

# Introduction to Differential Privacy

## Lecture 2 : Exploiting the sensitivity for privacy

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# Introduction

**Differential privacy:** Protect the inputs of a database.

**Last talk:** Definitions, examples and basic properties.

**First idea:** Release a **noisy** output.

# Today's presentation

## Plan of the talk:

- Differential privacy.
- The notion of sensitivity.
- Laplace mechanism.
- Exponential mechanism.
- Gaussian mechanism.
- Smoothed sensitivity.
- Local sensitivity and PTR algorithm.

## $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differential privacy

### Definition (Approximate Differential Privacy [DR<sup>+</sup>14])

A randomized function  $\mathcal{K}$  gives  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -approximate differential privacy if for all data sets  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  differing on at most one element, and all  $S \subseteq \text{Range}(\mathcal{K})$


$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{K}(D_1) \in S) \leq e^\epsilon \times \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{K}(D_2) \in S) + \delta$$

The probability is taken over the coin tosses of  $\mathcal{K}$ .

### Remarks:

- Few variations on close databases.
- The smaller  $\epsilon$  and  $\delta$ , the more privacy.
- Rough interpretation of  $\delta$ : The probability of failure.
- The case  $\delta = 0$  corresponds to pure DP.
- In practice:  $\delta < 1/n$

# First example



$$A(D) = XD + (1 - X)Y$$

## What about differential privacy?

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}(A(D) = 1 | D = 1)}{\mathbb{P}(A(D) = 1 | D = 0)} = \frac{p + (1 - p)/2}{(1 - p)/2} = 1 + 2 \frac{p}{1 - p}$$

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}(A(D) = 0 | D = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(A(D) = 0 | D = 1)} = \frac{p + (1 - p)/2}{(1 - p)/2} = 1 + 2 \frac{p}{1 - p}$$

$A$  is  $\log\left(1 + 2 \frac{p}{1 - p}\right)$ -DP.

## The notion of sensitivity

$f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ ,  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  two databases.

$$\begin{aligned} \log \left( \frac{p((f + \mu)(D_1) = x)}{p((f + \mu)(D_2) = x)} \right) &= \log \left( \frac{p(\mu = x - f(D_1))}{p(\mu = x - f(D_2))} \right) \\ &\leq |\lambda| |f(D_2) - f(D_1)|, p(x) \propto e^{\lambda|x|} \end{aligned}$$

Definition ( $l_1$ -sensitivity [DMNS06])

For  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$ , the sensitivity of  $f$  is

$$\Delta f = \sup_{D_1, D_2} \|f(D_1) - f(D_2)\|_1$$

for all  $D_1, D_2$  differing on at most one element.

# Laplace mechanism

## Definition (Laplace mechanism [DMNS06])

Let us consider the Laplace distribution defined for a real number  $\alpha > 0$  and with respect to Lebesgue measure as  $\text{Lap}(\alpha)(x) \propto \exp(-|x|/\alpha)$ . Let  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$ , we call the Laplace mechanism of  $f$  with privacy parameter  $\alpha$  the mechanism defined as

$$\mathcal{L}_f^{(\alpha)}(D) = f(D) + (\text{Lap}(\alpha))^k$$

where  $(\text{Lap}(\alpha))^k$  refers to a vector of size  $k$  of i.i.d. samples of distribution  $\text{Lap}(\alpha)$ .




# Laplace mechanism

## Theorem (Differential Privacy of Laplace Mechanism [DMNS06])

*For any  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$  with finite sensitivity, if  $\alpha \geq \Delta f / \epsilon$ , then the mechanism  $\mathcal{L}_f^{(\alpha)}$  is  $\epsilon$ -DP. Furthermore the mechanism is tight in the sense that for all  $\epsilon' < \epsilon$ ,  $\mathcal{L}_f^{(\Delta f / \epsilon')}$  is not  $\epsilon'$ -DP.*

## Example: Histograms



## Example: Histograms

**Sensitivity:** Adding or removing one vote modifies one of the columns by at most 1  $\Rightarrow \Delta\text{Hist} = 1$ .

**Laplace mechanism:** Adding independent noise to each column sampled from  $\text{Lap}(1/\epsilon)$  gives  $\epsilon$ -DP.

**Interpretability:** Round (post processing) or ...

## In metric spaces

### Definition (Sensitivity in metric spaces [DMNS06])

Let  $\mathcal{M}$  be a metric space with distance function  $d_{\mathcal{M}}(.,.)$ . The sensitivity of  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$  is defined as

$$\Delta_{\mathcal{M}} f = \sup_{D_1, D_2} d_{\mathcal{M}}(f(D_1), f(D_2))$$

for all  $D_1, D_2$  differing on at most one element.

## In metric spaces

### Definition (Exponential mechanism [DMNS06])

Let  $\mathcal{M}$  be a metric space with distance function  $d_{\mathcal{M}}(.,.)$ . Let  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ . We call exponential mechanism of  $f$  with privacy parameter  $\alpha$  the sampling mechanism  $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{M},f}^{(\alpha)} : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$  such that

$$\forall y \in \mathcal{M}, \mathbb{P} \left( \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{M},f}^{(\alpha)}(D) = y \right) \propto e^{-d(y,f(D))/\alpha}$$

### Theorem (Privacy of the exponential mechanism [DMNS06])

If  $\alpha \geq \frac{2\Delta_{\mathcal{M}}f}{\epsilon f}$  then  $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{M},f}^{(\alpha)}$  is  $\epsilon$ -DP. Furthermore, if the quantity  $\sum_{y \in \mathcal{M}} e^{-d(y,f(D))/\alpha}$  is independent of  $D$  then  $\alpha \geq \frac{\Delta_{\mathcal{M}}f}{\epsilon}$  ensures that  $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{M},f}^{(\alpha)}$  is  $\epsilon$ -DP and this result is tight.

## In metric spaces

### Proof.

Let  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  be two databases that differ on only one input.

$$\forall y \in \mathcal{M}, \frac{e^{-d(y, f(D_1))/\alpha}}{e^{-d(y, f(D_2))/\alpha}} \leq e^{d(f(D_1), f(D_2))/\alpha}$$

Let  $y \in \mathcal{M}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{M}, f}^{(\alpha)}(D_1) = y\right)}{\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{M}, f}^{(\alpha)}(D_2) = y\right)} &= \frac{e^{-d(y, f(D_1))/\alpha} \sum_{y' \in \mathcal{M}} e^{-d(y', f(D_1))/\alpha}}{e^{-d(y, f(D_2))/\alpha} \sum_{y' \in \mathcal{M}} e^{-d(y', f(D_2))/\alpha}} \\ &\leq e^{d(f(D_1), f(D_2))/\alpha} e^{d(f(D_1), f(D_2))/\alpha} \frac{\sum_{y' \in \mathcal{M}} e^{-d(y', f(D_2))/\alpha}}{\sum_{y' \in \mathcal{M}} e^{-d(y', f(D_2))/\alpha}} \\ &\leq e^{2\Delta_{\mathcal{M}} f / \alpha} \end{aligned}$$

## What about other noise structures?

### Definition (Gaussian Mechanism [DMNS06, DR<sup>+</sup>14])

Let  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$ . We call the Gaussian mechanism of  $f$  with standard derivation  $\sigma > 0$  the mechanism defined as

$$\mathcal{G}_f^{(\sigma)}(D) = f(D) + (\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2))^k$$

where  $(\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2))^k$  refers to a vector of size  $k$  of i.i.d. samples of law  $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ .

## Pure DP with gaussian noise?

Let  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$  be non-constant and  $\sigma > 0$ . Let  $x \in \mathbb{R}^k$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \log \left( \frac{p(\mathcal{G}_f^{(\sigma)}(D_1) = x)}{p(\mathcal{G}_f^{(\sigma)}(D_2) = x)} \right) &= \log \left( \frac{e^{-\|x - f(D_1)\|_2^2 / (2\sigma^2)}}{e^{-\|x - f(D_2)\|_2^2 / (2\sigma^2)}} \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{2\sigma^2} (\|x - f(D_1)\|_2^2 - \|x - f(D_2)\|_2^2) \\ &= \frac{1}{2\sigma^2} \langle f(D_2) - f(D_1), 2x - f(D_1) - f(D_2) \rangle \end{aligned}$$



## Pure DP with gaussian noise?

So, by taking  $x_n = \frac{1}{2} (n(f(D_2) - f(D_1)) + f(D_1) + f(D_1))$ ,

$$\log \left( \frac{p(\mathcal{G}_f^{(\sigma)}(D_1) = x_n)}{p(\mathcal{G}_f^{(\sigma)}(D_2) = x_n)} \right) \rightarrow_{n \rightarrow \infty} +\infty,$$

which proves that no pure differential privacy is possible.

# DP via relaxation

## Definition ( $l_2$ -sensitivity [DR<sup>+</sup>14])

For  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$ , the  $l_2$ -sensitivity of  $f$  is

$$\Delta_2 f = \max_{D_1, D_2} \|f(D_1) - f(D_2)\|_2$$


for all  $D_1, D_2$  differing on at most one element.

## Theorem (Approximate Differential Privacy of Gaussian Mechanism [DR<sup>+</sup>14])

*Let  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$  be with finite  $l_2$ -sensitivity and  $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ . For  $c^2 > \max(9/4, 2 \log(1.25/\delta))$ , the gaussian mechanism of  $f$  with standard deviation  $\sigma \geq c \Delta_2 f / \epsilon$  is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private.*

# DP via relaxation

Proof.



# Is global sensitivity good enough?

**Setup:** Estimation of the median of  $X \in [a, b]$  from  $n$  i.i.d. samples.

**Algorithm:** Empirical median + noise.

**Sensitivity:**  $\Delta f = \Delta_2 f = b - a$

**Problem:** The noise kills the information.

## Using local sensitivity?

### Definition (Local sensitivity [NRS07])

For  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$ , the  $l_q$ -sensitivity of  $f$  is a function defined of  $\mathcal{D}$  by

$$\forall D_1 \in \mathcal{D}, (L\Delta)_q f(D_1) = \sup_{D_2: d(D_1, D_2) \leq 1} \|f(D_1) - f(D_2)\|_q$$

**Remark:** For  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$ ,

$$\Delta_q f = \sup_{D_1 \in \mathcal{D}} (L\Delta)_q f(D_1).$$

**Problem:** We have no control over the variations of  $(L\Delta)_q f(D)$ .

## Solution 1: Smoothing

### Definition (Smoothed sensitivity [NRS07])

For  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  and  $\beta > 0$ , the  $\beta$ -smooth sensitivity of  $f$  is the function defines as

$$\forall D_1 \in \mathcal{D}, \Delta^{(\beta)} f(D_1) = \sup_{D_2 \in \mathcal{D}} \left( e^{-\beta d(D_1, D_2)} (L\Delta) f(D_2) \right)$$

### Proposition (Variations of sensitivity [NRS07])

Let  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ ,  $0 < \beta_1 \leq \beta_2$  and  $D \in \mathcal{D}$ ,

$$0 \leq (L\Delta) f(D) \leq \Delta^{(\beta_2)} f(D) \leq \Delta^{(\beta_1)} f(D) \leq \Delta f \leq \infty$$

## Solution 1: Smoothing

### Theorem (Privacy with smoothed sensitivity [NRS07])

$f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that  $\forall D \in \mathcal{D}, (L\Delta)f(D) < \infty$ .

- Let  $\epsilon, \delta > 0$ , if  $\beta \leq \frac{\epsilon}{2(\gamma+1)}$  and  $\gamma > 1$ , the random function  $D \mapsto f(D) + \frac{2(\gamma+1)}{\epsilon} \Delta^{(\beta)} f(D) Z$  where  $Z$  is sampled with density  $\propto \frac{1}{1+|z|^\gamma}$  is  $\epsilon$ -DP.
- Let  $\epsilon > 0$ , if  $\beta \leq \frac{\epsilon}{2 \log(2/\delta)}$ , the random function  $D \mapsto f(D) + \frac{2}{\epsilon} \Delta^{(\beta)} f(D) Z$  where  $Z$  is sampled from  $\text{Lap}(1)$  is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP.
- Let  $\epsilon > 0$ , if  $\beta \leq \frac{\epsilon}{4(1+\log(2/\delta))}$ , the random function  $D \mapsto f(D) + \frac{5\sqrt{2 \log(2/\delta)}}{\epsilon} \Delta^{(\beta)} f(D) Z$  where  $Z$  is sampled from  $\text{Lap}(1)$  is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP.

## Solution 2: PTR

Let  $f : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ ,

**Idea:** Measure how far from a problematic local sensitivity the database is.

$$A_{\eta,f}(D_1) = \min \{k \in \mathbb{N} : \exists D_2 \in \mathcal{D}, d(D_1, D_2) \leq k, |f(D_1) - f(D_2)| > \eta\}$$

**Propose Test Release:** If the local sensitivity is not stable: halt the algorithm. Otherwise, add noise to the output.



## Solution 2: PTR

**Inputs:**  $f, D, \eta, a_\delta, b_\delta$

$Z_1, Z_2 \leftarrow$  Two independent samples of a random variable  $Z$

$\tilde{A}_{\eta,f}(D) \leftarrow A_{\eta,f}(D) + \frac{a_\delta}{\epsilon} Z_1$

**if**  $\tilde{A}_{\eta,f}(D) \leq 1 + \frac{b_\delta}{\epsilon}$  **then**  
    **return**  $\perp$  (halt)

**else**

**return**  $f(D) + \frac{\eta}{\epsilon} a_\delta Z_2$

**end if**

**Figure:** Propose Test Release [DL09, BAM20]

## Solution 2: PTR

### Theorem (Privacy of PTR [BAM20])

- If  $Z_1, Z_2 \sim \text{Lap}(1)$ ,  $a_\delta = 1$  and  $b_\delta = \log(2/\delta)$ , PTR gives  $(2\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP.
- If  $Z_1, Z_2 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ ,  $a_\delta = \sqrt{2 \log(1.25/\delta)}$  and  $b_\delta = 2 \log(1.25/\delta)$ , PTR gives  $(2\epsilon, 2e^\epsilon \delta + \delta^2)$ -DP.

### Applications:

- First private algorithm for the unbounded median with sub-Gaussian concentration with high probability.
- First private algorithm for the unbounded mean with sub-Gaussian concentration with high probability (Median of means).

# Conclusion

**We saw that it is possible to achieve privacy by:**

- Adding noise from a Laplace or Gaussian distribution.
- Sampling from the output space with an exponential law.





**We refined the results using:**

- Smoothed sensitivity.
- the Propose Test Release algorithm.

**For the next talks:**

- Privacy in optimization problems.
- Advanced composition.

# References I

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## References II



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