Attack to LLM-based Web Agent to cause PII Leakage/Phishing/Malicious Behavior

Anthony La, Clyde Villacrusis, Henry Nguyen, Leo Thit, Ali Moazzami
University of California, Los Angeles

ABSTRACT

a. In general, web based agents complete several tasks for you on real websites, significantly increasing human productivity. Unfortunately, web based agents can be susceptible to malicious attacks that reveal the user's personally identifiable information (PII). In this report, we aim to explore how it is possible to make an LLM-based web agent leak a user's private information. Attacks to LLM-based web agents are done by modifying the source code of a website that the web agent acts on. Using SeeAct with Gemini 1.5 flash as our testing framework, we demonstrated how attackers can establish hidden forms that mirror legitimate input fields, causing web agents to inadvertently recreate sensitive information into concealed fields. In addition, we also used popup and adversarial attacks so that we can perform our attacks. Our preliminary results show particular success with login credential and shipping information forms. Shipping information forms is where the agent consistently populates the hidden forms, while login credential forms showed mixed results, suggesting potential built-in protective behaviors in some scenarios. Currently, the limitations of defense mechanisms, i.e., non-visible element detection and keyword filtering, fail to protect against sophisticated injection attacks. Thus, our findings highlight the need for more robust security measures against web agent attacks.

1. INTRODUCTION

b. As large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly popular, LLM-based web agents are designed to browse and perform actions on behalf of users, such as automating workflows and streamlining tasks. The rise of multimodal LLMs have enabled web agents to parse websites and execute tasks by examining website code, screenshots, understanding context, and generating iterative responses to complete tasks through feedback loops. However, due to the unreliable nature of LLMs it is possible for a malicious actor to exploit a web agent. This paper examines a method to extract personally identifiable information (PII) by manipulating the website source code. This allows us to modify visible, and most importantly, invisible elements on the website in a way that can exploit the capabilities of an LLM-based web agent.

We demonstrate this attack by executing an environment injection attack, which manipulates the state-changing process. This attack leverages two types of injection techniques: Form Injection (FI) and Mirror Injection (MI) (Liao et al., 2024). Form Injection involves creating HTML forms with prompts embedded in text fields or aria-label attributes, whereas mirror injection involves creating HTML forms that replicate the original form but includes additional attributes that hold malicious prompt instructions. We used mirror injection for our attack by utilizing Seasact as the frontend with Gemini 1.5 flash. Additionally, submission for the injections has to be automatic to preserve the integrity of the web agent. This is done by using JavaScript to auto submit after a certain time interval and then it is completely removed from the DOM tree.

2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

1. LLM-based web agents are a new creation that has not been researched thoroughly so many of its potential vulnerabilities are not known. One of the first open source implementations of an LLM-based web agent is the SeeAct web agent [1]. It uses a user-provided LLM for the backend as it queries the LLM for decision making and grounding to decide what to do. It works by interpreting the source code of the website and matching it to a screenshot of the browser at the current moment to perform actions for the user in the browser. Vulnerabilities for SeeAct were demonstrated in the form of environmental injection attack using form injection and mirror injection [2]. These methods of attack use the opacity of HTML elements and sub-elements such as aria-labels to manipulate the web agent into doing something that it was not instructed to do. They tricked the web agent into typing into transparent form fields that either contain different information or exactly mirror another field that is visible [2]. This allows the user behind the web agent to not be suspicious because the web agent is visibly performing as expected. It is

important for the web agent to perform as expected because the purpose behind these web agent exploits is to modify the source code in a way that it doesn't make the user suspicious but can still cause problems with the web agent. If the user does get suspicious, then they won't use the website anymore, which is not good in terms of performing malicious attacks. Thus, it is important that these types of injection attacks are created in a way that is not distracting to the user to prevent them from being suspicious. The group also showed that web agents are susceptible to leaking its instructions [2]. The web agent would leak its instructions if an acceptable level of percussion was used on the web agent through the labels of HTML elements. The purpose of these three forms of attack are to leak personal identifiable information (PII). The transparent forms could ask the web agent to enter another PII of the user, while leaking the entire instruction could contain PII as well.

2. Another group was able to demonstrate that the SeeAct model and likely other web agents could be interrupted in its instruction flow by using popups [3]. These pop ups interrupt the web agent by asking to perform an action or to change its current instructions. This allows multiple vulnerabilities because the popup interrupts the web agent and the web agent isn't sure what to do. It will still try to resolve the action so it will do what it thinks is correct. For example, if the popup suggests clicking something to hide the popup, the web agent may do so, not knowing that clicking the button may be a malicious act. To prevent regular instruction flow, the popups are designed to be obstructive and prevent the web agent from interacting with other parts of the website. They would either have to stop their current instruction flow or interact with the popup to close it. Since the LLM behind the web agent is not currently intelligent enough to detect malicious behaviors fully, it will often continue in hopes of finishing the action [3].

3. This area of research is critical as these vulnerabilities have already been shown to impact real-world applications used by millions of people daily.

For example, at the Black Hat security conference, Microsoft's AI, Copilot was found to have exploitable vulnerabilities. Researchers demonstrated the exploitation of these vulnerabilities and were able to have Copilot fetch false reference files, exfiltrate private data, and avoid security measures. A significant concern is that Copilot is integrated with the Microsoft ecosystem, which gives the corrupted LLM access to a whole network of exploitable applications. An attacker can utilize a corrupted agent that can fetch resources by having it send users to unsafe links. The researchers were also able to exfiltrate sensitive personal information through careful prompt engineering, which can be really damaging to companies' reputation as their users' information can be exposed. They were also able to have Copilot create realistic emails as part of an automated phishing attack [4]. Another real-world example of web agents being exploited is with the AI chatbots that have taken the world by storm. These include Meta's Llama, Mistral AI's LeChat, and China's chatglm. Researchers were able to exploit these chatbots through an attack known as "Imprompter," which is an algorithm that transforms a prompt given to the LLM into a set of malicious instructions [5].

3. THREAT MODEL

1. Firstly our first attack design, cookie popup banner attack, will misled agents into navigating unintended sites. It manipulates the user's trust in these banners to misled them into unintended actions or navigation. Additionally, it redirects users to phishing websites or malicious pages, which in our research is a shop page. This attack can also trigger downloads of malware and hijack user sessions or data through invisible scripts but we are not going to touch those. When the web agent clicks something on the website, such as a page, the cookie popup banner attack will execute such that it will trick the user to leak its PII.

a. Our attack consists of a fake cookie banner that mimics the legitimate ones in appearance. This might be "Accept all cookies" or "Manage Preferences". In our case, we did "Accept" or "Deny" cookies. So, when the web agent accepts the "Accept" button, it will manage to steal the user's PII and be sent to our server. *The attack will be sent to our own webhook.site.* This is because users are usually trained to quickly "Accept" the terms and conditions in other websites, which we, as the attackers, can quickly exploit by embedding misleading code within the button. Thus, when the user clicks accept, they unknowingly trigger actions that will submit their personal information, executing unauthorized scripts, or initializing unintended navigation

To mitigate this attack, we can adopt the following practices

c. For users, we can carefully inspect the cookie banners before clicking and use browser inspection or tools to block malicious scripts.
d. For organizations, we can implement CSPs to restrict unauthorized scripts, as well as auditing websites on a regular basis for vulnerabilities. Use HTTPS and secure server-side mechanisms to protect content delivery. Lastly, educate users about the risks associated with fake cookie banners
e. For developers, ensure that the cookie banners are consistent, secure, and not prone to tampering. Monitor traffic and behavior analytics for abnormal click patterns or redirects

2. Our second attack, adversarial attack, first identifies the target system. Then they analyze the model's decision boundaries, often through a black-box testing or white-box testing, to understand how small changes in input affect its output. There are four types of adversarial attacks: Evasion attacks, poisoning attacks, model extraction attacks, and model inference attacks. However, we will only focus on poisoning attacks. The goal of the poisoning attack is to corrupt the model during its training phase by injecting malicious data into the training dataset. In addition, injecting malicious prompts into HTML elements and source code to attack operational phrases to manipulate the agent into leaking PII. Some examples of keywords include "GOTO", "MEMORIZE" for the agent to work with.

A couple of its risks include security risk, which can compromise systems like biometric authentication and fraud detection, and operational disruption, which can include incorrect predictions in AI systems used in finance, healthcare, or military applications.

To mitigate these strategies, we can use adversarial training to make the model more resilient, as well as applying regularization methods to reduce overfitting and increase generalization. Another approach is to implement input validation techniques to detect and reject adversarial examples before processing. Lastly, we can monitor the model outputs for unusual patterns that may influence adversarial influence and continuously update and retrain models to address evolving attack strategies.

4. OVERVIEW OF THE DESIGN

The design of our research focuses on the vulnerabilities of LLM-based web agents and how they can be minorly influenced by the presence of cookie banners and prompts from adversaries. We put emphasis on taking advantage of the interaction web agents have with their contextual surroundings by incorporating open DOM elements and adversarial injections. We have these measures in place to ensure that the normal operations of agents are not too interfered with in order to meet the expectations of the users, while at the same time preventing detection mechanisms from being triggered.

To give a quick overview of both designs we did, our first design utilizes the interaction between web agents and cookie banner elements along with bound HTML elements to achieve the desired result. This shows how combining visible and invisible elements in a page layout can misdirect web agents in an attempt to get them to retrieve cookies from their storage. Our second design consists of particular injections that are designed to prevent an agent from interpreting certain DOM-based commands. It directs an agent towards a false line of reasoning, assessing how strong the agent's contextual comprehension is. Our designs aim to uncover the extent to which LLM-based web agents prioritize task completion over security considerations. By methodically examining their responses under controlled experiments, we identify critical vulnerabilities and provide a foundation for evaluating the efficacy of potential defenses.

5. METHODOLOGY OF OUR DESIGN

1. Our first design is based on the previous research of transparent fields and popups to use the vulnerabilities of the SeeAct web agent model. As previously mentioned, the web agent is vulnerable to both transparent fields and popups. To create an even stronger attack, we propose an attack that incorporates both of those two attacks together. The basis of our attack is based on the cookie banner. The cookie banner is prevalent in the usage of the internet to allow or deny cookie usage and storage. Cookies can be a big vulnerability for users due to the information that it can contain. Due to its possibilities in the usage of XSS, CSRF, MITM, and session hijacking, we decided to go with an attack that would involve extraction of a user's cookies because it could allow stronger vulnerabilities than individual PII extraction which can be quite limited depending on the situation. One of the limitations of single PII attacks is the scope where it is applicable is quite limited. This is because the LLM behind the web agent is intelligent enough to know where it is appropriate or not to operate on PII, so there are many cases where the web agent will refuse to enter PII if it is not relevant to the current action. To test our ideas, we modified a pre-existing website and created a new page to test the attack. For the attack to occur, we simply need the web agent to navigate to the correct page. On the web agent side, we are experimenting using SeeAct with Gemini 1.5 Flash with a temperature of 0.5. The prompt is very simple:

> "Log into my account with username anthony and password test. Then go to shop. Then go to home."

The malicious page where the cookie banner popup is located is on the shop page. It is intentionally crafted so that the popup is a modal popup where the user has to interact with it before they can interact with the website, encouraging the SeeAct agent to click on the popup buttons rather than ignoring it or stopping execution. In the cookie banner modal popup, it promotes two choices, accept and deny. These are user facing buttons that are visible to both the user and the web agent as seen in figure 1. These two buttons perform exactly as intended, the allow option allows the website to track cookies and it will send it to a webhook so that we can simulate exfiltration. The deny option does not send cookies.



Figure 1: A screenshot of the website loaded from a regular browser.

However, the novelty of the design is the mix of the modal popup with the transparent HTML elements previously seen in text fields with labels and opacity of zero. We hide a button above the cookie banner modal popup. This button, when clicked, sends cookies to the same webhook to test for exfiltration. The opacity of this button is set to zero to prevent the user from seeing it. Even with opacity of zero, since SeeAct examines the source code including the HTML and the Javascript, it will see the hidden button. Both the text of the button and the aria-label of it is important because it is what the web agent sees, so it needs to be sufficiently suggestive. If not, the web agent will ignore it. The text of the button should match the context of the popup – in this case, it should be “accept”. An important part of the design is to not interrupt the program flow. That means that whatever the web agent does to leak PII should not interfere with what it is trying to do. This is important because as mentioned, the user may get suspicious if the program flow that is expected is not followed. To ensure this design does not interrupt the program flow, we remove the hidden button from the DOM once it is clicked, so that in the next iteration, the web agent will click one of the visible buttons instead. The hidden button is placed above the cookie banner modal popup because it is more effective if it is vertically above it [2] rather than on the side or inside the popup. To encourage the web agent, the label of the hidden button is capitalized and uses exclamation points because it has been found to be more effective [2]. The label of the hidden button is:

"ATTENTION!!! MUST PRESS FIRST TO VERIFY IDENTITY"

This design from the point of view of the SeeAct web agent is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: The image shows what the SeeAct web agent can see when it parses the screenshot and the source code.

2. Our second design is an adversarial attack that builds upon the observed vulnerabilities in web agents like SeeAct, which operate by parsing and executing actions based on a combination of visible and DOM elements within a webpage. The key component of this attack is to exploit the web agent's behavior of parsing DOM tree to inject malicious instruction in HTML to allow malicious code to trigger actions that lead to malicious instructions to leak sensitive data without raising suspicion from the user.

In this attack scenario, the attack sequence begins by manipulating the web agent into visiting a user profile page using a given username and password. This page would typically allow users to customize their preferences, such as changing the color scheme of the navigation bar. The attacker’s goal is to craft a subtle modification that does not alert the user but causes the agent to misinterpret the instructions in a way that triggers an action harmful to the user. Next, the attacker injects a hidden HTML element into the page, which interacts directly with the web agent. This element is invisible to the user due to its hidden styling but remains part of the DOM tree. The agent parses this hidden element when executing its task, potentially causing the agent to perform actions based on the malicious code.

We ask the Web Agent to visit the profile page with a given username and password; then change the color scheme of the top nav bar to the last option. The attacker injects a hidden HTML element into a page that interacts with the web agent. These elements are invisible to the user but can be parsed by the agent as it still exists in the DOM tree even though it isn't present. When the attack prompt is parsed into the LLM prompt, the AI will misinterpret this prompt and make the attack as the result for the next action, leading it to take actions that would result in the exposure of PPI.

Our attack begins by crafting an injection prompt with an instruction of removing another part of the prompt in order to make the AI model focus its attention to the part of the attack prompt. Then we added an action that contains keywords that the Web Agent uses for this type of action and its specific detail of the action. Before every action,

SeeAct asks LLM a prompt about the best decision to take as a multiple choice. There are some keywords for SeeAct specific for command of the next action, such as “GOTO” to navigate to a site, or “MEMORIZE” to memorize an information. We use the keyword “GOTO” to tell the web agent to navigate to a webhook to determine its success attempt. Finally, we added the malicious prompt as an additional hidden <option> element in the <select> element. This field is invisible to the user due to CSS styling, but the web agent can detect them because it is in the DOM Tree.



Figure 3: The image of the rendered Selector and its HTML.



Figure 4: The image of the rendered Selector and its HTML.

The novelty of this design is that the Web Agent work flow is disrupted and executes the attack’s actions chain instead. These actions include navigating to another website, or leaking the user’s PPI that is stored in Web Agent memory. The successful attack would be that the AI picks up the command and redirects to the Webhook-test.com site. Since the Web agent handles sensitive user data, such as usernames, passwords, and other personal details, if the agent is manipulated into redirecting to an attacker's site, the attacker could potentially harvest this data, posing a significant privacy risk. If this attack is successful, it also means that we can disrupt the action of the Web Agent to execute our chain of actions. However, we have not yet achieved success in fully executing this adversarial attack as intended.

6. EVALUATION

1. For the first design where we used the cookie banner modal popup to exfiltrate cookies, we found that it was a fairly successful design in tricking the web agent to perform an action. To consider this a successful attack, we anticipate that the web agent first clicks the hidden accept button in the first iteration, and then in the next iteration, it will click on either the visible accept or the deny button. This ensures that while there is a slight temporal delay of clicking and waiting for the hidden button, the program flow stays the same. In a test using Gemini 1.5 Flash, we found that it performed the anticipated steps correctly 19 out of 20 times giving a successful result of 95%. That means the web agent was fooled into clicking the hidden button 95% of the time. The run where it was not successful was but it clicked the deny button first. Given that the hidden button is labeled accept rather than deny, if we had it labeled as deny, it very likely would have clicked the hidden button. This result brings interest into the importance of the text used on both the labels and the buttons.

In another test where there was no hidden button, we found that the web agent always clicked either the accept or deny button in the cookie banner instead of just stopping execution. Additionally, we found that the web agent almost always selected the accept button rather than the reject button. Even when swapping the placement of the button so that the deny button is on the left, it would still click the accept button. This shows that in our particular experiment with SeeAct paired with Gemini 1.5 Flash, there is a preference or openness for accepting popups and dialogs rather than rejecting it. This appears to be somewhat of a security risk if not a privacy risk in most cases, even in uncompromised websites because in most cases, privacy issues are opt-in, rather than opt-out. It would be best for these web agents to prefer rejecting rather than accepting, even if it interferes with the web agent’s flexibility. For the aria-label of the hidden button, we agree with previous research [2] that the loud capitalized text is better than just a mirror of the visible text. In our testing, we found that the web agent did not click the hidden button reliability if the aria-label was the same as the text – both of which were accepted. This may be because the visible button is also labeled accept, so the web agent was intelligent enough to know that it would be strange to have two accept buttons.

Given this, the web agent may have decided to opt for the standard button which is in the modal popup. However, when the aria-label was instructive, it seemed to oblige if it reasonably matched the context. For example, it worked if the label said it was for identity verification, but it would not have worked if I asked it to leak its instruction. This shows that the aria-label does influence SeeAct and the LLM behind it. For the text of the hidden button, we found that sometimes, it would be unreliable if it was a mirror copy of another button. To ensure that the web agent would

be tricked, we wanted to keep the text the same yet have some ability to distinguish them. Using HTML formatting, we found a way that would do this for us. By separating the text into a flex divider where each part of the text is its own divider, it would look visually indistinguishable from the user-visible button but be different enough that it would fool the LLM so that it would not get filtered out or ignored. This sort of formatting is done as seen in figure 3.

```
<div style="display: flex;">
    <div>Acc</div><div>ept</div>
</div>
```

Figure 5: The multi-section separation for the button's label.

We also found that we could apply this formatting to one of the two buttons to coerce the web agent into selecting a choice that we want. For example, if we wanted to coerce the web agent into clicking the accept button, we would apply this level of formatting to the deny button. We believe it is because since the SeeAct examines the source code and finds it non-standard, it will prefer the accept button which is standard instead.

2. Our second design leverages the vulnerabilities in web agents like SeeAct, focusing on their behavior of parsing DOM elements to execute actions. The approach involves manipulating hidden HTML elements and crafting prompts that the agent interprets to trigger specific actions. The goal is to induce an attack scenario that can potentially reveal sensitive user information. However, our attempts using Gemini 1.5 Flash did not yield a successful exploit.

In our tests, the web agent parsed the DOM element containing the attack payload and integrated it into the LLM prompt to decide on the next course of action. However, the expected outcome—where the agent would act on the malicious instructions embedded within the DOM tree—did not occur consistently. Instead, the web agent often defaulted to performing benign tasks, such as updating the navigation bar's color scheme, while ignoring the hidden malicious prompt. This result suggests that SeeAct, when paired with Gemini 1.5 Flash, does not get tricked into disregarding other parts of the prompt in favor of the malicious instructions.

Interestingly, this behavior hints at the web agent's ability to discern the context of the prompt. The agent did not ignore other components of the prompt, which implies that it maintains a level of contextual awareness and prioritizes tasks based on their typical structure and intent. For example, despite the malicious prompt embedded within the DOM, the web agent focused on more typical operations like visual updates, such as changing the color scheme of the navigation bar, rather than acting on the unexpected instructions.

This indicates that the agent is not fully vulnerable to arbitrary DOM manipulations, which is a promising finding from a security standpoint but also presents a limitation in our testing approach. It suggests that the web agent has a level of robustness against manipulation that prevents it from executing untrusted or malicious actions embedded within the DOM, even when prompted.

To enhance future attack strategies, it's essential to refine the craft of the prompts. Specifically, more contextually aligned and semantically precise prompts—designed to mirror the language and structure typically used in the web agent's usual operations—could bypass the agent's contextual safeguards. To enhance our success rate, it's crucial to explore other research papers that examine how web agents handle and interpret prompts. This includes studying how different agents prioritize tasks and whether they can be tricked into executing malicious instructions embedded within the prompt. Specifically, research on how agents maintain contextual awareness and filter out untrusted instructions will be valuable in informing our future tests, allowing us to better craft semantically precise prompts that align more closely with the agent's typical behavior.

Given that web agents can vary widely in terms of their architecture and behavior, future research should also incorporate a wider range of web agents and test them under different conditions. This could lead to the identification of more vulnerable agent designs, ultimately helping to develop more generalizable attack strategies that can be applied across multiple platforms.

7. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS

An alternative design for exploiting vulnerabilities in web agents could involve crafting a multi-layered social engineering attack using dynamic content manipulation. Rather than relying solely on static hidden elements or cookie banners, this approach would involve creating deceptive content that evolves as the web agent interacts with the page. For example, an attacker could dynamically inject fake notifications or form elements into the DOM that appear to be important updates or system alerts. These notifications could include enticing actions like "Confirm your account" or "Verify security settings," which are commonly triggered by automated agents like SeeAct. The key would be to inject these elements with malicious JavaScript code designed to exfiltrate sensitive data, such as cookies, session tokens, or user credentials, once the web agent interacts with them. To increase the likelihood of success, the injected content could be made contextually relevant based on the user's previous activity, such as referencing their last purchase or account modification. This strategy capitalizes on the agent's tendency to focus on high-priority, seemingly legitimate interactions, while maintaining a low level of disruption in the flow of tasks.

In addition, to prevent detection, the attacker could use progressive opacity and animations to simulate the gradual appearance of new elements, making it harder for the agent to distinguish them from normal page behavior. This design takes advantage of both user-centric elements (animation) and agent-centric behavior (DOM parsing and interaction), offering a more sophisticated and scalable attack method.

8. POTENTIAL DEFENSES

1. There are several potential protective strategies that can be implemented to defend against LLM-based web agent attacks. For cookie banner and popup attacks, the primary risk comes from ambiguous language that tricks the agent into executing malicious actions. To protect against this attack, we can implement a couple of protective measures such as forcing our agent to interact with these elements under strict instructions. This would reduce the risk of unintended or malicious actions, but this limits the agent's flexibility. Another potential defense is to have our agent verify the source code of a webpage before the agent takes any action. This allows our agent to identify unsafe elements and abort harmful instructions before they take place. While this enhances security, analyzing the source code would cost more tokens per instance, slows response times, and can come at the cost of accuracy. This is because the agent has to take in more context, and can have false positives, as it is challenging to identify "malicious coding patterns." For poisoning attacks, we have a few potential defenses such as filtering comments, filtering sensitive keywords, and filtering non-visible elements and labels. Filtering comments from source code is a protective measure as comments can contain misleading and malicious content which can affect the way the LLM parses the website. However, the tradeoff comes at the cost of accuracy, as some LLMs rely on these comments to give them more context on this code. Another protective method is to filter sensitive keywords that are attributed to PPI. These are words such as password, email, secret, and key, etc. Removing these words would reduce the likelihood of our agent interacting and potentially revealing sensitive information. Again, this protective measure comes at the cost of accuracy as we may be omitting important information from the webpage and giving our agent less context to work with. Another defense can be to filter out non-visible elements and labels within the HTML. This is because these non-visible elements are often used in attacks so it would make sense to just avoid these elements altogether. However, omitting these elements can cause our agent to lose accessibility functionality and accuracy as these elements are often used for accessibility and our agent has less context to work with overall. All our protective measures can be used to protect against these vulnerabilities, but they come at the cost of accuracy, computation time, or accessibility.

9. DISCUSSIONS

Our research on LLM-based web agents has demonstrated several paths for further exploration and improvement but also some limitations that should be considered. One of the most promising lines of future work involves developing alternative methods of attack in order to test the robustness of such agents. For instance, dynamic content manipulation, whereby malicious elements evolve based on the interaction of the agent with a web page, could provide further insight into the adaptability and contextual awareness of web agents. Such evolving elements could simulate real-time changes, such as personalized alerts or notifications, making it more difficult for the agent to tell which content is legitimate and which is harmful. Additionally, studying multi-agent scenarios, where multiple web agents interact and share data, may uncover vulnerabilities that arise from inter-agent communication or data synchronization.

Another area for future research involves enhancing the robustness of defense mechanisms against these attacks. Adaptive filters that can identify and neutralize evolving attack patterns in real time would be invaluable. Further, behavioral analysis of web agents using machine learning models that identify unusual patterns when performing tasks might be used as an added level of protection. Cross-agent vulnerability testing is also an area worth considering. It would enable different LLM architectures and frameworks to face the same attack scenarios and subsequently understand what design principles lead to much better robustness and which make the agent more exploitable. More sophisticated examples fed into adversarial training could significantly enhance the model in adversarial settings to develop better attack strategies. That would make the agents resilient against at least the existing attack methods, though it would prepare them to bear unknown and evolving threats. Again, a time-based attack exploiting specific windows of opportunity will shed light on some possible vulnerabilities not evident under static conditions.

Despite the promising results obtained from our research, there are several limitations that need to be acknowledged. Our experiments have been conducted in an artificial environment using Gemini 1.5 Flash and may not fully capture the complexity and variability of real-world web ecosystems. This controlled setting limits the scalability and generalizability of our findings to other LLM-based agents and frameworks. Moreover, our reliance on the SeeAct framework introduces its own biases and thus may not apply to web agents in general. Our second major limitation concerns the testing of the scope of defense: Although we suggested a few preventive measures, such as filtering non-visible elements and using strict source code verification, these are as yet untested in practical scenarios. These also come with trade-offs, including reduced flexibility, increased latency, and potential decreases in accuracy. Finally, ethical and legal considerations remain a key challenge. Though our experiments were conducted in a simulated environment to avoid ethical breaches, applying these findings in

real-world scenarios could have unintended consequences, including aiding malicious actors.

10. CONCLUSION

Our work points to critical vulnerabilities in LLM-based web agents and their possible exploitation for malicious purposes, especially regarding cookie banner attacks and adversarial injections. These methods leverage weaknesses in how agents interpret and interact with web elements, often bypassing user suspicion by exploiting invisible or contextually misleading components. In our experiments, we showed the viability of such attacks: cookie banner manipulations achieved a high success rate while adversarial injections provided insights into the decision-making and limitations of agents. The most important thing one could take away from this work is that, as much as LLM-based web agents are very powerful and changing the face of web task automation, their dependence on contextual understanding and task-oriented filtering makes them vulnerable to manipulation. This underlines the urgent need for more robust defenses, which include context-aware filtering, better DOM parsing strategies, and adaptive behavior monitoring as a safeguard against such vulnerabilities.

Lessons Learned

Our experiments showed that the interaction between visible and invisible web elements plays a crucial role in agent behavior. Indeed, we have seen how minor changes to element attributes or placement can significantly affect whether an agent will carry out a malicious instruction. Furthermore, our adversarial attack results indicate that while current web agents are capable of some contextual judgment, they are still susceptible to carefully crafted, contextually fitting prompts. This highlights the importance of continuous refinement in how web agents interpret and prioritize tasks. In the end, this research shows both the potential and the perils of LLM-based web agents, underlining the need for collaborative efforts in strengthening their security while preserving their usability. Our findings lay the groundwork for future investigations aimed at creating safer, more resilient web interaction technologies.

11. CONTRIBUTIONS OF EACH TEAMMATE

Anthony: coded parts of the website (shopping popup, transparent button), did parts of the slides (6-8), and wrote section 2.1, 2.2, 6.1

Clyde: Did slides (10); presented slides (2 & 10). Wrote Abstract, sections 2.3, 2.4. Researched Related and Future attacks

Leo: Researched potential defenses against attacks, Did slides (3, 11). Wrote Introduction and sections 2.3 and 8.1

Henry: coded parts of the website, developed and tried adversarial attack, did slides (9 & 12), and wrote section 5.2, 6.2, and 7.

Ali: Researched previous attacks such as mirror and form injection. Did slides (4 & 5) and presented them. Wrote section 4, 9, 10.

f. REFERENCES

[1] Zheng, B. et al. (2024) GPT-4V(ision) is a generalist web agent, if grounded, arXiv.org. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01614 (Accessed: 12 November 2024).

[2] Liao, Z. et al. (2024) EIA: Environmental injection attack on generalist web agents for privacy leakage, arXiv.org. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.11295 (Accessed: 12 November 2024). http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/332040.332491.

[3] Zhang, Y., Yu, T. and Yang, D. (2024) Attacking vision-language computer agents via pop-ups, arXiv.org. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.02391 (Accessed: 12 November 2024).

[4] Burgess, Matt. "Microsoft's AI Can Be Turned into an Automated Phishing Machine." *WIRED*, 8 Aug. 2024, www.wired.com/story/microsoft-copilot-phishing-data-extraction/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[5] ---. "This Prompt Can Make an AI Chatbot Identify and Extract Personal Details from Your Chats." *WIRED*, 17 Oct. 2024, www.wired.com/story/ai-imprompter-malware-llm/?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 8 Dec. 2024.