3. Tony's Trinkets and Bitaly's Bracelets are the only two firms in a town that produce and sell jewelry. Tony's Trinkets is deciding whether to produce Unique jewelry or Typical jewelry. Bitaly's Bracelets is deciding whether to produce Gold jewelry or Silver jewelry. The payoff matrix shows the payoffs for each combination of strategies. The first entry in each cell shows Tony's Trinkets' profit, and the second entry shows Bitaly's Bracelets' profit. Each firm independently and simultaneously chooses its strategy. Assume that the two firms know all the information in the matrix and do not cooperate.

		Bitaly's Bracelets	
		Gold	Silver
Tony's Trinkets	Unique	\$15, \$21	\$20, \$19
	Typical	\$10, \$7	\$21, \$16

A. Suppose Bitaly's Bracelets chooses to produce Silver jewelry. Is choosing to produce Unique jewelry the best choice for Tony's Trinkets? Explain using numbers from the payoff matrix.

B. Is Bitaly's Bracelets' dominant strategy to produce Gold jewelry, to produce Silver jewelry, or does it not have a dominant strategy? Explain using numbers from the payoff matrix.

C. Identify all Nash equilibria for this game.

D. Suppose Tony's Trinkets' profit from producing Typical jewelry increases regardless of what Bitaly's Bracelets does. What is the minimum amount by which Tony's Trinkets' profit must increase in order for Typical jewelry to become a dominant strategy: \$2, \$4, \$6, \$11, or \$15?

E. Suppose instead that these two firms now cooperate and merge into one firm to maximize their combined profits. The new firm will have two locations and continue to face the same actions and payoffs. Calculate the new firm's maximum combined profit. Show your work.

STOP

END OF EXAM