Factions of Mass Organizations

(Extract from *Mobilization, Factionalization and Destruction of Mass Movements in the Cultural Revolution: A Social Movement Perspective*, by Joshua Zhang, Philip Monte and James Wright.)

Regarding the question of why persons joined different factions, some researchers held that faction membership was closely related to the family background (Chan et al, 1980). We call these scholars "the social conflict school". Family background as a political label was imposed upon the Chinese by the Communist Party following its takeover over the government in 1949. The Chinese people were sorted into three categories: the Five Red Categories, the Five Gray Categories, and the Five Black Categories. These social identities determined an individual's social status, educational opportunities, political prospects, career chances, family life – in other words, a person's entire existence.

Indeed, during the CR, the family background played an especially important role with respect to faction alignment. Analysis of affiliation patterns associated with the Red Guards of middle schools in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province shows that those from red families tended to join the conservative organization, Faction East Wind, while those from non-red families tended to join the radical organization, Faction Flag.

The findings by the social conflict school have, however, been challenged in recent years. In the research on the factions of Tsinghua University and the TU School, it was found that the students of the TU school were polarized according to their family origins, with those from revolutionary families aligned against those from gray families. But the university students did not split along family origin lines. The factional alignment at the school, pitting political against cultural capital, conformed to the competing elites model developed by Chan et al. in their analysis of elite middle schools in Guangzhou. The political battle lines drawn at Tsinghua University, however, cannot be explained within the confines of the competing elites models, in which political and cultural capital are locked in mutual opposition. The radical faction at the university attacked the political hierarchy with passion, but they made cultural capital their target as well, while the moderate faction became a defender of both.

This was because the university had a large number of students from worker and peasant family backgrounds and they changed the factional dynamics. These students were neither completely accepted (as those from revolutionary families) nor completely excluded (as those from gray and black families) by the propositions associated with the blood lineage theory. Instead of indelibly defining the battle lines at the university, the blood lineage theory, which focused critical assessment upon cultural capital and old elites, was soon displaced by the radical agenda targeting both cultural and political hierarchies (Andreas, 2002).

The research regarding Peking University confirmed the above findings. Factions did not express differences via political doctrine or orientation towards the status quo. They expressed competition between rival wings of a movement against the old Party leadership that originated within the Party apparatus. Factions failed to offer rival programs, articulate different political doctrines or exhibit different orientations towards the status quo ante. In

the absence of substantive political differences between the two factions it is hard to imagine how students could choose sides according to their vested interests or political values. The most important feature of the CR was the conflict generated in the abrupt shift from open rebellion to a power seizure and reassertion of authority.

The city (and also province) wide alliances drew rebel leaders into conflicts at the organizational level that led to splits in an initially unified rebel camp. Faction Heaven and Faction Earth grew from just such entangling alliances across organizations. These dynamics help us to understand how factional struggles could be prolonged and violent without articulating different positions towards the status quo ante, and without adopting stances that resonated with the interests of different status groups (Walder, 2006).

The research on the Red Guards in Beijing concluded that patterns of power and privilege had little influence on the factional conflicts of the CR. Social conflict argument applies only to the initial formation of factions. In Beijing, Faction Heaven and Faction Earth did not articulate distinct moderate and radical points of view. The factional divisions did not express conflicts of interest between groups that had different orientations towards the status quo. They had similar backgrounds and their identities and interests were forged in a series of dramatic political interactions (Walder, 2009: 255-261).

Research regarding the movements in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province found that the source of factional struggles had little similarity with interest group politics. The factions in Nanjing adopted the discourse of bureaucratic politics. Those who held privileges under the system prior to the CR were disunited and unable to defend the privileges they had enjoyed in order to confront those who had been denied the privileges and tried to overthrow the then current system. In its place, those with the same or similar backgrounds accidentally adopted different political stances and fought in different and contentious camps through the rapidly changing processes with incomplete and vague information.

In addition, the factionalism was not static but rather dynamic. This was because each phase of conflict produced losers and winners, forcing people to change political alignments, and hence factional alignment. The movements in Nanjing developed in lockstep with the development of bureaucratic politics which pitted those who had been loyal to the system against each other. This compromised the power structure of the political system from within (Dong Guoqiang, 2012; Dong Guoqiang and Walder, 2011; Dong Guoqiang and Walder, 2001).

The study on Zhejiang Province (Forster, 1990) and research on Shanghai (Perry and Li Xun, 1997) also challenged the relation between faction alignment and family background. We call those scholars "the political process school".

Some scholars have tried to bridge the gap of differences between the two schools. Previous studies have focused primarily on patron-client relations and/or the class relations which had existed prior to the CR. From the perspective of resource mobilization, it has been argued that neither patron-client relations nor class relations per se would lead to factional violence which depended on how these relations were mobilized.

Research on a textile factory in Shanxi Province gave rise to three major findings. First, it found two main forms of mobilization: political mobilization by political leaders (from higher level) and resource mobilization by faction leaders (at local level). Violence was often the result of interplay between political leadership and faction

leaders. Second, faction leaders played important roles during the formation of factions and in ensuing competitions with other factions. Violence was a result not only of political mobilization from above; more importantly, it was a result of resource mobilization from below. Third, the formation of factions was political. Mobilization from above during the pre-CR period and mobilization from below during the CR created enormous tensions among social groups. These tensions came to be important tools during the faction formation and in factional struggles, where the likes of patron-client relations or class relations can be mobilized to achieve certain political goals (Lijun Yang, 2005).

The effort to bridge the gap between the two schools has not been resolved in a convincing manner and has failed to answer the question "What caused the differences between the two schools?"

18.1.   Four Types of Causal Relationship between Faction and Family Background

Even in light of the differences that existed between the two schools, there is, in fact, one area of common ground between them. That is, family background and faction alignment are treated as a causal relationship. The analysis of causal relations is one of the most central topics in social science theory and research. Causation indicates that an event is the result of the occurrence of another event. Variable X is considered to be a cause of Variable Y if a change in X (sooner or later) produces a change in Y and the relationship is not spurious. The following table displays four types of possible scenarios.

TABLE 18.1.   *Four Scenarios for Possible Causal Relationship*

Scenario	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
1	A	M
	B	N
2	C	P or Q
	D	P or Q
3	E	R
	F	
4	G	S
		T

Scenario 1 is a common causal relationship. The independent variable has two values (A and B). If it is A, the dependent variable is M and if it is B, the dependent variable changes to N. For instance, in terms of the relation between family background and faction alignment, if family background is the Five Red Categories (A) and the faction is conservative (M) and if family background is the Five Black Categories (B) and the faction becomes radical (N), we can then infer that a causal relationship between family background and faction alignment does exist.

Scenario 2 does not represent a causal relation. When the independent variable changes between C and D, the dependent variable's values will be P or Q but do not follow any fixed pattern. That is, its changes are random and are not caused by the change in the independent variable. In Scenario 3, though the independent variable could change from E to F, the dependent variable remains R regardless of the changes in the independent variable. We can conclude that there is no causal relation between the two variables. In Scenario 4, a dependent variable might have two values S and T but the independent variable remains G. This relation between the two variables is not a causal one either.

Though Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 are all non-causal relations, they do exhibit differences. In Scenario 2, both independent and dependent variables have two possible values but the changes in those values do not demonstrate a fixed and meaningful pattern. In terms of family background and faction alignment relationship, those with red family background might have joined conservative or radical factions and those with black family background might also have participated in conservative or radical factions. No clear pattern can be found in the relation. It seems rather random.

However, Scenarios 3 and 4 do not show change in either the independent or the dependent variable. In Scenario 3, the dependent variable has only one outcome regardless of the changes in the independent variable. In terms of family and faction relationship, the Red Guards in Beijing belonged to Scenario 3. Faction Heaven and Faction Earth were both radical organizations. No matter what family background a student was from, he or she did not have any choice except for a radical faction. The two factions did not articulate distinct moderate and radical points of view. The factional divisions did not express conflicts of interest between groups that had different orientations towards the status quo.

It should be noted that Factions Heaven and Earth were city-wide radical factions in Beijing based on the classification scheme discussed in the previous chapter. But the factions in Peking University and Tsinghua University were not all radical. The factions can be classified into radical and moderate categories though they were all rebels. Faction Commune of Peking University and Faction Corps of Tsinghua University were radical, while their opposing factions were moderate. It showed that the factions at lower levels were not necessarily synchronized with the factions at higher levels, especially at the provincial level (or city level in direct control cities such as Beijing and Shanghai). The moderate factions at universities could have been aligned with radical factions at the provincial level. The Red Guards in the two universities in Yunnan Province as recounted in the previous chapter exhibited this kind of phenomenon.

In some entities which were composed of persons from red families, we also fail to observe a causal relation between family backgrounds and factions. This situation is represented in Scenario 4. Though people had a choice in selecting factions, members of the factions were all from red families (e.g., in military academies and many military factories). For security reasons, the workers and technicians in military factories were required to obtain a security clearance. They were mostly discharged servicemen or university graduates from red families. In military academies, such as Nanjing Military Academy recounted in Part One of this book, the cadets had been subjected to stringent scrutiny. In these entities, no effect of family background on the faction selection was noted simply

because there was no room for family background to change. In the situations of Scenarios 3 and 4, no causal relation between the two variables was found due to the fact that either the independent or dependent variable was fixed and invariable.

In short, the differences that we have described as existing between Factions Heaven and Earth in Beijing are not the same differences as those that we find between Faction Flag and the East Wind in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province. The struggle between the two factions in Beijing was between different factions in the same rebel camp. We call them "sectarian factions". The contradiction between the two factions in Guangzhou was between two different classes, which we call "class-based factions". Failure to notice the fundamental difference between the two types of faction struggles is the primary reason for the controversy between the two schools.

18.2.   In the Provinces of Confrontation between Rebels and Conservatives

It has been argued that social conflict argument applied only to the initial formation of factions (Walder, 2009). And it was posited that the Red Guards factions first went through the confrontation between the rebels and conservatives. It was following the defeat of the loyalists that serious confrontation emerged between the radical and moderate rebels. The rebels engaged in severe violence and the sectarian fighting continued unabated (Xu Youyu, 1999).

For the Red Guard factions in Beijing, there were four primary factions with political and social significance: the old Red Guards, conservative Red Guards, rebel Red Guards and ultra-left Red Guards. Among these four main factions, the old Red Guards first and rebel Red Guards later played a leading role (Yin Hongbiao, 1997). It has also been claimed that in the provinces other than Beijing, the main factions of the Red Guards were rebels and conservatives (Xiang Qian, 2012).

In reality, social conflicts existed not only in the early stage of the CR but in fact proved to be a plague throughout its duration. Due to variations in the development of the mass movements, the factions in some provinces were involved in the fierce sectarian confrontations. As a result, social conflicts were overshadowed.

Using the data collected via our survey, we selected respondents who were rebels and conservatives to examine the relationship between family background and faction affiliation. In the analysis, the nine provinces (see Table 17.4) were selected where the confrontation between the rebels and conservatives lasted throughout the mass movements. In other words, provinces were selected where the confrontations evolved from class-based struggle. Any respondent whose alignment with a faction could be clearly identified was retained in the analysis, regardless of whether the faction was conservative or radical. In total, we found 92 respondents who met our criteria.[1] The following summarizes the relation between their family backgrounds and faction alignment.

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[1] Four respondents failed to reveal their family background, and the faction alignments for another 38 respondents were unclear. For more analysis on those respondents see Appendix H.

TABLE 18.2.   *Family-Faction Relation in Class-based Confrontation Provinces*

Faction	Family Background				Total
	Red (I)	Red (II)	Gray	Black	
Conservative	12 (80%)	11 (38%)	3 (12%)	11 (48%)	37 (40%)
Radical	3 (20%)	18 (62%)	22 (88%)	12 (52%)	55 (60%)
Total	15	29	25	23	92

As seen from the above table, those from revolutionary families (80%) tended to join the conservative factions while the respondents from non-revolutionary families (from 52% to 88%) were inclined to participate in the radical factions. It should be noted that those from black families were more likely to join conservative factions than those from worker/peasant and gray families. We will explore this issue further in the later sections.

The relationship between family background and faction alignment is statistically significant (χ^2=18.8, L^2=20.3, degree of freedom=3, P=0.0003). Since the sample size is small, we also employed Fisher's exact test (P value<0.0001), which indicates that the observed association between family background and faction selection is extremely unlikely to be due to chance. From the above analysis we can see that family background played an important role in faction alignment in the provinces where class-based confrontation dominated the struggles. This result supports the model proposed by the social conflict school.

18.3.   In the Provinces of Confrontation between Split Rebels

Though in the provinces with class-based confrontation family back-ground played an important role in faction selection, the situation was different in the provinces where the contention was between split rebels, or in other words, between radicals and moderates. We selected respondents from the 16 provinces where these sectarian factional struggles were present (see Table 17.4). There were 394 respondents whose faction alignment could be clearly identified as either radical or moderate.[2] The following table displays the association between family background and faction selection.

TABLE 18.3.   *Family-Faction Relationship in Sectarian Factional Struggle Provinces*

Faction	Family Background				Total
	Red (I)	Red (II)	Gray	Black	
Radicals	38 (63%)	47 (53%)	113 (64%)	50 (71%)	248 (63%)
Moderates	22 (37%)	41 (47%)	63 (36%)	20 (29%)	146 (37%)
Total	60	88	176	70	394

From the above table, we can see that those from worker and peasant families were less likely than others to join the radicals. However, the differences regarding faction selection by family background is not statistically significant (χ^2=5.71, L^2=5.70, degree of freedom=3, P=0.1264).

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[2] Another 330 respondents were those either with missing information on family background or with unclear faction selection. We conducted more analysis on those unclear respondents, which is reported in Appendix H.

This finding supports the position held by the political process school. The status quo and class membership had no effect upon faction alignment. Note that we are addressing sectarian factional dynamics here. As pointed out by some scholars (e.g., He Shu, 2005), by the time of the power seizure major differences had already disappeared between loyalists and rebels, which was apparent in the early days of the CR. The early popular terms of "revolutionary" versus "loyalist" and "rebel" versus "loyalist" could not be applied to the factional differences between radicals and moderates.

From the analyses above, we can predict with strong confidence that if research were to be conducted on the nine provinces where rebels were confronted with conservatives, the relationship between family background and faction alignment will prove to be statistically significant. This has indeed held true for Guangdong province. We further predict that if studies are to be conducted with respect to other provinces where rebels were involved in internal fights or rebels had no challengers, the relationship between family background and faction selection will prove statistically insignificant. Previous research has demonstrated this to be true with respect to Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces. Our predictions can be summarized as follows:

TABLE 18.4. *Provinces Fit for the Two Theories*

Theory	Social Conflict Theory	Political Process Theory
Province	Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Henan, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang, (Baoding, Hebei)	Beijing, Shanghai, Anhui, Fujian, Guizhou, Hubei, Heilongjiang, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Sichuan, Tianjin, Yunnan, Zhejiang, (Shijiazhuang, Hebei)

18.4. Factions in Tsinghua University

Fifty-nine respondents from Tsinghua University responded to the survey. The relationship between their family backgrounds and faction alignment was as follows:

TABLE 18.5. *Family Background and Faction Alignment for Tsinghua Respondents*

Faction	Family Background		Total
	Red	Non-Red	
Faction 4.14	12 (71%)	16 (40%)	28 (49%)
Faction Corps	5 (29%)	24 (60%)	29 (51%)
Total	17	40	57[3]

Because of the sample size, we collapsed family background into two categories, red and non-red families. As seen in the above table, more red family children (71%) joined Faction 4.14 while more non-red family children (60%) joined Faction Corps. The association between family background and faction selection was statistically significant (Fisher's Exact Test, P=0.0454).

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[3] Two respondents failed to indicate their family background.

Faction Corps published some statistical data during April to May in 1967 (Shen Ruhuai, 2004:115-117). One report stated that among student Party members 62.6% joined Faction 4.14 and 27.4% joined Faction Corps. It can be speculated that the remaining 10% of the student Party members were bystanders. Since detailed data is unavailable, we cannot conduct additional statistical tests regarding the relationship between Party membership and faction alignment. Fortunately, Faction Corps published detailed data with respect to faculty. The following sets forth faculty Party membership and faction alignment:

TABLE 18.6. *Relation between Party Member and Faction Alignment for Tsinghua Faculties*

Faction	Party Member	Non-Party Member	Total
Faction Corps	338 (25%)	988 (75%)	1,324
Faction 4.14	528 (53%)	471 (47%)	999
Bystander	249 (26%)	694 (74%)	943
Total	1,113	2,153	3,266[4]

As shown in the above table, only 25% of the faculty Party members joined Faction Corps, while 53% of them joined Faction 4.14. The difference between the two factions (with or without consideration of the bystanders) was statistically significant. The difference for the student Party members with respect to faction selection was even greater. Thus, we could conclude with confidence that the relationship between political status and faction alignment for Tsinghua University was statistically significant.

Our findings here are different from those by scholars such as Andreas (2002) and Walder (2009). Sun Nutao, an expert on CR research who was also a top-ranking Red Guard leader in Tsinghua University, has offered an explanation. The split of the Red Guards on campus was centered on the issue of evaluations of the pre-CR period (i.e., 1949-1966) and the cadres. The political orientations of those from the Five Red Categories and Party members can be expected to have aligned with Faction 4.14. The reasons for the schisms with regards to rebels in other universities and units might in fact differ from the reasons for the schisms observed within the Red Guards in Tsinghua University.[5]

Problems with previous studies included small sample sizes and analysis without the use of statistical tools. Most of the analyses relied on impressionistic qualitative data instead of scientific statistical inference. We will further explore this issue in the latter part of this chapter.

18.5. Whereto for the Loyalists of the Early Days

The initial loyalists had to realign themselves by or after the time that power was seized. This might offer another explanation for the complexity of the relationship between family background and faction selection. In our survey,

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[4] There might an error for the Department of Automatic Control in the original data. 111 people joined Faction Corps. 76 joined Faction 4.14. And 61 people were bystanders. The total number for that department should be 248. But the original table showed the total as 249. Therefore, our total is one less than the original total.

[5] We consulted Mr. Sun on the issue on Feb. 7 and 8, 2019.

there were 188 respondents who had joined the loyalist organizations.[6] With the development of the mass movements, 77 (41%) of them exited the movements and became bystanders. Others joined conservative, moderate or radical factions. The following depicts the realignment of those former loyalists:

TABLE 18.7. *The Realignment of the Former Loyalists*

Realignment	Family Background				Total
	Red (I)	Red (II)	Gray	Black	
Conservative	17 (18%)	14 (29%)	3 (11%)	2 (12%)	36 (19%)
Radical	9 (9%)	0 (0%)	7 (25%)	8 (47%)	24 (13%)
Moderate	5 (5%)	5 (10%)	4 (14%)	2 (12%)	16 (9%)
Unknown	19 (20%)	8 (17%)	6 (21%)	2 (12%)	35 (19%)
Bystander	45 (47%)	21 (44%)	8 (29%)	3 (18%)	77 (41%)
Total	95	48	28	17	188

Two findings are apparent from the above table. First, after their defeat 41% of the loyalists became bystanders, among whom 86% (i.e., [45+21]/77=86%) were of red family background. Second, among the former loyalists 24% of the respondents were from gray and black families ([28+17]/188=24%). This appears to be in contradiction to the perspective set forth by the social conflict school. Those from gray and black families would not be expected to join the loyalist organizations under that paradigm.

In reality, as we will show in later discussion, a person joined an organization or a faction only as a means towards an end, rather than as an end in itself. A person from a gray or black family might have joined a rebellious faction or a conservative one as a vehicle for attaining the same goal (say, to improve his or her social status). A person may have engaged in an offensive against capitalist roaders in order to take revenge against them who had oppressed him or her. However, a person might also join a conservative faction to achieve the same goal. Having learned lessons from the Anti-Rightists Campaign in 1957, he or she may have been afraid to fight against the Party Committee and work group. Brainwashed for decades, many Chinese harbored a feeling of reverence towards the revolutionary cadres, treating them as gods, sacred and inviolable. From previous experience, they believed that anyone who challenged the cadres stood to sustain unfavorable treatment in the future.

In addition, there were other possible reasons for those from red families to join the conservative factions. For some, faction selection had nothing to do with the development of the mass movements. Consider, for instance, Fan Yuchen, a student at Tsinghua University, who hailed from a worker's family. As he was not accustomed to acting obsequiously towards the Party members in his class, he was slandered by false statements and damaging accusations were registered in his personal files. By accident he found the false accusations in his personal files, despite having not been granted access. He hence learned that he had been degraded into a bad category.

His class had already been divided into two contentious groups before the CR. One group was composed of Party members and members-to-be, while another group consisted of so-called "rotten fish and shrimp". The former was referred to as the "advanced" group, and the latter was referred to as the "backward" group (Sun Nutao, 2013). In

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6 Ten respondents failed to indicate their family background and were excluded from the analysis.

spite of the complexity of the mass movements and numerous realignments of factions, the two groups in his class were clearly separated. The backward group mostly joined Faction Corps and the advanced group mostly aligned with Faction 4.14.

Fan Yuchen, however, was an exception. He was originally a hardcore supporter of Faction Corps. Following the inception of the CR, the students of the backward group who had long been oppressed could finally voice their grievances. They criticized the student cadres in their class, accusing them of following a bourgeois revisionist line. The students of the backward group in the class organized a group to denounce the advanced students.

At the beginning of the criticism, Fan Yuchen participated in the struggle out of instinct. But he soon realized the danger – his personal files carried damaging information against him. If he continued engaging in criticism, his acts would further anger those in charge of his personal files and they would add additional damaging records in retaliation. After careful reconsideration, Fan ceased the criticism. He was blamed by the former allies. But in reality he in fact had only one choice, i.e., to make peace with the advanced students. The advanced students all joined Faction 4.14 and Fan Yuchen, the defector, also became a member of the faction, essentially as an inactive follower.

Fan's faction selection decision-making process was representative of what occurred among a portion of the population during the CR. Some people had already lost the privileges associated with their red family background, moving towards the Five Black Categories with respect to status rankings. It also showed that those from black families or at the very line of demarcation associated with the black categories could join conservative factions in a bid for a better future. In these cases, faction selection had nothing to do with the dynamics of the movement.

18.6.   An Analysis on the Red Guards in Guangzhou with Computer Simulation

The above discussion has covered the different ways in which the relationship between family background and faction alignment was manifested during the CR. Though family background played a role in the class-based factional struggles, it had no effect with respect to the non-class based sectarian factional confrontations.

In this section we further explore the relation between family and faction, but from a different angle. It is quite evident that family background had a significant effect on faction selection in the class-based factional struggles of the Red Guards of Guangzhou middle schools. The following is data we have replicated from Chan et al (1980):

TABLE 18.8.   *Relationship between Family Origin and Faction (Guangzhou)*

Faction	Family Background				Total
	Red (I)	Red (II)	Gray	Black	
Faction Flag	55 (19%)	181 (34%)	525 (54%)	143 (36%)	904
Faction East Wind	208 (73%)	215 (40%)	76 (8%)	17 (4%)	516
Bystander	22 (8%)	141 (26%)	365 (38%)	239 (60%)	767
Total	285	537	966	399	2,187

As shown in the above table, those from revolutionary families (73%) tended to join the conservative organization (Faction East Wind) while those from gray and black families (54% and 36% respectively) were inclined to align themselves with the rebellious group (Faction Flag), and about 60% of those from black families were bystanders. The relationship between family origin and faction alignment is statistically significant.

What would have happened if those middle school students should have become students of universities such as Tsinghua or Peking Universities. We understand that history does not allow for the notion of "if". But with computer technology, using simulation models, we can implement hypothetical tests which can sensitize us to various possibilities.

Suppose that the middle school students in the research by Chan et al (1980) had entered universities and that we further assume that the admission quotas for those students were as follows: 85%, 10% and 5% for red, gray and black family backgrounds respectively. In other words, if we should conduct a survey on 100 of those hypothetical university students, we would expect to obtain 85 from red families, 10 from gray families and 5 from black families. The following represents the average distribution of family background and faction alignment based on a computer simulated selection run 10,000 times:

TABLE 18.9. *Computer Simulated Survey of Guangzhou Red Guards*

Faction	Family Background				Total
	Red (I)	Red (II)	Gray	Black	
Flag	6	19	5	2	32
East Wind	21	22	1	0	44
Bystander	2	15	4	3	24
Total	29	56	10	5	100

As seen from the table above, it might be vaguely noticeable that those from red families are inclined to join the conservative Faction East Wind; however, it is not especially apparent. Among those from worker and peasant families, 22 join the conservative Faction East Wind, 19 join the radical Faction Flag and 15 choose to be bystanders. As there are so few from gray and black families that they do not prove substantively important here.

Why does the strong association between family and faction become obscured in this case? Two reasons are apparent. The first has to do with the strict screening process with regard to admission to universities. The majority of the high school students from gray and black families are excluded from admission due to the class struggle policy adopted by the Party at the time. The conflict between the classes is obscured by the disappearance of those students. The second reason is that the sample size is too small. The students from non-red families are too few to be notable.

Among the previous analyses mentioned, only one study by Chan et al (1980) involved a large-scale survey exploring the relation between family and faction. Other research was based on small-scale interviews. The sample size for a survey of the population of a large university, such as Peking University and Tsinghua University, should

be 386 or more (see Appendix A for more details). Unfortunately, few scholars have performed such large-scale surveys.

In addition, no scholars have employed statistical tools to quantitatively analyze the relationship.[7] Statistics can be used with smaller sample sizes. The statistical testing procedures conducted on the data set forth in Table 18.9 do indicate that the relationship between family background and faction alignment is statistically significant (χ^2=20.3, L^2=23.2, degree of freedom=6, P=0.0025, Fisher's Exact Test P<0.0001). It would prove erroneous to simply rely on one's non-empirical judgment to assess the significance of the relationship between family origin and faction selection. We argue that the discrepancy with respect to the findings between the two schools may indeed be accredited to small sample size issues and lack of statistical analysis.

18.7.   The Relationship between Class Division and Faction Alignment

We explored some of the reasons for differences between the social conflict and political process schools with respect to faction alignment dynamics. Previous studies failed to recognize the complexity of the family and faction relations, and especially failed to distinguish the different types of the factional struggles (i.e., class-based factions vs. sectarian factions).

The study of the relationship between family and faction was grounded in an oversimplified causal model. For the social conflict school, the causal model can be summarized as follows:


FIGURE 18.1.   *The Causal Model by the Social Conflict School*

In the above causal model, family background was used to predict faction alignment. The political process school was not satisfied with the above model and proposed a modified causal model:


FIGURE 18.2.   *The Causal Model by the Political Process School*

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[7] Zhang and Wright (2018) replicated the survey by Chan et al and conducted a quantitative analysis on the relationship between family and faction for the Red Guards in Guangzhou.

The modified causal model proposed by the political process school showed that movement process also played an important role in faction alignment. At the early stage of the CR, movement process (Variable D) might not have been important in decision-making. But with the development of the movement, the process played a more important role in shaping people's decision on faction selection. In some provinces (such as Beijing, Shanghai and Jiangsu), it overshadowed family background. As a result, family background could no longer satisfactorily explain faction alignment.

However, the actual relationship between family background and the alignment of factions at the provincial level was more complex than what the above two causal models indicate. Faction selection went through multiple level alignments and was affected by multiple factors. It should be pointed out that an individual did not join an organization at a higher level (such as the provincial level) directly. Rather, a person usually first joined a smaller organization at a lower level (say, at his or her workplace). The smaller or lower level organization then made the decision to join a larger or higher level organization as a whole, regarding which an individual may not have had much influence. We call this kind of alignment "block joining". The following is the causal model that we propose:


FIGURE 18.3.   *The Proposed Causal Model*

Variable A in the above figure represents a person's demographic profile (such as age and gender), occupation, family background, social status, etc. Variable B reflects the individual's action motives, including a possible response to Mao's call, intention to improve social status, action upon grievance against capitalist roaders, sympathy towards the oppressed, influence of the surroundings, etc. The joining by an individual of a faction at a lower level was impacted not only by his or her personal demographics and social status but also by the individual's motives. Different motives would dictate to an individual whether to participate and direct the person's choice to join a certain faction. At the same time, a person's demographics also influenced his motives.

Personal demographics, social status and motives influenced alignments with factions at the lower level. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, those from non-red families and those of non-red social status were generally more anxious to improve their status positions. Those from red families would most likely want to maintain their place in the status hierarchy. Their motives were more likely based on an intention to respond to Mao's call. To them – as long as they followed the Party and Mao – the final results would not prove contrary to their interests.

But as soon as he or she joined an organization at the lower level, a person's individual decision-making process carried a very limited role in deciding which faction to align with at a higher level. The influence of his or her

personal demographics, social status, and motives in this dynamic were at best minimal. In contrast, the en masse joining of factions by the smaller organizations, and movement progress, which had little relationship to personal demographics and social status, played a more significant role.

Consider the instance of Beijing. In the camp of Faction Heaven, there were Faction Commune of Peking University, Faction Corps of Tsinghua University and the Red Flag of Beijing Institute of Aeronautics. In the camp of Faction Earth, there were Faction Jinggangshan of Beijing Normal University and the Red East of Beijing Institute of Geoscience. The large factions did not generally exhibit any real differences in political doctrine. The organizations within the same camp had different positions on issues, while organizations in different camps could have closer ties across the faction lines. The Red East in Faction Earth kept a closer relationship with Faction Corps in Faction Heaven.

As an individual, a person could not easily defect from one organization and join its opposing faction unless the faction was on the verge of collapse or disbandment. This is because Chinese culture strongly rejects the idea of defection. A defector would have been subjected to ridicule and despised. The ordinary members of Factions Heaven and Earth joined their respective factions through their original smaller factions in their universities. In other words, it was the top leaders of their universities' factions who exercised the prerogative to side with larger factions, i.e., Faction Heaven or Faction Earth.

There exist two problems in the causal models set forth by the two schools. First, both schools have overlooked the intermediate variable, the faction membership at lower levels (Variable C in the proposed model). Without it, the link between family background (or more broadly personal demographics and social status) and faction alignment at higher levels becomes an unpredictable "black box".

Second, and more important, both schools fail to distinguish the differences between the class-based factional struggles and the sectarian factional confrontations. For the Red Guards in Guangzhou middle schools, the factions at both higher and lower levels belonged to the same class-based factional struggles. As a result, the social conflict school found a correlation between family background and faction alignment. The political process school noted the importance of movement process (Variable D in the proposed model) but mistook process to be the sole factor in the relationship between family origin and faction selection.

The social conflict school concentrates only on family background and the political process school emphasizes only the movement process. Thus, both schools fail to identify the real causal relationship between family background and faction selection. We argue that the key lies in the relation between the faction at the lower level (Variable C) and the faction at the higher level (Variable E). When the factions at different levels belonged to the same class-based factional struggles, the causal relationship between family background and faction alignment would be reflected. A positive relation between family and faction would be observed. Nevertheless, when the factions at lower and higher levels belonged to different types, i.e., one belonged to the class-based factional struggle and the other to the sectarian factional struggle, it would be expected that the relation between family background and faction alignment would be obscured.

It should also be noted that the mass organizations were comprised of many layers and levels. Consider Tsinghua University, for instance. The two factions, Faction Corps and Faction 4.14, had many small fighting teams. The two large factions on the campus in turn belonged to two different larger factions at the city level. In our proposed causal model, we simplified the lower factions to one layer for ease of discussion.

In reality, the layers of the factions might be much more numerous, as the situations were much more complex. The key is that there existed two kinds of factional struggles: the class-based factional struggle and non-class-based sectarian factional conflict. Failure to note the difference between the two is the source of the controversy between the two contending schools. We argue for a "two-type factional struggle" perspective as the most appropriate explanatory approach.

18.8.   Why Factions?

In the previous chapter, we discussed the reasons for which an individual might have participated in the movements. In this section, we analyze factionalism. In the factional struggles, the most fundamental and important factional confrontation was the one between the conservatives and rebels. This was in essence the class-based struggle. After the Communist takeover in 1949, a class struggle policy was adopted in China. The ordinary Chinese were divided into two groups: the privileged and the deprived groups. The privileged enjoyed advantages in education, job assignment, career, and promotion, etc. The deprived suffered serious discrimination in every aspect of life.

In the aforementioned privileged group, which was composed mostly of those from red families, persons with revolutionary family backgrounds enjoyed more privileges than those from worker and peasant families. In the deprived group, those from gray families were a little better off than those from black families. The people from black families were located at the bottom of the social hierarchy, without much hope to escape their predicament.

The membership of the privileged and deprived groups was not static; it was in fact a constantly changing dynamic. We call this process – a man-made dynamic – a "screening differentiation process". Sun Nutao (2018) of Tsinghua University first proposed the concepts of "advanced group" and "backward group". He explained the concepts using his own experiences with respect to the class stratification system.

When they were admitted to the university (which was and still is one of the top one or two most renowned universities in China), he and his classmates were all members of the privileged group. While in their high schools, the students had already diverged into two obviously divided camps. Those who were politically reliable, ideologically advanced, from red family backgrounds, and academically excellent formed one camp. The students of this camp were mostly admitted to prestigious universities, such as Tsinghua University and Peking University. Those in the other camp who were from non-red families were mostly rejected by universities. A very few of them were lucky enough to be admitted to some rather undesirable backwater colleges. The university admission process acted as a screening filter that divided the students into two groups with different life paths. The students admitted to the prestigious universities were not only in the privileged group but also in the advanced group as well.

However, during six years in the university, political campaigns never ceased. For example, students were continually exposed to the debate over redness and expertness, the study of Mao's selected works, the recalling of sufferings in the old society and contrasting them with the purported happiness in the new, the Campaign of Learning from Lei Feng, the study of "Nine Critics",[8] the Four Cleansing Campaign, etc. Two groups gradually loomed among the classmates. One was the advanced group and the other the backward group. The major difference was in political performance.

The advanced group exhibited loyalty to the Party, a firm stance in harmony with the class line. Those from revolutionary families and worker/peasant families accounted for the majority of the advanced group. Political councilors, Party members, Youth League secretaries, and student cadres were the elites of the advanced group; they were the core and backbone of the group.

In contrast, the rightist students who held reactionary ideology and/or had grievances against the Party were the most backward elements in the backward group. The students who had "unclear" thoughts and swaying stands vis-a-vis the class line during the previous political campaigns were demoted into the backward group. The students who were from gray and black families, who had strong character and independent thoughts, and who did not follow the Party would very likely fall into the backward group. Also falling into the backward group were those who had some problems with regard to behavior, such as petty theft, and lack of discipline and motivation. But they were different from, or better than to some extent, those with political and ideological problems.

Between the advanced and backward groups there was a middle stratum with a vague boundary, where many students landed. The membership of the two groups was in a state of flux. If members in the advanced group committed any errors they would be demoted into the backward group. Some members in the backward group, those from non-red families in particular, could be upgraded into the advanced group through good political performance.

The Party policy towards the members in the advanced group was to trust them and assign them important positions. As those in the advanced group had bright future, they would try to make more contributions to move up the ladder in the group. The Party policy towards the backward elements was to help, unite, and educate them so that they could move upwards into the advanced group. The policy towards the backward elements with serious problems was to criticize, monitor and reform them so that they would not become enemies. The backward elements under-stood clearly their hopeless future and ill fate. They grasped any chance to improve their status by escaping the backward group.

The man-made screening differentiation process worked as a high-speed centrifuge, throwing those who could not closely follow the Party out of the center, into the backward group. No clearly stated criterion had ever been declared for assignment to the advanced and backward groups. No label had ever been definitively placed upon any individual.

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[8] It refers to the nine open letters by the Chinese Communist Party criticizing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from September 6, 1963 to July 14, 1964.

But the Party, embodied by the political councilors and Party and Youth League cadres, maintained an unspoken criterion. They continually sorted the students into different types to maintain a dynamic control over them. They knew clearly the students who were advanced and who were backward. And each student knew indeed the group to which group he or she belonged. There was no synchronization between the dynamic screening process (advanced vs backward) and class-based classification (privileged vs deprived). Their relationship can be displayed by the following table:

TABLE 18.10.   *Relationship between Class-based Classification and Dynamic Screen Process*

| | | Class-based Classification | |
		Privileged	Deprived
Dynamic Screening	Advanced	I	II
	Middle	III	IV
	Backward	V	VI

The members of Type I were in the best subgroup. They were not only from red families and therefore privileged, but also stayed in the advanced group through the screening differentiation process. They had a bright future in front of them. The members in Type II ranked second. Though they were from non-red families, they were upgraded through the screening process into the advanced group. They had "defected" from their non-red families and became an advanced element. However, it was very difficult for those from non-red families to be upgraded into this subgroup. The total number within the subgroup was quite small.

Type III was for those from red families who were in the middle land. They could be either upgraded into Type I or degraded into Type V. Type IV was for those from non-red families who were in the middle land. They could also be upgraded or downgraded. Membership in Types III and IV was unstable. Type V was a subgroup in the backward group. Its members were a little better off than those in Type VI. They were considered as "defecting" from their red families. Those in Type VI were at the bottom of the society. They were from non-red families and were adjudged as having poor political performance. They were discriminated against and oppressed, with no hope of improving their lots.

The screening differentiation process existed not only in Tsinghua University but also across the entire country. The dynamic process divided the Chinese into two contentious groups. It did not fully follow the class line, yet was deeply affected by it. The probability was very slim that those from non-red families would ascend into the advanced group. Most of them remained where they had been. The division by class line, such as the Five Black Categories and Five Red Categories, was tangible with unmistakable labels, whereas the screening differentiation process was intangible without evident traces. But it did exist.

The social status positions of the Chinese were ordered from Type I as the highest, Type II as the next highest, and Type VI as the lowest. Thus, before and during the CR, China was divided into a combination of privileged and deprived groups by class line and advanced and backward groups through the screening process.

Those occupying the higher positions on social ladder were Party members, Youth League members, model workers, and those from red families with good political performance. They enjoyed privileges in job assignment, promotion, etc., and were empowered to oppress others. They were trusted and relied upon by the Party and government. Since their privileged status was determined by the political system before the CR, they were naturally its defenders.

At the lower levels of the social ladder were those who exhibited poor political performance, who were condemned and criticized in the various political campaigns before the CR. Discriminated against by officials, they perceived themselves as oppressed. When they saw officials struck down, they experienced a sense of jubilation (Yang Jusheng, 2016).

A common phenomenon existed in a variety of provinces – the conservative factions had five "More's". That is, more Five Red Categories, more Party members, more Youth League members, more cadres and more activists. They were the beneficiaries of the system in existence prior to the CR. The rebels, however, included all kinds of people – from the Five Red Categories to the Five Black Categories – many of whom had been victims of the previous political campaigns (Wu Lili and Zhao Dingxin, 2007).

The major difference between the rebels and conservatives was related to the interests enjoyed by people from different classes and with different social status (Zhou Lunzhuo, 2006). We see here two factions striving hard to advance their own interests (Wang Fang, 2008); that is, the privileged and deprived groups were based on, and their confrontations were grounded in, class conflict.

In addition to the struggle between the conservatives and rebels, there also existed the struggle between rebels within the same camp. Why did the rebels split? Why did they fall into an internal and irreconcilable war? According to one explanation at the time, there were three reasons: (1) incitement by the capitalist roaders behind the scene; (2) sabotage by the bad elements who had crept into the rebel camps; and (3) the tendency towards anarchism of the rebels.

In the internecine struggles among the rebels, the factions all had support from former officials. Besides the involvement by the CR Group at the top, the local officials, including local military, were also actively involved in the confrontations. Within the military, there were different factions. The local military often held positions different from those held by the field troops. The struggles among the factions reflected the contradictions displayed by officials at higher levels. It was not a coincidence that internal struggles were more fierce when factions had more powerful high-level supporters backing them. Where the struggles at the top became stalemated, the struggles at the lower level grew more intensely confrontational.

It was also argued that the split among the rebels resulted from internecine competition to become more revolutionary. Radicals did not split from their original rebels because they were more radical. Rather, they became more radical simply because of the split. They needed a rationale for the split, and to act in a more radical manner served as a powerful justification. During the CR, the trend was to lean towards a radical rather than conservative orientation. Hence, the rebels who split from their original rebel groups tended to become more radicalized – they

were generally impelled to continue acting within a radical framework. As a result, it is difficult to know whether the split was caused by a group's radicalism or vice versa (Hu Ping, 2016b).

The factionalism within the rebel groups was rooted in several phenomena, but the most important cause was political ideology. Once the rebels became leaders of a faction, they were influenced by class struggle ideology and adopted trickery in the struggle for power. Without the guidance of democracy and rule of law, and without a clear aim to reform the system, the rebels became local gangs of bandits (Yang Jusheng, 2016). Sectarian factional fights among splintered groups of rebels resulted from the power seizure in the January Revolution. The rebel schisms could be sorted into several different types.

The first type of split was caused by the struggle against "exclusion". When the storm of the January Revolution swept across the country, the loyalists in many provinces were defeated. The winning rebels then turned against each other on the issue of power sharing. The leaders of the rebels never seriously considered exercising power when they initially engaged in the rebellion. But once victorious, their ambitions and desires for power were sharpened, given that if they shared power with other factions their own share of the spoils would be reduced accordingly. If they could maintain a hold on power, the benefits realized would of course prove that much greater.

Consider Jiangsu Province, for example. After the defeat of the loyalists, the rebels held a meeting to plan a power seizure. In the meeting a committee was established to execute the power seizure. Some representatives boycotted the meeting to protest the exclusion of an important mass organization, Faction 8.27.

It had originally been intended as a peripheral organization but it had become stronger than its parent organization. Its members were no longer content holding the status of a peripheral organization, subordinate to its parent. The group desired its fair share in the redistribution of power, and was angered by its total exclusion. A new, opposing faction thus appeared. The two factions which had been arm-in-arm comrades now became contentious enemies. Violence broke out between the two factions, resulting in thousands of casualties. The rebels in the neighboring province, Anhui, had the same experiences.

The second type of split was caused by competition among rebels to become the leading force in a camp. The case involving University HQ and Faction Storm in Hunan Province is representative. After the defeat of the loyalists, the rebels split during the power seizure in early 1967. The University HQ was composed of the Red Guards from eight universities with a total of some 20,000 members. They had taken the lead in the rebellion, and had called upon the local residents to rebel and helped workers establish their own organizations.

They took it for granted that they should act as leaders of the rebels, but the worker rebels thought otherwise. They acknowledged the early contributions by the Red Guards, but they no longer respected the students. They reasoned that the intellectuals were only vanguards for the revolution but that the working class was the most revolutionary and should play a leading role in the movement. Faction Storm rejected the request by the University HQ to continue in its leadership role. This was unacceptable to University HQ and the former allies became enemies with violence breaking out between the two factions.

The third type of split was caused by competition for more seats in the new government. Fights for additional seats were common across the country. Take the struggle between Faction Steel and Faction New in Hubei Province,

for instance. After the collapse of the conservative faction (Faction Million), the two factions fell into an internal power struggle. The dispute centered around how many seats each faction would be allocated in the Revolutionary Committee.

The same thing happened in Ningxia Province. The rebels were in opposition with the military regarding the issue of seats in the Revolutionary Committee, which led to a schism within the rebel camps. In the capital city of Sichuan Province, the same thing also occurred. After the defeat of the loyalists, order was not restored because the rebels split immediately. The former allies occupying the same trenches became opposing and irreconcilable factions. They spared no effort in their attempts to occupy more land and seize more power.

The sectarian factional confrontations centered on power for two reasons. First, each faction was afraid that it would suffer if the other side seized greater power. Second, each side was anxious to obtain more benefits. They did not wield very much power over scarce resources. As ordinary people under the planned economy, the rebels were constrained tightly by the authoritarian political system in every aspect of their lives. As long as the old system remained unchanged, their living conditions would not change significantly. If power fell into the hands of the other faction, they would suffer dearly.

Hence the former allies were now competing in a "rat-race". Each faction felt threatened by the opposing faction. The power struggle became a struggle to defend the right for life (Wang Fang, 2016). The power struggles reflected the desires and interests of the people at the bottom of the society. The CR presented opportunities for ordinary people which had never before been available. As a result, the power struggle soon escalated into fierce violence.

The fourth type split was caused by the involvement of former officials. This was because they represented the Party's power structure. Authority in China derived from the bureaucratic system headed by Mao. In order to keep localities under their control, local bureaucrats generally acted under the auspices of Mao and the Central Committee. Mao deliberately permitted his subordinates some freedom of action in the performance of their duties. They indeed enjoyed – to some extent – exercising Mao's authority. Once the former officials became involved in the power struggles of the rebels, things grew more complicated.

In Zhejaing Province, the rebels won resounding fame and prestige after the Central Committee expressed its support for them. However, the rebels viewed things differently. One faction supported the former provincial Party secretary, while the other faction did not. The faction opposed to the Party secretary was supported by the CR Group, the 5th Air Force Corps and 20th Army Corps. The faction supporting the Party secretary was supported by the local Provincial Military Region Command.

The same situation appeared in Fujian Province. With the downfall of the provincial Party secretary, the military became split into two factions. The commander of the Fujian Military Region Command, the 31st Army Corps and the Air Force supported one faction of the rebels while the deputy commissar of the Military Region Command, the 28th Army Corps and the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Forces supported the other faction. The conflict between the two factions was actually the struggle between the local officers (also known as the endogenous faction) and "outsiders" (also known as the exogenous faction).

The two factions of the rebels fought on the front stage while their supporters stayed behind the scenes issuing orders. It turned out that the rebels were manipulated by the former officials – as a cat's paw. Most of the officials returned to power after the CR, but the rebels bore the brunt of the blame.

The fifth type of split appeared after the power seizure. The rebels holding power became divided over several contentious issues. For example, in Jiangxi Province, the rebels entered the Provincial Revolutionary Committee. But shortly after the power takeover, the rebels in the power center split into two factions, Faction Good and Faction P. The former was supported by the local officials and constituted the majority. The latter was in the minority but had a very strong supporter.

It was the same in Heilongjiang Province. Within the Revolutionary Committee, a member secretly collected damaging information regarding the director, aiming to bring him down. He was put into jail by the director. His supporters openly opposed his arrest and organized as an opposing faction. The struggle between the two factions created a disturbance in the province. Though this type of schism was not directly related to power sharing, it did have roots within the power struggle.

Both the class-based confrontations between the rebels and conservatives and the sectarian factional struggles within the rebel groups concerned the issue of power. A statement in a tabloid published by Faction Steel in Hubei Province expressed – undisguisedly – the faction's desire to acquire power. It claimed, "The question of who should be the core leaders in the power seizure is actually an issue of who should lead the revolution. The issue of power is the primary issue of the revolution."

It continued, "Faction Steel, a time-tested organization, is the backbone of the mass movement in the province. We can rest assured if the faction can hold the power for the revolution and for us. It is erroneous to seek power for the benefits of individuals or small groups. But it is correct to seek power for the benefits of the proletariat. We should be confident, resolute, and clear. We should not be afraid of ridicules" (Wang Fang, 2016).

The slogan "To grasp power for the revolution" legitimized the power-seeking behavior. Two factions in Hubei Province fell into a power struggle pursuant to the excuse of seeking power for the revolution. In reality, they sought power for their own benefits and needs.

The types of split are not mutually exclusive. The split among the rebels in one province could be considered a phenomenon that involved multiple types manifested at the same time. For example, the fourth type, involvement of former officials, occurred quite commonly in a variety of provinces. In those provinces, the split also exhibited characteristics of the type associated with "exclusion", "competition for seats", etc. As stated previously, the class-based and sectarian factional struggles all centered on power. The former involved the struggle between the vested interest keepers and the challengers while the latter entailed confrontations between the challengers.

It is interesting to consider the dynamics involved in avoiding schisms. It required astute political leadership skills to solve the crisis associated with an "exclusion" split. What Zhang Chunqiao did in dealing with the problems in Shanghai was quite impressive. The rebels met with challenges from within and without in drafting the declaration of power seizure. Among the 32 sponsoring rebel organizations, there was a dispute over the order of

the signatures on the declaration. Everyone wanted his organization's name to be on the top of the list in the declaration. For the 600 plus non-sponsors, they all sought a share of power in the new government.

Zhang did not act in disregard of the challenges as the rebel leaders in Jiangsu Province. Instead, he held a secret meeting with the sponsoring rebels, proposing each of them a seat in the new government but insisted on no signs of sponsoring rebel organizations in the declaration of power seizure. The crisis was peacefully solved. The outcome showcased the political skills of Zhang. This was one of the reasons why Shanghai was much more stable than other provinces.

The best way to deal with splits regarding seat competition involved the holding of elections. In the one-person-one-vote election, whoever won the most votes was declared the winner. Peking University held an election to select the director of the Cultural Revolutionary Committee. Nie Yuanzi won the most votes and was elected.

But there was a problem. In Tianjin, an election was held for the Preparatory Committee of Power Seizure. A rebel leader lost the election, refused to acknowledge his failure, and organized another mass organization. Because of the split, the CR Group believed that negotiation would be better than choosing leadership via an election. This was because there would be no remedy after the election result was announced. As a result, there were no elections held in other provinces, opening the door for disputes over power redistribution.

18.9.   Bystanders Not Standing by

In previous chapters, we discussed the reasons that the masses participated in the mass organizations. In the CR, many people did not participate in the movements for various reasons, but this is not to state that they stayed away from the movements. In our survey, about 42% (a total of 703[9]) of the respondents answered "NO" with respect to the question of participation.

Nonetheless, some of these respondents still answered the questions concerning reasons for participation which they ordinarily would have been expected to have skipped in taking the survey. Via examination of their survey answers, we have concluded that they were indeed bystanders in the CR. The following shows the distribution of the motivations behind the bystanders' participation.

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[9] As 31 respondents failed to indicate their family background, the actual number of respondents in the analysis is 672。

TABLE 18.11.   *Reasons for Bystander Participation*

		Family Background				Fisher's Test P-value
		Red (I) (77)	Red (II) (217)	Gray (197)	Black (181)	
Y1	Y	16 (76%)	43 (56%)	24 (46%)	15 (35%)	<0.0001
	N	5	34	28	28	
Y2	Y	1 (5%)	8 (10%)	8 (15%)	9 (21%)	0.0017
	N	20	69	44	34	
Y3	Y	0 (0%)	2 (3%)	5 (10%)	7 (16%)	0.0003
	N	21	75	47	36	
Y4	Y	3 (14%)	15 (19%)	13 (50%)	15 (35%)	0.1879
	N	18	62	39	28	
Y5	Y	2 (10%)	17 (22%)	8 (15%)	4 (9%)	0.0014
	N	19	60	44	39	
Y7	Y	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (4%)	1 (2%)	0.0483
	N	21	77	50	42	
Y8[10]	Y	1 (5%)	10 (13%)	12 (23%)	13 (30%)	0.0001
	N	20	67	40	30	
Skip		56	140	145	138	

About 72% of the respondents (out of 672) answered the questionnaire as intended, i.e., they skipped the questions about participation reasons. But about 28% of the respondents (a total of 191) were not actual bystanders and they had objectives in mind that they desired to see accomplished even though they did not participate in the mass organizations.

With regard to responding to Mao's call (Y1), the percentages of positive answers decreased as follows, ordered by category: those from revolutionary families (76%), worker/peasant families (56%), gray families (46%), and black families (35%). The association between family origin and the response to Mao's call was statistically significant.

And with respect to status improvement (Y2), action upon grievance against cadres (Y3) and improvement and/or action upon grievance (Y8), the trend was in the opposite direction with black families most likely to respond positively. The trends were the same as what were noted among respondents who participated in the mass movements discussed previously.

Logically speaking, the response content discussed above was "inconsistent" (and should be skipped), but it does in fact shed light on the preferred outcomes among the masses with respect to the CR.

18.10.   Structures of the Mass Organizations

In this section, we discuss how the mass organizations were operated. The mass organizations declared their political stands and missions in statements which were filled with political terms popular at the time.

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[10] Since it is multiple choice, Y8<=Y2+Y3.

For example, the statement by the Steel Workers HQ in Hubei Province included the following quotations from Mao: "Only through sacrifice can we display our aspirations, and change the whole world," and "In the doctrine of Marxism there are one-thousand principles and ten-thousand guidelines, but in the final analysis it comes down to just one saying: in revolution there is justice." The rebels isolated the provincial Party secretary as an attack target. They also set up regulations and rules for their organizational operations including "the principle of democratic centralism", "the unity-criticism-unity principle", individual members deferring to the organizations, the local interests subordinate to the overall interests (Wang Fang, 2016).

Mass organizations also had membership criteria. One organization in Yunnan Province maintained the following criteria for applicants: (1) An applicant should hold high the great banner of Mao Zedong thought, should resolutely defend Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and his proletarian headquarters. An applicant should follow Deputy Chairman Lin Biao's teachings that we should treat ourselves as the targets of the revolution and the force of the revolution as well. We should participate in the revolutionary struggles and reform ourselves in the struggles. (2) An applicant should follow the statements and regulations of our organization. (3) Anyone except for the three-anti-elements[11] and the cadres who refused to correct their errors can apply for the membership of our organization. The procedure for membership application was as follows: (1) apply in person; (2) the application should be approved through collective decision (Zhou Ziren, 2017).

The mass organizations had their own hierarchies. The structures reflected those of formal official entities. The larger organizations, especially the provincial mass organization, had a general HQ or committee in charge of its routine activities. These were often known as a "central group" or "servant group". Group members were called "servants". Under a central group was a general office, political department, organizational department, propaganda[12] department, operation department, liaison department, secretarial department, and logistics department.

As with the military, some mass organizations formed their members into regiments, companies, platoons and squads. Some large organizations had multiple layers, to better exercise control. For example, Faction Storm in Hunan Province had four levels in the chain of command. The highest level was the general HQ. The second level was corps for regions in the province. The third level was detachments for entities. In some large entities (e.g., large factories), sub-detachments were formed.

Here is another example. The Red Guards in Fujian Province had a general HQ in charge of ten regional HQs. Each regional HQ had its servant group and departments for personnel, propaganda, secretarial and public relation affairs. In addition, they had command centers in universities and middle schools (Ye Qing, 2018).

Faction 4.14 of Tsinghua University had four levels of command. At the highest level was the General Committee with the following departments under its control: (1) the Department of General Affairs, (2) the Department of Operations, (3) the Political Department, and (4) the Department of Logistics.

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[11] Three-anti-elements referred to the people who were anti-Party, anti-socialism and anti-Mao's Thought.
[12] It is also translated as the publicity department. We prefer the translation of "propaganda" as its function was in some sense to persuade people with information including misinformation and even rumors.

At the second level, the Department of Operations was in charge of several divisions: (1) the Division of Movements on and off the Campus, (2) the Operations Division for Criticizing Jiang Nanxiang, (3) the Division of Struggle, Criticism and Reformation, (4) the Division for Security and Dictatorship, (5) the Division of Information.

The Political Department was in charge of the following divisions: (1) the Division for Cadres, (2) the Counseling Division, (3) the Organizational Division, (4) the Propaganda Division, and (5) the Liaison Division.

At the third level, two divisions had sections under their control. The Division of Information was in charge of the following sections: (1) the General Affairs Section, (2) the Section of Military Information, and (3) the Section of Regional Information. The Propaganda Division had the following entities under its control: (1) the Broadcast Station, (2) the 4.14 Newspaper, (3) the Information Section, (4) the Section for Bulletin, and (5) the Propaganda Troupe.

Faction Corps of Tsinghua University had five levels of command. At the highest level was the General Committee which oversaw the following departments: (1) the Department of General Affairs, (2) the Department of Operations, (3) the Political Department, and (4) the Department of Logistics.

At the second level, the Department of Operations was in charge of two divisions: (1) the Division of Internal Operations, and (2) the Division of External Operations. The Political Department had the following divisions under its control: (1) the Division of General Affairs, (2) the Division of Student Affairs, (3) the Division of Faculty Affairs, (3) the Division of Cadre Affairs, (4) the Organizational Division, (5) the Propaganda Division, (6) the Division of Science and Technology, and (7) the Division of Finance.

At the third level, the Division of Internal Operations was in charge of the following sections: (1) the Section of General Affairs, (2) the Section of Security, (3) the Section of Special Investigation, (4) the Section of Criticizing Jiang Nanxiang, (5) the Editor's Section, (6) the Section of Struggle, Criticism and Reformation, and (7) the Section of the Attack by Pen and Defense by Weapon.[13]

The Division of External Operations was in charge of the following sections: (1) the Section of General Affairs, (2) the Section of Information, and (3) the National Liaison Section. The Division of Faculty Affairs had two sections under its control: (1) the Workers HQ, and (2) the Section of Faculties.

The Division of Propaganda was in charge of the following entities: (1) the Jinggangshan Broadcasting Station, (2) the Vanguard Broadcasting Station, (3) the Jinggangshan Newspaper, and (4) the Jinggangshan Journal.

At the fourth level, the Section of Security had three groups under its control: (1) the Group of Political Security, (2) the Group of Defense, and (3) the First Group. The Section of Information controlled the following groups: (1) the Group of Jinggangshan Bulletin, (2) the Group of On-campus Information, (3) the Group of Information on the Central Committee Leaders, (4) the Group of Information on Middle Schools, and (5) the Group of Military Information (Sun Nutao, 2018).

The membership composition of the mass organizations was not uniform. Their leaders (known as "servants" at the time) were mostly from red families and their political status was mostly good, i.e., many of them were Party

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[13] This section was in charge of fights with and without weapons.

members. The top leaders were also mostly early rebels with strong reputations. However, for ordinary members the criteria were much less strict. Some organizations even rejected the Party members. Criminal convicts were not welcomed by either conservatives or rebels (Chen Yinan, 2006a). The leaders were selected through either election or negotiation. In theory, if a leader failed to perform well, he or she could be replaced through a subsequent election, and each member had the right to exit the organizations.

The mass organizations had a wide variety of names, which can be summarized using a few categories. First, their names were inspired by the revolutionary terms at the time, such as Red East, Red Flag, Red Rebel, Storm, East Wind, etc. Second, organizations were named after famous individuals, martyrs, or places, such as Lu Xun (a famous leftist writer) and Jinggangshan (the birthplace of the Chinese revolution). Third, organizations were named after special dates, for example, Faction 8.27, Faction 4.20, and Faction 8.15. Fourth, organizations were named from Mao's poems or quotations. The names of the mass organizations vividly expressed the characteristics of the discourse system of the CR.

Telecommunication technology was rather underdeveloped in China at the time of the CR. The real-time communication within a city relied exclusively on landline telephones and communication between cities was via long distance telephones or telegrams. This technology performed poorly during the swiftly changing situations associated with the movements, especially when violent clashes occurred. The attack and defense of a location (e.g., a building, an entity, and a town) depended heavily on reliable and convenient communication systems.

The rebels invented several ways to deal with these problems. The people at large factories and government organs lived close to each other, and if something happened, a single oral call would be answered by hundreds of people. Another efficient tool for communication was wire broadcasting. It was a popular tool for propaganda in the CR. It was also used for communication purposes. For instance, the order to mobilize people for rescue could be broadcast through loudspeakers. These simple and primitive tools played an important role in the clashes.

During the 17 years of political campaigns before the CR following the Communist takeover, China had been polarized and filled with social conflicts along class lines and the screening differentiation process. The inception of the CR rendered ordinary people, long oppressed and at the bottom of the social hierarchy, with an unprecedented chance for a change. The masses formed into three groups: conservatives, moderates, and radicals, each with different goals and interests.

The three groups of the masses, along with the three other groups (the conservatives, moderates and radicals) in the Party, were involved in an uncooperative struggle, or a game, characterized by imperfect information. Constrained by a backward economy and scarce resources, the competition among the six groups was extremely fierce; relationships between them tended to lack sincere cooperation and trustworthy alliances, as each group attempted to advance its own interests.

By the time of the January Revolution in early 1967, most of the loyalists had been defeated and driven out of the arena. Failing to consolidate their hard-won successes, the rebels fell into internal life-and-death struggles immediately, dragging China to the verge of a civil war. If the rebels had not split into internecine war, China's

history would have been entirely different. There would have been no need for the next chapter wherein we discuss the self-destruction of the rebels. Unfortunately, there is no "if" in the history.