

Protecting Privileged User and Workload Identities in Microsoft Entra

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Agenda



PRIVILEGED **USERS**



PRIVILEGED ACCESS



PRIVILEGED **ENDPOINTS**




PRIVILEGED WORKLOADS



Privileged Identities


Automated Lifecycle and Monitoring for Privileged Accounts

Attack paths to privileged (work) accounts





Foundation of Privileged Identities








Onboarding and of Privileged Users



Privileged Access


Scoped permissions on a least-privilege and security boundary approach

Attack paths to privileged accounts






Attack paths to privileges in Entra ID






Delegation and permissions on privileged objects



Delegation and permissions on privileged objects




Different types of groups for privileged assignments

| | Preferred use case/scenario | Restricted group object | Restriction applies to <u>user</u> members | Blocks AADC Soft Match |
|------------------------------------|--|-------------------------|--|---|
| Security Groups without PIM | Non-high privileged assignments | X No restriction | X No restriction | X No restriction |
| Security Group with PIM for Groups | Just-In-Time Access outside of Azure and Entra ID RBAC | X No restriction | X No restriction | X No restriction |
| Security Groups in Restricted AU | Assignment to sensitive policies or none-PIM groups | ✓ RMAU-scoped Admins | X No restriction | X No restriction |
| Role-Assignable Security Groups | Assigning Entra ID roles (or other high-privileges) | GA, PRA and Owners | Restricted to GA and Privileged Auth. Admin when active/permanent member | ♠ Only when active or permanent assigned Entra ID role member |



Identity Governance for Privileged Access




Assignment

Azure DevOps Role











Privileged Access Model for Endpoints



Request and assign privileged roles by Identity Governance




Attack paths to privileged Azure resources in Entra ID






Privileged Access Model in Microsoft Azure



Privileged Access Model in Microsoft Azure



Classification for Azure Privileged Roles

Classification of Action and Scope

Classification of Privileged Principal

```
"EAMTierLevelName": "ControlPlane",
"TierLevelDefinition": [
    "Category": "Microsoft.Azure",
    "Service": "Privileged RBAC Management",
     "RoleAssignmentScopeName": [
       "/*/managementGroups/lab-saezone".
       "/*/managementGroups/lab"
     "RoleDefinitionActions": |
            "Microsoft.Authorization/*",
```

```
"ObjectAdminTierLevelName": "ControlPlane",
"ObjectDisplayName": "admThom0",
"Classification": [
    "AdminTierLevelName": "ControlPlane",
    "Service": "Privileged RBAC Management"
  "RoleAssignments": [
    "RoleAssignmentScopeName": "/*/managementGroups/lab",
    "RoleAssignmentType": "Transitive",
    "TransitiveByObject": "prg_Tier0.IdentityOps",
    "RoleDefinitionName": "User Access Administrator",
    "PIMAssignmentType": "Eligible"
```



Classification of Privileged objects in Enterprise Access Model



Privileged Endpoints

Restricted access to/from privileged and secured endpoints for privileged accounts

Foundation of Privileged Endpoints





Image source: "Microsoft CISO Workshop 4a - Threat Protection Strategy"



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Privileged, Specialized and Enterprise Security





Restricted access to Privileged Interfaces and Token Replay



Workload Identities

Detection and monitoring of non-human privileged identities

Comparison Human vs. Workload Identities





HR data and processes as source of authority

Multi-factor and strong authentication (Phishing-resistant Passwordless)

Just-in-Time access and review by Identity Governance workflows

Support for many built-in templates and detection capbilities

No defined lifecycle management

Risks of leaked secrets or compromised credentials in code or automation jobs

Escalation paths by standing and overprivileged access, limitations for fine-granted API permissions

Lack of auditing, monitoring and detections



Differences in Types of Workload Identities

| | Application Identity (Key/Certificate) | Application Identity (Federated Credentials) | Azure Managed Identitiy (System-/User-Assigned) |
|-----------------------------|--|---|---|
| Trust Relationsship | Issued credential | External IdP | Azure Managed Resource |
| Lifecycle Management | Admin | Admin | Azure (System-Assigned), Admin (User-Assigned) |
| Delegation | Application/Enterprise Object, Entra ID Role | Application/Enterprise Object, Entra ID Role | Azure RBAC Role, Enterprise Object |
| Token Lifetime / Cache | 1h (Default), 24h (CAE) | 1h (Default) | 24h |
| Entra ID Conditional Access | Yes | Yes | Not available |
| Entra ID Protection | Yes (Single-Tenant) | Yes (Single-Tenant) | Not available |
| Detection / Logging | Sign-in logs | Correlation between Entra and External IdP Logs | Limited sign-in logs |



Detection and monitoring of high privileged workload identities



Summary | Privileged User & Workload Identities



privileged user
with lifecycle and
relation to work
account and HR
processes



privileged access
model by classified,
governed and scoped
assignments in Entra ID
Identity Governance



explicitly verified and restricted access from privileged endpoints to interfaces by using secured workstations



Identified and strictly monitoring of privileged workloads incl. their non-human identities and security posture



Continue the conversation...

Live Q&A up next!





Questions?



Thank you!