

P2P - Theorie Aufgabe 5

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1 Aufgabe 5.1

1.1 XOR metric

The XOR metric serves as a means to compute the distance between 2 nodes or keys in general, which allows all the knowledge about the group that the XOR arithmetic forms to be extended to certain aspects of the protocol, allowing for closed analysis of the P2P system, in contrast to being restrained to simulations.

Furthermore, this metric and implementation also not only allows to quickly find close nodes, but to use the same algorithm to find close and exact matches for a given key.

1.2 Routing table

The number of entries in the routing table of each node are up to 160 times the replication parameter (k , for example $k = 20$). For each value of i , with $0 \leq i < 160$, with i representing the XOR distance between two node ids, one k -bucket is allocated. As the k -buckets for low distances between node IDs are generally empty or sparsely populated, a considerable amount of routing entries will normally not be filled.

1.3 Lookup algorithm

For lookup, α nodes, closest to the searched key or node are chosen (via XOR metric). α is a global concurrency parameter, usually 3. Each of these nodes are then sent the `FIND_NODE` message, returning the k closest nodes to the target key. Upon receiving the list of nodes, the α nodes closest to the target that have not yet been queried are recursively sent the `FIND_NODE` message. If no node is closer to the target than the already queried nodes, the `FIND_NODE` message is extended to the k closest nodes not already queried. When all relevant nodes have been queried, the node(s) closest to the target have been identified.

This lookup is an iterative lookup system, as a certain number of nodes (α) are queried iteratively and in parallel, whereas the answer of these queries is usually not the final answer, but a referral to other nodes. Therefore, not one queried node will recursively search for the exact node, but the searching node will iterate on the answers and find nodes close and closed to the targeted node.

1.4 Update Policy

Upon receiving a request, the receiving node pings the least recently seen node in the bucket. If this node fails to respond, the failed node is removed from the bucket and the new node (sender node of the initial request) is inserted at the tail of the bucket. By pinging the least recently seen node and preferring that node instead of the new node if it is still alive, the entries in the bucket are more likely to be alive, given that nodes with an already high uptime can be expected to be alive even longer.

1.5 Kademlia and BitTorrent

Kademlia is used in some (optionally) tracker-less BitTorrent clients as a means of content discovery. One possible downside to this approach is that the actual content can not be determined before downloading and there are no means of marking such content as trustworthy, illegal, incomplete or just wrong by means of administration, comments, etc.

1.6 Sorting Buckets

Nodes in the sorting buckets are sorted from least recently seen node at the head, most recently seen node at the tail. Upon receiving a request, the following will happen:

1. Buckets not full: Add new node to the tail of the list (most recently seen).
2. Buckets full and bucket index not 0: Ping the least recently seen node (LRSN) (head of the list)
 - LRSN answers: Move LRSN to the tail of the bucket
 - LRSN does not answer: Remove LRSN node from the bucket and insert the new node to the tail (most recently seen)
3. Buckets full (otherwise): Split bucket in half, distribute existing nodes onto the two buckets and continue as normal.

By preferring old contacts over new nodes and never evicting living nodes, the percentage of probably life nodes is increased as nodes that are already alive a certain time are likely to stay alive even longer. Furthermore, only least recently seen nodes in the bucket are ever removed, keeping all frequently seen nodes in the bucket. Furthermore, because nodes are chosen very conservatively, basic DOS attacks are automatically mitigated.

2 Aufgabe 5.2

2.1 Kademlia vs. KAD routing tables

Kad uses k-buckets with 10 entries each and for levels of 0 to 4, each bucket can be split if a new node is contacted, not only those with a 0-index. This results in much more detailed routing tables and therefore decreases the average path length. The degree of the tree is therefore in more cases two, compared to plain Kademlia, and whereas in Kademlia every k-bucket with index $\neq 0$ has a degree of zero, in Kad this restriction is lifted for buckets with index $\in [0, 4]$

2.2 Routing table examples

Kademlia Figure 1

KAD Figure 2

2.3 Requests

HELLO_REQ Message to test if a contact node is still alive. Checked approximately every two hours if not checked otherwise (regular messages for example). Used to keep only live nodes in the k-bucket list, to avoid timeouts in later queries. Furthermore, **HELLO_REQ** messages are used to inform other nodes of address changes.

SEARCH_REQ Once a replica root is found, a **SEARCH_REQ** message with the search keyword is sent to the replica root. The answer to this message are the content pieces. If more than 300 are found (from one node only or from multiple nodes), no more **SEARCH_REQ** or **KADEMLIA_REQ** messages for this keyword are sent anymore. Acts as a means of content discovery.




Figure 1: Kademlia routing table

KADEMLIA_REQ Used for discovery of nodes that have certain content. Contains MD4 hash of the keyword that is looked for. The response are more contacts that are closed to being replica roots for that keyword. A node is considered a match if its distance to the keyword is less than the search tolerance (a system wide constant).

2.4 Attacks

Reflection Attack This attack relies on hijacking the entire routing table of several nodes to point back to the node itself. It then answers all incoming **KADEMLIA_REQ** messages with its own address (but different IDs), effectively making him unable to access any legitimate node again (since the victim node will always be online) and unwillingly poison the **KADEMLIA_REQ** messages. If this reflection attack is done to enough nodes, many nodes will be unable to access any valid information at all, and even more nodes will get bogus responses to their queries, resulting in large parts of the KAD network to be inaccessible. This attack is carried out in two phases:

Crawling Phase First the attacking nodes gather valid routing information to find nodes in their neighborhood. This can be done following the standard KAD / Kademlia protocol. Also, the attacking nodes have to gather the entire routing table of the victim nodes. To do so, many **KADEMLIA_REQ** messages are sent, leading (given certain keys) to the discovery of most or all routing entries of the victim node.

Back-pointer hijacking The attacking nodes send **HELLO_REQ** messages to the victim node, impersonating valid routing entries in the victims node but always using the victims node IP address. This leads to the aforementioned effect of poisoning all incoming request and being unable to connect any alive KAD node. In order to keep this state however, every routing entry of the victim node has to be attacked, too, in order to keep the legitimate nodes from sending **HELLO_REQ** messages to the victim, which would reverse the attack and make the node operational again.




Figure 2: KAD routing table

This attack is very effective because after the crawling phase, only `HELLO_REQ` messages have to be sent, making it possible to execute this attack with limited available bandwidth. The maintenance of this attack is essentially free since the invalid routing entries will only ever be reversed when previously of line nodes come back online.

Poisoning Attack This attack is about inserting many amounts of bogus bindings so that a user that is searching for a specific key will need (in case of 75% bogus entries) in average four tries to find the right one. The attack consists of two phases. The first one is the preparation phase in which one or many nodes are listening to the network to collect as many keyword-file-bindings as possible. Phase two is the execution phase in which bogus entries for each found keyword-file-binding are generated and spread. This attack is very weak because the bandwidth that is needed to execute this attack is very high and the damage that is caused is too low to be efficient.

Sybil Attack The intention of a Sybil Attack is to collect so called back-pointers to attack query messages and increase the influence of the attacker in the network. To do so several nodes are inserted that act as normal network nodes. It takes some time for a node to become fully integrated into the network which is measured by `KADEMLIA_REQ` messages that are sent by the node with its own `nodeID` as the `targetID`. By receiving so called `KADEMLIA_RES` messages it can see that it is on the routing table of the receiver node. When one node is in the routing table of enough normal nodes it is called a Sybil Node which means the node successfully infiltrated the network. To have many Sybil Nodes effectively reduces the wall-clock time and bandwidth expenditure that is needed to attack the network.