

Homework - inequality

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Yun LI. Yang LI. Hemim HE. Yi LIANG. Xiaoyi HAO. Yuren CHE.

1.1 Problem 1:

the original maximization problem is equivalent to the following one:

$$\text{Max}_{s_t, b_{t+1}} \left[\frac{(-s_t + w_t l_t + (1-z)b_t + g_t)^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} - \frac{1}{1-\eta} + \beta \frac{((1+r_{t+1})s_t - b_{t+1})^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} - \frac{\beta}{1-\eta} \right. \\ \left. + \beta \chi \frac{[(1-z)b_{t+1}]^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} - \frac{\beta \chi}{1-\eta} \right]$$

F.O.C.'s w.r.t. s_t and b_{t+1} give us:

$$b_{t+1}^* = \frac{(1-z + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}})(1+r_{t+1})b_t + g_t(1+r_{t+1})}{(1 + (1+r_{t+1})\beta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}})(1 + (\chi(1-z))^{1-\eta})^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} = \frac{(1+r_{t+1})s_t}{1 + (\chi(1-z))^{1-\eta})^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} \quad (1)$$

$$s_t^* = \frac{b_t(1-z + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}) + g_t}{1 + (1+r_{t+1})\beta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} = \frac{1}{1 + \tilde{\beta}_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} (w_t l_t + (1-z)b_t + g_t) \quad (2)$$

$$C_t^{Y*} = w_t l_t + (1-z)b_t + g_t - s_t^* \quad (3)$$

$$C_t^{D*} = (1+r_{t+1})s_t^* - b_{t+1}^*$$

$$\tilde{\beta}_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} = \beta \left[1 + \chi^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} (1-z)^{\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}} \right]^{\eta} (1+r_{t+1})^{1-\eta}$$

1.1. Problem 2:

From (1) we can derive: $b_{t+1}^* = \frac{(1+r_t)s_{t+1}}{1 + (\chi(1-z))^{1-\eta})^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} \quad (5)$

Plug (5) into (2), we have: $s_t^* = c_3 l_t + c_4 s_{t+1}^* + c_5$, where

$$c_3 = \frac{w_t}{1 + \tilde{\beta}_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}}, \quad c_4 = \frac{(1-z)(1+r_t)}{(1 + \tilde{\beta}_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}})(1 + \chi^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}(1-z)^{\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}})}, \quad c_5 = \frac{g_t}{1 + \tilde{\beta}_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}}$$

and

$$\beta_{t+1}^* = \beta \left(1 + \alpha \frac{1}{n} (1-\beta) \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} (1+r_{t+1})^{1-\alpha}$$

1.2. Problem 3

F.O.C.s:

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial k_t} = \alpha A \left(\frac{k_t}{L_t} \right)^{\alpha-1} - (r_t + \delta) = 0 \Rightarrow k_t = \left(\frac{r_t + \delta}{\alpha A} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}, & k_t := \frac{k_t}{L_t} \\ \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial L_t} = (1-\alpha) A \left(\frac{k_t}{L_t} \right)^{\alpha} - w_t = 0 \Rightarrow k_t = \left(\frac{w_t}{(1-\alpha)A} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}, & k_t := \frac{k_t}{L_t} \end{cases}$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{cases} r_t = \alpha A k_t^{\alpha-1} - \delta & (6) \\ w_t = (1-\alpha) A k_t^{\alpha} & (7) \end{cases}$$

1.4. Problem 4

From ② we know:

$$s_{it} = \frac{1}{1 + \beta_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} - \frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[w_t l_{it} + (1-\beta) b_{it} + g_t \right]$$

$$K_{t+1} = \int s_{it} di = \frac{1}{1 + \beta_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} - \frac{1}{\alpha}} \left(w_t \int l_{it} di + (1-\beta) \int b_{it} di + g_t \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 + \beta_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} - \frac{1}{\alpha}} \left(w_t + \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} g_t + g_t \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 + \beta_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} - \frac{1}{\alpha}} \left(w_t + \int b_{it} di \right)$$

From ③ we know: $b_{it}^* = \frac{(1+r_t) s_{it+1}}{1 + \alpha \frac{1}{n} (1-\beta) \frac{1}{\alpha}} = \varphi (1+r_t) s_{it+1}$, $\varphi := \frac{1}{1 + \alpha \frac{1}{n} (1-\beta) \frac{1}{\alpha}}$

Therefore, $K_{t+1} = \frac{1}{1 + \beta_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} - \frac{1}{\alpha}} \left(w_t + \varphi (1+r_{t+1}) \int s_{it+1} di \right) = \frac{1}{1 + \beta_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} - \frac{1}{\alpha}} (w_t + \varphi (1+r_t) K_t)$

Plug in (b). θ , we have:

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}} \left((1-\alpha) A k_t^\alpha + \varphi (1+\alpha A k_t^{\alpha-1} - \delta) k_t \right), \text{ since } L_t = 1.$$

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}} \left[(1-\alpha + \varphi\alpha) A k_t^\alpha + \varphi(1-\delta) k_t \right]$$

Problem 5

From (2) we know $S_t = \frac{1}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}} \left[W_t l_t + (1-\zeta)\varphi(1+r)S_{t-1} + g_t \right] \quad <1>$

From government's budget constraint, we know $g_t = g = \zeta\varphi(1+r)k \quad <2>$

$A_{t+1} = S_t$, i.e. $A_t = S_{t-1} \quad <3>$

From <1> <2> <3>, we obtain

$$A_{t+1} = \frac{W}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}} l_t + \frac{(1-\zeta)\varphi(1+r)}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}} A_t + \frac{\zeta\varphi(1+r)}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}} k.$$

Therefore, $A_{t+1} = C_3 l_t + C_4 A_t + C_5$,

where $C_3 = \frac{W}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}}$, $C_4 = \frac{(1-\zeta)\varphi(1+r)}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}}$, $C_5 = \frac{\zeta\varphi(1+r)}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{2}} k.$

Problem 6.

$$A_{i1}^B = C_4 A_0^B + C_3 l_{i0} + C_5$$

$$A_{i2}^B = C_4^2 A_0^B + C_4 C_3 l_{i0} + C_3 l_{i1} + C_5$$

$$A_{i3}^B = C_4^3 A_0^B + C_4^2 C_3 l_{i0} + C_4 C_3 l_{i1} + C_3 l_{i2} + C_5$$

$$A_{i4}^B = C_4^4 A_0^B + C_4^3 C_3 l_{i0} + C_4^2 C_3 l_{i1} + C_4 C_3 l_{i2} + C_3 l_{i3}$$

...

$$\text{Var}(A_{i1}^B) = C_3^2 \sigma^2 \quad \text{Var}(A_{i2}^B) = \sigma^2 C_3^2 (1 + (C_4 + 1)^2) \quad \dots$$

$$\text{Var}(A_{it}^B) = C_3^2 \sigma^2 \sum_{k=1}^t \left(\sum_{s=0}^{k-1} C_4^{k-1-s} \right)^2$$

$$\therefore \sum_{s=0}^{k-1} C_4^{k-1-s} V^s = \frac{C_4^k - V^k}{C_4 - V}$$

$$\therefore \text{Var}(\text{Ait}^B) = C_3^2 \sigma^2 \sum_{k=1}^t \left(\frac{C_4^k - V^k}{C_4 - V} \right)^2 = \frac{C_3^2 \sigma^2}{(C_4 - V)^2} \sum_{k=1}^t (C_4^{2k} + V^{2k} - 2(C_4 V)^k)$$

$$= \frac{C_3^2 \sigma^2}{(C_4 - V)^2} \cdot \frac{(C_4 - V)^2 (1 + C_4 V)}{(1 - C_4^2)(1 - V^2)(1 - C_4 V)}$$

$$= C_3^2 \sigma^2 \frac{(1 + C_4 V)}{(1 - C_4^2)(1 - V^2)(1 - C_4 V)}$$

~~$$\therefore C_3 \text{ is independent of } z, \text{ and } C_4 \text{ falls in } z,$$~~

$\therefore C_3$ is independent of z and C_4 falls in z ,
the higher the tax is, the smaller the $\text{Var}(\text{Ait}^B)$ is.

which means the estate taxes reduce wealth inequality in the long run.