This is contradictory to both the authors' Figure 5 findings and also their overall argument.