



# Penetration Testing Professional

## INFORMATION GATHERING

### Section 5: Web App Security – Module 2



## 2. Information Gathering



2.1 Gathering Information on Your Targets

2.2 Infrastructure

2.3 Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications

2.4 Fingerprinting Custom Applications

2.5 Enumerating Resources

2.6 Information Disclosure Through Misconfiguration

2.7 Google Hacking

2.8 Shodan HQ



## 2.1. Gathering Information on Your Targets



# GATHERING INFORMATION ON TARGET

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## 2.1. Gathering Information on Your Targets

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**Information gathering** is the very first and most critical step of every penetration test.

\*\*It does not matter if you have to assess the security of an entire network or a single web application, you need to know as much detail as possible of your target or targets.



## 2.1. Gathering Information on Your Targets



Most pentesting jobs are **black-box** tests.

During a **black-box** test, penetration testers simulate an external hacker's attack. By design, they do not know the inner processes, technology or any other internal information. Therefore, it makes the information they discover crucial.



## 2.1. Gathering Information on Your Targets

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Gathering information about the target is the initial phase of any penetration test. You will quickly find that in general, this is the most important part of the entire engagement.

At this stage, there is no unnecessary information; everything you collect should be noted for future use. The wealth of information you collect will become useful in both understanding application logic and during the attack phase.

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What sorts of information are we going after?

- Infrastructure (Web server, CMS, Database...)
- Application Logic
- IPs, Domains and Subdomains
- Virtual hosts

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## 2.1. Gathering Information on Your Targets

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During this chapter on information gathering techniques, you will be given valuable tips on how to store this information efficiently.

We highly recommend that you follow our approach. The better organized the information you collect, the easier it will be to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Please refer to our methodology documents for more advice.

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## 2.1.1. Finding Owner, IP Addresses And Emails



For simplicity, we will pretend to be unaware of what systems and individuals are behind a given website.

The first step of information gathering usually starts away from the organizations network. It begins with their electronic footprint, not just of their employees, but also of their network and websites.

Here are some tools to help you do that.



## 2.1.1. WHOIS



**WHOIS** lookups are used to look up domain ownership details from different databases. They were traditionally done using a command line interface, but a number of simplified web-based tools now exist.

Web-based WHOIS clients still rely on the WHOIS protocol to connect to a WHOIS server to perform lookups and command-line execution. WHOIS clients are still widely used by system administrators.

WHOIS normally runs on TCP port 43.



## 2.1.1. WHOIS

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The following slides will guide you through the steps needed to use the [Whois](#) service to get information about a website.

We will first use *Whois* with a command line utility and then we will take a look at an online, web-based tool.

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## 2.1.1. WHOIS

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### Whois Example - Command Line:

You can perform *Whois* queries by using the `whois` \*nix command or by installing the [Sysinternal Whois](#) utility.

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@kali:~# whois google.com
Whois Server Version 2.0

Domain names in the .com and .net domains can now be registered
with many different competing registrars. Go to http://www.internic.net
for detailed information.

Aborting search 50 records found .....
Server Name: GOOGLE.COM.87937.COM
IP Address: 91.218.229.20
Registrar: REGISTRAR OF DOMAIN NAMES REG.RU LLC
Whois Server: whois.reg.ru
Referral URL: http://www.reg.ru

Server Name: GOOGLE.COM.AFRICANBATS.ORG
Registrar: TUCOWS DOMAINS INC.
Whois Server: whois.tucows.com
Referral URL: http://www.tucowsdomains.com
```

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
C:\tools>whois.exe google.com
Whois v1.12 - Domain information lookup utility
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
Copyright (C) 2005-2014 Mark Russinovich

Connecting to COM.whois-servers.net...
Connecting to COM.whois-servers.net...
Connecting to whois.markmonitor.com...

Domain ID: 2138514_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.markmonitor.com
Registrar URL: http://www.markmonitor.com
Updated Date: 2014-10-28T12:38:28-0700
Creation Date: 1997-09-15T00:00:00-0700
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2020-09-13T21:00:00-0700
Registrar: MarkMonitor, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 292
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abusecomplaints@markmonitor.com
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/whois>



## 2.1.1. WHOIS



### Whois Example - Command Line:

Note: on \*nix systems you can set or specify many options. To list them, just run **whois -h**.

```
root@kali:~# whois -h
whois: option requires an argument -- 'h'
Usage: whois [OPTION]... OBJECT...

-h HOST, --host HOST      connect to server HOST
-p PORT, --port PORT      connect to PORT
-H                          hide legal disclaimers
--verbose                  explain what is being done
--help                      display this help and exit
--version                  output version information and exit

These flags are supported by whois.ripe.net and some RIPE-like servers:
-l                          find the one level less specific match
-L                          find all levels less specific matches
-m                          find all one level more specific matches
-M                          find all levels of more specific matches
-c                          find the smallest match containing a mnt-irt attribute
-x                          exact match
-b                          return brief IP address ranges with abuse contact
-B                          turn off object filtering (show email addresses)
-G                          turn off grouping of associated objects
-d                          return DNS reverse delegation objects too
-i ATTR[,ATTR]...           do an inverse look-up for specified ATTRibutes
-T TYPE[,TYPE]...           only look for objects of TYPE
```



## 2.1.1. WHOIS

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
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LAB

14

### Whois Example - Web Based tools

Instead of using the command line tools, you can also use web-based tools such as: [whois.domaintools.com](http://whois.domaintools.com)



<http://whois.domaintools.com/>



## 2.1.1. WHOIS

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
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15

The *Whois* database contains public information, so you can freely check it. In this example we will perform a lookup of google.com. This is what we get:





## 2.1.1. WHOIS



We get administrative contact information...



Registry Admin ID:  
Admin Name: DNS Admin  
Admin Organization: Google Inc.  
Admin Street: 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway  
Admin City: Mountain View  
Admin State/Province: CA  
Admin Postal Code: 94043  
Admin Country: US  
Admin Phone: +1.6506234000  
Admin Phone Ext:  
Admin Fax: +1.6506188571  
Admin Fax Ext:  
Admin Email: dns-admin@google.com



## 2.1.1.1. WHOIS



... Technical contact information...



Registry Tech ID:

Tech Name: DNS Admin

Tech Organization: Google Inc.

Tech Street: 2400 E. Bayshore Pkwy

Tech City: Mountain View

Tech State/Province: CA

Tech Postal Code: 94043

Tech Country: US

Tech Phone: +1.6503300100

Tech Phone Ext:

Tech Fax: +1.6506181499

Tech Fax Ext:

Tech Email: dns-admin@google.com



## 2.1.1. WHOIS

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More importantly, we get the IP address of one of the machines of the organization we are studying

Registrar Status	clientDeleteProhibited, clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, serverDeleteProhibited, serverTransferProhibited, serverUpdateProhibited
Dates	Created on 1997-09-15 - Expires on 2020-09-14 - Updated on 2011-07-20
Name Server(s)	NS1.GOOGLE.COM (has 11,892 domains) NS2.GOOGLE.COM (has 11,892 domains) NS3.GOOGLE.COM (has 11,892 domains) NS4.GOOGLE.COM (has 11,892 domains)
IP Address	74.125.129.99 - 78 other sites hosted on this server
IP Location	 - California - Mountain View - Google Inc.
ASN	 AS15169 GOOGLE - Google Inc. (registered Mar 30, 2000)
Whois History	4,487 records have been archived since 2001-05-03





## 2.1.1.2. DNS



Now that we have some valuable information about our target, we can start digging further into the data to identify individual targets.

A valuable source for such information is the [Domain Name System \(DNS\)](#). We can query it for some of the IP addresses that we received from the WHOIS database.



## 2.1.1.2. DNS



The DNS structure contains a hierarchy of names. The root, or highest level of the system is unnamed.

**Top Level Domains** (TLDs) are divided into classes based on rules that have evolved over time. Most TLDs have been delegated to individual country managers, whose codes are assigned from a table known as ISO-3166-1. These are maintained by an agency of the United Nations and are called country-code Top Level Domains, or ccTLDs. (Ex: .us, .uk, .il, .de, .fi, .fr)



## 2.1.1.2. DNS

In addition, there are a limited number of "generic" Top Level Domains (gTLDs) which do not have a geographic or country designation. (Ex. .com, .org, .net, .gov, .edu)

Responsibility for procedures and policies for the assignment of Second Level Domain Names (SLDs) and lower level hierarchies of names has been delegated to TLD managers - subject to the policy guidance contained in [ISO-3166-1](#).




## 2.1.1.2. DNS

Country code domains are organized by a manager for that country; these managers perform a public service on behalf of the Internet community.

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
## 2.1.1.2. DNS



DNS queries produce listing called Resource Records.  
This is a representation of a Resource Record.




## 2.1.1.2. DNS



A Resource record starts with a domain name, usually a fully qualified domain name. If anything other than a fully qualified domain name is used, the name of the zone the record is in, will automatically be appended to the end of the name.



## 2.1.1.2. DNS



Time-To-Live (TTL), in seconds, defaults to the minimum value determined in the SOA record.



## 2.1.1.2. DNS


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
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26






## 2.1.1.2. DNS

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## 2.1.1.2. DNS




### Name Server

Defines an authoritative name server for a zone.  
It defines and delegates authority to a name server for a child zone.

NS Records are the GLUE that binds the distributed database together.



## 2.1.1.2. DNS




### Address

The A record simply maps a hostname to an IP address.

Zones with A records are called 'forward' zones.



## 2.1.1.2. DNS




### Pointer

The PTR record maps an IP address to a Hostname.

Zones with PTR records are called 'reverse' zones.



## 2.1.1.2. DNS




### CNAME

The CNAME record maps an alias hostname to an A record hostname.



## 2.1.1.2. DNS

32



### Mail Exchange

The MX record specifies a host that will accept email on behalf of a given host.

The specified host has an associated priority value.

A single host may have multiple MX records.

The records for a specific host make up a prioritized list.



## 2.1.1.2. DNS



The domain name system (DNS) is a distributed database arranged hierarchically. Its purpose is to provide a layer of abstraction between Internet services (web, email, etc.) and the numeric addresses (IP addresses) used to uniquely identify any given machine on the Internet.

[https://icannwiki.com/Domain\\_Name\\_System](https://icannwiki.com/Domain_Name_System)

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This has several advantages:

- It permits the use of names instead of numbers to identify hosts (usually servers).
- Names are much easier to remember.
- It permits a server to change numeric addresses without requiring notification of everyone on the Internet, by simply pointing the name to the new numeric address.
- One name can refer to multiple hosts, to share the load

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## 2.1.1.3. Nslookup

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**Nslookup** is another very handy tool that lets you translate hostnames to IP addresses and vice versa.

Let us quickly review its main features in the next interactive slide.



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


## 2.1.1.3. Nslookup

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### Nslookup

- Under *Windows*, click Start>Run>cmd.
- Under *\*nix* systems, open a console and type:



```
C:\>nslookup google.com
Server:  google-public-dns-a.google.com
Address: 8.8.8.8

Non-authoritative answer:
Name:  google.com
Addresses: 2a00:1450:4002:800::1002
          173.194.113.224
          173.194.113.227
          173.194.113.230
          173.194.113.228
          173.194.113.226
          173.194.113.229
```

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@kali:~# nslookup google.com
Server: 192.168.102.2
Address: 192.168.102.2#53

Non-authoritative answer:
Name: google.com
Address: 173.194.113.224
Name: google.com
Address: 173.194.113.228
Name: google.com
Address: 173.194.113.229
```



## 2.1.1.3. Nslookup



### Reverse Lookup

The previous query is referred to as a lookup or as referenced in the previous section, it is an "[A](#)".

If you provide a domain name, DNS returns the IP addresses for the matching hosts.

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## 2.1.1.3. Nslookup



### Reverse Lookup

Let us try with a **reverse lookup**.

If you provide an IP address, DNS returns the domain name associated with that IP.

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@kali:~# nslookup -type=PTR 173.194.113.224
Server:      192.168.102.2
Address:     192.168.102.2#53

Non-authoritative answer:
224.113.194.173.in-addr.arpa    name = mil01s18-in-f0.1e100.net.

Authoritative answers can be found from:

root@kali:~#
```

172.194.113.224 is the IP address we have found in the previous step



## 2.1.1.3. Nslookup

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### Records

In this step we will query the DNS server for the whole record associated with *google.com*:

```
nslookup -querytype=ANY google.com
```

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
root@kali:~# nslookup -querytype=ANY google.com  
;; Truncated, retrying in TCP mode.  
Server: 192.168.102.2  
Address: 192.168.102.2#53  
  
Non-authoritative answer:  
Name: google.com  
Address: 173.194.113.229  
google.com has AAAA address 2a00:1450:4002:800::1004  
google.com mail exchanger = 20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.  
google.com rdata_257 = \# 19 0005697373756573796D616E7465632E636F6D  
google.com mail exchanger = 50 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com.  
google.com mail exchanger = 40 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com.  
google.com nameserver = ns1.google.com.  
google.com origin = ns1.google.com  
google.com mail addr = dns-admin.google.com  
google.com serial = 2015032501  
google.com refresh = 7200  
google.com retry = 1800  
google.com expire = 1209600  
google.com minimum = 300  
google.com nameserver = ns2.google.com.  
google.com text = "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ip4:216.73.93.70/31 ip4:2
```



## 2.1.1.3. Nslookup

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Review results

From the previous command we are given the following important information:

- Name Servers
- A records
- CNAME's
- MX

You will have to save this information for the subsequent steps of your penetration testing engagement.

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## 2.1.1.3. Nslookup

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Every IP address on the Internet is assigned to an organization.

An organization can purchase a block of IP addresses according to their needs and it will "own" that entire block.

The [whois](#) database tracks the owners of public IP addresses as well as domain names.





## 2.1.1.3. Nslookup



Sometimes, organizations are not actually the owners of the IP addresses they use for their presence on the internet.

They may rely on ISPs and hosting companies that lease one or more smaller netblocks (among those owned) to them.

Finding the netblock owner and the ISPs that our target organization relies on, is an important step that we will study in the next slide.



## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's



This time we want to know which ISP's hosting and IP addresses our target organization uses.

Using Nslookup we get the IP addresses associated to each subdomain. We will perform a whois request for each of these IP addresses to uncover the ISP's that these IP addresses belong to.

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## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's



**Note:** When the organization is big, net-blocks may be assigned directly to it, so no Hosting services are involved.

**Note:** A corporation is not limited to having only one hosting company.

### Requirements:

- nslookup (Windows/Linux)
- web browser



## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's

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The first step is to gather all the IP addresses related to a domain or subdomain. For this example we will research the *statcounter.com* website.

Now is your chance to use FreeMind to map your research!

Let's start from the domain "*statcounter.com*":



```
nslookup statcounter.com
```



## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's



```
root@kali:~# nslookup statcounter.com
Server:      192.168.102.2
Address:     192.168.102.2#53

Non-authoritative answer:
Name:   statcounter.com
Address: 104.20.2.47
Name:   statcounter.com
Address: 104.20.3.47
```

As you can see there are two ip addresses ("A" records in the DNS) registered for that domain. We will store these two IP addresses for steps 3 and 4 of this process.

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## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's

Continuing to perform a per-subdomain ip survey, we move on to "www.statcounter.com" and find out that it has different IP addresses associated with it.

```
</> nslookup www.statcounter.com
```

This command returns other two IP addresses:

- 93.188.134.172
- 93.188.134.237

Please note that these addresses may change in your tests



## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's

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The returned IP addresses must be saved for further checks against *whois* in step 5.

We can continue this survey against all of the organization's domains and subdomains, but we will stop here and start our ISP recognition phase. We have to check:

- 1. 104.20.2.47
- 2. 104.20.3.47
- 3. 93.188.134.172
- 4. 93.188.134.237



## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's



Using online tools such as [arin.net](http://arin.net), [whois.domaintools.com](http://whois.domaintools.com) or [ripe.net](http://ripe.net) we will uncover the ISP's that our organization relies upon.

Let us start querying **104.20.2.47**.

<http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-108-162-192-0-1/pft>  
<http://whois.domaintools.com/>  
<https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/#/query>



## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's



This IP address belongs  
to "CloudFlare".

A netblock for this ISP is  
104.16.0.0/12.

IP Location	Singapore Singapore Cloudflare Inc.
ASN	AS13335 CLOUDFLAREN - CloudFlare, Inc. (registered J
Whois Server	whois.arin.net
IP Address	104.20.2.47
NetRange:	104.16.0.0 - 104.31.255.255
CIDR:	104.16.0.0/12
NetName:	CLOUDFLAREN
NetHandle:	NET-104-16-0-0-1
Parent:	NET104 (NET-104-0-0-0-0)
NetType:	Direct Assignment
OriginAS:	AS13335
Organization:	CloudFlare, Inc. (CLOUD14)
RegDate:	2014-03-28
Updated:	2014-03-28
Comment:	<a href="https://www.cloudflare.com">https://www.cloudflare.com</a>
Ref:	<a href="http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-104-16-0-0-1">http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-104-16-0-0-1</a>
OrgName:	CloudFlare, Inc.
OrgId:	CLOUD14
Address:	665 Third Street #207
City:	San Francisco



## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's

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We can move on with the other two IP address:  
**93.188.134.172** and **93.188.134.23**. We have now uncovered that the `www.statcounter.com` subdomain is handled by another organization: *CDNetworks*.

IP Address	93.188.134.149
% Abuse contact for '93.188.134.0 - 93.188.134.255'	
inetnum:	93.188.134.0 - 93.188.134.255
netname:	CDNETEU1
descr:	CDNetworks Inc.
country:	IT
admin-c:	CDN57-RIPE
tech-c:	CDN57-RIPE

IP Address	93.188.134.23
% Abuse contact for '93.188.134.0 - 93.188.134.255' is	
inetnum:	93.188.134.0 - 93.188.134.255
netname:	CDNETEU1
descr:	CDNetworks Inc.
country:	IT
admin-c:	CDN57-RIPE
tech-c:	CDN57-RIPE
status:	ASSIGNED PA



## 2.1.1.3.1. Finding Target ISP's



At the end of this process, we can build a table with all the IP addresses used by the organization and the ISP/Hosting services that these IP addresses belong to.

To perform a thorough pen test, this information must be included in your penetration testing documentation.

This information will become useful when mapping the attack surface.



## 2.1.1.3.2. Finding Target ISP's with Netcraft

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A faster way to uncover the organization's hosting scheme and ownership is by using **Netcraft**.

Netcraft has a wealth of information for us and we will use it often in this module.

Visiting [www.netcraft.com](http://www.netcraft.com) and doing a search for *statcounter.com* will reveal the Hosting provider for *statcounter.com* as well as its IP netblock.

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## 2.1.1.3.2. Finding Target ISP's with Netcraft

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54

The *statcounter.com* example is a good example for demonstrating how an organization may rely upon different netblocks (and hosting) for different servers.

By just querying a domain we get all the information in 1 page.

Let us try it by visiting [netcraft.com](https://www.netcraft.com)



<https://www.netcraft.com/>



## 2.1.1.3.2. Finding Target ISP's with Netcraft



Netcraft

### Network

Site	http://statcounter.com
Domain	statcounter.com
IP address	104.20.3.47
IPv6 address	Not Present
Domain registrar	unknown
Organisation	unknown
Top Level Domain	Commercial
Hosting country	US

Netblock Owner	CloudFlare, Inc.
Nameserver	may.ns.cloudflare.com
DNS admin	dns@cloudflare.com

```
root@kali:~# nslookup statcounter.com
Server:          192.168.102.2
Address:         192.168.102.2#53

Non-authoritative answer:
Name:  statcounter.com
Address: 104.20.2.47
Name:  statcounter.com
Address: 104.20.3.47
```

This is the IP address that we found using nslookup.



## 2.1.1.3.2. Finding Target ISP's with Netcraft



Netcraft

Network

Site	http://statcounter.com	Netblock Owner	CloudFlare, Inc.
Domain			
IP address			
IPv6 address			
Domain			
Organization			
Top Level			
Hosting			

IP Location: Singapore Singapore Cloudflare Inc.

ASN: AS13335 CLOUDFLARENET - CloudFlare, Inc. (registered)

Whois Server: whois.arin.net

IP Address: 104.20.3.47

NetRange: 104.16.0.0 - 104.31.255.255  
CIDR: 104.16.0.0/12  
NetName: CLOUDFLARENET  
NetHandle: NET-104-16-0-0-1  
Parent: NET104 (NET-104-0-0-0-0)  
NetType: Direct Assignment  
OriginAS: AS13335  
Organization: CloudFlare, Inc. (CLOUD14)  
RegDate: 2014-03-28  
Updated: 2014-03-28  
Comment: https://www.cloudflare.com  
Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-104-16-0-0-1

OrgName: CloudFlare, Inc.  
OrgId: CLOUD14


Do you remember?  
This Netblock belongs  
to "CloudFlare", we  
have already found it  
using whois!



## 2.1.1.3.2. Finding Target ISP's with Netcraft

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

If you have read and applied our methodological approach, this map should be similar to the one you created up to this point:





## 2.1. Video - Information Gathering

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

58



If you have a **FULL** or **ELITE** plan you can click  
on the image on the left to start the video

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# INFRASTRUCTURE

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## 2.2. Infrastructure



The infrastructure behind a web application is what supports it and allows it to function.

This includes the web server that is directly involved in the execution of any web application.

The two most common web servers used on the internet today are **Apache** and **Microsoft IIS**.



## 2.2. Infrastructure



Discovering what kind of web server is behind your application will give you a hint about what OS the server is running. This helps you to research what known vulnerabilities may exist.

For example, discovering an [IIS](#) (Internet Information Service) web server will tip us off that the server is running an OS in the Windows Server OS family.

IIS version 6.0 is installed by default on all Windows Server 2003 boxes, Windows Server 2008 supports IIS 7 and Windows server 2012 is the only one to support IIS 8.0.

<https://www.iis.net/>



## 2.2. Infrastructure

 MAP REF VIDEO LAB

These guesses are correct in 90% of the cases when dealing with IIS and Windows Server however, the same cannot be said for the many different Linux and BSD distributions. These may run different versions of the Apache web server.

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## 2.2. Infrastructure

Although hacking into the server operating system is beyond the scope of our web application test engagement, having a clear understanding of the infrastructure will be useful in the next testing steps.



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## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



Uncovering both the web server type and version will give us enough information to mount many different attacks against its components (during later stages of the test).

IIS components, usually called ISAPI extensions, work as dynamic libraries, extending the functionalities of the web server and performing different tasks for the web server.



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



These include: URL rewriting, load balancing, script engines (like PHP, Python or Perl) and many others.

A rewriter changes "ugly" web application URLs such as [news.php?id=12](#) to a more search-engine-friendly URL like [news/12.html](#) or a route like [news/12](#).

Also an IDS is a web application firewall that detects and prevents intrusions coming from the HTTP/S protocol.

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## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver




The presence of either of these two modules can alter the results of our tests significantly, so performing a careful fingerprint of the web server and its components is obviously a great help.

Let's have a look at the first and simplest way to retrieve the web server version along with other useful information. Sometimes, this information is leaked through the HTTP headers in response to a trivial HTTP request to the web server.



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



As we can see from this response, the web server has quietly provided its name to us!

In this case, unfortunately, we have no versioning information. That info is extremely important to us in order to understand the level of exposure to known vulnerabilities.



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

For the version info, we can use Netcraft; it provides web server analysis via its enormous information database.

It can be reached at: [www.netcraft.com](http://www.netcraft.com).



What's that site running?

Find out what technologies are powering any website:

→

The image shows the Netcraft logo at the top left, followed by a large watermark for "eLearnSecurity.com" and the tagline "Forging security professionals". To the right is a screenshot of the Netcraft website's search interface. The search bar contains the URL "netcraft.com".



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver

 MAP REF VIDEO LAB

You will find Netcraft to be very useful not only for this web server fingerprinting step but also, for subsequent steps like collecting all available subdomains for a domain.

Let's try our web server identification using [Netcraft](#).

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## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

By searching for the domain name from the Netcraft home page, we are presented with a great deal of information regarding our target.

This includes the web server version, name server and IP addresses of the different web servers in use.



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



The Netcraft site report also shows the webserver and historical OS information about the domain [microsoft.com](https://www.netcraft.com/surveys/www/server/microsoft.com).

Background					
Site title	Microsoft – Official Home Page	Date first seen	August 1995		
Site rank	1082	Primary language	English		
Description	At Microsoft our mission and values are to help people and businesses throughout the world realise their full potential.				
Keywords	Not Present				

Network					
---------	--	--	--	--	--

Hosting History					
Netblock owner	IP address	OS	Web server	Last seen	Refresh
Microsoft Corp One Microsoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	134.170.188.221	unknown	Microsoft-IIS/8.5	29-Mar-2015	
Microsoft Corp One Microsoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	134.170.185.46	unknown	Microsoft-IIS/8.5	25-Mar-2015	
Microsoft Corp One Microsoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	134.170.188.221	unknown	Microsoft-IIS/8.5	24-Mar-2015	
Microsoft Corp One Microsoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	134.170.185.46	unknown	Microsoft-IIS/8.5	22-Mar-2015	
Microsoft Corp One Microsoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	134.170.188.221	unknown	Microsoft-IIS/8.5	21-Mar-2015	
Microsoft Corp One Microsoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	134.170.185.46	unknown	Microsoft-IIS/8.5	15-Mar-2015	
Microsoft Corp One Microsoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	134.170.188.221	unknown	Microsoft-IIS/8.5	14-Mar-2015	



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



We searched for domain info on [microsoft.com](https://microsoft.com) and Netcraft responded with a Web Server version [Microsoft-IIS/8.5](#).

We are also given a list of the web servers and IP addresses. Microsoft uses a server farm and the HTTP request may be routed to different web servers based on load and availability at the moment we visit.

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## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



This is not to confuse us, but it must be taken into account when we perform our web application tests.

It is not uncommon to find corporations or even small businesses using load balancers that route HTTP request to different servers that may even run different web servers versions.

The advice here is to take note of all web server version-to-IP couplets for further use.



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



The Nameserver is the DNS server that replies to all lookup queries regarding the namespace of a domain. An [nslookup](#) query for [microsoft.com](#) involves a request to ns1.msft.net, for example.

```
</>
C:\>nslookup -type=NS microsoft.com
Server:  google-public-dns-a.google.com
Address: 8.8.8.8

Non-authoritative answer:
microsoft.com      nameserver = ns3.msft.net
microsoft.com      nameserver = ns4.msft.net
microsoft.com      nameserver = ns1.msft.net
microsoft.com      nameserver = ns2.msft.net
```



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

In addition to web server version, IP addresses and Nameservers, Netcraft provides the following information we can capture:

- Server version
- Uptime stats
- IP address owner
- Host provider

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## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



Sometimes Netcraft does not provide us with enough information regarding our target web server version.

In addition, there are cases where Netcraft cannot be used, such as with Internal Web Servers that are not attached to Internet.

When this is the case we can use manual testing techniques and tools to identify a server such as: [netcat](#), [httprint](#), [whatweb](#), [wappalyzer](#).

<https://github.com/urbanadventurer/WhatWeb>  
<https://wappalyzer.com/>



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



Some of these freely available tools rely on common web server characteristics in order to accurately identify them.

They probe the web server with a series of requests and compare the responses to their database of signatures in order to both find a match, and accurately guess the following information:

- Web server version
- Installed modules
- Web enabled devices (routers, cable modems, etc.)



## 2.2.1. Fingerprinting The Webserver



The most important feature of these tools is that they do not solely rely on the service banner.

They are capable of fingerprinting the web server version even when the banner or the HTTP response header has been manually obfuscated / altered using security modules (mod\_security...).

<https://www.modsecurity.org/>



## 2.2.1.1. Netcat



Let's start inspecting these tools.

The first one we want to use for manual fingerprinting is **Netcat**. This is a simple utility that reads and writes data across network connections.

By using *Netcat* we can establish a connection to the Web Server and look at the *Server* field in the HTTP response header.



## 2.2.1.1. Netcat

The following is an example of what we can get by using `nc` (Netcat) against a Web Server that resides in our network:

```
</>root@kali:~# nc 192.168.102.136 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 14:40:06 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Debian)
Last-Modified: Thu, 05 Feb 2015 21:12:05 GMT
ETag: "1847cb-b1-50e5dc184b340"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 177
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
```

Remember that once we establish the connection with netcat, we have to send `HEAD / HTTP/1.0` and hit enter two times

From the server field we can see that we are running Apache version 2.2.22 on Linux OS



## 2.2.1.1. Netcat



Here is another Web Server address. As you can see, the field order changes as well as their values:

```
</>root@kali:~# nc 134.170.185.46 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Cache-Control: private
Content-Length: 23
Content-Type: text/html
Location: http://www.microsoft.com
Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.5 ←
Set-Cookie:
ASPSESSIONIDACRQQCDQ=LKKMCDHAFINIAMHBICPIMLJF; path=/
...
...
```

The following output shows us that the remote Web Server is using IIS version 8.5



## 2.2.1.1. Netcat



Beyond the [Server](#) header we should also look at the [X-Powered-By](#) header, which may reveal the technology behind the Web Application.

```
</>
root@kali:~# nc 134.170.188.221 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
..stripped output...
Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.5
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-UA-Compatible: IE=EmulateIE7
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2015 07:48:01 GMT
Connection: close
```

In this case, the header tells us the Web App is using ASP.NET. Other possible values are PHP, JSP, JBoss and so on.



## 2.2.1.1. Netcat

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

Cookies are also an interesting resource that may reveal useful information in this phase. Each technology has its default cookies names. Therefore, we can potentially guess the web server by inspecting the cookie header. Here is a short list of what you may encounter:

Server	Cookie
PHP	PHPSESSID=XXXXXX
.NET	ASPSESSIONIDYYYY=XXXXXX
JAVA	JSESSION=XXXXXX



## 2.2.1.1. Netcat



As you can imagine, there may be many different result outputs depending on the service running on the machine, the version, Operating System and so on.

[Here](#) and [here](#) you can find a few more examples and information about different Web server outputs.

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_Web\\_Application\\_Fingerprint\\_\(OWASP-IG-004\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Web_Application_Fingerprint_(OWASP-IG-004))  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Fingerprint\\_Web\\_Application\\_Framework\\_\(OTG-INFO-008\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Fingerprint_Web_Application_Framework_(OTG-INFO-008))



## 2.2.1.2. WhatWeb



Another very useful tool is [WhatWeb](#). It is a command line tool that can be used to recognize website technologies, Web server versions, blogging platforms, JavaScript libraries and much more.

Pentesting distributions such as Kali Linux have it installed by default, so you can start using it by running the following command:



```
root@kali:~# whatweb -h
```

<https://github.com/urbanadventurer/WhatWeb>



## 2.2.1.2. WhatWeb



If you are using a clean environment, you can use `git clone` to download it on your machine. Here is how to clone the git repository to the `tools` folder:

```
root@kali:~/tools# git clone https://github.com/urbanadventurer/WhatWeb.git
Cloning into 'WhatWeb'...
remote: Counting objects: 17838, done.
remote: Total 17838 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 17838
Receiving objects: 100% (17838/17838), 6.65 MiB | 224 KiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (9360/9360), done.
root@kali:~/tools# cd WhatWeb/
root@kali:~/tools/WhatWeb# ./whatweb -h
```

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## 2.2.1.2. WhatWeb



This tool is very easy to use. You only need to type the name of the tool followed by the address (IP or URL) of the target and hit enter. Note that you can specify multiple targets in the command or even IP ranges.

Moreover, it offers options that allow us to specify different user agents, HTTP basic authentication credentials, cookies, proxy and much more.

Let us try to run the tool against [www.elearnsecurity.com](http://www.elearnsecurity.com).



## 2.2.1.2. WhatWeb

```
root@kali:~/tools/WhatWeb# ./whatweb www.elearnsecurity.com
http://www.elearnsecurity.com [302] HTTPServer[Microsoft-IIS/7.5], IP[199.193.116.231],
Microsoft-IIS[7.5], RedirectLocation[https://www.elearnsecurity.com/], Title[Document
Moved], UncommonHeaders[x-xss-protection,x-frame-options,strict-transport-security], X-
Frame-Options[sameorigin], X-Powered-By[MOS 6502], X-XSS-Protection[1; mode=block]
https://www.elearnsecurity.com/ [200] HTML5, HTTPServer[Microsoft-IIS/7.5], IP[199.193.
116.231], JQuery, Microsoft-IIS[7.5], PoweredBy[eLearnSecurity,], Script[text/javascript],
Title[eLearnSecurity - IT Security training courses for individuals and corporation
s], UncommonHeaders[x-xss-protection,x-frame-options,strict-transport-security], X-Fram
e-Options[sameorigin], X-Powered-By[MOS 6502], X-UA-Compatible[IE=edge], X-XSS-Prote
ction[1; mode=block]
root@kali:~/tools/WhatWeb# █
```

As you can see we have a great deal of information in the output. Moreover, you should notice that the tool automatically follows redirections (302): in the output we have the results for both HTTP and HTTPS websites.



## 2.2.1.2. WhatWeb



If you are using a newer version of Kali you may be able to run **whatweb** directly from the terminal window by typing:  
**whatweb <website>**

```
root@kali:~# whatweb www.elearnsecurity.com
/usr/share/whatweb/lib/tld.rb:85: warning: key "2nd_level_registration" is duplicated and overwritten on line 85
/usr/share/whatweb/lib/tld.rb:93: warning: key "2nd_level_registration" is duplicated and overwritten on line 93
/usr/share/whatweb/lib/tld.rb:95: warning: key "2nd_level_registration" is duplicated and overwritten on line 95
/usr/share/whatweb/plugins/wordpress.rb:436: warning: key "2.7-beta1" is duplicated and overwritten on line 453
/usr/share/whatweb/lib/extend-http.rb:102:in `connect': Object#timeout is deprecated, use Timeout.timeout instead.
http://www.elearnsecurity.com [302] Country[UNITED STATES][US], HTTPServer[Microsoft-IIS/7.5], IP[199.193.116.231]
, Microsoft-IIS[7.5], RedirectLocation[https://www.elearnsecurity.com/], Title[Document Moved], UncommonHeaders[strict-transport-security], X-Frame-Options[sameorigin], X-Powered-By[MOS 6502], X-XSS-Protection[1; mode=block]
/usr/share/whatweb/lib/extend-http.rb:102:in `connect': Object#timeout is deprecated, use Timeout.timeout instead.
/usr/share/whatweb/lib/extend-http.rb:140:in `connect': Object#timeout is deprecated, use Timeout.timeout instead.
https://www.elearnsecurity.com/ [200] Country[UNITED STATES][US], HTML5, HTTPServer[Microsoft-IIS/7.5], IP[199.193
.116.231], JQuery[1.11.0], Microsoft-IIS[7.5], PoweredBy[eLearnSecurity], Script[text/javascript], Title[eLearnSe
curity - IT Security training courses for individuals and corporations], UncommonHeaders[strict-transport-security
], X-Frame-Options[sameorigin], X-Powered-By[MOS 6502], X-UA-Compatible[IE=edge], X-XSS-Protection[1; mode=block]
```



## 2.2.1.2. WhatWeb



The previous output may seem a bit messy. If you want a more readable output, use the `-v` option.

As you can see, we now have all the information well organized.

```
root@kali:~/tools/WhatWeb# ./whatweb -v www.elearnsecurity.com
http://www.elearnsecurity.com/ [302]
http://www.elearnsecurity.com [302] HTTPServer[Microsoft-IIS/7.5], IP[199.193.116.231], M
eetLocation[https://www.elearnsecurity.com/], Title[Document Moved], UncommonHeaders[x-xss
ions,strict-transport-security], X-Frame-Options[sameorigin], X-Powered-By[NOS 6502], X-XS
ock]
URL   : http://www.elearnsecurity.com
Status : 302
HTTPServer -----
Description: HTTP server header string. This plugin also attempts to
identify the operating system from the server header.
String    : Microsoft-IIS/7.5 (from server string)

IP -----
Description: IP address of the target, if available.
String    : 199.193.116.231

Microsoft-IIS -----
Description: Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) for Windows
Server is a flexible, secure and easy-to-manage Web server
for hosting anything on the Web. From media streaming to
web application hosting, IIS's scalable and open
architecture is ready to handle the most demanding tasks. -
homepage: http://www.iis.net/
Version   : 7.5

RedirectLocation -----
Description: HTTP Server string location. used with http-status 301 and
302
String    : https://www.elearnsecurity.com/ (from location)

Title -----
Description: The HTML page title
```



## 2.2.1.3. Wappalyzer

 MAP REF VIDEO LAB

As we have seen, WhatWeb successfully identified the target Web Server.

Although we are not going to inspect all the tool options, feel free to explore.

Instead we are going to see another very useful tool that can be used directly from our web browser. It is called [wappalyzer](#) and it is a Web Browser plugin based tool that works both on *Firefox* and *Chrome*.

<https://wappalyzer.com/download>



## 2.2.1.3. Wappalyzer

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

Once you install the plugin from the previous link, you have to navigate to your target website: you will see some icons in your address bar.



Each icon gives you information about the Web Server, such as the Operating System, The Web Server, JavaScript frameworks and much more.



## 2.2.1.3. Wappalyzer

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

93

In order to inspect the information found, just click on an icon and a pop up will appear on the right, listing all the information gathered.

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the eLearnSecurity website at <https://www.elearnsecurity.com/>. A tooltip has appeared over the 'Font Awesome' link in the sidebar, listing the following technologies:

- Font Awesome
- Font Script
- Google Font API
- Font Script
- IIS IIS 7.5
- Web Server
- jQuery 1.11.0
- JavaScript Framework
- Windows Server
- Operating System
- Google Analytics
- Analytics



## 3..2.1. Video - Web App Fingerprinting

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

94



If you have a **FULL** or **ELITE** plan you can click on the image on the left to start the video

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## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules



Along these same lines of how we fingerprinted the web server version, we can fingerprint what modules are installed and in use on the server.

Modules we are looking for are ISAPI modules (for IIS) or Apache modules that may interfere with or alter our test results.

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## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules



Nowadays, more and more websites use search engine and human-friendly URLs (SEF URLs).

So-called "ugly" URLs are the ones that carry query string parameters and values that are meaningful to the web server but not representative of the content on the page.

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## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

For example, [www.example.com/read\\_doc.php?id=100](http://www.example.com/read_doc.php?id=100) tells the server to query the database to fetch the document with `id=100`. This is not helpful to search engines looking for the document's contents.

A search engine-friendly version would be

[www.example.com/read/Buffer\\_Overflow.html](http://www.example.com/read/Buffer_Overflow.html).



## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

So, how are the two translated?

When a user requests `read_doc.php?id=100` the server side module in charge of translating the URL will use regular expressions to match a **Rewrite rule** and will translate the URL according to the rules specified by the administrator.

In the case above, *Buffer overflow* is the title field in the database at `id=100`.

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## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules

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URL rewriting is done on Apache with the **mod\_rewrite** module or **.htaccess**.

On IIS it is handled by *Ionic Isapi Rewrite* or *Helicon Isapi Rewrite*.



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## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules



The presence of URL-rewriting is easy to recognize as in the above example and should be kept in mind during the testing phase when attempting input validation attacks.

This type of attacks involves the use of malformed input (among the other data input) using the URL parameter.

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## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

101

Not having the real URL, and only the rewritten URL, will make it much more difficult for a penetration tester to try these attacks on URLs. However, still be possible to carry malformed payload using other input "*channels*" such as: forms, cookies, and headers.

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## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

102

Search engine friendly URLs are **not** a security feature at all; input validation attacks are still possible if you can reverse-engineer the translation rules.

However, there will be only rare cases in which the rewritten URL is easy to reverse engineer to its original form.

Also note that input from forms are still intact for us to tamper with.



## 2.2.1.4. Fingerprinting Webserver Modules



Example: `www.example.com/news_read/112`

We can make a guess by requesting

[www.example.com/news\\_read.php?id=112](http://www.example.com/news_read.php?id=112).

If the two pages match and no 404 error is returned, we have found the URL rewriting rule.

As you can see, we are guessing on the parameter name- (id), which usually does not appear in the rewritten URL.



## 2.2.2. Enumerating Subdomains



Since we have already discussed DNS, this is the right place to mention **subdomain enumeration**.

The enumeration exercise starts by mapping all available subdomains within a domain name.

This will widen our attack surface and sometimes reveal hidden management backend panels or intranet web applications that the network administrators intended to protect through the old disgraced method of **security through obscurity**.



## 2.2.2. Enumerating Subdomains



There are lots of ways to enumerate subdomains:

- Netcraft
- Google
- Crawling / Brute force
- Tools
- Zone transfers

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## 2.2.2.1. Enumerating subdomains with Netcraft

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

106

We have already used Netcraft to gather information from a specific domain, but Netcraft can also be used to enumerate subdomains.

In order to list all the subdomains of a specific target we need to open the [Netcraft search page](#), select "subdomain matches" from the dropdown menu and type in our string:

The screenshot shows the Netcraft search interface. At the top left is a 'Search:' field containing 'subdomain matches'. To its right is a dropdown arrow. Next is a search bar containing the query '\*.elearnsecurity.com'. To the right of the search bar is a 'lookup!' button. Above the search bar, there is a link 'search tips'. Below the search bar, there is an example: 'example: site contains .netcraft.com'.

<http://searchdns.netcraft.com/>



## 2.2.2.1. Enumerating subdomains with Netcraft



If the target has any subdomain, we will see them listed on the results page. If you want to get more information about a specific subdomain, just click on the "*Site Report*" icon.

Search: [search tips](#)  
subdomain matches  [lookup!](#)  
example: site contains .netcraft.com

### Results for \*.elearnsecurity.com

Found 3 sites

Site	Site Report	First seen	Netblock	OS
1. <a href="#">www.elearnsecurity.com</a>		april 2005	noc4hosts inc.	windows server 2008
2. <a href="#">members.elearnsecurity.com</a>		july 2010	noc4hosts inc.	windows server 2008
3. <a href="#">community.elearnsecurity.com</a>		november 2010	noc4hosts inc.	windows server 2008



## 2.2.2.2. Enumerating subdomains with Google

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

Although tools such as Netcraft are very useful in finding subdomains, search engines are sometimes an even better option. We will exploit the power of [Google search operators](#) to tweak the results and enumerate a list of subdomains. Let us see some example that can be run with Google.

[http://www.googleguide.com/advanced\\_operators\\_reference.html](http://www.googleguide.com/advanced_operators_reference.html)



## 2.2.2.2. Enumerating subdomains with Google



Let us suppose our target is [microsoft.com](#), and our goal is to obtain a list of all its subdomains.

Our first search query string will be something like this:



The site: operator restricts the search results to the domain specified. In our case means that we will get results that have the domain [.microsoft.com](#). Let's see what we get.



## 2.2.2.2. Enumerating subdomains with Google

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

110

As we can see, each result displayed is part of the domain [microsoft.com](http://microsoft.com).

The screenshot shows a Google search results page with the query "site:.microsoft.com" entered in the search bar. The results are categorized under "Web". A red arrow points from the word "www" to the first result, which is "Xbox One | Gaming" from [www.microsoft.com/xbox/](http://www.microsoft.com/xbox/). Another red arrow points from the handle "lumiaconversationsuk" to the third result, which is "Lumia Conversations UK" from [lumiaconversationsuk.microsoft.com/](http://lumiaconversationsuk.microsoft.com/). The search results indicate about 80,700,000 results found in 0.19 seconds.

Google

site:.microsoft.com

Web Images News Shopping Maps More ▾ Search tools

About 80,700,000 results (0.19 seconds)

**Xbox One | Gaming**  
[www.microsoft.com/xbox/](http://www.microsoft.com/xbox/) Microsoft Corporation ▾  
Xbox One is the only place to play the best exclusives and all the biggest blockbusters of the year. Learn more about gaming on Xbox One.

**.NET Downloads, Developer Resources & Case Studies ...**  
[www.microsoft.com/net](http://www.microsoft.com/net) Microsoft Corporation ▾  
The .NET Framework provides a comprehensive and consistent programming model for building applications that have visually stunning user experiences with ...

**Lumia Conversations UK**  
[lumiaconversationsuk.microsoft.com/](http://lumiaconversationsuk.microsoft.com/)  
Device hands-on March 25, 2015. Microsoft Lumia 535 and Lumia 435 hands-on and tech

lumiaconversationsuk



## 2.2.2.2. Enumerating subdomains with Google



As you have probably noticed there are some subdomains that appear more often than others (such as [www](#)). Moreover, once you discover some subdomains, we have to further tweak our search query in order to delete them from the results. To do this we can use the minus operator (-) in conjunction with [site](#) or [inurl](#):

```
site:.microsoft.com -inurl:www.
```

or

```
site:.microsoft.com -site:www.microsoft.com
```



## 2.2.2.2. Enumerating subdomains with Google

As we can see in the results, the subdomain [www](#) no longer appears in the output:

site:.microsoft.com -site:www.microsoft.com

**Web** Images News Shopping Maps More ▾ Search tools

About 80,700,000 results (0.26 seconds)

Cookies help us deliver our services. By using our services, you agree to our use of cookies.  
[Learn more](#) [Got it](#)

**PCs with the Microsoft Signature Experience - Microsoft Store**  
<https://signature.microsoft.com/> ▾  
Microsoft Store PCs with Signature help ensure you get the best experience with Windows 8.1. It is the cleanest PC experience with no junkware installed!H.

**Microsoft Office - Tools to Get Work Done | Sign in**  
[office.microsoft.com/](https://office.microsoft.com/) ▾  
From desktop to web for Macs and PCs, Office delivers the tools to get work done. View product information or sign in to Office 365.

**Microsoft Azure: Cloud Computing Platform & Services**  
<https://azure.microsoft.com/> ▾

site:.microsoft.com -inurl:www.

**Web** Images News Shopping Maps More ▾ Search tools

About 76,700,000 results (0.18 seconds)

**Microsoft Ignite - Register**  
<ignite.microsoft.com/register> ▾  
Full Conference Pass. All access. All breakout sessions. All social events. \$2,220. The Full Conference Pass provides access to all sessions, content, and the ...

**Guide Covering Steps to Download Candy Crush Saga ...**  
<curah.microsoft.com/374817> ▾  
2 days ago - Hi companions the amusement I'm offering to you down here today is the particular case that is the most addictive and clients who are playing ...

**MSDN Code Gallery - Microsoft**  
<https://code.msdn.microsoft.com/> ▾  
Items 1 - 10 of 8429 - Download and share sample applications, code snippets, and other resources with the developer community.



## 2.2.2.2. Enumerating subdomains with Google



Now we can continue tweaking our search query by removing the new subdomains found. So we will keep adding "["-site"](#) or "["-inurl"](#) until we find all the subdomains:

```
site:microsoft.com -site:subdomain1.microsoft.com  
</> site:subdomain2.microsoft.com -inurl:subdomain3.microsoft.com
```

As you can imagine the process can be continually exhaustive, and why it is important to take good notes and use your mindmapping software.



## 2.2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



In addition to search engines, there are a plenty of tools that can be used to enumerate subdomains. Some of them parse search engine results, while others use wordlists to verify if a specific set of domains exist. The following is a small list of these tools:

- [dnsrecon](https://github.com/darkoperator/dnsrecon): <https://github.com/darkoperator/dnsrecon>
- [subbrute](https://github.com/TheRook/subbrute): <https://github.com/TheRook/subbrute>
- [fierce](https://github.com/davidpepper/fierce-domain-scanner): <https://github.com/davidpepper/fierce-domain-scanner>
- [Nmap](https://nmap.org/book/man-host-discovery.html): <https://nmap.org/book/man-host-discovery.html>
- [dnsenum](https://code.google.com/archive/p/dnsenum/downloads): <https://code.google.com/archive/p/dnsenum/downloads>
- [knock](https://github.com/guelfoweb/knock): <https://github.com/guelfoweb/knock>
- [theHarvester](https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester): <https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester>
- [recon-\*ng\*](https://bitbucket.org/LaNMaSteR53/recon-ng/wiki/Usage%20Guide): [https://bitbucket.org/LaNMaSteR53/recon-\*ng\*/wiki/Usage%20Guide](https://bitbucket.org/LaNMaSteR53/recon-ng/wiki/Usage%20Guide)



## 2.2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



Since they are all very similar, we are going to inspect only a few ([subbrute](#), [dnsrecon](#) and [theHarvester](#)). We encourage you try them by yourself to verify how they work and what features they offer.

The first tool, as the name suggests, uses a default wordlist to find the subdomains of a specific target. These types of tools are very useful if we cannot rely on search engines (IE: performing an internal pentest).

Forging security professionals



## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

subbrute

If you do not have the tool already installed on your machine, you can simply run the following command:

```
git clone https://github.com/TheRook/subbrute.git
```

Once you have cloned the repository on your machine, you can launch the tool and display its options with the following command:

```
python subbrute.py -h
```



## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



### subbrute

By running the previous command, you should receive an output similar to the following screenshot. As you can see, the tool uses, by default, a wordlist named [names.txt](#).

```
root@kali:~/tools/subbrute# python subbrute.py -h
Usage: subbrute.py [options] target

Options:
-h, --help            show this help message and exit
-s SUBS, --subs=SUBS  (optional) list of subdomains, default = 'names.txt'
-r RESOLVERS, --resolvers=RESOLVERS
                      (optional) A list of DNS resolvers, if this list is
empty it will OS's internal resolver default =
'resolv.conf'
-t TARGETS, --targets_file=TARGETS
                      (optional) A file containing a newline delimited list
of domains to brute force.
-o OUTPUT, --output=OUTPUT
                      (optional) Output to file (Greppable Format)
-j JSON, --json=JSON   (optional) Output to file (JSON Format)
-a, -A                (optional) Print all IPv4 addresses for sub domains
                      (default = off).
--type=TYPE           (optional) Print all responses for an arbitrary DNS
record type (CNAME, AAAA, TXT, SOA, MX...)
-c PROCESS_COUNT, --process_count=PROCESS_COUNT
                      (optional) Number of lookup threads to run. default =
16
-f FILTER, --filter_subs=FILTER
                      (optional) A file containing unorganized domain names
which will be filtered into a list of subdomains
sorted by frequency. This was used to build
'names.txt'.
-v, --verbose          (optional) Print debug information.
root@kali:~/tools/subbrute#
```





## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



subbrute

Let's try to run the tool  
and see what subdomains  
it is able to enumerate.  
We are not going to use  
any particular option at  
this time.

```
root@kali:~/tools/subbrute# python subbrute.py microsoft.com
microsoft.com
www.microsoft.com
home.microsoft.com
cs.microsoft.com
my.microsoft.com
members.microsoft.com
blogs.microsoft.com
search.microsoft.com
i.microsoft.com
feeds.microsoft.com
forums.microsoft.com
math.microsoft.com
news.microsoft.com
games.microsoft.com
dev.microsoft.com
mail.microsoft.com
info.microsoft.com
music.microsoft.com
support.microsoft.com
help.microsoft.com
s.microsoft.com
e.microsoft.com
office.microsoft.com
profile.microsoft.com
member.microsoft.com
```

Note: the whole task may take a while



## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

subbrute

As shown in the previous screenshot, by simply running the tools against the microsoft.com domain, it is able to enumerate an acceptable number of subdomains.

In case you want to use a custom wordlist you can simply run the following command:

```
python subbrute.py -h -s [path_to_file.txt]
```



## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



dnsrecon

The second tool we want to use is [dnsrecon](#). If you are using Kali Linux, it is already installed on your machine and you can simply run it with the following command:

```
dnsrecon -h
```

Similarly to [subbrute](#), [dnsrecon](#) can leverage wordlists to enumerate subdomains. However, in addition to this, it also offers the possibility to use search engines like google.



## 2.2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



dnsrecon

As we can see in the following screenshot, it offers many more options.

```
root@kali:~# dnsrecon -h
Version: 0.8.8
Usage: dnsrecon.py <options>

Options:
  -h, --help           Show this help message and exit.
  -d, --domain        <domain>      Domain to Target for enumeration.
  -r, --range         <range>       IP Range for reverse look-up brute force in formats (first-last)
                                     or in (range/bitmask).
  -n, --name_server  <name>       Domain server to use, if none is given the SOA of the
                                     target will be used
  -D, --dictionary   <file>       Dictionary file of sub-domain and hostnames to use for
                                     brute force.
  -f                  Filter out of Brute Force Domain lookup records that resolve to
                                     the wildcard defined IP Address when saving records.
  -t, --type          <types>       Specify the type of enumeration to perform:
                                     std      To Enumerate general record types, enumerates
                                             SOA, NS, A, AAAA, MX and SRV if AXFR on the
                                             NS Servers fail.
                                     rvl      To Reverse Look Up a given CIDR IP range.
                                     brt      To Brute force Domains and Hosts using a given
                                             dictionary.
                                     srv      To Enumerate common SRV Records for a given
                                             domain.
                                     axfr     Test all NS Servers in a domain for misconfigured
                                             zone transfers.
                                     goo      Perform Google search for sub-domains and hosts.
```



## 2.2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

122

dnsrecon

The option we are interested into is `-g`: *perform Google enumeration with standard enumeration*. Moreover, it is multi-threaded, so we can speed up the process by setting more threads (`--threads`). Let us use `microsoft.com` once again and run the following command:

```
dnsrecon -d microsoft.com -g
```



## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

dnsrecon

As we can see in the following outputs, first, it execute some general enumeration by checking the DNS configuration and then begins enumerating the domains via Google.

```
root@kali:~# dnsrecon -d microsoft.com -g
[*] Performing General Enumeration of Domain: microsoft.com
[-] DNSSEC is not configured for microsoft.com
[*] SOA ns1.msft.net 208.84.0.53
[*] SOA ns1.msft.net 2620:0:30::53
[*] NS ns3.msft.net 193.221.113.53
[*] NS ns3.msft.net 2620:0:34::53
[*] NS ns4.msft.net 208.76.45.53
[*] NS ns4.msft.net 2620:0:37::53
[*] NS ns1.msft.net 208.84.0.53
[*] NS ns1.msft.net 2620:0:30::53
[*] NS ns2.msft.net 208.84.2.53
[*] NS ns2.msft.net 2620:0:32::53
[*] MX microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com

[*] Performing Google Search Enumeration
[*] CNAME www.microsoft.com toggle.www.ms.akadns.net
[*] CNAME toggle.www.ms.akadns.net www.microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net
[*] CNAME www.microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net www.microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net.globalredi
[*] CNAME www.microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net.globalredi.akadns.net e10088.dsdp.akamaiae
[*] A e10088.dsdp.akamaiedge.net 72.247.197.45
[*] CNAME ieonline.microsoft.com any.edge.bing.com
[*] A any.edge.bing.com 204.79.197.200
[*] CNAME windows.microsoft.com origin.windows.microsoft.com.akadns.net
[*] A origin.windows.microsoft.com.akadns.net 134.170.119.140
[*] CNAME support.microsoft.com wildcard.support.microsoft.com.edgekey.net
[*] CNAME wildcard.support.microsoft.com.edgekey.net e10315.g.akamaiedge.net
[*] A e10315.g.akamaiedge.net 2.17.104.63
```



## 2.2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



theHarvester

**TheHarvester** is a tool for gathering subdomain names from different public sources such as search engines or PGP key servers. Among its subdomain enumeration features, theHarvester is also able to retrieve data related to the target organization from many websites such as *LinkedIn*, *People123*, *Twitter*, *Google+* and few more.

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## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



theHarvester

*Kali Linux already has [theHarvester](#) installed by default. We can simply run it as follows:*

```
theharvester [options]
```

-d	Domain to search
-l	Limit the results to work with
-b	Data source (bing, google, linkedin, pgp, all,...)
-f	Output to HTML or XML file (optional - good for long lists)



## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

126

theHarvester

Now that we know its basic options, let's try to run the tools against [microsoft.com](https://microsoft.com). We will use *google* as the search engine, we will limit the results to 200, and also store the results into a HTML file.

Our command will look like this:

```
theharvester -d microsoft.com -b google -l 200  
-f /root/Desktop/msresults.html
```



## 2.2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



theHarvester

Even if we set an output file, the results are also displayed in the console.

Console

```
[+] Emails found:  
-----  
oss@microsoft.com  
secure@microsoft.com  
joakim.karlen@microsoft.com  
Edvard.bergstrom@microsoft.com  
dinei@microsoft.com  
cormac@microsoft.com  
@microsoft.com  
hiballan@microsoft.com  
thomkar@microsoft.com  
antr@microsoft.com  
simonpj@microsoft.com  
  
[+] Hosts found in search engines:  
-----  
[-] Resolving hostnames IPs...  
72.247.197.45:www.microsoft.com  
134.170.119.140:windows.microsoft.com  
168.62.198.20:commerce.microsoft.com
```

### E-mails names found:

- oss@microsoft.com
- secure@microsoft.com
- joakim.karlen@microsoft.com
- Edvard.bergstrom@microsoft.com
- dinei@microsoft.com
- cormac@microsoft.com
- @microsoft.com
- hiballan@microsoft.com
- thomkar@microsoft.com
- antr@microsoft.com
- simonpj@microsoft.com

HTML

### Hosts found:

- 72.247.197.45:www.microsoft.com
- 134.170.119.140:windows.microsoft.com
- 168.62.198.20:commerce.microsoft.com
- 2.17.104.63:support.microsoft.com
- 191.235.177.147:azure.microsoft.com



## 2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools



theHarvester

Another, very useful feature of *theHarvester*, is the ability to collect data from other sources, such as LinkedIn. Obviously, in order to list all the people that are somehow related to our target.

For example, let us see what happens if we use the target [eLearnSecurity](#):

```
theharvester -d elearnsecurity.com -b linkedin -l 200
```

Forging security professionals



## 2.2.2.3. Enumerating subdomains with Tools

theHarvester

We will obtain something similar to the following screenshot.

All the people listed here are related to eLearnSecurity (employees, customers, partner and so on).

```
root@kali:~# theharvester -d elearnsecurity.com -b linkedin -l 500
```

```
[ -] Searching in LinkedIn..  
      Searching 100 results..  
      Searching 200 results..  
      Searching 300 results..  
      Searching 400 results..  
      Searching 500 results..
```

### Users from LinkedIn

=====  
Domenico Quaranta  
Armando Romeo  
David Puggioni  
Francesco Stillavato  
Edcel Suyo  
Andrea Tarquini  
Giuseppe Trotta  
Ilaria Mori  
Giacomo Trudu  
Stefano Angaran



## 2.2.4. Enumerating subdomains via Zone Transfer



In addition to search engines and tools, there are other ways we can discover information about domains and subdomains. One of these is through a Zone Transfer.

*"A Zone Transfer is the term used to refer to the process by which the contents of a DNS Zone file are copied from a primary DNS server to a secondary DNS server."*

*Explanation of a DNS Zone Transfer. Microsoft Support.*

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS\\_zone\\_transfer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_zone_transfer)



## 2.2.4. Enumerating subdomains via Zone Transfer



**Zone transfers** are usually the result of a misconfiguration of the remote DNS server. They should be enabled (if required) only for trusted IP addresses.

When zone transfers are available, we can enumerate all of the DNS records for that zone. This includes all the subdomains of our domain (A records).



## 2.2.4. Enumerating subdomains via Zone Transfer



On Windows systems, we can gather information from Zone Transfer by running the following commands:

```
</> nslookup  
server [NAMESERVER FOR mydomain.com]  
ls -d mydomain.com
```

- [NAMESERVER] = you can find this by just doing:

```
nslookup -type=NS mydomain.com
```



## 2.2.2.4. Enumerating subdomains via Zone Transfer



This screenshot shows the output from the previous commands run against the target elsfoo.com.

```
C:\>nslookup -type=NS elsfoo.com
Server: google-public-dns-a.google.com
Address: 8.8.8.8

Non-authoritative answer:
elsfoo.com      nameserver = ns.elsfoo.com
elsfoo.com      nameserver = ns6.dnsmadeeasy.com
elsfoo.com      nameserver = ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com
elsfoo.com      nameserver = ns7.dnsmadeeasy.com

C:\>nslookup
Default Server: google-public-dns-a.google.com
Address: 8.8.8.8

> server ns.elsfoo.com
Default Server: ns.elsfoo.com
Address: 74.50.103.103

> ls -d elsfoo.com
[ns.elsfoo.com]
elsfoo.com.          SOA    ns.elsfoo.com bernyreed.elsfoo.com. (41 900 600 86
elsfoo.com.          NS     ns6.dnsmadeeasy.com
elsfoo.com.          NS     ns7.dnsmadeeasy.com
elsfoo.com.          NS     ns.elsfoo.com
elsfoo.com.          NS     ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com
elsfoo.com.          MX     5      alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
elsfoo.com.          MX     5      alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
elsfoo.com.          MX     10     aspmx2.googlemail.com
elsfoo.com.          MX     10     aspmx3.googlemail.com
elsfoo.com.          MX     1      aspmx.l.google.com
elsfoo.com.          TXT   "google-site-verification=omyr9Nazb1WYCs_I
axvvtCjTI2EA4_S-Q"
elsfoo.com.          TXT   "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"
ns6.dnsmadeeasy.com. A     208.80.124.13
ns7.dnsmadeeasy.com. A     208.80.126.13
ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com. A     208.94.148.13
ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com. AAAA  2600:1800:5::1
admin               A     74.50.103.103
intranet            A     74.50.103.103
ns                 A     74.50.103.103
private             A     74.50.103.103
www                A     74.50.103.103
elsfoo.com.          SOA   ns.elsfoo.com bernyreed.elsfoo.com. (41 900 600 86
```



## 2.2.4. Enumerating subdomains via Zone Transfer



On Linux systems you can run the following command:



```
dig @nameserver axfr mydomain.com
```

- [nameserver](#) is a nameserver for [mydomain.com](#)
- [axfr](#) is the mnemonic opcode for the DNS zone transfer.

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## 2.2.2.4. Enumerating subdomains via Zone Transfer




This screenshot shows the output from the previous command against the target elsfoo.com.

```
root@kali:~# dig @ns.elsfoo.com AXFR elsfoo.com

; <>> DiG 9.8.4-rpz2+r1005.12-P1 <>> @ns.elsfoo.com AXFR elsfoo.com
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      SOA     ns.elsfoo.com. bernyreed.elsfoo.com. 41 900 600 86400
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      NS      ns6.dnsmadeeasy.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      NS      ns7.dnsmadeeasy.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      NS      ns.elsfoo.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      NS      ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      MX      5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      MX      5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      MX      10 aspmx2.googlemail.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      MX      10 aspmx3.googlemail.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      MX      1 aspmx.l.google.com.
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      TXT    "google-site-verification=omyr9Nazb1WYCs_DW29VGj_zMJ"
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      TXT    "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"
ns6.dnsmadeeasy.com. 3600   IN      A       208.80.124.13
ns7.dnsmadeeasy.com. 3600   IN      A       208.80.126.13
ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com. 3600   IN      A       208.94.148.13
ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com. 3600   IN      AAAA   2600:1800:5::1
admin.elsfoo.com.    3600   IN      A       74.50.103.103
intranet.elsfoo.com. 3600   IN      A       74.50.103.103
ns.elsfoo.com.        3600   IN      A       74.50.103.103
private.elsfoo.com.   3600   IN      A       74.50.103.103
www.elsfoo.com.       3600   IN      A       74.50.103.103
elsfoo.com.          3600   IN      SOA     ns.elsfoo.com. bernyreed.elsfoo.com. 41 900 600 86400
;; Query time: 144 msec
;; SERVER: 74.50.103.103#53(74.50.103.103)
;; WHEN: Tue Mar 31 12:01:01 2015
;; XFR size: 22 records (messages 1, bytes 800)
```



## 2.2.2. Video - Subdomain Enumeration



If you have a **FULL** or **ELITE** plan you can click on the image on the left to start the video

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## 2.2.3. Finding Virtual Hosts



A **virtual host** is simply a website that shares an IP address with one or more other virtual hosts.

These hosts are domains and subdomains.

This is very common in a shared hosting environment where a multitude of websites share the same server/IP address.

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## 2.2.3. Finding Virtual Hosts

MAP

REF


VIDEO

LAB

138

For example:

There are multiple  
virtual hosts  
associated with the  
IP address  
**192.168.3.2**.





## 2.2.3. Finding Virtual Hosts

Many of the tools we have seen previously for enumerating subdomains can also be used in finding virtual hosts. The following is an example of what the tool **fierce** is able to discover starting from the domain [elearnsecurity.com](http://elearnsecurity.com).

```
root@kali:~/tools/hostmap# fierce -dns elearnsecurity.com
DNS Servers for elearnsecurity.com:
ns1.elearnsecurity.com
ns.elearnsecurity.com
ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com
ns6.dnsmadeeasy.com
ns7.dnsmadeeasy.com

Trying zone transfer first...
Testing ns1.elearnsecurity.com
Request timed out or transfer not allowed.
Testing ns.elearnsecurity.com
Request timed out or transfer not allowed.
Testing ns5.dnsmadeeasy.com
Request timed out or transfer not allowed.
Testing ns6.dnsmadeeasy.com
Request timed out or transfer not allowed.
Testing ns7.dnsmadeeasy.com
Request timed out or transfer not allowed.

Unsuccessful in zone transfer (it was worth a shot)
Okay, trying the good old fashioned way... brute force

Checking for wildcard DNS...
Nope. Good.
Now performing 2280 test(s)...
162.220.56.82 blog.elearnsecurity.com
162.220.56.82 community.elearnsecurity.com
199.193.116.231 lib.elearnsecurity.com
199.193.116.231 members.elearnsecurity.com
199.193.116.231 mgmt.elearnsecurity.com
199.193.116.232 ns.elearnsecurity.com
199.193.116.233 ns1.elearnsecurity.com
199.193.116.231 webmail.elearnsecurity.com
199.193.116.231 www.elearnsecurity.com
```



## 2.2.3. Finding Virtual Hosts

MAP

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
VIDEO

LAB

140

Have you been updating your map with the latest information recovered in this chapter?

Remember that keeping track of your findings is important!





## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



# FINGERPRINTING FRAMEWORKS AND APPLICATIONS

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

142

Once we have a list of subdomains, we will apply the techniques that follow in this module to all of them.

We will basically start looking at the webpages running on each of the subdomains we have found.

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



Common applications are software that is available for anyone to use (aka COTS - Common off the shelf).

They can be either open source or commercial, but what makes them interesting for our analysis is the fact that we have access to their source code (and other security researchers may have looked at it before us).

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



We are able to read both the application logic and the security controls implemented (or not implemented) therefore, we gain a big advantage over applications built in-house. For a pentester, the logic of in-house applications is a "guesstimate" task to some degree.

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



Common applications may be:

- forums (like phpBB, vBulletin)
- CMS's (like Joomla or Drupal)
- CRM's, blogging platforms (like WordPress or Movable types)
- social networking scripts and a number of other applications.

For example, web scripts are available online at sites like:

[www.hotscripts.com](http://www.hotscripts.com).



## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

146

Almost all of these freely (meaning open to anyone, regardless of their price) available applications suffered from some kind of vulnerability in their history.

Understanding what piece of commonly available software the web server is running will give us the possibility for an easy exploitation by just looking online for a publicly available exploit.

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



Even here, obtaining the name of the application will not be enough for us. We need the exact version in order to look for a working exploit online.

A basic step for fingerprinting the application involves browsing the website and looking at its URLs, appearance and logic.

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



Sometimes it is as easy as looking for the application's name in the web page content.

In other cases, we need to look at the web page source; the name and version is usually included in HTML comments or even in the HTTP headers.

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



Sending a GET request: This is how a Joomla powered website responds to a normal GET request:

Request

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.joomla.org
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0 Iceweasel/31.5.3
```

Response

```
HTTP/1.x 200 OK
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: LiteSpeed
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Content-Encoded-By: Joomla! 2.5
```



## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



As you can see, by just using telnet, Burp suite, web browsers or any other way that will let us read the raw response, headers will reveal useful information about the website; this includes the CMS running on it: **Joomla 2.5**.

Moreover, remember that response headers may give other valuable information such as PHP version, exact web server version and modules installed.



## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

Other applications may behave differently. The HTTP header exposing the CMS version can be suppressed so we would need to move on, examining the web page content for hints.

The open source community behind these projects (but many commercial applications act similarly), usually require the final user to keep a footer notification in place that gives credit to the project for more support and acknowledgment.

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications

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This also happens for commercial software like the famous forum application [vBulletin](#); it reveals its presence both in the website title and footer:

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## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



Sometimes we have to look more in-depth to find what we are looking for.

We may need to read the web page source code and look for information in the META tags and in HTML comments. This is [WordPress](#), the most popular blogging open source web application:

```
<link rel="wlwmanifest" type="application/wlwmanifest+xml" href="includes/wlwmanifest.xml" />
<meta name="generator" content="WordPress 4.2-beta3-31946" />
<script type="text/javascript" src="//s.w.org/wp-includes/js/jquery.js">
<script>document.cookie='devicePixelRatio='+((window.devicePixelRatio||1))</script>
```





## 2.3. Fingerprinting Frameworks and Applications



Many different kinds of CMSs are available online for free or licensed commercially. Very common examples of open source CMSs are *Joomla*, *Drupal* or *Mambo*.

These have a large customer base and an ever-growing support community providing free add-ons, components and extensions, which add more functionality to the core application.

These add-ons are usually poorly coded and contain vulnerabilities.



## 2.3.1. Fingerprinting Third-Party Add-Ons



While the core parts of these projects are usually built following the best practices of secure coding, thousands of free-to-use extensions are coded by amateurs, and most of the time, these are affected by many different web application vulnerabilities.

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## 2.3.1. Fingerprinting Third-Party Add-Ons



In the case of Joomla, (this discussion applies to many other, similar projects) fingerprinting installed add-ons is as easy as looking at the website URLs.

Joomla URLs consist of 3 main parts:

```
</>  
index.php?option=%component_name%&task=%task_value%
```

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## 2.3.1. Fingerprinting Third-Party Add-Ons



`Index.php` is the only script you will ever see on Joomla. It is in charge of loading the specified component passed in, via the `option` parameter.

More `tasks` and arguments are passed to that component with subsequent parameters.

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## 2.3.1. Fingerprinting Third-Party Add-Ons

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

The following is an example for the very popular [Docman](#), document manager, component:

```
</>index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=100
```

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## 2.3.1. Fingerprinting Third-Party Add-Ons



Here we are loading the [Docman](#) add-on, declaring that we want to view the document with [id=100](#).

It should be clear that by looking at the [option](#) parameter in the URL, we can easily understand what potentially vulnerable third party add-ons are installed and in use on the website.

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## 2.3.1. Fingerprinting Third-Party Add-Ons



In our **Information gathering** process, we will not only list all the common applications in use, but also, all the third party add-ons in use in that application. These will likely be useful for our penetration tasks later on.


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## 2.3.2. Map



Our map is starting to get filled up with the applications found on the subdomain (Joomla). We can (and should) also list 3rd party add-ons (such as *JomSocial*) and add-ons to 3rd party add-ons (such as *Jevents*, *Adsmanager*)





## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



# FINGERPRINTING CUSTOM APPLICATIONS

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## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



When you are not in front of a commonly available application, you have to go through an initial overview of the application logic.

In this case we have an in-house application, customized for the organization we are auditing. The inner logic is unknown to us but can be reverse engineered with a careful analysis of its behavior.



## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



Our first step in this case will be to consider the overall scope of the application:

- What is it for?
- Does it allow user registration?
- Does it have an administration panel?
- Does it take input from the user?
- What kind of input?
- Does it accept file uploads?
- Does it use JavaScript or Ajax or Flash? And so on.



## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



These questions can be answered by just visiting the website and taking notes of anything we come across in the process. *Spidering* (or crawling) the application is addressed at a later stage, but valuable in this case.

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## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



First we want to understand what our application does and how it does it.

Another important aspect to take into consideration is the possibility that we may find common software intertwined with custom code.

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## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



Forums and blogs are great examples when we are dealing with a custom application. It is very likely that we find open source or commercial applications implementing blogs, forums, shopping carts and a number of other functions.

This applies to small company websites as well as corporate ones. Recognizing them among the custom code is important and should be noted on our functional graph.

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## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications

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At this point, it would be helpful to browse the application with a proxy in the middle of our requests, collecting all the headers and responses. This will help us analyze the results later.

A good recommended proxy for this stage is [Burp Proxy](#)

<https://portswigger.net/burp>



## 2.4.1. Burp Target Crawler



This is the **Burp Target** tool. Burp lets us configure our scope through simple regular expressions.

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface with the 'Target' tab selected. On the left, a tree view displays the target application structure under 'http://targetapplication.site'. The root node '/' is expanded, showing sub-directories 'admin', 'css', 'icons', 'js', and a file 'login.php'. The 'Scope' tab is also visible. On the right, a table lists crawled URLs with columns: Host, Method, URL, Params, Status, Length, and MIME. The table includes rows for various admin pages like '/admin/buttons.php', '/admin/flot.php', etc., and the '/login.php' POST request. At the bottom, there are tabs for Request, Response, Raw, Headers, and Hex, along with a status bar showing 'GET / HTTP/1.1' and 'Host: targetapplication.site'.

Host	Method	URL	Params	Status	Length	MIME
http://targetapplication.site	GET	/admin/buttons.php		302	474	text
	GET	/admin/flot.php		302	471	text
	GET	/admin/forms.php		302	472	text
	GET	/admin/grid.php		302	705	text
	GET	/admin/index.php		302	1111	text
	GET	/admin/morris.php		302	473	text
	GET	/admin/notifications.p...		302	1127	text
	GET	/admin/tables.php		302	473	text
	GET	/admin/typography.php		302	477	text
	POST	/login.php		302	339	



## 2.4.1. Burp Target Crawler



While browsing, and if enabled, the crawler ([Spider tab](#)) automatically generates and records requests and response headers for further inspection.

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface with the Spider tab selected. The top menu bar includes Burp, Intruder, Repeater, Window, Help, Target, Proxy, Spider, Scanner, Intruder, Repeater, Sequencer, Decoder, Comparer, Extender, Options, and Alerts. Below the menu is a toolbar with Control and Options buttons. The main content area is divided into sections:

- Spider Status:** A section with a help icon and the title "Spider Status". It contains instructions: "Use these settings to monitor and control Burp Spider. To begin spidering, browse to the target application, then right-click one or more nodes in the target site map, and choose "Spider this host / branch"." It also displays metrics: "Spider is running", "Clear queues", "Requests made: 291", "Bytes transferred: 3,112,816", "Requests queued: 0", and "Forms queued: 0".
- Spider Scope:** A section with a help icon and the title "Spider Scope". It contains two radio button options: " Use suite scope [defined in Target tab]" and " Use custom scope".



## 2.4.1. Burp Target Crawler



The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface with the "Site map" tab selected. The left pane displays a tree view of crawled URLs under the scope "http://targetapplication.site". The tree includes the root directory / and sub-directories admin, css, icons, js, and login.php. A tooltip box is overlaid on the screenshot, containing the following text:

**Site map**

The crawler results are displayed in directories format.

Note: We have used "targetapplication.site" as the target scope. This will get us all the requests to targetapplication.site subdomains as well.

At the bottom of the screenshot, there is a status bar with tabs for Raw, Headers, and Hex, and a message indicating a GET request to the root URL with the host header set to targetapplication.site.



## 2.4.1. Burp Target Crawler

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

172

### Headers

For each request made by the web browser (or the crawler), Burp stores the HTTP Request and Response headers.

This will let us inspect the web application behavior carefully.

The screenshot shows the 'Headers' tab of a Burp Suite request editor. The 'Request' tab is selected at the top left. Below it, the 'Headers' tab is also selected. The request body is empty. The headers listed are:

```
GET /admin/forms.php?optionsRadios=option2&optionsRadiosInline=option2 HTTP/1.1
Host: targetapplication.site
Accept: /*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)
Connection: close
Referer: http://targetapplication.site/admin/forms.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=uh2hump47k7v5u42fs4l9f0433
```



## 2.4.1. Burp Target Crawler

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

173

http://targetapplication.site	POST	/login.php	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	302	376
http://targetapplication.site	POST	/login.php	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	302	
http://targetapplication.site	POST	/login.php	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	302	
http://targetapplication.site	GET	/css/bootstrap.min.css	<input type="checkbox"/>	304	
http://targetapplication.site	GET	/css/styles.css	<input type="checkbox"/>	304	

**Request** **Response**

**Raw** **Params** **Headers** **Hex**

```
POST /login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: targetapplication.site
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/3
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://targetapplication.site/
Cookie: PHPSESSID=uh2hunp47k7v5u42fs4l9f0433
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 37

username=Admin&password=adminpassword
```

## Requests

Requests are recorded. Clicking on any of them will show the Request/Response in the underlying panel.

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## 2.4.1. Burp Target Crawler



Burp is a very powerful tool.

It lets us store all the data traveling to/from our browser, while:

- Using the crawler
- Manually navigating the website from the web browser

We will then be able to carefully inspect the web application

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## 2.4.1. Burp Target Crawler



Your browsing of the most important parts of the target website will allow Burp to collect enough information for us to analyze.

In the analysis phase, may be necessary to further test the application to draw a more clear, functional graph.

We would draw the most important parts of the entire web application.



## 2.4.2. Creating a Functional Graph



Pentesting a complex web application is challenging as you have to keep close attention to small details while not forgetting the big picture.

The advice is to study the whole target behavior, then split the tests in smaller tasks and take care of each one.

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# Study The Target



In this phase you would use the web browser to study the target under the behavioral point of view. No technical analysis is involved.

This purpose of this phase is to recognize the blocks by which the target website is made of.

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## 2.4.2. Creating a Functional Graph



The following questions should help guide you:

- What is the purpose of the website/web application?
  - Sell online?
  - Corporate online presence?
  - Blogging?
- What seems to be the core of the website?
  - Selling products?
  - Do they sell memberships? digital contents?
- Does it require a login to perform certain actions?
- What are the main areas of the website?
  - Blogs?
  - eCommerce area?




## 2.4.2. Creating a Functional Graph



The answers to the above questions will help you illustrate the website blocks on paper.

Make sure to use different colors for the main area of the website (*eCommerce*). If you find a login protected area use a rhombus.

We have used a dark green from the HOME.





## 2.4.2. Creating a Functional Graph

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180

# Study The Blocks



Now we will repeat our process for each block more closely.



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## 2.4.2. Creating a Functional Graph

 MAP REF VIDEO LAB

We want to know if:


- Any block uses a third-party application (we will change the shape of the block if so and note the kind of application)
- Any block can only be accessed through the login (we will create a first path using arrows)



## 2.4.2. Creating a Functional Graph



*eCommerce* is a green Hexagon because it is a third-party application and at the same time is the Core of the whole website.





## 2.4.2. Creating a Functional Graph

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

183

# Functional Graph



The goal of the functional graph is to visually spot important information at a glance.

We will use this functional graph as a basis for further charting of our information and prepare it for the testing part.

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## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



This step is vital and we recommend taking it seriously as it will allow you to concentrate your testing efforts on smaller parts instead of the entire application.

The ancient motto *divide et impera* (divide and conquer) is the most efficient solution when dealing with complex applications.

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## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



For each smaller part of the application, we will add notes and comments including (but not limited to):

- Client side logic (usually JavaScript code in use)
- flash applications
- cookies (a new cookie may be set when browsing this area of the website)
- authorization required
- forms and so on

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## 2.4. Fingerprinting Custom Applications



It should be clear that our attack methodology will vary depending on the data collected in this phase and, as such, the more information we retrieve from direct inspection, the greater chance we will have in identifying exploitable vulnerabilities.

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## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



The attack surface is the area of the application in which we will focus all of our security testing efforts.

The more we know about our target web application, the wider the attack surface will be.

Use the suggested graphing techniques or create one you are comfortable with and stick with it.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

In our previous step, we dissected the application into smaller blocks, noting its most important functionalities and features.

Going deeper into this process, we will have to add more detailed information that will serve as a checklist in our testing phase.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

189

Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data


Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

We will collect this information on a per block basis. A suggested graph is given in the image below. An alternative is given in the Charting tab. We will inspect it later on.





## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

### Let's begin mapping the attack surface.

User submitted data through web forms can be validated on the client side, server side or both.

Recognizing where the validation occurs will allow us to manipulate the input in order to mount our input validation attacks like **SQL injection**, **Cross site scripting** or general logical flaws.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

We can reveal the presence of client side validation by inspecting the web page source code and looking at the JavaScript functions triggered upon form submittal.

We can do this different ways. Our favorite is [Firebug](#), the very popular [Firefox Add-on](#) that lets you to inspect the web page source code easily without having to read hundred lines of code before finding the interesting information.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

Detecting database interaction will allow us to look for **SQL injection** vulnerabilities in the testing phase.

By database interaction, we mean that the user input changes the appearance of the page because either different data is fetched from the database or, new data is added.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface

 MAP REF VIDEO LAB

193

Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

This hints that the SQL queries are generated from our input and if the input is not properly sanitized, may result in **SQL injections..**





## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

It is important to note the pages that use the database in an active way.

While you may want to skip all the pages that do not directly connect to our input, they are in fact retrieving data from the database and therefore it make them important.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

It is not uncommon to encounter web pages providing dynamic downloads according to a parameter provided by the user.

For example:

`www.example.com/download.php?file=document.pdf`

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## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

This kind of behavior, if not handled correctly, can lead to a number of nasty attacks including **Remote** and **Local File Inclusion** vulnerabilities. They will be explained in the next few modules.

Note: In this phase we are not interested in direct downloads like

`www.example.com/document.pdf`



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

197

Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

File upload forms are very common in forums, social networks and CMSs. Desired file types can be anything from images, documents and even executables.

Handling these uploads is a critical task for the web developer.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface

 MAP REF VIDEO LAB

Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

Mistakes in the way these documents are validated upon upload can lead to critical vulnerabilities, so we will make sure to note any page that offers this feature.

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## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

This is one of the most common features in a dynamic website.

Finding displayed user supplied data will bring us to the top web application vulnerability: **Cross site scripting**.

We will analyze in depth on next module.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

Redirections are server side or client side directives to automatically forward the visitor of a web page to another web page.

From the server side perspective the server can issue two different HTTP Response codes to make a redirect : [301](#) or [302](#).



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

The difference between the two is not important for our analysis. We will just have to remember that **3xx** code stands for redirect.

From the client perspective, the redirection is handled by the web browser. It recognizes the **3xx HTTP Response code** and makes a request to the page contained in the **Location** header.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

This is a sample of a server side redirect:

Request:

```
GET /index.php?id=100
HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.x 301 Moved Permanently
Content-Length: 0
Content-Type: text/html
Location:
http://www.example.com/index.php?=500
```

The client browser will make a request to  
<http://www.example.com/index.php?=500>.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

Another kind of refresh is the so-called meta refresh. The meta HTML tags are used to add metadata information to a web page. This data is usually read by search engines to better index the web page. Meta redirect, instead, is a way to generate a redirect either after  $x$  seconds or immediately if  $x=0$ .

**Example:**

```
<meta http-equiv="Refresh" content="0;  
url=http://www.example.com/">
```



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

Finding redirects is an important part of our attack surface as **HTTP response splitting** and other **Header manipulation** attacks can be performed when redirects are not handled properly.

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## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

Login pages will reveal the presence of restricted access areas of the site.

We will employ authentication bypass techniques as well as password brute forcing to test the security of the authentication routines in place.

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## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

While at this stage, we will not intentionally cause the application to generate errors (we will see later how it can be a great source of information), we will collect all the errors we may encounter while browsing it.

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## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

Since we are professionals, and not random amateurs firing up tools against a target, we want to keep all our information well organized.

This will let us spot the attack surface and perform our tests in a much easier and scientific manner.

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## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

We advise to add the information found for each block visually.

Blocks	Information					
	Client side validation	Redirections	Database Interaction	Errors	Displays users data	Login
Blogs	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗
eCommerce	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Downloads	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
...						
...						
...						
...						
...						



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



Client Side Validation

Database Interaction

File Uploading And Downloading

Display Of User Supplied Data

Redirections

Access Controls And Login  
Protected Pages

Error Messages

Charting

If you do not like the graph given at the beginning of this section, you can use the above table (or any other graph you are comfortable with).

You can also add more on the information retrieved, e.g. the URL inside the block where you encountered it.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface



During the process of mapping the attack surface, we have introduced two alternative charting techniques:

The **tree-based** chart is especially good if there are just a few blocks. Its value is in visually spotting information.

The **table-based** chart is what we can actually use in our testing phase, where a test for a given vulnerability will be triggered by a V in the table.



## 2.4.3. Mapping The Attack Surface

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### Example

A detected *interaction with a database* should be tied to a test for a **SQL Injection**.

An *access restricted page* may be checked against authentication bypass techniques.

This process will guarantee the best results while making sure that you do not miss any testable areas.



## 2.5. Enumerating Resources

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

212

# ENUMERATING RESOURCES

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## 2.5. Enumerating Resources

The resources we are going to enumerate in this step of our information gathering process are: subdomains, website structure, hidden files, configuration files and any additional information leaked because of misconfiguration.

This information will have to be saved, as usual, for later use (if you have not read the [Methodology document](#) already, this is the right time do so).

[https://members.elearnsecurity.com/course/resources/name/ptp\\_v5\\_section\\_2\\_module\\_1\\_attachment\\_eLearnSecurity\\_Handling\\_Information](https://members.elearnsecurity.com/course/resources/name/ptp_v5_section_2_module_1_attachment_eLearnSecurity_Handling_Information)



## 2.5.1. Crawling The Website



Crawling a website is the process of browsing a website in a methodical or automated manner to enumerate all the resources encountered along the way.

It gives us the structure of the website we are auditing and an overview of the potential attack surface for our future tests.

A crawler finds files and folders on a website because these appear in web page links, comments or forms.



## 2.5.1. Crawling The Website



In the section 2.4, we saw a manual, direct-browsing, crawling mechanism using [Burp Proxy](#).

We can have Burp Proxy perform an automatic and exhaustive crawling of a website. This gives us the hierarchical website structure in the form of folders and files.

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## 2.5.1. Crawling The Website



To do that, the first step is to jump to the **Target** tab of **Burp** and then to the Scope subtab to set up our scope.

This is an example of what should be inserted in the host/IP range field to retrieve data only from a given domain name:

`^www\domain\com$` where **domain** is in our test scope.

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## 2.5.1. Crawling The Website

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Once the scope has been set, we will have to make sure that the proxy is activated on port [8080](#).

To do this, we have to open the [Proxy](#) tab, select the [Options](#) subtab and make sure that the running checkbox is activated.






## 2.5.1. Crawling The Website

218

At this point, we activate the crawler by going to [Spider](#) tab and activating the [spider is running](#) checkbox.

We will set up our browser to use the proxy [127.0.0.1:8080](http://127.0.0.1:8080) and navigate to the home page of the website we want to crawl. This should appear in the Target tab within Burp as seen in our previous tutorial on Burp Suite.




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## 2.5.1. Crawling The Website

We have two ways to start the actual crawling process:

- right-click on the host and click spider this host
- enable the spider and start browsing the web app from our browser





## 2.5.1. Crawling The Website



We will be able to perform automatic form submittal, crawling pages that are reachable only through a POST request, as well as provide login data to crawl access-restricted areas of the site.

The ability to filter the data we receive makes our analysis phase easier. We will be able to see only the pages with redirects, or only pages with forms, etc.



## 2.5.1. Crawling The Website



One convenience of Burp is the built-in fuzzer and HTTP request editors in the same program. By right-clicking on any crawled web page, we will be able to send it to the [Intruder](#) - to fuzz it, or to [Repeater](#) - to manually alter the request in our tests.

Although Burp may not seem so intuitive at first, it is recommended that you get familiar with this tool. You will benefit from it in the long run.

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If you have a **FULL** or **ELITE** plan you can click  
on the image on the left to start the video

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## 2.5.2. Finding Hidden Files



While a crawler will only enumerate publicly available resources found through links and forms; *hidden files crawlers* and *fuzzers* like [DirBuster](#) will be able to find files that the web developer does not want us to see.

For this reason, these files are the most important source of information we can find and include: backup files, configuration files and a number of other resources that are very useful for our audit.

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## 2.5.2. Finding Hidden Files

**DirBuster** is a mature OWASP project that allows us to crawl a website and also mount a dictionary or brute force discovery attack on the remote file system by probing each call and identifying a correct guess through the HTTP response code or web page content (in case the website uses a custom 404 page.)

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## 2.5.2. Finding Hidden Files



The tool ships with few differently-sized dictionary lists that cover the most common folder and file names. We can choose to append an arbitrary extension to the items in the dictionary (matching the one used by our website).

For example, if the website is using PHP files, we will use `.php` as our extension.

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## 2.5.2. Finding Hidden Files



You can use different settings for crawling: custom user-agent, authentication, html elements to extract links from, number of requests per second, etc.

OWASP DirBuster 1.0-RC1 - Web Application Brute Forcing

File Options About Help

Target URL (eg http://example.com:80/)  
http://targetapplication.site/

Work Method  Use GET requests only  Auto Switch (HEAD and GET)

Number Of Threads  10 Threads  Go Faster

Select scanning type:  List based brute force  Pure Brute Force

File with list of dirs/files

Char set  Min length  Max Length

Select starting options:  Standard start point  URL Fuzz

Brute Force Dirs  Be Recursive Dir to start with /admin/

Brute Force Files  Use Blank Extension File extension php

URL to fuzz - /test.html?url={dir}.asp

Please complete the test details

DirBuster 1.0-RC1 - Advanced Options

DirBuster Options \ HTML Parsing Options \ Authentication Options \ Http Options \ Scan Options

File extensions to not process  
jpg,gif,jpeg,ico,tiff,png,bmp

HTML elements to extract links from

HTML Tag	Attribute
a	href
img	src
form	action
script	src
iframe	src
div	src
frame	src
embed	src

Tag Attribute



## 2.5.2. Finding Hidden Files

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227

DirBuster will present the results as a tree of folders and files. We need to pay particular attention to files and folders that were not retrieved by [Burp Proxy spider](#).



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## 2.5.2.1. Back Up And Source Code File



Web developers are known to be lazy. They have to do their job well, but quickly. Their project time constraints often bring errors that can be fatal to the overall website security.

Looking for back up files and source code files left on a server is an often-overlooked step in the information gathering process that we will take seriously as it can give us not only useful information but also, sometimes, complete access to the organization's assets.

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## 2.5.2.1. Back Up And Source Code File



A web server is instructed to treat special file extensions as [cgi](#) files, where the source code is interpreted and not relayed to the client.

When the extension is altered for back up or maintenance purposes, we are often given the application logic and if we are lucky enough, credentials to access the databases connected to that application.

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## 2.5.2.1. Back Up And Source Code File



Such common, disgraced practices, involve renaming the extension in `php.bak` or `asp.bak` for example.

In Burp, we will try to probe the web server, for every file found by our crawlers in the previous steps, for the presence of back up files by appending common backup extensions like `.bak` or `_bak` or `01` and so on.



## 2.5.2.1. Back Up And Source Code File



A good list of back up files extension follows:

- bak
- ~
- 001
- bac
- 01
- inc
- old
- \_bak
- Xxx
- 000

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## 2.5.2.1. Back Up And Source Code File



The extension `.inc` stands for *include* and it has been an abused extension for a long time; in [ASP 3.0](#) these files were used to contain source code to be included as part of the main asp page execution.

We recommend checking for their presence with DirBuster, especially when the site uses ASP as the server-side scripting engine.

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## 2.5.2.1 Video - Dirbuster



If you have a **FULL** or **ELITE** plan you can click on the image on the left to start the video

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## 2.5.3. Enumerating Users Accounts



Among the resources we can enumerate in a website, *usernames* are another important bit of information that may turn up useful information when we have to audit an authentication mechanism.

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## 2.5.3. Enumerating Users Accounts



A badly designed system can reveal sensitive information even if **wrong credentials have been inserted**.

For example, a web application could reveal information about the existence of a user.

It is important to note, that while determining valid usernames is something not considered as a serious threat, usernames are half of what is needed to login.

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## 2.5.3. Enumerating Users Accounts

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

236

While a user, at the login stage, wants to know whether the typed username or password is wrong, applications may reveal too much information. They can make an intruder's life easier by making it possible to enumerate the users.

How many times have you seen the incorrect login messages like "*Login incorrect*" or "*Username blah does not exist*"?

What is different in these messages?

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## 2.5.3. Enumerating Users Accounts

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Depending on the application behavior we may be able to discover valid usernames.

We will see later how to use tools such as [Burp Suite](#) and [Patator](#), to enumerate valid usernames on the target application.




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## 2.5.4. Map



Your information map nodes can be linked to the output of the tools we have just surveyed. Site directory tree, hidden files and usernames can be put in different TXT files and linked to tree nodes as the following image demonstrates:





# RELEVANT INFORMATION THROUGH MISCONFIGURATIONS

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## 2.6. Relevant Information Through Misconfigurations

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REF

VIDEO

LAB

240

Sometimes we find that the best way to retrieve relevant information about our web applications is to look for potential mistakes in web server configuration.

A quick and very common way to gather information, files, source code and misconfigurations is by looking for open directory listings.

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## 2.6.1. Directory Listing



These directories have been configured to show a list of the files and subdirectories in paths that we can access directly.

Note: 99% of the time, these directories have not been deliberately configured to show their content. They are just the result of a misconfiguration.

[To Parent Directory]

1/5/2004 3:29 PM	59748 <a href="#">2000_SA3_Index.zip</a>
1/5/2004 3:29 PM	66608 <a href="#">2001_SA3_Index.zip</a>
1/5/2004 3:29 PM	65935 <a href="#">2002_SA3_Index.zip</a>
1/5/2004 3:32 PM	72578 <a href="#">2003_SA3_Index.zip</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">Specs</a>
8/25/2010 3:55 AM	<dir> <a href="#">ADHOCs</a>
7/16/2012 2:20 PM	<dir> <a href="#">Drafts</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">EmailApproval</a>
3/9/2011 3:51 PM	<dir> <a href="#">Invitation</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">Reports</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_01</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_02</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_03</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_04_990616London</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_05_9908</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_06_9910</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_07</a>
11/4/2008 9:36 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_08</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_09</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_10</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_11_Mainz</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_12_Stockholm</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_13_Yokohama</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_14_Oslo</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_15_Washington</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_15bis_Munich</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_16_Sophia_Antipolis</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_17_Gothenberg</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_18_Phoenix</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_19_London</a>
11/4/2008 9:37 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_20_Sydney</a>
11/4/2008 9:38 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_21_Sophia</a>
11/4/2008 9:38 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_21b_adhoc_NDS_MAP_IMS</a>
11/4/2008 9:38 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_22_Bristol</a>
11/4/2008 9:38 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_22b_IMS_adHoc_Ft Lauderdale</a>
11/4/2008 9:38 PM	<dir> <a href="#">TSGS3_22_Vienna</a>



## 2.6.1. Directory Listing

The previous figure shows a sample of a webserver-generated webpage showing the directory listing for the main folder.

As you can imagine, you may have access to interesting information and files that potentially contain database information, login credentials, absolute server path and so on.

Looking for directory listings is an easy task that anyone with a basic experience in scripting languages like Perl, Ruby, Python and so on, and can be automated in few minutes.



## 2.6.1. Directory Listing



Starting with the DirBuster output, (from the previous step) which has uncovered a number of public and hidden directories on the server, let us do a [GET](#) request for each directory found. We will look at the web page content to search for patterns like *To parent directory* , *Directory Listing For*, *Index of...*

If the pattern is matched, we should be in front of a directory listing that we can navigate to using our web browser.



## 2.6.2. Log And Configuration Files



**Logs** are text files left on the web server by applications to keep track of different activities: errors, logins, informative messages and so on.

They usually contain valuable information that we will want to uncover.

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## 2.6.2. Log And Configuration Files



Every web application has a configuration file placed somewhere in the application's folder structure.

For example, *Joomla* stores the configuration file in the application root folder with the name [configuration.php](#).

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## 2.6.2. Log And Configuration Files

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**Configuration** files, as we saw in the previous paragraph, contain settings and preferences regarding the web applications installed.

They can contain the username and password that the application uses to connect to the database, or other administrative area.

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## 2.6.2. Log And Configuration Files



This file in itself is not viewable because it has the [.php](#) extension, but we should look for backup alternatives ([configuration.php.bak](#), [configuration.php.old](#),...).

In the case of Joomla and other similar CMSs, the configuration file contains the username and password of the database user used to connect to the database.



## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



Among the different mistakes an administrator can make in the configuration of the web server, leaving a directory writable by anyone is the biggest.

Writable directories are all those directories that allow us to upload our own files on the server through the [PUT](#) HTTP verb.

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



It is worth noting that the availability of the PUT verb among the allowed verbs does not imply that we can upload files on the server. We will be able to use the PUT verb only on writable directories.

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



The first step in this process is to check for the availability of the PUT verb among the allowed verbs.

To do this we will use [Putty](#) or [Netcat](#) to query the webserver directly issuing the following request:

```
OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1  
Host: targetsite.com
```

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



The server will respond with the list of the available verbs.

```
OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1
Host: test.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1
Date: Sat, 09 May 2009 17:01:57 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
MS-Author-Via: DAV
Content-Length: 0
Accept-Ranges: none
DASL: <DAV:sql>
DAV: 1, 2
Public: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, PUT, POST, COPY, MOVE, MKCOL, PROPFIND,
        PROPPATCH, LOCK, UNLOCK, SEARCH
Allow: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, COPY, MOVE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, SEARCH,
        MKCOL, LOCK, UNLOCK
Cache-Control: private
```

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



We are lucky! The server allows a number of verbs.

Note: this was an example that we made up for educational purposes. Usually you will find out that only [GET](#), [POST](#), [HEAD](#) and [TRACE](#) verbs are enabled.

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



Another thing to note is that if the **OPTIONS** verb is not allowed, we will not be able to enumerate all the available verbs. This does not mean that **PUT** is not available. We will just have to test it directly.

In case **OPTIONS** verb is not allowed we will receive either a **4xx** or **5xx** error message according to the webserver.

```
OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.google.com

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 1350
Date: Sat, 09 May 2009 17:11:54 GMT
Server: GFE/2.0
```



## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



This is just the beginning. We need now to know what directory, if any, we can upload to.

It is important to understand the correlation between the directory privileges and the possibility of uploading files: if the server's local user with which the website is executed also has the write attribute enabled for a given folder, then we will be able to write to that folder.

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload

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VIDEO

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In IIS, every configured website can be run by different local users. These users are assigned to the website visitor in order for him to browse the website.

If the user `IUSR_test` is set as the anonymous account for `test.com` then all the directories writable by `IUSR_test` will be our target (because we are indeed using `IUSR_test`'s privileges to browse the web site).



## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



Looking for writable directories is guess work. There is not a straight forward method how to verify directory privileges remotely.

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



Sometimes though, we can study the application and understand what directories are used to store user submitted avatars, files, attachments...

```
PUT /writable_folder/test.html HTTP/1.1
Host: test.com
Content-length: 184

HTTP/1.1 100 Continue
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1
Date: Sun, 10 May 2009 08:36:40 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE> Uploaded file </TITLE>
</HEAD>

<BODY>
<h1>Test uploaded file</h1>
</BODY>
</HTML>
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1
Date: Sun, 10 May 2009 08:36:43 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Location: http://test.com/writable_folder/test.html
Content-Length: 0
Allow: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, PUT, COPY, MOVE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH,
SEARCH, LOCK, UNLOCK
```

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



To do this, we will look for the path that brings us to these files.

For example, in a forum, we can find the path to a user's submitted avatar. This is useful because it is a folder configured to store these files.

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## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload



Once we have a pool of candidate folders we will try our **PUT** command on them:

```
</>
PUT /writable_dir/test.html HTTP/1.1
Content-length: 184
<RETURN>

[CONTENT OF TEST.HTML]
<RETURN>
<RETURN>
```

If the upload is successful, the server will respond with a **201 Created**.



## 2.6.3. HTTP Verbs and File Upload

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It is important to provide the **Content-length** of the payload that we want to upload in the file specified as an argument of the **PUT**. The actual file content is in the request payload.

To make sure that our file has been successfully uploaded to the server, we will look for it with our favorite browser.



# GOOGLE HACKING

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## 2.7. Google Hacking



When we talk about **Google hacking**, we mean using Google's sophisticated search operators for our information gathering purposes.

*Johnny Long* has been one of the first to uncover using Google to find misconfigured web servers, sensitive information left on a server (that was crawled by Google bots), password files, log files, directory listings and many others.

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## 2.7. Google Hacking

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

263

His [Google Hacking Database](#) contains a list of Google searches for every purpose.

Here is an example:

Fingerprinting web servers is possible through Google by querying for Apache online documentation or special folder added by IIS to the web root.

<https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/>



## 2.7. Google Hacking

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

264

Search term:

```
intitle:"Apache HTTP Server" intitle:"documentation"
```

The operator **intitle** will search only the title tag of all the pages crawled by Google. We can be more specific and restrict our search to include only our scope of audit:

Search term:

```
intitle:"Apache HTTP Server" intitle:"documentation" site:target.com
```



## 2.7. Google Hacking

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

265

Looking for open directory listings containing .bak files is another easy task with Google:

Search term:

"Index of" bak

Search term:

"Directory listing for" bak

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## 2.7. Google Hacking

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Looking for files with a specific extension is as easy as:

```
filetype:"bak"
```

or

```
filetype:"inc"
```

To restrict the search only to the website in our scope add  
[site:target.com](#).

```
filetype:"inc" site:target.com
```



Through Google Hacking, we may able to detect:

- Error messages that may contain valuable information
- Sensitive files and directories
  - Passwords, usernames, configurations, etc.
- Server or application vulnerabilities
- Pages that contain login portals
- and much more



## 2.7. Google Hacking



For a full list of available Google Search Operators please refer to:

[http://www.googleguide.com/advanced\\_operators.html](http://www.googleguide.com/advanced_operators.html)

Google Hacking Database is available here:

<https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/>



# SHODAN HQ

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## 2.8. Shodan HQ

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Similarly to [Google Hacking](#), there is another great search engine that will be very useful for our information gathering process.

It is [Shodan HQ](#). Shodan is a computer search engine that uses a different approach from other search engines like Google, Yahoo, Bing, etc. Indeed, instead of crawling data in web pages, Shodan scans the entire Internet and interrogates ports in order to gather information from the banners.

<https://www.shodan.io/>



## 2.8. Shodan HQ



Shodan searches includes the following protocols

- HTTP(S)
- SSH
- SNMP
- MySQL / MondoDB
- RDP
- FTP
- Telnet
- and few more

We can use it to search for:

- devices with default username and password,
- viewing the configuration of a device,
- detect server versions, and much more.



## 2.8. Shodan HQ



Like other search engines, it has Boolean operators and filters that can be used to narrow down the results:

- **[before/after] day/month/year:** search only for data that was collected before or after the given date
- **hostname:** filters results for hosts that contain the value in their hostname
- **port:** narrow the search for specific services
- **OS:** search for specific operating system

These are just a few of the available filters.

<https://www.shodan.io/>



It is important to know that in order to use most of its features (such as exporting results) and filters, you need to create an account.

Let's look at some search examples. Suppose we want to find all the devices running [apache](#) and that are in Italy (IT).

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## 2.8. Shodan HQ



274

Our search query will be something like this:

apache country:IT

Services		151.32.117.212	
HTTP	5,211	Linux 3.x	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
HTTPS	2,252	WIND Telecomunicazioni S.p.A	Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2013 02:12:30 GMT
HTTP Alternate	2,017	Added on 06.11.2013	Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
HTTPS Alternate	83	IT Torino	Last-Modified: Mon, 16 Sep 2013 15:41:49 GMT
HTTP	65	Details	ETag: "361a26-b1-4e6820ae2ed8f"
		ppp-212-117.32-151.iol.it	Accept-Ranges: bytes
			Content-Length: 177
			Vary: Accept-Encoding
			Content-Type: text/html
			X-Pad: avoid browser bug
Top Cities		<u>Elastix - Pagina di Connessione</u>	
Rome	500	93.63.209.104	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Milan	374	Fastweb	Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2013 02:07:16 GMT
Florence	127	Added on 06.11.2013	Server: Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
Torino	119	IT Rome	X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Genova	92	Details	



## 2.8. Shodan HQ



As we can see, we have a good list of matching devices:

Ip address of the device

Banner information grabbed by SHODAN matching our query string 'apache'.

Services	
HTTP	5,211
HTTPS	2,252
HTTP Alternate	2,017
HTTPS Alternate	83
HTTP	65

Top Cities

Rome	500
Milan	374

**151.32.117.212**  
Linux 3.x  
WIND Telecomunicazioni S.p.A  
Added on 06.11.2013  
 Torino  
**Details**  
ppp-212-117.32-151.iol.it

HTTP/1.0 200 OK  
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2013 02:12:30 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)  
Last-Modified: Mon, 16 Sep 2013 15:41:49 GMT  
ETag: "361a26-b1-4e6820ae2ed8f"  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Content-Length: 177  
Vary: Accept-Encoding  
Content-Type: text/html  
X-Pad: avoid browser bug

Location (Italy)



## 2.8. Shodan HQ

[MAP](#)[REF](#)[VIDEO](#)[LAB](#)

276

If you need more detailed information about the host, you can click on [Details](#) and then the following page will appear:

The screenshot shows a Shodan search result for the IP address 151.32.117.212. The top navigation bar includes links for MAP, REF, VIDEO, and LAB. The main title is "Host Profile: 151.32.117.212". A "Summary" section displays basic information: IP: 151.32.117.212, Location: Italy (Torino), and Latitude/Longitude: 45.05, 7.6667. Below this, an "HTTP" section shows a red button with the word "HTTP" and a green arrow pointing right. To the right of the arrow is a list of HTTP headers and a status message:

```
HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="TD-W8901G"
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Server: RomPager/4.07 UPnP/1.0
EXT:
```



Of course you can refine your searches by filtering results for specific hostname, ports and so on.

We suggest you try it yourself in order to understand the true power of this tool.

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# REFERENCES

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# References

 MAP REF VIDEO LAB

## Sysinternal Whois

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/whois>



## Arin.net

<http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-108-162-192-0-1/pft>



## Netcraft

<https://www.netcraft.com/>



## WhatWeb

<https://github.com/urbanadventurer/WhatWeb>



## whois.domaintools.com

<http://whois.domaintools.com/>



## ripe.net

<https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/#/query>



## IIS

<https://www.iis.net/>



## Wappalyzer

<https://wappalyzer.com/>



# References

MAP

REF

VIDEO

LAB

280



## ModSecurity

<https://www.modsecurity.org/>



## OWASP Framework Fingerprinting

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Framework\\_Web\\_Application\\_Framework\\_\(OTG-INFO-008\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Framework_Web_Application_Framework_(OTG-INFO-008))



## dnsrecon

<https://github.com/darkoperator/dnsrecon>



## fierce

<https://github.com/davidpepper/fierce-domain-scanner>



## OWASP WebApp Fingerprinting

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_Web\\_Application\\_Fingerprint\\_\(OWASP-IG-004\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Web_Application_Fingerprint_(OWASP-IG-004))



## Google Search Operators

[http://www.googleguide.com/advanced\\_operators\\_reference.html](http://www.googleguide.com/advanced_operators_reference.html)



## subbrute

<https://github.com/TheRook/subbrute>



## Nmap

<https://nmap.org/book/man-host-discovery.html>



# References



## dnsenum

<https://code.google.com/archive/p/dnsenum/downloads>



## theHarvester

<https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester>



## Zone Transfer

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS\\_zone\\_transfer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_zone_transfer)



## Burp Suite

<https://portswigger.net/burp>



## knock

<https://github.com/guelfoweb/knock>



## recon-ng

<https://bitbucket.org/LaNMaSteR53/recon-ng/wiki/Usage%20Guide>



## HotScripts

<http://www.webhostingtalk.com/>



## eLearnSecurity Methodology Document

[https://members.elearnsecurity.com/course/resources/name/ptp\\_v5\\_section\\_2\\_module\\_1\\_attachment\\_eLearnSecurity\\_Handling\\_Information](https://members.elearnsecurity.com/course/resources/name/ptp_v5_section_2_module_1_attachment_eLearnSecurity_Handling_Information)



## Google Hacking Database

<https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/>



## ShodanHQ

<https://www.shodan.io/>



## Google Advanced Operators

[http://www.googleguide.com/advanced\\_operators\\_reference.html](http://www.googleguide.com/advanced_operators_reference.html)



## Shodan Filters

<https://www.shodan.io/>

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## Web App Information Gathering



## Subdomain Enumeration



## Web app Fingerprinting



## Crawling and Spidering




## Dirbuster

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## Information Gathering

Fingerprint the web application, find hidden files, directories and much more



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