

## Reminder: CFAA is a a big hammer.

## Today in CFAA

- American Airlines is suing The Points Guy for syncing account data \*with\* user consent
- According to AA, this constitutes widespread hacking.
- AA is using the CFAA for its lawsuit.
- The CFAA is vague enough where AA might get what they want
- Either through a sympathetic judge's interpretation, or by prolonged and expensive litigation.

#### American Airlines suing The Points Guy over app that syncs frequent flyer data

The airline claims the travel tips site is violating its terms of use and infringing its trademarks

By Kim Lyons | @SocialKimLy | Jan 21, 2022, 5:58pm EST









# Lecture 1: Basics of Real Life Threat Analysis

Learning an entirely new language

## Definitions are important

Specialist language facilitates precise communication about complex topics.

Infosec is full of technical jargon and corporate speak.

It is also full of marketing teams that make up their own jargon.



## Definitions are important

Unfortunately, unlike Mathematics, there really isn't a single (trustworthy!) authority for definitions.

There are efforts in place to standardize vocabulary, but you will likely have context dependent jargon depending on where you work.

Military folks, Intelligence community vets, policy wonks, hackers and Punks, all have their own culture, definitions, and slang.

You will encounter folks with all kinds of ideas and political beliefs.

Many of whom have large platforms. Some with really bad takes dressed up in legitimizing jargon.



#### BS Detector

Seriously, having a good nose for BS will go a long way. Infosec is saturated with it.

Infosec is especially tricky, as it evolves rapidly.

Many people (myself included) constantly feel like they are behind the curve and playing catch up.

Marketers capitalize on this to make you feel out of the loop :)



## Technical Definitions

Malware

Threat Hunting

Offensive Cyber Capabilities

Malware: Unwanted, malicious software.

It has a bunch of definitions, and can get very meta.

At the end of the day, it is code that "does a thing" that the person who ran it might not either expect or want.

Context matters. Is PSExec Malware? Is Slack malware? Is RDP malware? Is Exchange Malware? Is Crowdstrike's EDR malware?

## Common activities performed by malware

- Host enumeration: whoami, whereami, whatami
- Network enumeration: what can I talk to, where can I get to?
- Execute: Powershell, Batch, shellcode...etc
- Download: get data into the computer
- Exfiltrate: get data out of the computer
- Process Manipulation: start, list, modify, and kill processes
- External Messaging: communicate with an external server

Are these indicators of a malicious program?

## Wacom drawing tablets track every app you open

But there's a way to disable it.















Written by Catalin Cimpanu, Contributor

Posted in Zero Day on February 6, 2020 | Topic: Security

https://www.zdnet.com/article/wacom-drawing-tablets-track-every-app-you-open/


## Malware is Subjective

The line between analytics and marketing and spyware can get blurred pretty quickly



#### Is Slack Malware

- Slack is a messaging service
- Slack allows you to host static files of any type and create public download links.
- Slack lets you script communication in its messenger, and can be used as a communication channel



https://threatpost.com/attackers-di scord-slack-malware/165295/

#### PSExec: Goodware?

- PSExec is a utility from the sysinternals suite of tools.
- It is used to execute powershell commands/scripts on a remote machine and is incredibly useful for sysadmins
- It is also commonly used in offensive cyber operations
  - Note that it is less common now because it became the default method for many popular tools, and vendors got good at flagging it.
  - It is still commonly used by crimeware.

https://www.mandiant.com/resources/a-nasty-tri
ck-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-d
isruption

The following high-level steps appear common across most incidents into which we have insight:

- Actors produce a list of targets systems and save it to one or multiple .txt files.
- Actors move a copy of PsExec, an instance of Ryuk, and one or more batch scripts to one or more domain controllers or other high privilege systems within the victim environment.
- Actors run batch scripts to copy a Ryuk sample to each host contained in .txt files and ultimately execute them.

## Is Crowdstrike's Agent Malware (Falcon)

Short answer: No...well kind of but don't seriously no.

It acts a lot like malware does! If you ever gain control of a company's Falcon endpoint, they are probably screwed!

Falcon is a a set of tools designed to "stop breaches"

It does so by gathering telemetry, spying on processes, and alerting/responding to activity it deems malicious.

https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/EDRs/blob/main/EDRs.md

What makes malware different from an antivirus?

How is a hacked exchange server any different from a dedicated malicious server?

Is Crowdstrike malware with (really) good marketing?

Meme src:
https://twitter.com/\_\_winn

MALWARE ALIGNMENT CHART			
	DOCTRINE PURIST	DOCTRINE NEUTRAL	DOCTRINE RADICAL
	Malware is deployed on a target machine.	Malware is deployed in a target environment.	Malware has a target.
STRUCTURE PURIST	and length ()		
Malware has harmful effects on software or hardware.	The second of th		
	WannaCry is malware.	An airstrike is malware.	A hammer is malware.
Malware has unintended effects on software or hardware.	McAfee Antivirus is malware.	Squirrels in power grids are malware.	Power outages are malware.
STRUCTURE RADICAL			
Malware has an effect.	Exchange Microsoft OWA		
	is malware.	Roombas are malware.	Emails are malware.

## Quick remark about Weird Machines

What if I execute malicious code only using instructions inside of a legitimate program?

Is PDF parser malware?

Recommended reading:

https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/12/a-deep-dive-into-ns o-zero-click.html

Malware: Unwanted, malicious software [has a bunch of definitions, can get very meta]

Threat Hunting: Searching environments to detect and isolate malicious activity.

## Definitions (for this class)

Malware: Unwanted, malicious software [has a bunch of definitions, can get very meta]

Threat Hunting: Searching environments to detect and isolate malicious activity.

- Blue Team: Analysis/Detection of new malicious activity, creating detection rules, attribution.
- Red Team: Attribution re: attacker environments, and/or emulation of real malicious activity.

There are other team "colors" that we do not cover in this class.

Red Team Engagement: An exercise involving (ideally) an external entity that provides continuous testing and validation of security controls for an organization.

While not totally accurate, it can be a useful starting point to think of a red team engagement as an open scope penetration test.

I.e., the folks carrying out the exercise will more open rules of engagement. This definition can also get very meta, and is borrowed from military jargon.

ROE: What am I, the (fake) attacker, allowed to do during this exercise?

Blue Team: an internal entity responsible for detecting, and remediating security incidents.

These are the folks who work around the clock to catch red teamers in addition to real threats.

Malware: malicious software
[has a bunch of definitions, can get very meta]

Threat Hunting: Searching environments to detect and isolate malicious activity.

- Blue Team: Analysis/Detection of new malicious activity, creating detection rules, attribution.
- Red Team: Attribution re: attacker environments, and/or emulation of real malicious activity.

#### Offensive Cyber Capabilities

For this class, we'll define it as "A device or computer that allows an adversary to execute on an objective during a cyber operation."

Note this can also get very meta.

Example: wiper malware that destroys computers used by mass transit

Non-Example: firing a rocket at an AWS datacenter to take everyone offline.

Grey Area: sending Neurolink super squirrels to chew networking cabling.

# Cyber Operations 101

## Many types of actors conduct cyber operations

Criminals

Hacktivists

Mercenaries/Private Industry

Literal children

Government/Government backed Actors (APTs)

## Many types of actors conduct cyber operations

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs): usually associated with Government actors, but any actor conducting cyber operations that can consistently target a set of victims and succeed can fall under this category.

Large criminal groups with tacit government approval/protection (FINs)

Cyber Mercenaries / Contractors (APT3 -> Boyusec, Appin Security, Positive Technologies, NSO Group )

Government Intelligence Agencies (FSB -> APT29, RGB -> Lazarus Group, NSA TAO  $\rightarrow$  Equation/G0020)

## Why conduct cyber operations?

**Activism** (DDoS attacks to shut down Nazi sites, defacing government websites)

Crime (Ransomware, stealing credentials, installing coin miners)

Espionage [CNE] (commercial vs. geopolitical -> stealing
Intellectual Property / state secrets)

"Warfare" [CNA] (Shutting down a country's internet, disrupting power grids, making nuclear centrifuges spin too fast, etc).

Clout/Trolling/fun Go to Shodan.io and search for sites with an HTML title "Hacked by\*"

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```
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
"Warfare" [CNA] (Shutting down a country's internet, making
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```

#### Some actors do a mix

#### North Korea:

- Bank heists
- Ransomware attacks
- Hack & Leak
- Destructive malware
- Espionage

Img: https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-57520169



## Example 1: OPM hack

Target: Gov

Attacker: Gov (espionage)

Benefit: intel/counterintel



"The compromised data included SF-86 forms which contain intimate details about the prospective employee's personal life, family members, and other contacts."

## Example 2: Twitter hack

Target: Corporation/Individuals

Attacker: Users / Individuals

Benefit: Ego + Money

What else could he have done?

Does social engineering count as an offensive cyber capability?



## Example 3: Monitoring

Target: User(s)

Attacker: Organization

Benefit: surveillance

Is "Find my friend" Malware?

What happens if someone compromises GoGuardian?



## **Beacon Demo**

Identify students who are silently suffering, alert those who can help, and quickly activate your school's custom response plan.

Get more info

### **How to Use Chromebook Monitoring Software to Protect Students**



GoGuardian Team

## Example 4: Jamal Khashoggi Assasination

Target: Individual

Attacker: Foriegn Government +

Mercenary

Benefit: Political



## Example 5: Advertising

Target: User

"Attacker": Company

Benefit: Money \$\$\$\$\$\$

Remember Wacom? They were using Google Analytics

Note Facebook and Google are not intelligence companies per say.

That said, they collect data that the intelligence community (IC) would kill for.

Make no mistake, digital marketing companies have impressive surveillance capabilities



## Example 6: Opportunistic Mass Exploitation

Saltstack RCE

Target: LineageOS, GHost, DigiCert (anyone vulnerable

to a specific exploit)

Attacker: various

Benefit: Financial

What else could they have done?

https://thehackernews.com/2020/05/saltstack-rce-explo
it.html



## Malware 101

## What platforms does Malware target?

Anything that can run code is susceptible to malware







## Definitions: Common types of malware

Packer: a tool that compresses, encrypts, and/or modifies an executable usually for the purpose of defense evasion.

Loader / Dropper: software that downloads and executes other malicious programs.

Spreader/Worm: software designed to spread malicious content on the system/executes the first of the attack. A virus.

Miner: malicious software that mines cryptocurrency on a victim machine.

Locker/Wiper: malware that encrypts/destroys files on a victim machine.

Backdoon: Similar to a loader/dropper but specifically designed to regain access

Spyware/RAT: collections of tools designed to spy on the victim machine that usually controlled by a remote server.

Stealer: Similar to spyware, but generally pillages a computer for all available passwords, crypto wallets...etc and exits.

Implant: catch all term for malware "implanted" on a victim machine


## Definitions: Less common types of malware

Rootkit: Generally speaking this is a subclass of spyware.

Rootkits are deployed on victim machines that usually have been "rooted" or where the attacker has escalated their privileges on the device. They usually try to hide their existence by hiding (among other things) processes, network traffic/connections, and files from the OS. Subclasses are defined based on what ring they run in.

Is a debugger a rootkit?

What about Riot Game's Anti Cheat engine for Valloran?



### C2 / Command and Control

Malware is just code. It is created to perform a job, and usually takes its marching orders from, and sends job results to remote servers

We call these servers Command and Control Servers (C2s)

We call the mechanism that sends data to and from C2 servers the C2 Channel

Note some malware is autonomous (Wanacry)

Some malware uses P2P communication (Game Over Zeus)

Some malware is deployed as a larger "Post Exploitation" effort

## Examples of C2 Channels

**TCP** 

UDP

**ICMP** 


HTTP(s)/ HTTP2/HTTP3


DNS


TLS handshakes/heartbeats

Trusted 3rd Parties


Other "Exotic" methods







## APT ChonkyBear



# How does Cyber Threat Analysis / Threat Hunting Work?

## Goal of Threat Hunting

Threat Hunting: Searching environments to detect and isolate malicious activity.

 Blue Team: Analysis/Detection of new malicious activity, creating detection rules, attribution.

Red Team: Attribution re: attacker environments, and/or emulation of real malicious activity.

## Goal of Threat Hunting

**Threat Hunting:** Searching environments to detect and isolate malicious activity.

- Blue Team: Analysis/Detection of new malicious activity, creating detection rules, attribution.
  - Finding new phishing emails, figuring out who is targeting your company and why, figuring out how to block malware or the emails from getting to your inbox in the first place.
- Red Team: Attribution re: attacker environments, and/or emulation of real malicious activity.
  - Finding out there's a bunch of phishing emails that compromised another company in your industry, and emulating the attack on your own company to see if it succeeded.
  - Identifying the actors who carried out the phishing campaign

## Quick Remark about Ethics and Red Team

Example: Emulating phishing activities of a financially motivated actor.

Consider a threat actor that sends targets a malicious document with a lure that uses one of the following email templates:

- 1) WARNING: You came into contact with someone with COVID-19!
- 2) URGENT: Immediate termination of your Position
- 3) Due to the hardship of COVID-19, we are issuing a one time spot bonus of \$5000

Should you emulate these tactics by sending your employees simulated emails using the templates aboe?

#### DON'T BE THAT PERSON

No. Seriously, don't stress out your employees over something that isn't going to make them safer.

The attackers won't play by the rules you lay out, but you should not try to emulate everything that they do.


## Frameworks for talking about Cyber Operations

There are a lot. Two of the more popular ones are

- Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain
- 2) MITRE ATT&CK

## Cyber Killchain

- Framework for identifying the steps an adversary takes to execute on a tactical objective
- As defenders, if you can "break a link in the chain" you can disrupt an adversaries operation



#### MITRE ATT&CK

- Similar approach to Cyber Killchain
- Goes into detail about specific TTPs: Tactics, Techniques, and procedures
- Is an industry standard for talking about how an objective was achieved or how an action was performed
- https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/
- https://attack.mitre.org/resources/faq/
- This course takes many of its definitions from MITRE
- It is far from a perfect framework, but it is another (incredibly useful) tool in your arsenal

#### TTPs: Tactics

"Tactics represent the 'why' of an ATT&CK technique or sub-technique. It is the adversary's tactical goal: the reason for performing an action. For example, an adversary may want to achieve credential access."

Example: Disrupting Iran's nuclear program



## TTPs: Techniques

"Techniques represent "how" an adversary achieves a tactical goal by performing an action. For example, an adversary may dump credentials to achieve credential access."

This includes the tools used, and you will sometimes hear me slip up and say tactics tools and procedures





## TTPs: Sub-Technique

"Sub-techniques are a more specific description of the adversarial behavior used to achieve a goal. They describe behavior at a lower level than a technique. For example, an adversary may dump credentials by accessing the Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets."

#### TTPs: Procedures


"Procedures are the specific implementation the adversary uses for techniques or sub-techniques. For example, a procedure could be an adversary using PowerShell to inject into lsass.exe to dump credentials by scraping LSASS memory on a victim. Procedures are categorized in ATT&CK as the observed in the wild use of techniques in the 'Procedure Examples' section of technique pages."

I like to think of this as "what playbooks does this specific actor use"?



#### This course

- In this class, we will mostly use MITRE ATT&CK
- It is a valuable framework for comparing cyber operations
- In particular, lets look at the previous example comparing APT28 and APT29




#### More Definitions

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): sets of forensic data found when malicious activity occurs. (IPs / domains of a C2 server, hash values of malware, email accounts of phishing email senders..etc)

Hash value: the unique fingerprint of a single file

IP address: the address of a computer on a network.

**Domain Name:** an entry for a A/AAAA record used by a DNS servers to map human friendly names (like google.com) to computer friendly IP addresses (8.8.8.8).




Blue team: how do I make sure this attacker can't successfully compromise our network?

Red team: how do I pretend to be this attacker to test under what circumstances we get past the blue team?


## Life of a Blue Teamer/ SOC analyst

- Find Indicators of Compromise
- Move from Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) to -> Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)
- Protecting your Environment from the Tactics / Techniques/ Procedures used.
- Break Links in the "cyber killchain"
- Eventually, threats evolve to combat your countermeasures. Go back to step 1 :)

## Threat Analysis Pyramid of Pain




## Threat Analysis Pyramid of Pain



## Threat Analysis Pyramid of Pain

#### Getting from IOCs -> TTPs:

- Hash -> Tools: What malware family does this hash belong to? How are all these hashes similar? Can I block every instance of the malware?
- IP/Domain -> Network Artifact: How does the malware communicate with the C2? Can I look at common patterns in the network traffic and block that behavior?
- IOC -> TTPs: Is there a pattern in the way this group conducts operations? Do they drop multiple malware families? Do they look for specific data? How do I block this activity?



## Easy...until it isn't!

Depending on the actor, the Pyramid of Pain might just be pain.

Hashes are easy, unless they use polymorphic code

IPs are easy, unless they use thousands of addresses all of which are compromised infrastructure. Hint: what happens when someone takes over a Kubernetes cluster or an admin cloud account?

Domains are easy, unless they use a domain generating algorithm (DGA) or quickly change them.

Or...you know what if someone compromises a bunch of legitimate sites and use them to carry out cyber operation?

## Different companies see different IOCs


Antivirus companies (Norton, McAfee) see the malware that attackers use.

Mail providers (Gmail, Yahoo) see the phishing emails.

Domain registrars (Namecheap / GoDaddy) see Command and Control registration.

Nobody sees everything. Analysis is hard.

You're going to have to work as a team.



#### Remark on Infosec Savants

There are plenty of brilliant people working in infosec, but by and large there is no such thing as someone who has all the answers.

In fact, someone who claims they do is likely wrong, lying, or trying to sell you something.

There is no Infosec Dr. House. It's probably just someone with a bit too much self confidence, and they probably are not fun to work with.

Cybersecurity is a team sport.



# Reminder! Different entities also use different jargon!

## Class Progression (blue team side)

Analysing Malware - (pulling out the IOCs in the malware)

 Example Assignment: Find all C2 domains, interesting files, and implant configuration, and imports!

Writing up a Technical Report on the Malware - (explaining the IOCs and how the malware works)

- Example Assignment: What is the malware trying to accomplish? Creating Threat Hunting Rules to find more malware
  - Example assignment: finding all code associated to APT Chonky bear in a collection of binaries

## Class Progression (blue team side)

**Analysing First stage loaders:** Analysing Malware - (pulling out the IOCs in the malware)

Writing up a Technical Report on the Malware - (explaining the IOCs and how the malware works)

Creating Threat Hunting Rules to find more malware

# Discussion: What do we need to control a computer?