ABOUT THE COVER

Some readers will be curious about the cover photograph. Beginning with the 2nd edition of the *Handbook*, we have used the cover to symbolize some theme or themes of the *Handbook*. This is no less true in this edition's cover photograph. We deliberately chose a photograph that is both non-Western in its orientation and also clearly performance-driven. We have been fortunate enough, with the good offices of the Sage Publications art division, to locate a photograph with three critical elements: perform-ers, a group that appears to be getting instruction, and an audience. For those familiar with the performance in the right-hand side of the photograph, the introduction of the whirling dervishes will come as as a familiar scene. The dervishes are Muslims, members of one of several sects, who take vows of poverty and austerity. The dance they perform is a sacred ritual, carried out to gradually reduce the body to focus on Allah and holy matters only. The performance itself—now shared with Westerners and non-Muslim audiences—is an intensely spiritual experience, as it is intended to be, even for non-Muslim audiences.

We have intended this photograph to do several things at once in the "reading": to indicate a broader reach for this *Handbook*, incorporating the perspectives of non-Western, indigenous, First Nations, and other non-U.S. and non-European sources; to signify the performance aspects of performance ethnography and performative, communitarian social justice; to indicate the "experience-near" quality of a new generation of ethnography, via showing the audience both near to the perform-ers and, simultaneously, on the same level; and to signal the return of the spiritual and the sacred to the practices of sciences, foretold in the previous editions. It is our hope that other readers, from other standpoints, will locate and resonate to other extended meanings in the cover and find that its multiple levels sets them, too, to dreaming of a re-envisioned ethnography and a set of qualitative practices that summon a wider view of the purposes of a re-imagined social science.

—Yvonna S. Lincoln
—Norman K. Denzin

THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH
THIRD EDITION

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33

FOUCAULT'S METHODOLOGIES

Archaeology and Genealogy

James Joseph Scheurich and Kathryn Bell McKenzie

T his chapter is not a true or accurate representation of Foucault's work.[1] No such representation exists or is possible, in our view. There are, consequently, many other possible readings of Foucault's work that are just as defensible as this one. Indeed, this reading, like Foucault's *savoir* (defined and discussed later), is messy, ruptured, often erroneous, broken, discontinuous, originless, fabricated, even a falsification. In other words, as Magritte wrote on his painting of a pipe, "this is not a pipe" (Foucault, 1973b); this is not Foucault.

Moreover, what we intended to accomplish here in our early conceptualizations of this project and what actually emerged are significantly different. Indeed, we might question ourselves as we think our critics will question us, and just as Foucault did at the end of his "Introduction" to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972).[2] We might say,

"Aren't you sure of what you're saying? Are you going to change yet again, shift your position according to the questions that are put to you, and say that the objections are not really directed at the place from which you are speaking? Are you going to declare yet again that you have never been what you have been reproached with being? Are you already preparing the way out that will enable you in your next book to spring up somewhere else and declare as you're now doing: no, no, I'm not where you are lying in wait for me, but over here, laughing at you?" (p. 17, quotes in original)

Although our only laughter is about our own pretensions, what we intended when we started this project was to try to show how archaeology and genealogy might be used as critical "qualitative" (defined broadly) methodologies. We also wanted to illustrate briefly how each of these methods might be applied to education issues, as this is our discipline. Finally, we also envisioned a critical survey of the uses and abuses of Foucault's work in education.

However, some of this happened and much did not. For us, what changed what we did here was our review of Foucault's *oeuvre* (just the books and the order in which they were published) from

the "beginning" through his genealogical work (we never thought we would cover what many consider the last phase of his work, the "care of self" or ethics period) and our review of articles and books in education that use Foucault's ideas in a central way. Neither of us had read through Foucault's work in such a systematic, focused, concentrated way, nor had we systematically surveyed the applications of Foucault in education. It was these systematic surveys, then, and the effects they had on our own understandings of Foucault and his use by education scholars that changed what we were doing in this chapter. For example, one change that emerged was our decision to discuss briefly the importance of Georges Canguilhem, arguably Foucault's most influential mentor. It almost seemed to us that to education scholars and, even more broadly, to scholars across the social sciences, Foucault and his ideas had emerged full grown from the forehead of Zeus. Consequently, we decided to provide a subsection within the "Archaeology" section that briefly discusses Foucault's view of Canguilhem and the latter's role in the French intellectual and philosophical context.

The rest of this essay, then, is divided into four parts. First, we discuss Foucault's archaeological method, which includes the Canguilhem discussion. Second, we discuss a particularly important essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (Foucault, 1977, in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*) that was first published *after* his last archaeological work and *before* his first genealogical work, which we see as thematically bridging between or connecting the two methodologies. Third, we present his genealogical method. While our discussions of his archaeology or genealogy is not comprehensive enough so that a reader could assume that she or he is ready to use either of Foucault's methods after only reading this chapter, we do believe that what we have written was done in a way to help those who are not familiar with Foucault take some beginning steps toward using archaeology and genealogy. We also hope, though, that our coverage of the two is provocative of further reflections for those more experienced in their uses of Foucault's methods.

We accomplish our discussion of his archaeological method by addressing two archaeological concepts in some depth, *savoir* and *connaissance*, and then allude to what the other key archaeological concepts are. To present his genealogies, we discuss in some depth one of them, *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1975/1979). However, in this work, he deploys so many provocative, useful critical tools that we can cover only some of them, let alone cover all of the other critical tools he adds with his second genealogy, *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1: *An Introduction* (1976/1980a).[3] For the latter, however, we do point out some particularly excellent sections.

Fourth, our conclusion includes a brief overview of what we think some the critical goals of both his archaeologies and his genealogies were. We summarize some of the points about archaeology and genealogy that we make. We enthusiastically praise a new collection of Foucault's work. We also provide some brief critical remarks on the uses—and abuses—of Foucault in education in particular and in the social sciences in general, although we do not provide a comprehensive or detailed review of this material. (We do try to provide a somewhat comprehensive list of such work in education in our bibliography along with some books on Foucault from outside of education that we think are either useful or influential; indeed, our bibliography is intended to be a resource for those interested in Foucault.) In general, we might forewarn by saying we are somewhat grumpy and surly, dissatisfied, about how Foucault has most frequently been read and used to date in education and the social sciences. In addition, our conclusion contains—and this was a surprise even to us—some substantive critique that we have of Foucault's work that we did not have when we started this chapter. In other words, by the end of our read of all of his books, we arrived at a critique of Foucault that we did not have when we began this read. We expect this critique will upset some advocates of Foucault and will gratify some critics. Our only defense is that we did not intend or desire this critique, although to be intellectually honest, we felt we needed to include it.

Our assumption, at this point, is that by the end of this essay we will leave a jangle, bangle, and tangle among some experienced Foucaultians, but hopefully some useful beginnings to those who have not yet tried on Foucault. Maybe, though, just maybe, some of the former will appreciate and find provocative our efforts to "think" Foucault both comprehensively *and* critically. Maybe we are all coming to a point, even among those of us who have been enthusiastic advocates of Foucault, at which it is possible to consider his work in a more balanced way, that is, without defensiveness. Perhaps. Perhaps not.

▣ ARCHAEOLOGY

Many scholars who survey the entire *oeuvre* of Foucault have discerned three sequential phases or periods—archaeology, genealogy, and the care of the self—that represent, it is thought, significant shifts in his philosophical thought, although some would add to this list Foucault's focus on governmentality.[4] Nonetheless, of the three periods, genealogy is the one that has captured the most attention of scholars to date, although one of us (Scheurich, 1997, pp. 94–118, "Policy Archaeology" chapter) has found archaeology useful, and recently Lather (2004) has written about "positivities," a key concept in archaeology. Care of the self, the last of the three periods, has generally received the least attention, although St. Pierre (2004) has recently found it to be fertile territory for her meditations on "the subject and freedom."[5]

Our intent here, however, because this is a chapter in a book on methodology, is to focus on archaeology and genealogy, which could be broadly construed as "qualitative" methods, as Foucault always used texts as his data or, what he sometimes called, the archive. It is not that we think Foucault's care of the self period or focus is unimportant. Nor do we think someone like St. Pierre could not creatively interpret the latter period as a methodology. Our aim is simpler than that. We want to provide a kind of beginner's introduction to the two Foucaultian methodologies

that have received the most attention among U.S. scholars and that those interested in Foucault's perspective might use as a starting place of further exploration. What we cannot provide, though, due to space limitations, is some sort of "complete" course on how to use either methodology so that on finishing this essay, someone could move directly to applying either one. There is simply not sufficient space for accomplishing this for even one of Foucault's methods.

Canguilhem

As we suggested in our introduction to this chapter, it is our judgment that there is a general lack of understanding of the philosophical context and influences within which Foucault worked in France. A good example of the latter is a lack of knowledge about Georges Canguilhem, arguably Foucault's main intellectual mentor and teacher. In general, our view is that Canguilhem's influence on Foucault, especially Canguilhem's influence on Foucault's archaeologies, is unacknowledged, underestimated, or even unknown. Indeed, even among philosophers who know Foucault deeply and use him well, there is much more fascination with Foucault and his relationships with Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger (see, e.g., the work of poststructuralist philosophers such as Elizabeth Grosz in *Volatile Bodies* [1994]). In response, we briefly discuss Canguilhem's influence on Foucault and Foucault's own view of Canguilhem's role in French philosophy with the hope that this will spur others to read more deeply into Foucault and his social and intellectual context. However, we are aware that our Canguilhem is but another author function[6] and that the relationship among Foucault, his mentor, and their social, historical, and intellectual "context" is complex, contradictory, and ambiguous.

One excellent example of Foucault's own discussion of Canguilhem and his influences, particularly as a historian of the sciences, is available in *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (1994a) and is called "Life Experience and Science," which originally appeared in a French-language journal but was modified to appear as

Foucault's introduction to the 1989 English translation of Canguilhem's *The Normal and the Pathological* (p. 465). As Foucault says, there has been less awareness "of the significance and impact of a work like that of Georges Canguilhem, extending as it has over the past twenty or thirty years" (p. 465). Foucault also says that when "the sociology of the French intellectual milieus" is considered for "those strange years, the sixties," nearly all French philosophers "were affected directly or indirectly by the teaching or books of Canguilhem" (p. 465), which were primarily focused on critiquing overly rationalistic views of the history of the sciences in a much more thoughtful and complex way than Kuhn ever did in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962).[7] Indeed, Foucault suggests that without Canguilhem, the French Marxists like Bourdieu, Castel, Passeron, and Lacan, would have less meaning for us (pp. 465–466)—a hefty claim on Foucault's part. In addition, Foucault suggests that Canguilhem (and others) played the same role in France that the Frankfurt School played elsewhere (p. 469)—another strong claim. Thus, both of these claims indicate how significant Foucault thinks Canguilhem's intellectual role was for him and others in France.

Foucault (1994a) argues that both Canguilhem and the Frankfurt School were raising "the same kind of questions" (p. 469), that is,

> questions that must be addressed to a rationality [the rationality of science] that aspires to be universal while developing within contingency, [a rationality] that asserts its unity and yet proceeds only through partial modifications, [a rationality[8]] that validates itself by into own supremacy but that cannot be dissociated in its history from the inertias, the dullness, or the coercions that subjugate it. In the history of the sciences in France, as in German Critical Theory, what is to be examined, basically, is a reason [a rationality] whose structural autonomy carries the history of dogmatisms and despotisms along with it—a reason [rationality], therefore, that has a liberating effect only provided it manages to liberate itself. (p. 469)

For those who know of Foucault's archaeologies and his genealogies, these are central themes, and

he is saying here that these themes come directly from the work of Canguilhem.

Foucault (1994a) suggests that in taking up these questions, Canguilhem "did not just broaden the field of the history of the sciences; he reshaped the discipline itself on a number of essential points" (p. 470). To accomplish this, Foucault relates that Canguilhem "first took up the theme of 'discontinuity'" (p. 470), a theme that many who use Foucault in education and the social sciences think came from Foucault himself. Second, Canguilhem developed the idea that "whoever says 'history of discourse' is also saying recursive method . . . in the sense in which successive transformations of this truthful discourse constantly produce reworkings in their own history" (p. 472). In other words, science or universal reason, contrary to the typical or dominant portrayal of these, has constantly, in a recursive fashion, rewritten its own story, although leaving that rewriting unmentioned (which is another idea that many think came from Foucault himself). Third, Canguilhem places the "sciences of life back into [the] historico-epistemological perspective, [thus bringing] to light a certain number of essential traits that make their development [i.e., the development of the sciences of life] different from that of the other sciences and present historians [of the sciences and, thus, of reason] with specific problems" (p. 475) because all sciences are, in the dominant portrayal, supposed to be unified or the same.

And fourth, Foucault (1994a) said that Canguilhem raised "in a peculiar way, the philosophical question of knowledge" (p. 474). That is, at the center of this philosophical question of the nature of the knowledge of science and universal reason,

> one finds that of error. For, at the most basic level of life, the processes of coding and decoding give way to a chance occurrence [such as the random play of genes] that, before becoming a disease, a deficiency, or a monstrosity, is something like a disturbance in the informative system, something like a "mistake" . . . [and] that "error" [or mistake] constitutes not a neglect or a delay of the promised fulfillment [of life] but the dimension peculiar to the life of human beings and indispensable to the duration of the species. (p. 476)

That is, Canguilhem and Foucault are raising to a philosophical level their contention that, at the physical level of life itself, there is random error that is integral to life itself, a point that is intended, as are the other points previously noted, to undermine the dominant portrayal of science and reason.[9] As Foucault (1994a), then, suggests at the end of this chapter, in recognition of the importance of his mentor's work, especially for Foucault's own work, "Should not the whole theory of the subject be reformulated, seeing that knowledge, rather than opening onto the truth of the world, is deeply rooted in the 'errors' of life?"[10] Thus, once it is understood that it was Canguilhem who developed these four "essential points," it is obvious from whom Foucault himself drew some of his richest intellectual resources, especially for his archaeological method. Consequently, in our view, those who use Foucault throughout the social sciences need to increase their understandings of the French intellectual context in which Foucault thought and wrote and of Canguilhem in particular (see, e.g., Canguilhem, 1988, 1989).

The Archaeological Method

The first point that is important to understand about Foucault's archaeological method is that it is *not* directly related to the academic discipline of archaeology, that is, the study of past cultures. It is not even particularly useful to be reminded of the iconic picture of the archaeologist using a brush to uncover old bones or artifacts embedded in dirt. As Foucault (1969/1972) says on this subject in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, his archaeology "does not relate analysis to geological excavation" (p. 131). In fact, we would recommend that you begin to understand Foucault's archaeology by assuming that his archeology has only the faintest allusion to the academic discipline of archaeology. It is not that there are not connections between the two; it is just that thinking of the academic discipline as a lens through which one might understand the shape and meaning of Foucault's archaeology will generally get in your way.

A second point is that there is simply not enough space here to describe archaeology in a comprehensive way. Foucault's archaeology is a complex set of concepts, including *savoir, connaissance*, positivity, enunciations, statements, archive, discursive formation, enunciative regularities, correlative spaces, enveloping theory, level, limit, periodization, division, event, discontinuity, and discursive practices. In addition, there is no book that we know of—and it would certainly take a book-length piece—that completely and thoroughly lays out how to use this method, although Foucault's "Introduction" in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, which follows three of his archaeologies, is a good synopsis of what he is after with archaeology.[11] Consequently, the only way you can begin to understand archaeology is to study carefully and thoroughly Foucault's own uses and discussions of archaeology in his three archaeologies—*Madness and Civilization* (1961/1988), *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963/1994b), and *The Order of Things* (1966/1973a)—and in his reflexive discussion of archaeology as a method, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972). We would especially suggest—and this applies to reading all of Foucault—that getting an in-depth understanding of Foucault requires close, careful, and repeated readings. Indeed, in our view, reading most education or social science texts, even many of the most abstract theorists, is simple and easy compared with reading the density and complexity of Foucault's work, some of which is a function of his writing style, our lack of knowledge of the French philosophy context, our inexperience in reading philosophy of any kind, the depth at which he worked, and the complexity that he was trying to address, much of which is counter to both dominant thought and critical thought. Obviously, though, we think the time and effort needed is worth it. We want to repeat, however, that a substantive use of Foucault's archaeology, in particular, means developing an in-depth understanding of the complex interrelated set of the concepts listed previously.

Two of the more commonly cited of this set of concepts are *savoir* and *connaissance*. In an

interview (Foucault, 1994a) that appeared in French in 1966, after the publication of *Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic,* and *The Order of Things* but before that of *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* Foucault discussed how he defined archaeology:

> By "archaeology," I would like to designate not exactly a discipline but a domain of research, which would be the following: in a society, different bodies of learning, philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices and police activities, mores—all refer to a certain implicit knowledge [*savoir*] special to this society. This knowledge is profoundly different from the [formal] bodies of learning [*des connaissances*] that one can find in scientific books, philosophical theories, and religious justifications, but it [*savoir*] is what makes possible at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice. (p. 261)

Thus, understanding these two arenas of knowledge, *savoir* and *connaissance,* is fundamental to understanding archaeology. *Savoir* includes formal knowledge such as "philosophical ideas" but also "institutions, commercial practices, and police activity,"[12] whereas *connaissance* includes only formal bodies of knowledge such as "scientific books, philosophical theories, and religious justifications." Similarly, Gutting (1989) suggests, "By *connaissance* he [Foucault] means . . . any particular body of knowledge such as nuclear physics, evolutionary biology, or Freudian psychoanalysis" (p. 251). In contrast, *savior,* Gutting continues, "refers to the [broad] discursive conditions that are necessary for the development of *connaissance*" (p. 251).

Foucault provides an example of the difference between these two concepts in the sixth chapter of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972). He says,

> The linch-pin of *Madness and Civilization* was the appearance at the beginning of the nineteenth century of a psychiatric discipline. This discipline had neither the same content, nor the same internal organization, nor the same place in medicine, nor the same practical function, nor the same methods as the traditional chapter on "diseases of the head" or "nervous diseases" to be found in eighteenth century medical treaties. (p. 179)

With this section, Foucault is comparing the psychiatric discipline that emerged at the beginning of the 1800s to the "diseases of the head" and "nervous diseases" of the 1700s because diseases of the head and nervous diseases during the 18th century were the closest comparison to the psychiatric discipline during the 19th century.[13] Foucault (1969/1972) continues,

> But on examining this new discipline, we discovered two things: what made it [i.e., the emerging discipline of psychiatry] possible at the time it appeared, what brought about this great change [i.e., changes from 18th-century diseases of the head to 19th-century psychiatry] in the economy of concepts, analyses, and demonstrations was a whole set of relations between [sic] hospitalization, internment, the conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, the norms of industrial labor and bourgeois morality, in short a whole group of relations that characterized for this discursive practice [i.e., psychiatry] the formation of its statements. (p. 179)

What made it possible, then, for psychiatry to appear as a formal discipline, as a *connaissance,* was a set of changes in concepts, practices, procedures, institutions, and norms, that is, a change in the much broader *savoir.* As Foucault (1969/1972) further elaborates,

> But this [discursive] practice is not only manifested in a discipline [i.e., psychiatry] possessing a scientific status and scientific pretensions [*connaissance* or psychiatry as a formal discipline]; it is also found in the operation in legal texts, in literature, in philosophy, in political decisions, and in the statements made and the opinions expressed in daily life [*savoir*]. (p. 179)

Thus, whereas the history of psychiatry is typically written solely in terms of psychiatry as a formal discipline, "possessing a scientific status and scientific pretensions," Foucault is arguing that this is inadequate. To better understand the history of psychiatry as a formal academic discipline, it is also necessary to study a much broader array that includes relations among "hospitalization, internment, the conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, the

norms of industrial labor and bourgeois morality" as well as legal texts, literature, philosophy, political decisions, and the statements and opinions of daily life.

For Foucault (1994a), then, archaeology is focused on the study of *savoir,* which is "the condition of possibility[14] of [formal] knowledge [*connaissance*]" (p. 262) for the purpose of showing that psychiatry or other formal disciplines do not simply emerge out of the historical trajectory of those disciplines when that history is restricted solely to the formal discipline as a formal discipline. Instead, a history of a formal discipline must address both *connaissance,* the formal statements of a discipline, and *savoir,* the much broader and less rational array of practices, policies, procedures, institutions, politics, everyday life, and so on. However, Foucault's larger point is that, rather than the traditional view that formal knowledges (*connaissance*), such as psychiatry and economics, have their own formal rational trajectory of emergence, formal knowledges emerge more "irrationally" or not rationally from *savoir,* which includes not just the formal and rational but also the much broader "irrationality" of politics, institutional practices, popular opinions, and so on. In other words, formal knowledges emerge, substantially, from a broad array of complex irrational sources or conditions, and this more complex, messier, more ambiguous "condition[s] of possibility" undermines the modernist rational "story" or "meta-narrative" of formal knowledges.[15]

Accordingly, after understanding the meanings of *connaissance and savoir* and the fact that archaeology is the study of *savoir* as the "condition[s] of possibility" of *connaissance,* it is necessary to return to the larger context of Foucault's archaeological work. With archaeology, Foucault is drawing on the work of Canguilhem, whose work he compared to that of the Frankfurt School. And for both the Frankfurt School and Canguilhem, the nature of reason—"a rationality that aspires to be universal" (Foucault, 1994a, p. 469)—in modernity is their macro text. Furthermore, Foucault is suggesting that the myth or master narrative of modernist reason,

when examined carefully, is not just logical and rational but also complex, contradictory, and problematic and that it has embedded within it instances of what we might call "unreason."[16] For example, Foucault says that this modernist reason "validates itself by its own supremacy but that cannot be dissociated in its history from the inertias, the dullness, or the coercions that subjugate it" (p. 469) and that it "is a reason whose structural autonomy carries the history of dogmatisms and despotisms along with it" (p. 469). Thus, according to Foucault, reason (i.e., formal knowledges), as it is typically portrayed within modernity, is not what it is made out to be; that is, the "archaeological" history of reason includes inertias, dullness, coercions, dogmatisms, and despotisms.

What Foucault is attempting, then, with his various archaeologies is to examine specific cases, particular examples, as in *Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic,* and *The Order of Things* (the human sciences), of the work of reason. And in carrying out these studies of specific cases of the work of reason, he has come to two insights. One is that the history of reason in these specific cases is "not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality" (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 4)[17]; that is, reason in these cases does not become progressively more refined, more rational, better, or more true. For example, in the psychiatry example cited previously, Foucault argues that there was no smooth, unbroken trajectory of psychiatry from the 1700s to the 1800s. Instead, he argues, during the 1700s, there was "the traditional chapter on 'diseases of the head' or 'nervous diseases' to be found in eighteenth century medical treatises," and then, at the beginning of the 1800s, there was the emergence of the "psychiatric discipline" (p. 179). However, and this is one of Foucault's key points about reason, the second did not emerge, rationally or logically, out of the first; the two—diseases of the head and nervous diseases, on the one hand, and the discipline of psychiatry, on the other—were separate and different, and the first did not lead logically and progressively to the second. There is, thus, a

"discontinuity (threshold, rupture, break, mutation, transformation)" (p. 2) between the two, which again means that reason is not nearly as rational as it has been portrayed within the metanarrative of modernity. Thus, rather than just critiquing this master narrative, in his archaeologies, Foucault is doing the hard work of providing research-based examples that the master narrative is wrong.

Foucault's second point is that disciplines, formal knowledges, or *connaissances* cannot be studied and understood in just their own formal terms. Rather, a *connaissance* emerges out of *savoir*, which includes formal knowledge, such as academic books, but also institutions, laws, processes and procedures, common opinions, norms, rules, morality, commercial practices, and so on. Thus, to understand a particular discipline means that not only must the formal treatises of that discipline be studied, but so too must the *savoir*, this much broader, more complex context that includes, say, institutions and commercial practices "on the same plane" as the formal aspects of the discipline. As a result, reason loses much of its elite exaltedness, its purity, its high status, its very rationality.

However, problematizing modernity's reason is not Foucault's only focus in his archaeologies. His "twin" focus is modernity's subject (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 12). As he says,

> Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous [e.g., portraying formal knowledge, *connaissance*, as emerging through a rational, logical, continuous trajectory] and making human consciousness [i.e., the human subject or subjectivity] the *original* subject of *all* historical development and *all* action are the two sides of the same system of thought [i.e., modernity]. (p. 12, emphases added)

Thus, Foucault is arguing that the idea that "man" or the human subject is creating human history and creating, most importantly, formal knowledge (*connaissance*) in a logical, rational, continuous manner is but the ideology of modernity. This ideology, then, becomes a lens through which historians, philosophers, economists, linguists, social scientists, and so on fashion or construct a "picture" or representation of "reality" that is logical

and rational and that has the human subject as its main actor or at its privileged center. In addition, this central actor is contradictorily both the doer and the object of the doing, the researcher and the researched. To Foucault, then, this modernist ideology and its resultant representation of "reality" in works of history, philosophy, economy, psychiatry, language, and so on can be undermined by using his archaeological methodology to show that formal knowledges emerge from *savoir*, which is not logical or rational, and that this process of emergence does not have a guiding or agentic subject at its center (i.e., archaeology decenters the modernist subject). For example, near the end of his "Introduction" to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1969/1972)—again, the last of his archaeological works—he says that the aim of archaeology is "to define a method of historical analysis *freed* from the anthropological [i.e., human subject-centered] theme" and "a method purged of all anthropologism" (p. 16, emphasis added)—a method of historical analyses freed from "man" as its center.

However, despite Foucault's (1969/1972) view that problematizing reason and the agentic subject are "two sides of the same system of thought" (p. 12), for the most part, those who have used Foucault have been more interested in his undermining of modernist reason than in his undermining of the privileged or centered subject. Indeed, some feminists and critical theorists[18] have rejected Foucault because, in their view, he destroys the agency of the subject, whereas others have appropriated parts of Foucault, such as his problematization of reason, while rejecting his decentering of the subject (e.g., Hartsock, 1998). However, other feminists, such as Butler (1993), have agreed with Foucault that the "two sides" are two parts of the "same system of thought." We agree, though, with Butler that the two cannot be separated, that it is not possible to appropriate the one from Foucault while rejecting the other. Indeed, we would argue that taking one side while rejecting the other indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of Foucault, similar to the general lack of understanding of Foucault's intellectual dependency on the work of Canguilhem and to the general lack of understanding of

archaeology as a method. Indeed, we would strongly suggest that to appropriate Foucault's critique of reason without simultaneously appropriating his antihumanism is simply wrong. Foucault's critique of reason cannot stand without his antihumanism; as he says, they are "two sides of the same system of thought" (p. 12).

Our advice, then, for those interested in pursuing archaeology—and we would urge this pursuit as we think that archaeology is generally underused and underappreciated—is this: Do not just "cherry pick" a concept here and a concept there and assume that you are doing archaeology or that you are using Foucault appropriately. To learn how to do archaeology, we would suggest reading all of the archaeologies in the order they were published. The first three are actual applications of archaeology, and the fourth, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972), is Foucault's reflexive effort to describe the methodology retrospectively. However, it is important to understand that, as Foucault says of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, "This work is not an exact description of what can be read in *Madness and Civilization, Naissance de la clinique* [*The Birth of the Clinic*], or *The Order of Things*. It is different on many points. It also includes a number of corrections and internal criticisms" (p. 16). Despite these corrections and criticisms, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is his best, and final, description of archaeology as a method. Unfortunately, we know of no book, or even article-length work (we doubt an article-length effort would be sufficient), that attempts to actually explain how to use archaeology as a method. There are, though, some works that, at least partially, focus on or critique archaeology, including Gutting's *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (1989). Books like these are helpful, but reading Foucault's four archaeological texts carefully and thoroughly is by far the best approach.

▣ CONNECTING ARCHAEOLOGY AND GENEALOGY

Is genealogy the successor to archaeology? Is genealogy the further development of archaeology?

Is genealogy superior to archaeology? Did Foucault decide that archaeology did not work, was flawed, so he moved on to genealogy, which he considered to be better? Are the two "methodologies" widely different, clearly separate, or are they closely connected, part of the same larger project? Answers to these questions are multiple and divergent among Foucault scholars, both critics and advocates. Our sense is that the dominant, but certainly not the only, conclusion among U.S. scholars of the social sciences, and more specifically among U.S. scholars of education, is that genealogy is superior to archaeology. Partially validating this conclusion is the fact that there are many more instances of these scholars claiming to do genealogies than there are of those claiming to do archaeologies. However, basing our perspective on that of Foucault, we would have to disagree with this conclusion.

In the first of Foucault's "Two Lectures" (1980, *Power/Knowledge*), which was given on January 7, 1976, and which is *after* Foucault had written his four archaeologies and *after* he had written his two genealogies (*Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1: *An Introduction*), he says,

> If we were to characterize it in two terms, then "archaeology" would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and "genealogy" would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play. (p. 85)

Also, in an interview just prior to his death on June 25, 1984, in Paris,[19] Foucault hopes that other scholars will continue to use both archaeology and genealogy, as he continues to consider both of them equally useful. Most tellingly, though, is what Foucault says in *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 2: *The Use of Pleasure* (1984/1990), which was published the year he died. Three times in this "Introduction" (on pages 4–5, 5–6, and 11–12), Foucault divides his work into three "axes" (p. 4) or arenas of analyses; he also labels these three "theoretical shifts" that he had to make to study "the games of truth" (p. 6). The first is "the analysis of discursive practices [that] made it

possible to trace the formation of disciplines (*saviors*)" (p. 4), that is, archaeology. The second is "the analysis of power relations and their technologies" (p. 4), that is, genealogy. And the third is "the modes according to which individuals are given to recognize themselves as . . . subjects" (p. 5) or "the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject" (p. 6), that is, the care of the self work. Then, at the end of this section, he calls these three the "archaeological dimension," the "genealogical dimension," and the "practices of the self," respectively (pp. 11–12).[20]

Unquestionably, then, Foucault himself does not see archaeology as less than genealogy or as superseded by it. Instead, throughout his work, he sees both archaeology and genealogy as continuing to be important and valid. Where, then, does this conclusion that genealogy is a correction of archaeology come from for U.S. scholars? We would suggest that it comes mainly from Dreyfus and Rabinow in their highly influential *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,* first published in 1983 when U.S. scholars were just beginning to read Foucault.[21] As a result, these two scholars, from early on, have been enormously influential in introducing both Foucault and his work to U.S. scholars; indeed, it could be said that they have been virtually canonical in their interpretations, at least for the U.S. audience. For example, that they think genealogy is the superior successor to archaeology is evident in their "Introduction" to their book. They say that they "will argue at length [about 40% of the book] that the project of *Archaeology* founder[ed]" (p. xxiv, emphasis in original) and that Foucault abandoned it (p. xxvi). They also say, at the end of their analysis of archaeology, that their "detailed study of the new archaeological method has revealed . . . that it suffers from several internal strains" (p. 90). In response, then, to the failure of archaeology, they assert that Foucault, based on "his reading of Nietzsche" (p. xxvii), developed genealogy, which Dreyfus and Rabinow claim is "his most original contribution" (p. xxvii). However, although Foucault never directly corrected them (as far as we can find), possibly

because Dreyfus and Rabinow were leading the charge in touting Foucault and his work to a large U.S. audience, Foucault persisted throughout his life in maintaining the equal value and validity of archaeology and genealogy. Thus, siding with Foucault, along with others such as Mahon (1992), we think that both of his methodologies—archaeology and genealogy—should continue to be seen as equally useful and valuable.

To further illustrate this point and to draw increased attention to what we think is a critically important essay, we now discuss "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (Foucault, 1977, 1994a), which we would suggest can be seen as a bridge between Foucault's archaeological period and his genealogical one. Although "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" was published in English in 1977 in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews,* it was actually first published in French in 1971 after Foucault finished publishing his four archaeologies but before he published his two genealogies. However, it is now available, in a better version in our view,[22] in *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology,* Volume 2 (1998), and one of the improvements in this latter version is that it better connects this essay to his archaeological work, especially in the use of two key archaeological terms, *savoir* and *connaissance.* In this essay, Foucault provides his first description of his genealogical method, but throughout the essay he clearly maintains the connection of his second method, genealogy, to his first one, archaeology.

In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (Foucault, 1994a), although his language is often literary and poetic, playing off of specific quotes and issues in Nietzsche's own works, particularly *The Genealogy of Morals,* Foucault makes four strong claims as to what a genealogist does (although it would be easy to argue that there are five, six, seven, or more such claims throughout the piece). One claim, drawn directly from Nietzsche, is that the genealogist "challenge[s] the pursuit of the origin" (p. 371). For Foucault and Nietzsche, "the pursuit of the origin" is the pursuit, largely in philosophy, history, and the social sciences, of the beginning of some phenomena or categories such

as "values, morality, asceticism, and knowledge" (p. 373). Foucault says that this pursuit is "an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their . . . original identity" (p. 371). Instead, by refusing "metaphysics" and by listening to "history," the genealogist finds that "there is 'something altogether different' behind things: not a timeless and essential secret but the secret that they [things] have no essence, or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms" (p. 371). Foucault also says, "What is found at the historical beginning of things is not inviolable identity of their origin, it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity" (pp. 371–372). It is the "vicissitudes of history" (p. 373). For example, he says that by

> examining the history of reason, he [the genealogist] learns that it [reason] was born . . . from chance; [that] devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their spirit of competition—the personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of reason. (p. 371)

Thus, the target of Foucault's critique, his genealogy, much like with this archaeological work, is the foundational assumptions of Western modernity. In this case, his critical focus is on modernity's teleological assumption that history moves upward or forward from some origin. In contrast, he argues that the genealogist finds that there are no such origins and that origins are often fabricated. What the genealogist finds, instead, as she or he explores origins is randomness, piecemeal fabrications, dissension, disparity, passion, hatred, competition, "details and accidents" (Foucault, 1998, p. 373), "petty malice" (p. 373), "the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations" (p. 374) (similar to *savoir*) mixed together with devotion to truth, precise methods, scientific discussions, and so on (similar to *connaissance*). In other words, Foucault is not denying that reason is a part of this history, but

it is only one player amid a much broader cast in the dramaturgy of modernity.

A second focus of the genealogist, one that becomes much more important in later works although not a large one in this essay, is the body. Foucault (1998) says, "The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration" (p. 375). He, then, indicates that "genealogy is . . . thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its take is to expose a body totally imprinted by history" (pp. 375–376). This last sentence is key; the "take" of genealogy is "to expose a body totally imprinted by history." However, these few remarks are the extent of Foucault's effort to connect genealogy to the body in this essay, but he returns to this particular focus in subsequent scholarship. For example, in *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault (1975/1979) says,

> The body is also directly involved in the political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument system meticulously prepared, calculated, and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and subjected body. (pp. 25–26)

This focus on the body has inspired numerous philosophers, especially feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz and Nancy Fraser, who assert that the body has been left out of philosophy. For example, Grosz (1994) says in *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* that she intends to "explore the work of theorists of corporeal instruction, primarily Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari," because each "explores the position of the body as a site of the subject's social production" (p. xiii).

A third claim that Foucault (1998) makes for the genealogist is a focus on describing "the various systems of subjection" (p. 376) and "the endlessly repeated play of dominations" (p. 377). For example, he says that "the domination of certain men over others leads to the differentiation of values" and that "class domination generates the idea of liberty" (p. 377). He also says that domination

> establishes marks of its power and engraves memories on things and even within bodies. It makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it. (p. 377)

Foucault is arguing here that the modernist rationale for debts, rules, laws, and the current social, economic, governmental, and legal arrangements diverts critical attention from its domination and subjection effects. For example, he says that

> the law is a calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in promised blood, which permits the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence. The desire for peace, the serenity of compromise, and the tacit acceptance of the law, far from representing a major moral conversion or a utilitarian calculation that gave rise to the law, are but its result and, in point of fact, its perversion. (p. 378)

Foucault follows this with a direct quote from Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*: "guilt, conscience, and duty had their threshold of emergence in the right to secure obligations and their inception, like that of any major event on earth, saturated in blood" (p. 378). Foucault then concludes that

> humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination. (p. 378)

Foucault thus contends that the rationales that support modernity as humane and as becoming more so are false and that, instead, modernity is but a new installation of domination and violence as a "system of rules." For example, schools, the prison system, commerce, and so on are installations of domination and violence masquerading as systems of rules, and it is the work of the genealogist to describe and reveal this domination and violence.

The final focus of the genealogist that we take from this essay is drawn from what Foucault calls "effective history." Foucault's (1998) critique of traditional history or the "history of historians" (p. 380) is what he calls "effective history." This critique is "without [the] constants" of traditional history. Foucault argues,

> The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies which encourage the consoling play of recognitions. Knowledge [*savoir*], even under the banner of history, does not depend on "rediscovery of ourselves." (p. 380, brackets and emphasis in original)

Once again, the now familiar targets of Foucault's critique are the same foundational assumptions of modernity. The regime of traditional history is one that constructs "a comprehensive view of history," retraces "the past as a patient and continuous development," "encourages the consoling play of recognitions," dissolves "the singular event into an ideal continuity" (Foucault, 1998, p. 380), asserts that history is controlled by "destiny or regulative mechanisms" (p. 381), and "confirm[s] our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities" (p. 381).

In response to this regime,

> History becomes "effective" to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being—as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body, and sets it against itself. Effective history leaves nothing around the self, deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. (Foucault, 1998, p. 380)

Also, "'Effective' history differs from the history of historians in being without constants" (p. 380):

> "Effective" history . . . deals with events in terms of their most unique characteristics; there most acute manifestations. An [historical] event, consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a domination that grows feeble, poisons itself, grows slack. (pp. 380–381)

This "effective" historical sense "confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference" (Foucault, 1998, p. 381). Finally, it is an "affirmation of a perspectival knowledge [*savoir*]," as traditional "historians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and place" (p. 382). In a sense, then, Foucault is making an argument that traditional (modernist) history is an effort to console ourselves with the assumptions that there is unity, continuity, teleology, meaning, destiny, and so on built into history itself, a view that makes us feel safe or that would make "history" our safe harbor. In critique of the latter modernist and humanist view, Foucault argues that this aspect of traditional history is predominantly dependent on a metaphysics (p. 381), a kind of modernist psychosis or spell, that hides the fact that history is "the luck of the battle," the "randomness of events," "a profusion of entangled events," "a 'host of errors and phantasms' [a quote from Nietzsche]," and "countless lost events" (p. 381).

The work, then, of the genealogist in this bridging essay between archaeology and genealogy is fourfold. The genealogist is to critique the pursuit of origins by showing they are fabrications, to show that the body is "imprinted by history" (Foucault, 1998, p. 376), to describe "systems of subjection" (p. 376) and "the endlessly repeated play of dominations" (p. 377), and to do what Foucault calls "effective history." We now turn, after this explication of this bridging essay, to his two genealogies, which did immediately follow his "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (Foucault, 1977/1994a)

bridging essay. To accomplish this, we discuss his extensive comments on genealogy in the first of his two genealogies, *Discipline and Punish* (1975/1979), and then end the "Genealogy" section with some brief comments on his second and last genealogy, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction* (1976/1980a).

Genealogy

Discipline and Punish first appeared in French in 1975, was translated into English by Alan Sheridan in 1977, and finally was published by Vintage Books in 1979, which is the version we are using. Although there is much in this book that is provocative and uncomfortable reading, such as Foucault's well-researched descriptions of torture used by the French penal system prior to the contemporary period,[23] we focus here primarily on what Foucault has to say about *doing* genealogy. As with his archaeologies, another of the many similarities between his archaeological work and his genealogical work,[24] Foucault is comparing one period with another period. For example, he says that during the second period, "in Europe and in the United States, the entire economy of punishment was redistributed. [There was] a new theory of law and crime, a new moral or political justification, old laws were abolished, old customs died out" (Foucault, 1975/1979, p. 7). "By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century" (p. 8), the old penal style was dying out.

During this new period, then, "punishment has become an economy of suspended rights. . . . As a result a . . . whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the immediate anatomist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists" (Foucault, 1975/1979, p. 11). And the consequence of this change seemingly was a "reduction in the penal severity," "a phenomenon with which legal historians are well acquainted" (p. 16)—"less cruelty, less pain, more kindness, more respect, more 'humanity'" (p. 16). However, not surprisingly, Foucault is going to critique "the new tactics of power" (p. 23) of this liberal progressive view of less cruelty and pain. For example, he is going to argue that the

penal system had become "a strange scientifico–juridical complex," the focus of which is now the soul rather than the body (p. 19), which, to some extent, Foucault considers a more oppressive focus than that of the old penal regime. He is also going to argue that the ultimate target of this complex "is not simply a judgment of guilt. . . . It bears within it an assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normalization" (pp. 20–21), which applies throughout society rather than just to criminals. In other words, to Foucault, one effect of the new penal regime is not to punish the criminal but rather to normalize the larger population in terms of correct behavior.

Foucault (1975/1979), then, says that *Discipline and Punish* "is intended as a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present scientifico–legal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications, and rules" (p. 23). "But from what point can such a history of the modern soul on trial be written?" (p. 23). First, he answers that this cannot be written

> by studying only the general social forms, as Durkheim did, [because] one runs the risk of positing as the principle of greater leniency in punishment processes of individualization that are rather one of the effects of the new tactics of power, among which can be included the new penal mechanisms. (p. 23)

In other words, focusing on the "greater leniency in punishment" in this new penal regime, as if that were a causal principle of the new regime, would be a mistake; instead, this "greater leniency" should be seen as an "effect" of "the new tactics of power."

Immediately thereafter, Foucault (1975/1979) lays out "four general rules" for his genealogical study. Although these four rules are focused specifically on this particular study, they highlight well several areas of possible work for the genealogist. What we do here, then, is present each of the rules, discuss its implications for the genealogist, and briefly speculate as to how it might be applied to some facet of public education. The following is his first rule:

> Do not concentrate the study of the punitive mechanisms on their "repressive" effects alone, on their "punishment" aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of their possible *positive* effects, even if these seem marginal at first sight. As a consequence, regard punishment as a complex social function. (p. 23, emphasis added)

Foucault wants us to look beyond the obvious "'repressive' effects" of punishment to examine "a whole series of their possible *positive* effects." By positive, though, he does not mean an effect that we might like or approve of; he means something produced rather than something repressed or excluded. For example, as mentioned previously, one "positive" or produced effect of the new penal regime is the normalization of appropriate behavior among the general population. Indeed, one of Foucault's favorite genealogical maneuvers is to focus not just on the negative or repressive effects of power but also on the positive or productive effects of power. To Foucault, power does just exclude or repress; power also produces. However, he is not saying that the repressive effects of power should be ignored by the genealogist; rather, he is arguing that the genealogist should regard "punishment as a complex *social* function" (emphasis added) that includes both the repressive and the productive. For instance, school discipline programs do not just punish (repress) certain student behaviors among a small group of students; they also, and perhaps more importantly, produce a normalization (a "positive" effect) of correct behavior among the rest of the students. Thus, to Foucault, these discipline programs could be said to be both negative (repressive) effects and positive (productive) effects.

Foucault's (1975/1979) second rule is to "analyze punitive methods not simply as consequences of legislation or as indicators of social structures, but as techniques possessing their own specificity in the more general field of other ways of exercising power. Regard punishment as a political tactic" (p. 23). Thus, how social acts or policies get analyzed or thought about is critical to the genealogist. However, the norm of the mainstream social sciences is to see actions that are related to the government as the result of legislative policymakers

or other governmental actors, that is, a function of social actors or agents. In contrast, the norm of critical theorists and other structuralists is to see governmental actions as a function of the social structures. Foucault, though, wants us to turn our thinking in a different direction. He wants us—and this is a persistent point he made throughout his career—to see specific acts, procedures, or processes, such as "punitive methods" and school discipline programs, as having a kind of a quasi-independent standing or importance, a "specificity," within "the more general field of other ways of exercising power." They are not just actions of individual agents, and they are not merely functions of something more important and larger, some social structure; these methods or programs need to be looked at by the genealogist as having their own specificity or independent standing. Moreover, by "ways of exercising power," Foucault does not usually mean the power exercised by an intentional actor, although his view encompasses that; instead, he usually means that a procedure or process multiplies across a social field because of a complex set or collection of reasons or causes that are not entirely intentional or rational. Thus, these governmental acts, procedures, or processes are not only or simply a function of legislation or social structures; instead, to the genealogist, they are ways that power multiplies, without some agentic agent consciously accomplishing this, across a social field. For instance, the new emphasis on student-centered classrooms[25] should not be analyzed only as a new and better approach emerging from progressive educational theorists or only as a function of social structures; instead, it should also be analyzed as a practice of power that has emerged and circulates more broadly in society and as a practice of power that is, in many ways, actually more oppressive than teacher-centered classrooms. The reason why Foucault might offer that the new student-centered classrooms are more oppressive is because the work of this new tactic of power is to imprint the souls of the children rather than just their behaviors, as the old teacher-centered classrooms did.

The third rule, and a critically important one to those of us in the social sciences, is as follows:

> Instead of treating the history of penal law and the history of the human sciences as two separate series whose overlapping appears to have had on one [penal law] or the other [the history of the human sciences], or perhaps on both, a disturbing or useful effect, according to one's point of view, see whether there is not some common matrix or whether they do not both derive from a single process of "epistemologico–juridical" formation; in short, make the technology of power the very principle both of the humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of man. (Foucault, 1975/1979, p. 23)

Thus, the history of penal law, the public educational system, or nursing should not be examined just as a separate, albeit sometimes overlapping, series running parallel to the history of the social sciences but should also be examined as emerging from "some common matrix" or as deriving from a single "process of epistemo-logico–[fill in the blank with a juridical, educational, or medical] formation." Again, as with the second rule, the principal focus of the genealogist should be on the technologies of power and the ways that the same technology of power spreads across and is enacted both within particular systems, such as those of prisons, schools, or hospitals, and in the social sciences. Thus, technologies of power, arising out of a "common matrix" or a "'epistomologico–[fill in the blank]' formation," may multiply across both particular systems and social sciences in general, and this multiplication is likely to be both intentional and unintended, both rational and not rational. For example, we might find that contemporary public education—its practices, procedures, and policies—and the history of education scholarship, its research, and its theories have emerged from the same "common matrix" or the same epistemologico–educational formation. Although this seems to be a less radical assertion than Foucault's similar assertion about penal systems, it is important to understand that he does not simply mean that both contemporary public education and education scholarship share the same general assumptions about schools or education; instead, he means that there is a more primary matrix or

formation that is not necessarily intentionally or rationally created, and that is not necessarily education oriented, out of which both are emerging. For example, perhaps, on genealogical investigation, both the new movement emphasizing student-oriented classrooms and the growth of qualitative research methodologies arise out of the same "pastoral" matrix or formation (e.g., see Foucault's use of the concept of the pastoral in *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1: *An Introduction* [1976/1980a]).

Foucault's (1975/1979) fourth rule is as follows:

Try to discover whether this entry of the soul on to the scene of penal justice, and with it the insertion in legal practice of a whole corpus of "scientific" knowledge, is not the effect of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations.

In short, try to study the metamorphosis of punitive methods on the basis of a political technology of the body in which might be read a common history of power relations and object relations. Thus, by an analysis of penal leniency as a technique of power, one might understand both how man, the soul, [and] the normal or abnormal individual have come to duplicate crime as objects of penal intervention and in what way a specific mode of subjection was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a "scientific" status. (p. 24)

By his use of the word "soul," Foucault means that the focus of the new penal system is "not only on what they [the criminals] *do* but also on what they *are, will be, may be*" (p. 18, emphases added); that is, the new focus is not on their behavior but rather on their being or their selves. The new penal perspective has "taken to judging something other than crimes, namely, the 'soul' of the criminal" (p. 19). Then, this new focus on the "soul" of the criminal is combined with a new "corpus of 'scientific' knowledge," *both* of which are the "effect of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations." It is, as Foucault says, "a political technology of the body." Thus, what is generally seen as more humane and more liberal (i.e., "penal leniency"), in this case, is argued by Foucault to be but "a new technique of

power," one in which "the body itself is invested by power relations." And he indicates that he sees this change as another example of the modernist social construction of "man [or the subject] as an object of knowledge for a discourse with 'scientific' status."[26] An example of this in education might be a consideration of "site-based management," "distributive leadership," and "community of learners," all of which are generally seen as more humane or more democratic approaches to school leadership or governance, as new "techniques of power" that are not just endemic to education but also part of a larger formation, the effect of which might be seen as a worse oppression at the level of the soul. In other words, these new techniques of power in education focus on controlling or managing the "soul" of educators rather than just their behaviors, which, to Foucault, is much more oppressive than techniques of power that seek to control only behaviors.

Although we find these four rules to be a particularly rich source for understanding the work of the Foucaultian genealogist, they certainly do not exhaust *Discipline and Punish* in terms of what the work of a genealogist is. For example, we find the entire last section of the same chapter that contains the four rules (Foucault, 1975/1979, pp. 16–31) to be a particularly exciting discussion of genealogy. We also have a strong appreciation for (a) the "The Composition of Forces" section (pp. 162–169) in the chapter, titled "Docile Bodies," which includes some direct statements about education; (b) the entire chapter titled "The Means of Correct Training," which includes sections on "Hierarchical Observation," "Normalizing Judgments," and "The Examination" as well as some direct comments on education; and (c) the last chapter, "The Carceral," which is another particularly rich and provocative section in *Discipline and Punish*. In contrast, we are not as enamored as many are with the chapter on "Panopticism," as we find it to be one of his more simplistic, more totalized, and more poorly developed concepts. Our point, though, is that this first genealogy is literally a panoply of critical tools and ideas that can be used to do Foucaultian genealogies.

Foucault's (1976/1980a) second and last genealogy was *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1: *An Introduction*. What we do here, given space limitations, is provide just some brief comments and offer some suggestions about reading this volume. Provocatively, and one of the main reasons why we have used more space discussing *Discipline and Punish*, is that the *History of Sexuality* includes little direct discussion of genealogy as a method, whereas *Discipline and Punish* includes considerable discussion of the genealogical method. Indeed, through a systematic search of the text,[27] we found that in his second genealogy, he uses the word "genealogy" only five times (four times in the Introduction and once on p. 171).[28] Nonetheless, in general, in our view, *History of Sexuality* is the better genealogy of the two, more confident, smoother, better worked out, as if he had more deeply integrated the methodology of genealogy by the time he did this second one. It is as if he had worked out his genealogical method in *Discipline and Punish*, whereas in *History of Sexuality* he was applying what he had already worked out. In addition, we particularly recommend "Part Four: The Deployment of Sexuality" section. In many ways, this is the mature Foucault at his best. The writing is excellent, the organization is clear, and, the insights are powerful.[29] It is in this section that Foucault provides some extended discussion of how he thought power differently, what he calls an "analytics" of power (p. 82), as not just negative and repressive but also positive. Even more specifically, we recommend the "Objective" subsection (pp. 81–91) and his discussion at the beginning of the "Method" subsection of "Part Four" (pp. 92–97). Indeed, we would suggest that one of Foucault's greatest contributions to intellectual thought has been his reconceptualization of power, and a good discussion of this reconceptualization is abundantly available in *History of Sexuality*. Finally, however, what generally distinguishes his second method, genealogy, from his first one, archaeology, in our view, is that his archaeological method is dependent on a highly structured, highly interrelated set of constructs, all of which

need to be deployed together to actually do an archaeology, whereas his genealogical method is more like a set of critical tools that can be used in any sort of grouping. And it is this difference, we believe, that is one of the chief reasons why the latter is much more appealing to scholars.[30]

▣ CONCLUSION

Overall, it could be argued that Foucault's archaeological and genealogical work was mainly a critique of the modernist view of the human sciences and of "man" as simultaneously both the human scientist and the object of the human sciences. Then, in his conduct of any particular critique, whether archaeological or genealogical, he almost always takes up one "period" (although his "periods" often do not parallel those of mainstream history) prior to the one (the second period) he will critique and describes this first period to lay the basis for his description and critique of the subsequent period. However, his description of one period, his description of the change from one to the next, and his description of the second period move far beyond the territory typically covered in conventional history. For example, see our comparison of *connaissance* and *savoir* earlier, where *connaissance* covers the conventional territory, whereas *savoir*, which is what Foucault is focused on with both his archaeologies and his genealogies, is much broader, even including social phenomena that seem to have little direct connection to the particular *connaissance*. His point here is that the conventional or traditional view of the formal academic social sciences is but one part of an "effective history" and that when the *savoir* is considered, it becomes much more obvious that the human sciences are much less rational, much more ambiguous, much messier, much more filled with random error, and more driven by the petty jealousies and competitions of social scientists than is conventionally assumed. Thus, if you understand the difference between *connaissance* and *savoir*, and if you understand the fact that Foucault focused mostly on *savoir* as the territory of the archaeologist or

the genealogist, you understand a significant piece of what Foucault was up to with his critiques.

A second point he makes with these "period" comparisons is that, contrary to the self-story of modernity that the more recent is more humane, the "modernist" period is actually, when critiqued with an archaeology or a genealogy, worse, more oppressive, more demeaning. For example, whereas the prior penal system tortured bodies, the target of the subsequent one was the soul, not what people do but rather what they are. Thus, Foucault stands as a major critic of Western modernity, particularly calling into question a wide array of "progressive" assumptions that modernity is considerably better, more humane, and more rational than that which came before modernity.

A third focus for Foucault is to decenter "man" as the primary subject of modernity. To Foucault, modernity constructed man, the subject, the agent running the world. It was modernity that fashioned the whole of human life as constructed around and for man, the central subject, the central agentic actor. It was modernity that wrote a history of the progressive rational rise of the human sciences guided by and for man, the central subject. In contrast, Foucault suggests a different and effective history of the human sciences. Based on his critical examination of historical documents, he suggests that, although rationality is part of Western history, there is much, much more that is not rational and that is not guided by any central actor. Indeed, in both his archaeologies and his genealogies, history is not predominantly created by a subject, particularly a logical rational subject who has "his" hands on the guiding wheel of history. Instead, history is created by a complex array of processes, dispersions, procedures, accidents, hatreds, policies, desires, dominations, unintended or uncontrolled circulations of techniques of power, commercial practices, mores, analyses and demonstrations, the norms of industrial labor and bourgeois morality, the endlessly repeated play of dominations, literature, political decisions, discontinuities, opinions expressed in daily life, the fanatical and unending discussions

of scholars, randomness, dissensions, petty malice, precise scientific methods, subjected bodies, and faulty calculations, to name but just a few—and man, the subject, is not running this show called history. In addition, he repeatedly points out the contradiction within modernity of simultaneously having man as both the subject and object of history. However, given the dominance of our modernist romanticized view of ourselves as the center of our lives and our society and, given our deep ontological and epistemological attachment to this romanticized view, it is usually ignored or critiqued by scholars while they appropriate other aspects of Foucault's critique of modernity. This, to us, is a serious mistake. His critique of modernity and his critique of the agentic subject at the center are deeply intertwined; thus, separating the two violates Foucault's perspective at the most basic level of his thought.

There are other lesser abuses, and some erroneous readings, of Foucault that we have tried to address or correct. First, Foucault was, by his own words, enormously influenced by Canguilhem and saw Canguilhem and others as playing a role in French intellectual work similar to that which the Frankfurt School played in German intellectual work. Thus, we suggest that Canguilhem and others, such as Gaston Bachelard, should receive increased attention, as themes that Foucault draws from Canguilhem continue through his genealogies. Second, the amount of time and energy that Foucault gave to archaeology was much larger than that which he gave to genealogy. Thus, we suggest that much more attention be given to archaeology. Indeed, there is no legitimate doubt that Foucault continued throughout his life to highly value it as a method, despite what others concluded. Third, again by his own words, genealogy was not seen by Foucault as being superseded by or superior to archaeology. Thus, in comparing the two methods, more attention needs to be given to how Foucault saw the relationship of the two. Fourth, archaeology and genealogy are much less different than is often assumed, and this also could use more attention. Fifth, it was, in our opinion, Dreyfus and Rabinow who were largely responsible for

what we see as a distorted view of the relationship of archaeology and genealogy in the United States. Thus, we suggest more problematization of this contention. And sixth, in any considerations of the two methods, the essay on "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" should receive increased attention, as it is a good bridge that directly connects the two methods.

In this conclusion, we also want to strongly recommend a relatively new collection of Foucault's work. The entire set is called *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, and Paul Rabinow is the series editor.[31] The first volume is *Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth* (1994/1997) and was edited by Rabinow. The second volume is *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (1994a) and was edited by Faubion. The third volume is *Power* (1994c), and it too was edited by Faubion. In this set, when the English translations provided in it are compared with alternative ones, we consistently find that the translations in this set are superior. In addition, this set thematically groups parts of Foucault's books with some of his articles and interviews. We would suggest that, especially for beginners, this set is an excellent place to start reading Foucault, as it makes Foucault more accessible.

Undeniably, though, whichever books, articles, and interviews are considered, Foucault has left us with an impressive body of work and new methodologies and with a host of powerful analytic concepts, some of which we have tried to introduce to a broader range of readers. We want to end, then, with two more statements. The first is a very brief summary of our take on the use of Foucault in education scholarship. Unfortunately, we do not have space to comment in any detail on the use of Foucault in the social sciences generally or in education, our field, specifically. Indeed, commenting on the uses of Foucault across the social sciences in the United States alone is already probably too large for anything less than a book. Even just the use of Foucault as a primary focus by education scholars, as can be seen in one part of our bibliography, is rather large. However, after reviewing the scholarship in education using Foucault as the main theoretical resource, our

conclusion is that a very high percentage of this work engages Foucault's work at only a fairly superficial level.

Probably the most popular use, or abuse, is to cherry pick one concept, such as "panopticon" or "disciplinary society," and then use that one concept within a more traditional critical framework, even though there are epistemological contradictions between Foucault and most U.S. critical theory.[32] In general, we would say this cherry picking is a mistake, as typically the single concept, in its Foucaultian meaning, does not really integrate with the rest of the assumptions in the article or book. Our point is that Foucault's concepts are but aspects of a general epistemological position that needs to be engaged with as a whole. Another similar error that we found in the uses of Foucault's work by U.S. education scholars, as well as by many social scientists, is to adopt his critique of modernity while ignoring his simultaneous critique of subjectivity itself. We are uncomfortable saying this because we sound like we are policing Foucault, but we think that it is simply undeniable that there is a tremendous amount of fairly superficial and ill-informed use of Foucault; in fact, we concluded that many have used his work without ever reading carefully through several volumes of it. Of course, the line between substantive engagements of Foucault and superficial ones can never be securely drawn. Thus, we are decidedly not arguing that we know and can define the canonical Foucault, but we would suggest that a supple use, or even an adequate use, of Foucault requires more than one close reading of any one book, article, or interview. Instead, we would suggest close readings of several books, along with articles and interviews, before trying to use or apply his work. When U.S. scholars do not engage in this kind of in-depth study of Foucault, we would remind them that their ignorance is fairly transparent to those who do study and use Foucault in a more substantive way.

Our second final point is what surprised us the most with our systematic review of Foucault's books. Also, we should say that we were reluctant to make this point, but we decided that we had to

for us to maintain the integrity of our recent rereading of all of Foucault's major works in the order that he published them. Before we did this review, we were strong advocates of Foucault's work and not too receptive to the many critiques of his work, as we saw most of them as conscious or unconscious defenses of the foundational assumptions of modernity. What emerged, though, for us is a new openness to one of the main critiques that has been made of Foucault's work. That is, there have been numerous complaints that in Foucault's consideration of the truth regimes of social life, such as those of prisons, the clinic, and sexuality, Foucault's descriptions of these regimes make them relentlessly oppressive, perhaps even totalized, with no way "out" (see, e.g., Hartsock, 1998). Clearly, we cannot go into a lengthy discussion of this critique, nor do we want to debate it at this point. What we can do, however, is strongly suggest that other advocates and persistent users of Foucault need to more openly and more carefully consider this critique. In other words, we would suggest that our experienced Foucault scholars need to engage this critique in a more balanced way and recognize that there is some "validity" to it.

After recently rereading straight through all of his books in the order that he published them, we were truly struck, unexpectedly struck, with how unrelenting Foucault is in his critique of the social forms in which we live. We began to understand what others have concluded about his totalizations of these social forms. We began, for example, to understand where others have concluded that, in his descriptions of penal institutions or the social sciences, there appears to be "no exit." His critique and the described oppression are powerfully unrelenting and do appear to approach a totalization. It is almost as if he has discovered that, for example, the new penal regime is not just a 6-sided cube of oppression and control but also a 500-sided cube and that, in brilliantly describing all of these sides, he leaves us with no recourse, no path for resistance or emancipation. What simultaneously reinforces this is the fact that in his major works, he rarely offers any alternative for resistance or emancipation from the oppression he so

thoroughly describes. (See, e.g., Grosz, 1994, who uses Foucault extensively but is simultaneously critical of how unrelenting his lack of alternative spaces and possibilities is; in fact, for us, Grosz exemplifies a balanced, in-depth use of Foucault that is both critical and appreciative.) Thus, for example, while Foucault provides an insightful characterization of the complexity of a discipline or regime, virtually every aspect, every facet, of the new complexity that Foucault describes becomes a critical moment for Foucault so that while he is opening up new perspectives on specific truth regimes, he is also foreclosing, through his totalized critique, the possibility that these new frontiers might become new possibilities or imaginaries.

Of course, we realize that the words "resistance" and "emancipation" are humanist ones arising out of modernity; thus, an advocate for Foucault might say that Foucault's unwillingness to offer any such alternative is simply his maintenance of a consistently anti-humanist-, anti-subject-centered epistemology. However, as Fraser (1989) pointed out some time ago, what is often ignored with Foucault is that much of his language, such as "systems of subjection" (Foucault, 1975/1979, p. 376) and "the endlessly repeated play of dominations" (p. 377), is itself language that is modernist and humanist and that the power Foucault's critiques have for us is a function of our immersion in and attachment to this modernist, humanist language. We would, thus, point out that what we have here is another modernist binary. Accordingly, whereas Foucault powerfully appropriates one side of this binary (e.g., subjection and domination), he largely avoids the other (e.g., resistance and emancipation). This, as Derrida[33] has pointed out so well with his deconstructive methodology, does not mean that the other side of the binary, variously labeled resistance or emancipation, is not equally in play.

Thus, again, we want to suggest that scholars who are advocates of Foucault take this critique more seriously and approach Foucault more the way that Grosz (1994) generally does. However, we are not saying that Foucault never addresses some "positive" change possibilities. We are saying, though, that in all of the archaeologies he

overwhelmingly does not and that in *Discipline and Punish* (1975/1979) he largely does not. Also, for the most part in *The History of Sexuality,* Volume 1: *An Introduction* (1976/1980a) he does not, although in this latter work he does begin to talk about countering "the grips of power" with the "rallying point" being "bodies and pleasures" (p. 157). In *The History of Sexuality,* Volume 1, near the end, for example, he says,

> We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality [when one says yes to sex]. It is the agency of sex that we must break away from if we aim—through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality—to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures. (p. 157)

This is clearly an effort by Foucault to begin to explore resistance and a space of possible change, but this is by far the exception. In fact, some might argue that it is with this work that Foucault's interest in working on resistance and change emerges in the care of the self period that is said to follow the two genealogies. In addition, he was an activist, especially around prison issues, and in his interviews he supported activism while resisting critiques of the lack of activism in his books. For example, in an interview published in an Italian journal in 1978, he said (somewhat defensively, we would say), "I don't construct my analyses in order to say, 'This is the way thing are, you are trapped.' I say these things only insofar as I believe it enables us to transform them" (Foucault, 1994c, pp. 295–295).

However, our point here is that through all of the archaeologies and the first genealogy and even most of the second genealogy, while Foucault is opening up new ways to think about our social world, his unrelenting, almost totalized, critique serves to foreclose how to use those new ways of thinking for resistance, for countering "the grips of power," and for developing spaces of valuable change. To us, this should be a major

concern because, in our view, his descriptive accounts of the complexities of disciplines, social arenas, and institutions could as well show that within these complexities, there are almost always spaces for resistance, "counterattack," appropriation, and construction, and this is also a point that Grosz (1994) makes. Similarly, Gubrium and Holstein (2000), in the second edition of this *Handbook,* drawing strongly on Foucault, have tried to develop "an interpretive practice [that] works against [the kind of Foucaultian] totalization that views all interpretations as artifacts of particular regimes of power/knowledge" (p. 501). By raising these criticisms of Foucault, though, we are not trying to be definitive, as that would require a more extended, in-depth discussion of the whole range of critiques of Foucault on this issue. Instead, we are more modestly suggesting, based on our recent systematic read of Foucault, that Foucault advocates, as we ourselves have been, need to take another, more careful, more balanced consideration of this critique of Foucault's work. Or, as Foucault himself said, "The only valid tribute to [anyone's] thought . . . is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful . . . that is of absolutely no interest" (Foucault, 1980b, pp. 53–54).

Nonetheless, even with such reconsiderations, Foucault remains a powerful, innovative intellectual whose work has opened up insightful and provocative avenues of thought, critique, and understanding. Moreover, without a doubt, his work has become enormously influential worldwide. Deleuze (1990/1995), though, said this much more poetically:

> When people follow Foucault, when they're fascinated by him, it's because they're doing something with him, in their own work, in their own independent lives. It's not just a question of [Foucault's] intellectual understanding or agreement, but of intensity, resonance, musical harmony. (p. 86)[34]

Hopefully, our interpretations presented here will add to this influence by helping those who have not yet engaged Foucault to understand where they might begin. We also hope we have been useful and

provocative to those who are more experienced friends of Foucault, even if we may have disturbed them a bit with our critical remarks. Whatever the reads of our read, though, we want to *again* and *again* strongly emphasize that our interpretations of Foucault, our comments on the uses and abuses of Foucault in education and the social sciences, our critiques of Foucault and others, and our concluding remarks are not the correct, the best, the authoritative, or the canonical ones. Even if you forget everything else we have written here, do not forget this point. As we said at the beginning of this essay, the comments we offer here are not *true* interpretations of Foucault's work, nor are such interpretations possible in our view. The primary issue to us is how substantive the engagement is, not whether the engagement is the correct one. Thus, whether there is agreement or disagreement with what we have said here, we truly hope that all readers will see this essay as a substantive effort to engage primarily not only with Foucault but also, to a smaller extent, with his users and abusers, his advocates and critics.

◨ NOTES

1. Despite the fact that this essay is not a "true" one, we want to thank our reviewers for their suggestions, comments, and criticisms. There is simply no question that this essay was substantively improved due to their responses even when we disagreed with those responses. Those reviewers were Jaber Gubrium, Patti Lather, Bill Black, Elizabeth St. Pierre, Norman Denzin, and Jack Bratich. However, none of them should be held responsible for anything we have written here as we used and abused, agreed and disagreed with, incorporated and ignored their words.

2. The American Psychological Association (APA) style format rule is that the original publication date for a publication in another language precedes the publication date in English, just as we have done it here. However, we wanted to make sure that everyone paid attention to these dates because they are part of a significant point that we are making in this essay.

3. Foucault himself actually calls his archaeologies and genealogies toolboxes: "All my books . . . are little toolboxes, if you will" (Halperin, 1995, p. 52). Thanks to Elizabeth St. Pierre for pointing out this quote.

4. See, for example, Burchell, Gordon, and Miller's *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (1991), Barry, Osborne, and Rose's *Foucault and Political Reason* (1996), and parts of Popkewitz and Brennan's *Foucault's Challenge* (1998).

5. Jaber Gubrium also suggests John Rajchman, Lisa King, and Lee Quimby as doing similar work. We would agree with the Rajchman suggestion, but we are not familiar with the other two. Nonetheless, we think Gubrium knows what he is talking about.

6. See Foucault's "What Is an author?" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* (1977).

7. In other words, we are suggesting to those enamored of and influenced by Kuhn that they should read the work of Canguilhem because, in our view, Canguilhem's work with the history of sciences is much more impressive, much more substantive, than that of Kuhn.

8. Throughout this essay, when we quote Foucault, we add words or phrases in brackets to help readers follow his meaning. Foucault often writes in long sentences and is often not clear with his referents or words he substitutes for other words. Thus, reading Foucault typically requires paying very close attention to his meaning as a sentence or paragraph progresses. Our added brackets are intended, then, to help readers follow his meaning more easily.

9. It is certainly easy to imagine the good uses to which Lincoln and Guba could have put Canguilhem in their critique of science and reason in 1985 in *Naturalistic Inquiry* (1985).

10. It should not be assumed that Canguilhem was trying to totally undermine the history of the sciences or to destroy the value and importance of reason. He was not. In fact, it is clear that Canguilhem appreciates and values both science and reason. Instead, Canguilhem could be said to be trying to develop an approach to the study of the history of science and the history of reason that was much less hagiographic.

11. However, Gutting's *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (1989) is a useful discussion of archaeology, though we disagree with some of his interpretations of Foucault.

12. It should be noted that for Foucault, practices and institutions, theories and disciplines, all exist at the same level. As he says, "I deal with practices, institutions, and theories on the same plane and according to the same isomorphisms" (Foucault, 1994c, p. 262).

13. Foucault always felt that to understand something, say a discursive formation, he needed another one to which to compare it. Comparison, then, is almost always a key part of his analytic work.

14. Foucault uses "possibility" because the process is not deterministic; that is, it is not deterministically inevitable that a *connaissance* will emerge out of a *savoir*.

15. This point is similar to points made by Canguilhem, as was already discussed.

16. Remember here how Canguilhem had asserted that "error" is an integral part of life at the biological level.

17. In the specific part of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* from which this cite is drawn (p. 4), Foucault (1969/1972) cites Canguilhem. Indeed, as we argued in an earlier section, much of archaeology comes from Foucault's use, interpretation, and transformation of his mentor's work.

18. Habermas would be an example of the latter.

19. Unfortunately, we cannot find this interview at this point, but we know we have read it. Our apologies to our readers. If someone comes across it, she or he should e-mail it so that we can add the citation to any future revisions of this essay.

20. One of the reviewers of this chapter argued that *The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure* was clearly a genealogy, but it is our view that Foucault's own words in this text indicate that Volume 2 is not another genealogy. In the "Introduction" to Volume 2, Foucault discusses the genealogy he originally intended to do but then turns away from this. A good discussion of the three periods and Foucault's intentions with each can be found in Davidson (1986).

21. We would also suggest that because of their critique of archaeology, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) played a key role in the lack of attention to Canguilhem, as they mention him only once throughout *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics.*

22. The reason why this more recent version is better, in our view, is that it clearly distinguishes knowledge as *connaissance* and knowledge as *savoir*, both of which we have discussed as key concepts of Foucault's archaeology.

23. It is hard not to conclude that Foucault actually either enjoyed writing about the torture or enjoyed shocking readers or both, given the extended detail in his descriptions.

24. Obviously, one of the points we are trying to make here is that there is less of a break between archaeology and genealogy than is commonly assumed.

25. Foucault would likely call the new focus on student-centered classrooms one of the effects of a "pastoral" approach.

26. This point is a good example of a concern that started with Canguilhem and continues from Foucault's archaeologies into his genealogies.

27. Amazon.com now allows anyone to do two-word or phrase searches of an entire book of any book that is contained in this system. It is a marvelous system, but any single person can do this only twice a month without buying the book.

28. One odd little note is that although Foucault's convention is to compare two periods in his various analyses, in *History of Sexuality* he compares three.

29. Contrary to what many assume, Foucault is exceedingly logical in his written presentations. He constantly divides an arena of focus into numbered parts and then proceeds to define those parts in an orderly fashion. Indeed, at this point, we have begun to wonder why there is all of this commentary as to how Foucault writes in some disrupted "postmodern" fashion. We find, after our lengthy review of his work, that he writes in a fairly conventional way for complex intellectual work. Actually, other than learning to think differently, which is really the hardest task in reading Foucault, what is required is to carefully follow the meaning in his long complex sentences, as it is sometimes difficult to follow to what he is referring. In other words, it takes a close reading to follow his meaning, but there is little that is "disrupted" in his texts, in our view.

30. One of our reviewers argued that the larger problem with the archaeological methodology is that very few areas of social life lend themselves to the kind of complex discursive structures that Foucault addresses in his archaeologies. We would clearly disagree. We would suggest that before Foucault's archaeological analyses, few would have seen the complex *savoir*-based discursive patterns that Foucault identified in *Madness and Civilization* (1961/1988), *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963/1994b), and *The Order of Things* (1966/1973a). For instance, we think education could definitely be a fertile arena for archaeological analyses.

31. There is a new comprehensive set of all of Foucault's work that has been published in French, called *Dits et Ecrits*. It is two volumes, *Dits et Ecrits, tome 1, 1954–1975* (2001a, 1,700 pages) and *Dits et Ecrits, tome 2, 1976–1988* (2001b, 1,976 pages). We certainly hope that some group will provide an English translation of the entire set.

32. There is no doubt that Foucault is part of a critical tradition in Western philosophy, but he had fundamental arguments with that part of the critical

tradition that has been labeled Marxist, neo-Marxist, or critical theory.

33. As Foucault scholars well know, Derrida was strongly critical of Foucault's work.

34. Thanks to Elizabeth St. Pierre for this delightful quote.

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34

ANALYZING TALK AND TEXT

Anssi Peräkylä

There are two much used but distinctively different types of empirical materials in qualitative research: interviews and naturally occurring materials. Interviews consist of accounts given to the researcher about the issues in which he or she is interested. The topic of the research is not the interview itself but rather the issues discussed in the interview. In this sense, research that uses naturally occurring empirical material is different; in this type of research, the empirical materials themselves (e.g., the tape-recordings of mundane interactions, the written texts) constitute specimens of the topic of the research. Consequently, the researcher is in more direct touch with the very object that he or she is investigating.

Most qualitative research probably is based on interviews. There are good reasons for this. By using interviews, the researcher can reach areas of reality that would otherwise remain inaccessible such as people's subjective experiences and attitudes. The interview is also a very convenient way of overcoming distances both in space and in time; past events or faraway experiences can be studied by interviewing people who took part in them.

In other instances, it is possible to reach the object of research directly using naturally occurring empirical materials (Silverman, 2001). If the researcher is interested in, say, strategies used by journalists in interviewing politicians (cf. Clayman & Heritage, 2002a), it might be advisable to tape-record broadcast interviews rather than to ask journalists to tell about their work. Or, if the researcher wants to study the historical evolution of medical conceptions regarding death and dying, it might be advisable to study medical textbooks rather than to ask doctors to tell what they know about these concepts.

The contrast between interviews and naturally occurring materials should not, however, be exaggerated (cf. Potter, 2004; Speer, 2002). There are types of research materials that are between these two pure types. For example, in *informal interviews that are part of ethnographic fieldwork,* and in *focus groups,* people describe their practices and ideas to the researcher in circumstances that are much closer to "naturally occurring" than are the circumstances in ordinary research interviews. Moreover, even "ordinary" interviews can be, and have been, analyzed as specimens of interaction and reasoning practices rather than as representations of facts or ideas outside the interview situation. As Speer (2002) recently put it, "The status of pieces of data as natural or not depends largely on what the researcher intends to 'do' with them" (p. 513). Wetherell and Potter (1992), for example, analyzed the ways in which