

Data Science for Public Policy

Applied Micro Methods II

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Synthetic control method

- ▶ With this method, it is possible to generate a "**synthetic control**" for a treated unit i , allowing comparisons free from confounding.
- ▶ By assigning weights to the Y values of untreated units, a "synthetic control" is produced

$$\hat{Y}_{t,post}(0) = \mu + \sum_{i \in c} \omega_i Y_{i,T}$$

- ▶ Typically, it is necessary to estimate the ω_i , which are formed by minimizing the distance between covariates in the pre-period.

$$\{\hat{\omega}\}_i = \arg \min_{\mathbf{W}} ||\mathbf{X}_{\text{treat}} - \mathbf{X}_{\text{control}} \mathbf{W}||$$

Synthetic control method

- ▶ Importantly, \mathbf{X} can include both lagged outcomes and covariates.
- ▶ Reconnecting with the idea of what is observable and what is not:
 - ▶ Unobserved outcomes: $Y_{t,post}(0)$, $Y_{c,post}(1)$
 - ▶ Observed outcomes: $Y_{t,post}(1)$, $Y_{c,post}(0)$
 - ▶ Observed covariates / predictors: $Y_{t,pre}(0)$, $Y_{c,pre}(0)$, X_t , X_c
- ▶ Relevant method if one wants to study just one treated unit
- ▶ Recent papers have introduced Synthetic Difference-in-Differences (SDID)

Example

The Economic Costs of Organised Crime - Pinotti 2015 *EJ*

- ▶ Is organized crime good or bad for the economy?

Example


The Economic Costs of Organised Crime - Pinotti 2015 *EJ*

- ▶ Is organized crime good or bad for the economy?
- ▶ Expansion of Mafia to regions previously unaffected (Apulia and Basilicata)
- ▶ From the minimization problem, the control group is created by weights from Abruzzo (0.624) and Molise (0.376).

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- ▶ Expansion of Mafia to regions previously unaffected (Apulia and Basilicata)
- ▶ From the minimization problem, the control group is created by weights from Abruzzo (0.624) and Molise (0.376).
- ▶ GDP growth slows down after mafia activities expanded to new regions



Example

Tax Reform and Foreign Inventors - Akcigit, Baslandze and Stantcheva 2016 *AER*

- ▶ Do people respond to changes in tax burden?

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- ▶ Do people respond to changes in tax burden?
- ▶ In 1992, Denmark reduced taxes on foreign researchers
- ▶ From the minimization problem, the control group is created by weights from Switzerland, Canada, and Portugal
- ▶ Increased in the share of foreign inventors




FIGURE 9. DENMARK'S 1992 TAX REFORM AND FOREIGN INVENTORS

Instrumental variables

- ▶ **Instrumental variables (IV)** is the most popular solution for dealing with endogenous treatments
- ▶ The **2021 Nobel prize** for economics was assigned to researchers that linked the potential outcome framework with IV and introduced the concept of **local average treatment effect (LATE)**, the actual type of estimands that IV delivers

Instrumental variables


- ▶ **Instrumental variables (IV)** is the most popular solution for dealing with endogenous treatments
- ▶ The **2021 Nobel prize** for economics was assigned to researchers that linked the potential outcome framework with IV and introduced the concept of **local average treatment effect (LATE)**, the actual type of estimands that IV delivers
- ▶ Let's go back to the link between education and income

$$Y_i = \alpha + \rho S_i + \epsilon_i$$


$$Y_i = \alpha + \rho S_i + \underbrace{\phi A_i}_{\text{unobs}} + \eta_i$$

- ▶ OLS estimates for $\hat{\rho}$ will be biased.

Instrumental Variables: Main Intuition




Instrumental Variables: Main Intuition




Instrumental Variable (IV): to identify a variable, that is correlated with S_i , but not correlated with anything else affecting Y_i .

Instrumental Variables: Main Intuition



- ▶ We identify a source of variation in treatment assignment that is as good as random – orthogonal to any relevant unobserved confounder.
- ▶ We compare individuals that, due to the instrument, are shifted between the control group and the treatment group.

What is a valid instrumental variable?



1. Correlated with the causal variable, e.g. S_i :

$$\text{Cov}[Z_i, S_i] \neq 0$$

2. Uncorrelated with any other determinants of outcome Y :

$$\text{Cov}[Z_i, \epsilon_i] = 0$$

What is a valid instrumental variable?

(1) Exogeneity: No unobserved factors affect both the outcome and the instrument:

$$\epsilon_i \not\rightarrow Z_i$$

► No “Z-confounders”


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
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
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
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► “single mediator” condition

Violation of exogeneity:



Violation of exclusion:



Good instruments are hard to find

- ▶ Good instruments come from a combination of three ingredients:
 - ▶ Good institutional knowledge
 - ▶ Theoretical modeling
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- ▶ Good instruments come from a combination of three ingredients:
 - ▶ Good institutional knowledge
 - ▶ Theoretical modeling
 - ▶ Last but not least: Originality
- ▶ Some usual sources of instruments:
 - ▶ Nature (e.g., genes, weather)
 - ▶ Assignment rules (e.g., random assignment of judges to cases)
 - ▶ 'Natural' experiments (e.g. lottery drafts, sudden policy changes, geographic or temporal cutoffs)

Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)

IV estimates are equivalent to running two separate OLS regressions:

1. Estimate “first stage”, regressing treatment on instrument:

$$S_i = \gamma Z_i + \nu_i$$

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- ▶ First stage is driven by “compliers” (responders to instrument).
- ▶ Standard 2SLS estimates give a “local average treatment effect” on the complier population.

Can we test validity of IV?

- ▶ Is Z_i correlated with causal variable of interest, S_i ?
 - ▶ YES: check for the significance of the first stage (first-stage F-statistic)
 - ▶ The standard is $F > 10$, but recent studies show you might need more
 - ▶ With weak instruments IV bias towards the OLS

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 - ▶ But often indirect ways to probe exogeneity and exclusion

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- ▶ Is Z_i uncorrelated with any other determinants of Y_i ?
 - ▶ Untestable, use logic and theory to argue in favor the assumption
 - ▶ But often indirect ways to probe exogeneity and exclusion
- ▶ Additional assumption that is important (and untestable)
 - ▶ Monotonicity: the instrument(s) should have a monotonic relationship with the endogenous explanatory variable(s)

Reduced Form

“Reduced Form” (RF) means regressing the outcome directly on the instrument:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \phi Z_i + \epsilon_i$$

- ▶ Papers will normally report this along with 2SLS estimates.
- ▶ For causal interpretation, RF requires exogeneity but not exclusion.

Example

Media and local finance - Ash and Galletta, 2023 *AEJPOL*

- ▶ How national cable news affects local public policy?

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
- ▶ How national cable news affects local public policy?
- ▶ Variation in channel position depending on the area of residence
- ▶ Higher channel position lower viewership

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
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- ▶ How national cable news affects local public policy?
- ▶ Variation in channel position depending on the area of residence
- ▶ Higher channel position lower viewership
- ▶ Fox News did decrease the size of local budgets

Panel A. First stage



Panel B. Reduced Form



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War and Tax Evasion - Galletta and Giommoni 2023 WP

- ▶ Does exposure to war violence affect tax evasion?

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- ▶ Does exposure to war violence affect tax evasion?
- ▶ Death of a relative in WWI as treatment
- ▶ Exogenous allocation of soldiers to more/less risky military units
- ▶ Yes, higher tax evasion when a relative died during the war

Table 3: Effect of War on Tax noncompliance - IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: OLS</i>				
Death of a relative in the battlefield	0.028*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>				
Risk of military unit	0.101*** (0.004)	0.105*** (0.004)	0.098*** (0.005)	0.104*** (0.007)
F-stat	634.1335	835.1041	332.6722	219.2009
<i>Panel C: Reduced form</i>				
Risk of military unit	0.019*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.004* (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
<i>Panel D: IV</i>				
Death of a relative in the battlefield	0.186*** (0.031)	0.200*** (0.028)	0.044* (0.026)	0.064** (0.030)
N Observations	54,990	54,771	51,486	49,472
Baseline controls		✓	✓	✓
Surname FE			✓	
Province FE			✓	
Municipality FE				✓
Surname FE × Province FE				✓

Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)

- ▶ **Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)** is a quasi-experimental design that has gained popularity among researchers because it can provide more credible causal estimates than other designs.
- ▶ It exploits that individuals are assigned to treatment or control groups based on a running variable (e.g., test score, distance, or class size) with a discontinuity at a certain threshold or **cutoff point**.

Sharp vs Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design

- ▶ In the Sharp RDD, individuals who score above the cutoff receive the treatment, and those who score below the cutoff do not.
- ▶ In the Fuzzy RDD, the probability of receiving the treatment changes discontinuously at the cutoff, but not all individuals who score above the cutoff receive the treatment.
- ▶ Fuzzy RDD is essentially equivalent to an Instrumental Variables (IV) design, where the running variable serves as the instrument for the treatment.

Notation and Key Assumptions

- ▶ Let $Y_i(0)$ and $Y_i(1)$ be the potential outcomes of individual i when they do not receive the treatment and when they do, respectively.
- ▶ Let D_i be the treatment indicator such that $D_i = 1$ if individual i receives the treatment, and $D_i = 0$ otherwise.
- ▶ Let Z_i be the running variable that assigns individuals to treatment or control.
- ▶ We assume that Z_i **has a discontinuity at a threshold** value z_0 , where the treatment is assigned to individuals with $Z_i \geq z_0$.
- ▶ We assume that $Y_i(0)$ and $Y_i(1)$ **are continuous in Z_i around the threshold value**, which allows us to estimate the LATE at the threshold.

Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)

- ▶ If the previous assumptions hold

$$\tau_{ATE} = E(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | Z_i = 0) = \lim_{z \downarrow 0} E(Y_i | Z_i = z) - \lim_{z \uparrow 0} E(Y_i | Z_i = z)$$

- ▶ But, this is a very particular subgroup of individuals right at the cutoff

Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)

- ▶ The basic RDD model can be expressed as:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \gamma(Z_i - c) + \epsilon_i$$

- ▶ where Y_i is the outcome variable
- ▶ T_i is a binary treatment
- ▶ Z_i is the continuous variable used for assignment
- ▶ c is the cutoff point, and ϵ_i is the error term
- ▶ Local linear regression method by selecting a small neighborhood around the cutoff point.

RDD Check list

- ▶ A graphical representation and test of “balance” and first stage (if fuzzy)
- ▶ Permutation test of characteristic at cutoff
- ▶ The density of the forcing variable (Mcrary test)
- ▶ Placebo checks
- ▶ A graphical representation of the outcomes
- ▶ Estimates based on optimal bandwidth choice and robust inference, using local linear analysis
 - ▶ These decisions vary depending on running variable. If discrete running variable, need to account for discreteness (Kolesar and Rothe (2018))
 - ▶ Should use local linear regression, and not global polynomials (Gelman and Imbens)
- ▶ Robustness analysis along bandwidth choice (and other tuning parameters)
 - ▶ Present this graphically

Example

Female Mayor and Violence against Women - Bochenkova, Buonanno and Galletta 2023 *JDevE*

- ▶ Does female mayor influence violence against women?

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Female Mayor and Violence against Women - Bochenkova, Buonanno and Galletta 2023 *JDevE*


- ▶ Does female mayor influence violence against women?
- ▶ Compare Brazilian municipalities where a female candidate barely won to those where a female candidate barely lost mayoral elections
- ▶ Winning is random for those close to 50%

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- ▶ Does female mayor influence violence against women?
- ▶ Compare Brazilian municipalities where a female candidate barely won to those where a female candidate barely lost mayoral elections
- ▶ Winning is random for those close to 50%
- ▶ Yes, having a female mayor reduces crime against women

Figure 1: Female Mayor and Violence against Women



Example

Direct democracy and social preferences - Galletta 2021 *JEBO*

- ▶ Does political institutions affect preferences for redistribution?

Example


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- ▶ Does political institutions affect preferences for redistribution?
- ▶ Exploits a discrete change in the probability that a municipality has representative democracy based on a population threshold
- ▶ ≥ 800 inhabitants adopt a city council

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- ▶ Does political institutions affect preferences for redistribution?
- ▶ Exploits a discrete change in the probability that a municipality has representative democracy based on a population threshold
- ▶ ≥ 800 inhabitants adopt a city council
- ▶ Yes, representative democracy reduces the share of votes in favor of public spending



Regression Discontinuity Aggregation (RDA)

- ▶ In a classic RDD, treatment is assigned by whether an observation's running variable crosses a fixed cutoff.
- ▶ Borusyak and Kolerman-Shemer 2024 extend the RDD framework to cases where a unit is exposed to multiple discontinuity events
- ▶ In such settings, a unit's "treatment" is no longer a simple binary indicator at a single cutoff, but rather an aggregate measure of several RD shocks across events
- ▶ Important finding: RDA solutions provide a causal estimate as far as the standard RDD assumptions are satisfied

Upper-Level IV Estimator (RDA)

- ▶ Estimate causal effects at an aggregate level by combining multiple regression discontinuity events.
- ▶ Aggregate treatment indicators from multiple local RD events into a single measure per aggregate unit (e.g., multiple elections results).
- ▶ Construct an instrumental variable from aggregated near-threshold discontinuities (e.g., elections results that happen "by chance").
- ▶ Use this IV approach to estimate how aggregated treatments affect the aggregated outcome (e.g., economic outcomes).
- ▶ Include aggregated controls to mimic local comparisons at each RD threshold.

Lower-Level (Stacking) Estimator (RDA)

- ▶ Stack multiple individual RD events into one dataset and performing a fuzzy RD analysis.
- ▶ Create a dataset with each RD event as a separate observation.
- ▶ Assign identical aggregated outcomes and treatments to all events from the same aggregate unit.
- ▶ Perform regression discontinuity analysis on the stacked data, controlling for individual running variables.

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Political Influence during Childhood - Daniele, Galletta, Le Moglie and Masera 2025 *almost a WP*

- ▶ Does early-life exposure to political ideology shape voters' political preferences?

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
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- ▶ Data: Party preferences from over 200 million U.S. voters

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- ▶ Does early-life exposure to political ideology shape voters' political preferences?
- ▶ Study context: Ideological exposure to U.S. state governors during childhood
- ▶ Data: Party preferences from over 200 million U.S. voters
- ▶ Main finding: Significant ideological imprinting, strongest effect at age 10

Figure 6: Growing up under a Republican governor: Different ages



Example

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Upper-Level Estimator

$$ShRep_{i,s}^{a,b} = \gamma_s + \gamma_0 ShRepNE_{i,s}^{a,b} + \gamma_1 Q_{i,s} + \gamma_2 BY_{i,s} + \epsilon_{i,s}, \quad (2 \text{ FS})$$

$$Y_{i,s} = \beta_s + \beta_0 \widehat{ShRep_{i,s}^{a,b}} + \beta_1 Q_{i,s} + \beta_2 BY_{i,s} + \rho_{i,s}, \quad (2 \text{ SS})$$

- ▶ $ShRep_{i,s}^{a,b} = \sum_{\tau=a}^b \frac{RepGov_{i,s}^{\tau}}{(b-a+1)}$: Share of years under a Republican governor.
- ▶ $ShRepNE_{i,s}^{a,b}$: Same as $ShRep_{i,s}^{a,b}$, but only using elections with $MV_{i,s}^{\tau} < c$.
- ▶ $Q_{i,s}$: Aggregated controls (e.g., share of narrow elections, average margin of victory).
- ▶ $BY_{i,s}$: Birth year fixed effects.

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Lower Level Estimator

$$ShRep_{i,s}^{a,b} = \gamma_s + \gamma_0 RepGov_{i,s}^\tau + \gamma_1 MV_{i,s}^\tau + \gamma_2 (MV_{i,s}^\tau \times RepGov_{i,s}^\tau) + \gamma_3 BY_{i,s} + \epsilon_{i,s}, \quad (3 \text{ FS})$$

$$Y_{i,s} = \beta_s + \beta_0 \widehat{ShRep}_{i,s}^{a,b} + \beta_1 MV_{i,s}^\tau + \beta_2 (MV_{i,s}^\tau \times RepGov_{i,s}^\tau) + \beta_3 BY_{i,s} + \rho_{i,s}, \quad (3 \text{ SS})$$

- ▶ $RepGov_{i,s}^\tau$: Dummy for a Republican governor at age τ .
- ▶ $MV_{i,s}^\tau$: Margin of victory in the election at age τ .
- ▶ $ShRep_{i,s}^{a,b}$: Defined as in the upper-level estimator.

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	Share Years Rep Governor (7-16)	Republican	Republican	Democrat	Independent	Republican
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Upper-Level Estimation						
Share Years Rep Governor (7-16)		6.76*** (1.44)	8.65*** (1.86)	-4.49** (1.75)	-2.48 (1.80)	
Upper Level Instrument	0.33*** (0.03)					2.82*** (0.52)
Observations	141.82M	141.82M	98.67M	141.82M	141.82M	98.67M
Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	2Party-Registered	Full Sample	Full Sample	2Party-Registered
F-stat		124.8	121.7	124.8	124.8	
Panel B: Lower-Level Estimation						
Share Years Rep Governor (7-16)		8.78*** (1.11)	11.99*** (1.58)	-8.33*** (1.45)	-1.11 (1.29)	
Lower Level Instrument	0.32*** (0.03)					3.58*** (0.38)
Observations	724.73M	724.73M	509.38M	724.73M	724.73M	509.38M
Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	2Party-Registered	Full Sample	Full Sample	2Party-Registered
F-stat		154.8	131.0	154.8	154.8	

To recap

- ▶ We care about causality
- ▶ Potential outcome framework
- ▶ Quasi-experimental methods
 - ▶ Diff-in-Diff
 - ▶ Synthetic controls
 - ▶ IV
 - ▶ RDD