



BUG-BOUNTY HUNTING

CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY



Vulnerability: CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Application: Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA)
Level: Medium

Description

- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of web vulnerability which allows an attacker to convince a user to perform an action they never intended to do. This happens because websites automatically trust requests that come from your browser as long as you're logged in.
- Basically, this is an attack which happens when the end-user is forced to execute unwanted actions in a web application they are currently authenticated on.
- This attack is assisted by social-engineering e.g. the end-user receiving an email with a link.
- The CSRF has a number of synonyms and can be referred to as Sea Surf, Cross-Site Reference Forgery or Session riding. Microsoft refers to it as a 'One-Click' attack in their threat modelling process.
- In the OWASP Top 10 (2021) & OWASP Top 10 (2025), this vulnerability is under the Broken Access Control Vulnerability which is in the 1st position(A01).
- When you log in to a website, your browser usually stores a "session cookie" that tells the website who you are. If you visit a malicious page while still logged in somewhere else, your browser might accidentally help the attacker by sending those cookies automatically.
- This means an attacker can create a fake website or link that secretly sends a request on your behalf. For example, changing your password or updating account details without your permission.

Severity

- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is considered a high-severity vulnerability because it allows an attacker to make important changes to a user's account without the user's permission.
- The danger comes from the fact that the website fully trusts the victim's browser and automatically carries out the attacker's request.
- The CSRF is considered high severity because:

- i. The website believes the request is legitimate because it comes with the victim's real session cookie;
- ii. The victim doesn't need to click anything suspicious-looking. Even an innocent link or hidden form can trigger the attack;
- iii. Instead of guessing a password or hacking a system directly, they simply trick the user into sending the request for them;
- iv. Depending on what the application allows, CSRF can cause password changes, email updates, money transfers, deleting or updating data, full account takeover; and
- v. If an administrator falls for a CSRF attack, the attacker could create new admin accounts, change system settings, modify or delete sensitive information, potentially compromise the whole application.

Discovery

URL: <http://localhost/DVWA/vulnerabilities/csrf>

- To identify the CSRF vulnerability in DVWA's medium security level, we followed a structured, step-by-step approach.
- The goal was to understand how DVWA validates password-change requests and whether this validation could be bypassed.

1. Logged in as an Admin User

- We began by logging into DVWA as the admin user and navigating to the password-change page.
- This allowed us to observe how the application behaves during a normal password update.

2. Analyzing the Vulnerability with Burp Suite

- To understand what was happening behind the scenes, we submitted a legitimate password change and intercepted the request using Burp Suite.
- This helped us identify the parameters involved and whether the request contained CSRF tokens, security checks and header validation. From the captured request, we noticed that medium

security relied only on a Referer header check, which is a weak form of protection.

3. *Creating a malicious web page*

- Next, we created a simple malicious HTML page (with the help of AI) designed to send the same password-change request as the legitimate one.
- The idea was to trick the browser into sending the request while the admin is logged in.

4. *Comparing legitimate and malicious requests*

- We clicked the malicious link while still logged in, intercepted the request in Burp Suite, and compared it to the legitimate admin request.
- Here's what we observed:
 - The legitimate request included a Referer header that matched DVWA's domain;
 - The malicious request did not include a Referer header, which DVWA's medium-level security checks for.

5. *Bypassing the Referer Check*

- To test whether DVWA truly depended on the Referer:
 - We manually copied the Referer header from the legitimate request;
 - We added it to the intercepted malicious request;
 - We forwarded the modified request to the server

6. *Successful Password Change*

- Once the Referer header was added, DVWA accepted the forged request and changed the admin password.
- This confirmed that DVWA's medium security level was vulnerable because the Referer header check was easy to spoof.

- Basically, the vulnerability was discovered by:
 - i. Intercepting and comparing legitimate vs malicious requests;
 - ii. Identifying that the only protection was a weak Referer check; and
 - iii. Successfully bypassing it to perform an unauthorized password change

Steps of Reproduce

- These steps explain exactly how the CSRF attack was carried out against DVWA under the medium security level.

<u>STEP</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>EXPECTED RESULT</u>
<i>Environment Setup</i>	Deploy DVWA in a controlled Kali Linux environment. Configure Burp Suite and FoxyProxy for request interception. Set DVWA security level to Medium .	DVWA is running locally with proxy tools ready.
<i>Log in as the Admin User</i>	Start by logging into DVWA with admin credentials.	This ensures the browser holds a valid session cookie, which is necessary for the attack to work.
<i>Navigate to the Password Change Page</i>	Go to the CSRF vulnerability module and open the password-change form	This is the feature that will later be targeted by the malicious request
<i>Capture a Legitimate Password Change Request</i>	Submit a real password change (any values are fine) and intercept the request using Burp Suite.	<p>This lets you observe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Required parameters; • Headers sent by the browser;<i>and</i> • Any security checks (such as Referer). You will

		notice that DVWA medium security checks the Referer header.
<i>Create a Malicious HTML Page</i>	Build a simple HTML page that automatically sends a password-change request when clicked.	This page mimics the request but does not naturally include the Referer header required by DVWA
<i>Trigger the Malicious Page</i>	<p>While still logged in as admin:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open the malicious page; • Intercept the outgoing request with Burp Suite; 	This intercepted request will be the forged CSRF attempt.
<i>Compare Legitimate – vs- Forged Requests</i>	<p>Check both intercepted requests side-by-side. You will notice:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The legitimate request contains a Referer showing DVWA's URL; • The malicious request is missing the Referer entirely. 	This missing header is what prevents the CSRF attack from succeeding by default.
<i>Add the Referer Header Manually</i>	<p>In Burp's intercepted malicious request:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Add the Referer header copied from the legitimate request; • Use "Referer: <u>http://localhost/DVWA/vulnerabilities/csrf/</u>" 	This makes the malicious request appear as if it came from the original DVWA site.


<i>Forward the Modified Request</i>	Send the modified request through Burp Suite.	Once received by the server, DVWA accepts the request because the Referer now matches.
<i>Confirm the Password Change</i>	Return to the DVWA login page and try logging in with the new password that the malicious site attempted to set.	You'll find that the password update succeeded even though the victim never authorized it.

Expected Result -vs- Actual Result

	<u>EXPECTED RESULT</u>	<u>ACTUAL RESULT</u>
1.	The application should only allow a password change when the logged-in user intentionally submits the password change form from within the DVWA application.	When a forged password-change request was sent from an external malicious page, the DVWA application still processed it successfully.
2.	It should verify that the request is legitimate by checking: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A valid CSRF token • A correct Referer header • That the request came from the DVWA interface, not an external site 	The system did not validate any CSRF token, and the Referer header could be spoofed, allowing the attacker's request to look "valid."
3.	If these checks are in place, any forged request from a malicious website should be rejected.	As a result, the admin's password was changed without their knowledge or consent.

--	--	--

Proof of Concept




Username

Password

Login

Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA)



- Instructions
- Setup / Reset DB
- Brute Force
- Command Injection
- CSRF**
- File Inclusion
- File Upload
- Insecure CAPTCHA
- SQL Injection
- SQL Injection (Blind)
- Weak Session IDs
- XSS (DOM)
- XSS (Reflected)
- XSS (Stored)
- CSP Bypass
- JavaScript Attacks
- Authorisation Bypass
- Open HTTP Redirect
- Cryptography
- API
- DVWA Security
- PHP Info
- About
- Logout

Change your admin password:

Test Credentials

New password:

Confirm new password:

Change

Note: Browsers are starting to default to setting the `SameSite=cookies` flag to `Lax`, and in doing so are killing off some types of CSRF attacks. When they have completed their mission, this lab will not work as originally expected.

Announcements:

- [Chromium](#)
- [Edge](#)
- [Firefox](#)

As an alternative to the normal attack of hosting the malicious URLs or code on a separate host, you could try using other vulnerabilities in this app to store them, the Stored XSS lab would be a good place to start.

More Information

- <https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf>
- <https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sec/seminar/2017/04/28/csrf.html>
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery

Username: admin
Security Level: Security Level: medium

[View Source](#) | [View Help](#)


```
CSRF Source
vulnerabilities/csrf/source/medium.php

<?php
if( isset( $_GET['Change'] ) ) {
    // Checks to see where the request came from
    if( strpos( $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'], $_SERVER['SERVER_NAME'] ) != false ) {
        // Get input
        $pass_new = $_GET['password_new'];
        $pass_conf = $_GET['password_conf'];

        // Do the passwords match?
        if( $pass_new == $pass_conf ) {
            // They do!
            $pass_new = addslashes( $pass_new );
            $pass_conf = addslashes( $pass_conf );

            // Update the database
            $current_user = $_SESSION['user'];
            $insert = "UPDATE users SET password = '$pass_new' WHERE user = '$current_user'";
            $result = mysql_query($insert) or die("Error: " . (mysql_error() ? mysql_error() : false));

            // Feedback for the user
            echo "prePassword Changed.</pre>";
        } else {
            // Issue with passwords matching
            echo "prePasswords did not match.</pre>";
        }
    } else {
        // Didn't come from a trusted source
        echo "preThat request didn't look correct.</pre>";
    }
}

if( !isset( $pass_new ) || !isset( $pass_conf ) ) {
    // If the passwords don't match, or if the passwords are empty, return false
    return false;
}
```

Home

Instructions

Setup / Reset DB

Brute Force

Command Injection

Cookie Poisoning

File Inclusion

File Upload

Insensate CAPTCHA

SQL Injection

SQL Injection (Blind)

Weak Session IDs

XSS (DOM)

XSS (Reflected)

XSS (Stored)

CSP Bypass

JavaScript Attacks

Authentication Bypass

Open HTTP Redirect

Cryptography

API

DVWA Security

PHP Info

About

Logout

Vulnerability: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Change your admin password:

Test Credentials

New password: ****

Confirm new password: ****

Change

Now Firefox has started to debut to setting the [Security Center](#) flag to 1, and in doing so we're killing off some types of CSRF attacks. When they have completed their mission, this tab will not work as originally expected.

Announcements:

- [CrossSiteRequestForgery](#)
- [CrossSiteRequestForgery](#)
- [CrossSiteRequestForgery](#)

As an alternative to the normal block of hosting the malicious URL or code on a separate host, you could try using other vulnerabilities in this app to store them, the Stored XSS tab would be a good place to start.

More Information

- [CrossSiteRequestForgery](#)
- [CrossSiteRequestForgery](#)
- [CrossSiteRequestForgery](#)

Username: admin
Security Level: Security Level: medium
Localize on
SQL DB: MySQL

View Source View Help

Request

Response

Inspector

Request


Response





Inspector

Request

Response

Inspector





Impact

- A successful CSRF attack allows an attacker to force a logged-in user to perform actions they never intended, without their knowledge. In this DVWA case, the impact includes:

i. Unauthorized Account Changes

An attacker can change a user's password by tricking them into clicking a malicious link. Since the victim is already logged in, the application processes the attack as if the victim requested it.

ii. Account Takeover

Once the password is changed, the attacker can log in as the victim (in this case, the admin), giving full control over the account.

iii. Privilege Abuse

If the victim has high-level privileges (like admin), the attacker indirectly gains those privileges too. This can lead to data leakage, user management manipulation and system configuration changes.

iv. Violation of User Trust

The victim has no idea anything happened, making the attack silent and dangerous.

Mitigation

- To protect applications against CSRF, developers must enforce proper request validation. The recommended mitigations include:

i. Implement Anti-CSRF Tokens

Every sensitive action should include a unique, unpredictable token that must match the server's version. This prevents attackers from crafting valid requests.

1. Enforce Same-Site Cookies

Setting cookies to SameSite=Lax or SameSite=Strict helps limit cookies being sent during cross-site requests.

2. Validate the Origin and Referer Headers

Although not foolproof alone, checking that sensitive requests come from the same domain helps detect unwanted cross-site activity.

3. *Use POST for Sensitive Actions*

GET requests should never change state (example: password reset). Using POST prevents accidental triggering through images or links.

4. *Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)*

Even if an attacker successfully changes a password, MFA can block them from logging in.

5. *Conduct Regular Security Testing*

Tools like Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP, and manual code review help detect missing tokens and insecure request handling.

References

1. <https://chatgpt.com>
2. <https://web.dev/articles/samesite-cookies-explained>
3. <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Set-Cookie/SameSite>
4. <https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf>
5. https://owasp.org/www-community/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology
6. https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
7. [A01 Broken Access Control - OWASP Top 10:2025 RC1](#)
8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GfLZkGdc_w
9. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yE29bkem-yU&t=59s>
10. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nfb9E8MJv6k&t=735s>
11. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyJnuw7afX8>