Lab 07

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Task 1: Create and Install a Kernel Module

After running sudo insmod simple_module.ko, dmesg will display four more following lines.

```
[ 1443.616329] simple_module: loading out-of-tree module taints
kernel.
[ 1443.616347] simple_module: module license 'unspecified' taints
kernel.
[ 1443.616354] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 1443.616698] Hello world.
```

After running sudo rmmod simple module, dmesg will display "exit" after "hello world".

Question: What is the exception level and the security state of the core with loaded LKM?

When a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) like the one shown is loaded, it runs within the kernel space of the operating system, typically at Exception Level 1 (EL1) with a non-secure state.

Task 2: Directly Access a High Privilege Register: SCR

Task 2.a: What is the complete instruction?

```
asm volatile("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c1, 0":"=r"(reg));
```

Task 2.b: Question: Why the segmentation fault occurs?

Error message in dmesg:

```
[ 507.480130] Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#1] SMP ARM
```

Unprivileged Access to System Control Registers: SCR is privileged and typically accessible only at a high exception level, such as EL3 (for secure mode) or EL1 (kernel mode) on ARMv8. In a standard Linux kernel environment, attempting to read or write such a privileged register from module code (especially outside secure mode) will cause an undefined instruction exception, leading to a segmentation fault.

Task 3: Read the Debug Authentication Signal

Task 3.a: Question: What is the instruction to read DBGAUTHSTATUS? Suppose we

MRC p14,0,<Rt>,c7,c14,6; Read DBGAUTHSTATUS into Rt

Task 3.b: Take single_module.c as an example, write your kernel module to read the signal. A screenshot of the result is needed, and tell us what is the meaning of the result. What kind of debug events are enabled?

```
C simple_module.c × M Makefile
                                                                                                         □ …
 task2 > C simple_module.c
    1 #include <linux/module.h> // included for all kernel modules
        #include <linux/kernel.h> // included for KERN_INFO
        #include <linux/init.h> // included for __init and __exit macros
        * The init function of the module.
       static int __init simple_module_init(void)
   10
       uint32_t reg;
       // asm volatile("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c1, 0":"=r"(reg));
       // printk(KERN_INFO "SCR %x.\n", reg);
asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c7, c14, 6":"=r"(reg));
   13
       printk(KERN_INFO "DBGAUTHSTATUS %x.\n", reg);
   15
        return 0;
  16
  18
        st The cleanup function of the module.
   19
        static void exit simple module exit(void)
       printk(KERN_INFO "Exit.\n");
  23
  25
        module_init(simple_module_init);
  26 module_exit(simple_module_exit);
  问题 输出 调试控制台 端口 终端 注释
                                                                          + \vee \bigcirc bash - task2 \triangle \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc
result
```

Bits [31:8] reserved.

SNID, bits [7:6], Secure non-invasive debug. 11 means implemented and enabled.

SID, bits [5:4], Secure invasive debug. 11 means implemented and enabled.

NSNID, bits [3:2], Non-secure non-invasive debug. 11 means implemented and enabled.

NSID, bits [1:0], Non-secure invasive debug. 11 means implemented and enabled.

Task 4: Enable the Halting Debug

```
#define EDLAR_OFFSET 0x300

...

iowrite32(0xc5acce55, param->debug_register + EDLAR_OFFSET);
iowrite32(0xc5acce55, param->cti_register + EDLAR_OFFSET);
iowrite32(0x0, param->debug_register + OSLAR_OFFSET);
iowrite32(0x0, param->cti_register + OSLAR_OFFSET);
iowrite32(0x0, param->cti_register + OSLAR_OFFSET);
```

Task 5: Switch to the EL3 and read the SCR

The code to access SCR is mrc p15, 0, R0, c1, c1, 0. The corresponding machine code is $0 \times e = 111111$.

To transfer the value of R1 on core 0 to the local variable scr, first load the value from R0 to p14, then read from param->debug register + DBGDTRTX OFFSET.

```
// Step 7: Read the SCR
printk(KERN_INFO "Step 7: Read SCR\n");
// Oxee111f11 <=> mrc p15, 0, R0, c1, c1, 0
execute_ins_via_itr(param->debug_register, 0x1f11ee11);
// Oxee001e15 <=> mcr p14, 0, R0, c0, c5, 0
execute_ins_via_itr(param->debug_register, 0x1e15ee00);
scr = ioread32(param->debug_register + DBGDTRTX_OFFSET);
```

Task 6: Restore the Context and Exit

```
[ 2800.877786] Step 1: Unlock debug and cross trigger registers
[ 2800.877793] Step 2: Enable halting debug
[ 2800.877796] Step 3: Halt the target processor
[ 2800.877799] Step 4: Wait the target processor to halt
[ 2800.877802] Step 5: Save context
[ 2800.877805] Step 6: Switch to EL3
[ 2800.877808] Step 7: Read SCR
[ 2800.877812] Step 8: Restore context
[ 2800.877815] Step 9: Send restart request to the target processor
[ 2800.877818] Step 10: Wait the target processor to restart
[ 2800.877823] All done! The value of SCR is 0x00000131
pi@raspberrypi:~/Desktop/task4 $ ■

result
```

The value of SCR is 0x00000131.

TWE, bit [13]: Traps WFE instructions to Monitor mode. 0: This control has no effect on the execution of WFE instructions.

TWI, bit [12]: Traps WFI instructions to Monitor mode. 0: This control has no effect on the execution of WFI instructions.

SIF, bit [9]: Secure instruction fetch. 0: Secure state instruction fetches from Non-secure memory are permitted.

HCE, bit [8]: Hypervisor Call instruction enable. 1: HVC instructions are enabled at EL2 and Non-secure EL1.

SCD, bit [7]: Secure Monitor Call disable. 0: SMC instructions are enabled.

nET, bit [6]: Not Early Termination. 0: Early termination permitted. Execution time of data operations can depend on the data values.

AW, bit [5]: When the value of SCR.EA is 1 and the value of HCR.AMO is 0, this bit controls whether CPSR.A masks an external abort taken from Non-secure state. 1: External aborts taken from either Security state are masked by CPSR.A. When CPSR.A is 0, the abort is taken to EL3.

FW, bit [4]: When the value of SCR.FIQ is 1 and the value of HCR.FMO is 0, this bit controls whether CPSR.F masks an FIQ interrupt taken from Non-secure state. 1: An FIQ taken from either Security state is masked by CPSR.F. When CPSR.F is 0, the FIQ is taken to EL3.

EA, bit [3]: External Abort handler. This bit controls which mode takes external aborts. 0: External aborts taken to Abort mode.

FIQ, bit [2]: FIQ handler. 0: FIQs taken to FIQ mode.

IRQ, bit [1]: IRQ handler. This bit controls which mode takes IRQ exceptions. 0: IRQs taken to IRQ mode.

NS, bit [0]: Non-secure bit. Except when the PE is in Monitor mode, this bit determines the Security state of the PE. 1: PE is in Non-secure state.

Questions

1. During this lab, what is the base address of Cross Trigger Interface in Raspberry Pi 3? Can your find the global address of CTICONTROL register in Raspberry Pi 3 according to the Arm Reference Manual? Answer the address value and show your calculation. (hint: Find the offset)

0x40038000 is the base address of the cross trigger interface registers on Core 0.

CTICONTROL offset is 0×000 , so the global address of it is 0×40038000 .

2. Do we have another way to unlock the OS Lock in this lab except memory mapping? If yes, how to do that? Justify your answer.

Yes, we can use hardware-debugging tools such as JTAG + debug authentication to do this. Using a hardware debugger allows direct access to the system's memory and registers without needing the OS to be actively involved or for the memory to be mapped in software.