



DIMA PROJECT OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION

“Watchdog”

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1 Project context and purpose

1.1 Context

1.2 Purpose

2 Project planning

2.1 Time schedule

3 Requirements analysis

3.1 Actors

3.2 Functional requirements

3.2.1 Mobile phones association

3.2.2 Mobile phone remote localization

3.2.3 Mobile phone remote mark

3.2.4 Mobile phone remote alarm triggering

3.3 Non-functional requirements

3.3.1 Privacy and security: problems and solutions

The remote control of a cellphone is a critical activity and has many security and privacy requirements: the next paragraphs show them briefly: for in-depth explanations see the design section (4.3).

Sender authentication

While the sender (telephone) authentication plays indeed a key role, it's even more crucial the authentication of the person behind a control message; that is the reason for a password based authentication: in the initialization wizard the user is required to insert a password which will be needed to send a message to that telephone (the basic assumption is that the password is known only by the mobile owner and by some people, possibly nobody, he trusts). The password is stored in the application preferences hashed along with the hashing salt (a random token) to avoid both time-to-memory attacks (such as rainbow tables) and the equality of two hashes generated from two equal passwords; the salt is sent to another telephone after the process of authentication.

Message integrity/authentication/non forgeability/non repudiation

The command messages have some specific security requirements (plus confidentiality which is explained in the next paragraph:

Integrity

The message received must be exactly the one sent: every transmission error or tampering must be detected and cause the abort of the current message session: no retransmission is done.

Authentication

The receiver must have a secure way to understand which telephone the received message comes from.

Non forgeability

Nobody should be able to forge a command message which is both valid and correctly authenticated.

Non repudiation

The sender must not be able to deny he sent a specific message (if he actually did it).

Digitally signing every command message can ensure integrity, authentication, non repudiation and a weak defense against non forgeability: symmetric encryption (and in particular AES-256 in GCM mode of operation) is needed for full protection.

Message confidentiality

No one should be able to detect that and which command is sent to a mobile phone, so the command message is encrypted with the symmetric cipher AES-256 in GCM mode of operation (used for performance reasons and for a supplementary integrity check).

Asymmetric keys management

Digital signatures (and shared secrets computation as we will see) require asymmetric cryptography: in the initialization wizard the application generates and stores in the preferences a key pair based on the elliptic curves; the reasons for this choice are performances and the smaller key length with respect to other keys (like RSA and DSA ones) at a fixed level of security. This makes the 140 characters (bytes) Android limit for a single sms no more a problem.

Symmetric key/initialization vector management

AES-256, being a symmetric cipher, encrypts and decrypts a specific message with the same key, and, given that the communication channel is not secure, the two parts must agree on the same key in some way; in particular ECDH is used to compute a common secret once and for all, then, when in need to send a message, the sender picks up a random 32 bytes salt, forwards it to the receiver, then both parts use a keyschedule algorithm (PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256) to derive the same key starting from the secret and the salt. Furthermore the GCM mode of operation requires for every message the sender to generate a 12 bytes random initialization vector and to send it to the receiver.

Public keys mutual authentication

While dealing with asymmetric cryptography, the main problem is to bind a public key with a real user to avoid active Man-In-The-Middle (MITM from now on) attacks. Neither a Public Key infrastructure (PKI) or a Web Of Trust (WOT) is employed because they are both potentially insecure for various reasons (in the PKI case the presence of a trusted element, a certification authority hierarchy, which may be compromised/untrusted/fake; in the WOT case the presence of a net of trusted elements, the ones who signed a specific public key, which might be fake/bad persons; furthermore a key with no signatures is not automatically a fake one, but there isn't a way to tell), so the application uses a modified version of the Socialist Millionaire Protocol (SMP) to authenticate to each other each key; this requires the two parts to have a common secret (an answer to a particular question set up on the fly by the users), which is easy to achieve, since the two users are likely to be the same person or two people who trust themselves.

3.3.2 Human friendly interface and transparency

3.3.3 Performance

3.4 Use cases

3.4.1 Initialization wizard

3.4.2 Mobile phones association

3.4.3 Remote control: localization

3.4.4 Remote control: mark stolen/lost/both/found

3.4.5 Remote control: alarm triggering/untriggering

4 Design

4.1 Application Architecture

4.2 Design Patterns

4.3 Crypto protocols and algorithms

The application makes a heavy use of cryptography, so we needed a good crypto provider for java, which we believed to have found in Bouncycastle; however its libraries are not convertible into the Dalvik format, so we had to rely on Spongycastle, an unofficial Bouncycastle porting for Android. Unluckily some algorithms/protocols we had intention to use (namely FH-MQV/ECMQV and the native SMP) are not supported (no java implementation for them found), so we ended up using ECDH and a homemade version of SMP instead.

4.3.1 Elliptic Curves key pair generation

The public/private key pair generation is done by using elliptic curves for performance and memory complexity reasons (at a fixed security level the EC keys are more than 10 times shorter compared to the RSA/DSA/ElGamal ones): a message in Android has a maximum length of 140 characters (bytes), so we had no choice if we didn't (and we didn't since it would have screwed up our crypto layer) want to use multipart messages. The curve used is a NIST standard: "secp256r1", also known as "prime256v1" which generates 256 bits long keys (we actually thought to use "secp521r1" for enhanced security, but the keys were too long). Using a named curve which is also a standard has a few advantages: first it generates automatically all the parameters needed, and second its security has been widely tested by the cryptanalists of all the world. The generated keys are encoded into byte arrays in different ways: the private ones using the "PKCS8 encoded key specifiers" and the public ones with the "X509 encoded key specifiers". It's always possible with a key factory to decode both encodings leading to keys identical to the pre-encoding ones.

4.3.2 Socialist Millionaire Protocol

Public key request

Public key sending

Question sending

Hash sending

Ack and password salt sending

Second half

Error management

4.3.3 Elliptic Curves Diffie Hellman key exchange

4.3.4 Command Protocol

First message

Second message

Third message

Fourth message

Error management

Timeout management


4.3.5 Elliptic Curves Digital Signature Algorithm

4.3.6 AES-256-GCM


The Advanced Encryption Standard is the symmetric encryption standard algorithm (NIST FIPS-197) almost worldwide since 2001 and it's known for his high performance; in the application we employed its version with a 256 bits key, which has a security margin comparable to RSA with a 15360 bits key. Actually, since it's used in Galois/Counter mode (GCM), it does not encrypt directly the plaintext, but it's instead used together with a 12 bytes initialization vector IV (which doesn't need to be secret, but unpredictable for every encryption, so the best choice is to pick it up randomly) to generate a pseudorandom keystream which is then XORed to the plaintext: basically the block cipher simulates a stream cipher (so no padding is needed for the plaintext, whose length, thus, does not need to be a multiple of 16 bytes like in direct encryption, which is a good thing, considering the 140 bytes limit for Android messages) which simulates a One Time Pad (OTP), the only cipher perfectly secure. Obviously AES-GCM is not perfectly secure because soon or later a new key will be equal to one used in the past (not so soon though), the key is shorter than the plaintext and the keystream is only pseudorandom.

In addition to this the GCM mode generates also a 16 bytes Message Authentication Code (MAC) which is prepended to the ciphertext in order to provide an additional integrity check. Before the decryption (which needs of course the same IV and the same key) the message integrity is verified and, if it's not the case, an exception is raised and the command session is aborted. In GCM mode it's also possible to attach to the ciphertext some non-encrypted data (called Additional Authenticated Data, AAD) which are used along with the ciphertext itself to produce the MAC; in our case this feature is useless, so no AAD.


The three pictures below show the encryption and the decryption under GMC (P = plaintext, K = key, C = ciphertext, A = AAD, T = MAC) and the AES encryption/decryption used to generate the keystream.



Picture 1: Encryption in GCM mode of operation



Picture 2: Decryption in GCM mode of operation



Picture 3: Encryption/Decryption in AES

5 Testing

5.1 Cryptography

5.2 Protocols

6 Installation and usage manual

6.1 Installation

6.2 Usage

6.2.1 Initialization wizard

6.2.2 Change application settings

6.2.3 Send a command message