Assignment 3

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O1:
1. p = 11, g = 13
    \triangleright Assume: SA = 6, SB = 4

Arr TA = g^{SA} mod p = 13^6 mod 11 = (13*13*13*13*13*13) mod 11 = 2^6 mod 11 = 9
       TB = g^{SB} \mod p = 13^4 \mod 11 = 2^4 \mod 11 = 16 \mod 11 = 5
    ➤ TA <--> TB
       TB^{SA} \mod p = 5^6 \mod 11 = (3*3*3) \mod 11 = 27 \mod 11 = 5
       TA^{SB} \mod p = 9^4 \mod 11 = (81*81) \mod 11 = 16 \mod 11 = 5
    > 5 is the secret key.
2. p = 7, g = 17
    > Assume: SA = 7, SB = 6

Arr TA = g^{SA} mod p = 17^7 mod 7 = (17*17*17*17*17*17) mod 7 = 3^7 mod 7 = 3
       TB = g^{SB} \mod p = 17^6 \mod 7 = 3^6 \mod 7 = 8 \mod 7 = 1
    ➤ TA <--> TB
        TB^{SA} \mod p = 1^7 \mod 7 = (2*2*2*3) \mod 7 = 1
        TA^{SB} \mod p = 3^6 \mod 7 = 2^6 \mod 7 = 64 \mod 7 = 1
    > 1 is the secret key.
3. p = 17, g = 13
    \triangleright Assume: SA = 4, SB = 7

Arr TA = g^{SA} mod p = 13^4 mod 17 = (13*13*13*13) mod 17 = (16*16) mod 17 = 1
       TB = g^{SB} \mod p = 13^7 \mod 17 = (16^3 * 13) \mod 17 = 4
    ➤ TA <--> TB
       TB^{SA} \mod p = 4^4 \mod 17 = (13*4) \mod 17 = 1
        TA^{SB} \mod p = 1^4 \mod 17 = 1
    > 1 is the secret key.
```

Q2: I use python3 to code and the source code can be seen from the file "DiffieH". The sample outputs for question 1 are shown below:

```
[T909C:Assignment4_B00756586 wangzewen$ python3 DiffieH.py
 Please enter p : 11
 Please enter q: 13
 The secret key SA is 2
 The secret key SB is 358
 9 is the secret key.
 [T909C:Assignment4_B00756586 wangzewen$ python3 DiffieH.py
 Please enter p : 7
 Please enter q: 17
 The secret key SA is
                      120
 The secret key SB is 24
 1 is the secret key.
 [T909C:Assignment4_B00756586 wangzewen$ python3 DiffieH.py
 Please enter p : 17
 Please enter g: 13
 The secret key SA is 623
 The secret key SB is 438
 16 is the secret key.
O3:
Note: The shaded area is the encryption part and "a" means authentication part.
(1) original datagram:
A, B | Payload |
(2) A—>G1 segment:
               ESP Header Payload
A, B
                                              ESP Trailer
               |<----->|
(3) G1—>G3 segment:
               ESP Header Payload
                                             ESP Trailer
A, B
(4) G3—>G2 segment:
               ESP Header Payload
                                             ESP Trailer
               |<----a---
(5) G2—>B segment:
                          Payload
               ESP Header
                                             ESP Trailer
A, B
               |<-----a-----a------
(6) At B:
A, B Payload
b)
(1) original datagram:
A, B | Payload |
(2) A—>G1 segment:
A, B AH Payload
|<---->|
```

(3) $01-$	G3 segment:							
G1, G2	ESP	A, B	AH	Payload	ESP Traile	r		
	Header							
	<		a			>		
	ı					'		
$(4) G3 \longrightarrow$	G2 segment:							
G1, G2		A, B	AH	Payload	ESP Traile	-r		
01, 02	Header	71, D	7 11 1	1 ayload	LSI ITAIR	J1		
(5) (2)	<		a-			>		
(5) G2—>B segment:								
A, B AH Payload								
<	a	>						
(6) At B:								
A, B P	ayload							
' <u>-</u>								
c)								
	al datagram:							
A, B P	ayioau							
(2) 1 > (7.1							
	G1 segment:							
A, B A		Paylo						
<	a		>					
$(3) G1_{-}$	G3 segment:							
	do segment.							
A, B	ESP Hea			AH	A, B		Payload	ESP trailer
	ESP Hea	der					Payload	
	ESP Hea	der					•	
A, B	ESP Hea	der					•	
(4) G3—>	ESP Hea <	der			a		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B	ESP Heat <	derA,	В	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B	ESP Hea <	derA,	В	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> A, B <	ESP Heat <	derA,	В	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) < (5) G2—>	ESP Heat <	A,a	B 	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> A, B <	ESP Heat <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) < (5) G2—>	ESP Heat <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> A, B < (5) G2—> A, B <	ESP Heat <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> A, B < (5) G2—> A, B < (6) At B:	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> A, B < (5) G2—> A, B < (6) At B:	ESP Heat <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> A, B < (5) G2—> A, B < (6) At B: A, B P	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> A, B < (5) G2—> A, B < (6) At B:	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) < (5) G2—> (A, B) < (6) At B: A, B P	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> [A, B] < (5) G2—> [A, B] < (6) At B: [A, B] P d) (1) original	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) < (5) G2—> (A, B) < (6) At B: (A, B) P	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) < (5) G2—> (A, B) < (6) At B: (A, B) P d) (1) original A, B P	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) < (5) G2—> (A, B) < (6) At B: (A, B) P (1) origina (A, B) P	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) < (5) G2—> (A, B) < (6) At B: (A, B) P (1) origina (A, B) P	ESP Head <	A, a	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) <	ESP Head <	A,	B B	Paylo	ad		•	
(4) G3—> (A, B) <	ESP Head <	A,	B B	Paylo	ad		•	

Q4:

a. Brute-Force Attack:

IPSec provides many encryption algorithms such as AES, RC4, 3DES and other encryption algorithms. These encryption algorithms have long key length, which makes Brute-Force Attack extremely hard to launch.

b. Replay Attack:

IPSec consists of three important components, including authentication header, encapsulating security payload and internet key exchange. These components can mitigate Replay Attack by using generated sequence numbers which are stored in a table. If an attack duplicates encrypted packets and tries to launch the replay attack, the receiver who keeps track of packets will compare the sequence number of these packets with those stored in the table. If it is found that the number has already stored in the table, this may occur the replay attack and the packet will be discarded.

c. Man-in-the-middle Attack:

Among the three components of IPSec mentioned above, the Internet Key Exchange(IKE) protocol provides the security of key exchange during communications which can mitigate Man-in-the-middle Attack. Besides, this attack can also be prevented by authentication.

d. IP Spoofing:

Negotiating an IPSec connection requires mutual authentication, which is a way to prove the identity of the entity behind the IP address. All communications are cryptographically sound, so it must go through the mutual authentication phase. [1] Therefore IP Spoofing is countered.

e. SYN Flooding:

The IPSec Security Association creation requires authentication, the current form of SYN flooding attacks which use a forged source IP address in the SYN packets are precluded. If the attacker uses a real source IP address to launch the attack, then the attacker's identity is known and provable, in that case, one can add packet filters. [2]

Reference:

- [1] How does IPSec protect against IP spoofing? (n.d.). Retrieved April 03, 2017, from https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/46340/how-does-ipsec-protect-against-ip-spoofing
- [2] Re: transport vs network and ipsec syn. (n.d.). Retrieved April 03, 2017, from http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1997/03/msg00033.html